Full-time Union Officials Research Articles

Once more on the rank and file – union bureaucracy interplay: Mining unionism in Australia’s Pilbara region

The trade union bureaucracy debate has significant implications for both analysis and union strategy. Recently receiving renewed academic attention, this debate centres around whether there is a dichotomy between rank-and-file workers and full-time union officials, and whether these officials – the trade union bureaucracy – tend towards industrial conservatism. The case study of labour relations in the Pilbara iron ore industry in the north of Western Australia 1965–1986 enriches our analysis of the trade union bureaucracy by viewing its role in the class struggle over a number of decades, in varying contexts of union development, union power and union decline. Throughout this entire period, there was significant conflict between the bureaucracy and rank and file. The remoteness of the Pilbara region, and workers’ industrial militancy makes it an extreme case suited to unveiling insights on the nature of the trade union bureaucracy. The Australian focus broadens a largely British debate. This article also offers a greater consideration of the role of full-time shop stewards’ convenors than has occurred previously. Finally, the trade union bureaucracy theory illuminates our understanding of this period in Pilbara labour history.

전임자에 대한 근로시간면제제도 적용과 부당노동행위

전임자에 대한 근로시간면제제도 적용과 부당노동행위

Report: Labour in Japan: a meltdown into management

INTERNATIONAL union rights Page 22 Volume 20 Issue 4 2013 REPORT ❐ LABOUR MOVEMENT IN JAPAN Initially the US occupation encouraged trade unions in Japan but as communistinspired unions surged this policy saw a rapid about-turn - a ‘Red Purge’ began and a three-year limit was placed on the lifetime of collective agreements sidered to be the Cold War. SCAP intended to regulate the strike of the trade union and suppress communism in Japan. In addition, SCAP wanted to deveop the Japanese economy for a more independent alliance with the US. First of all SCAP demanded that the Japanese government restrict the trade union organised by public service workers. In responding to this demand, the Japanese government took the following measures as for public service workers who accounted for 40 percent of organised workers by the reform of the National Public Service Act in October 1948. These measures were (i) excluding an application of TUA 1945 to public service workers (so that TUA 1945 got to be applied only to the private-sector workers), (ii) prohibiting all public service workers from going on strikes by criminalising strikes, (iii) introducing different treatment between managerial workers and non-managerial workers which made it less likely for managerial workers to take part in unions, (iv) prohibiting payment to full-time union officials. The Demand of SCAP with Regard to Japanese Economy and the Reform of TUA 1945 As noted previously, SCAP intended to boost the Japanese economy in order to situate Japan in the factory of Asia as a bulwark against communism as soon as possible because of the Cold War. The US government declared nine principles about the policy for the Japanese economy. With regard to the industrial relations policy, the Japanese government published a new Ordinance in December 1948. This Ordinance required the trade unions to democratise their organisations. SCAP and the Japanese government thought that most trade unions were dominated by a few communist leaders. The democratisation of the trade unions meant that communist leaders of the trade union could be excluded from these organisations. In addition, the Japanese government intervened in collective agreements by this ordinance in order to make collective agreements unfavourable to workers. The reason of this intervention was that the Japanese government thought most collective agreements were advantageous to workers and that these collective agreements could be the cause of stagnating Japanese economy. In June 1949, TUA 1945 was revised to TUA 1949. TUA 1949 has required trade unions to establish an internal rule which ensures their democratic and impartial operation. TUA 1949 has also stipulated the rule by which managerial workers are prevented from joining trade unions. Furthermore TUA 1949 has set the rule of the colA lthough the activity of the trade union to strike had been restricted strictly by the Japanese government before World War II, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (‘SCAP’) tried, after the war, to promote organising workers in trade unions in order to democratise Japan. Therefore, immediately after WW2 and up to 1949, the density of the trade union in Japan increased rapidly to 55.8 percent. After 1949, however, the trade union density declined rapidly. Since then there has been a steady decline in density. More importantly it has come to be pointed out by some scholars in Japanese industrial relations that the Japanese trade unions have melted into management. In this article, it will be argued what processes after WW2 fueled this meltdown into management. The Enactment of TUA 1945 and the General Strike on 1 Feb 1947 Immediately after WW2, SCAP required the Japanese government to take several measures in order to promote democracy in Japan which included promoting trade unions. Responding to the demand of SCAP, the Trade Union Act (‘TUA’) 1945 was enacted on 22 December 1945. In addition the Constitution of Japan which included the guarantee of the right to organise, the right of collective bargaining and the right to strike to workers was published as a new constitution in 1946. The constitutional labour rights and TUA 1945 had continuity in terms of having the purpose of promoting democracy by improving the labour conditions. After WW2 the Japanese trade union were very...

Rebels without a Cause of Their Own?

This article explores the role played by white full-time union officials in the black unions that emerged in the wake of the 1973 Durban strikes. It asks how white officials could gain acceptance and play a central role in a movement of black workers in a context where black–white relations were characterized by a vast social distance, hostility and deep mutual mistrust between the two population groups. White officials, mainly from middle-class backgrounds, were never fully integrated into the class (and movement) with which they had decided to pledge solidarity. Erik Olin Wright's notion of ‘contradictory location’ is used to explain this incomplete integration. The social distance between white and black people in society continued to exist between white officials, on the one hand, and black workers and full-time officials, on the other. Power relations between white officials and black unionists remained unequal and white officials performed expert functions while black unionists performed more menial functions. The escalation of mass resistance against apartheid and the emergence within the black unions of a critical mass of younger black leaders and organic intellectuals, many previously leaders in the student and youth movements, changed the role and position of white officials and many retreated into policy work outside the union movement.

Union recognition and partnership at work: a new legitimacy for Irish trade unions?

In the Irish context of national partnership and the promotion of workplace partnership at firm level, unions might be expected to have achieved, at least, a pragmatic acceptance by employers. Using a survey of full-time union officials in eight trade unions organising in the private sector, this paper reports their experiences of recent recognition campaigns. Employer opposition appears to have intensified, and in a substantial percentage of cases has involved the victimisation of activists. In facilitating employees to make a free choice regarding union representation, the Codes of Practice and the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 2001 are regarded by the majority of officials as inadequate. A majority of officials favoured the introduction of a statutory right to recognition. Non-union firms appear as ‘free riders’ that have enjoyed the benefits of national partnership but evaded the compromises and concessions that necessarily characterise such agreements. If left unchecked, the free-rider phenomenon could undermine the institutional framework on which partnership is based.

Partnership paradoxes

This paper presents the findings of a case study undertaken in a UK utility company, referred to as Energy Co. The main aim of the study was to assess how the agreement of a partnership arrangement in 1995 had affected the conduct of employment relations. The study found that partnership was born out of a poor industrial relations climate, and driven primarily by management. They hoped that it might improve industrial relations, raise employee commitment, inform and educate the workforce, and increase employee contribution. Partnership was not intended to encourage joint governance or power sharing. In practice, partnership combined direct employment involvement (EI) such as team briefing and problem solving groups, with representative participation through a formal partnership council system. Management suggested that, on balance, partnership had been successful, with benefits including improved industrial relations, quicker pay negotiations and increased legitimacy of decision making. It was also suggested that there was a positive link – albeit indirect and intangible – with organisational performance. Union representatives also proposed that partnership was a success, citing benefits including greater access to information, greater influence, inter‐union co‐operation, and more local decision making. Employee views were more mixed. There was also clear evidence of several tensions. Four were particularly noteworthy: employee apathy, management‐representative relations, employee‐representative relations, and the role of full‐time union officials (FTOs). Despite espoused partnership, management hostility to unions was evident, and a preference for non‐union employment relations clear. Consequently, the future of the partnership in its current form is uncertain.

The Job of the Full-Time Trade Union Official

This paper exarnines the work activities and work patterns of 91 New Zealand full-time union officials located at different levels in the paid trade union structure. While officials with managerial responsibilities in their unions allocated their work-time to various tasks differently compared to those in non-managerial positions, broad similarities existed in terms of how and when managerial and non-managerial union officials morked. The findings are discussed in terrns of the current legislative climate in New Zealand.

Working For The Union: British Trade Union Officers

This book is a study of the relationship between full-time union officials and shop stewards across the whole of British industry (public and private, manufacturing and services) in 1986–91. It is the first major study of union officials for 20 years, and one of the most detailed studies of workplace collective bargaining and union organisation following the recession of the early 1980s. In the wake of recession, union decline, industrial restructuring, anti-union legislation, and changes in union policies (towards a new realism), Britain is said by some commentators to be entering a new era of industrial relations. This book provides a unique body of evidence that throws new light on this claim, and casts serious doubt on its validity. It combines survey, interview, questionnaire and observation data and thus overcomes the well known limitations of both large-scale surveys and individual case studies.

Do Union Voice and Worker Participation Coincide? A Study of Australian Managers' Perceptions

This paper examines the relationship between employee, union delegate and union official influence over managerial decision-making, using survey responses from 249 workplace managers from large Australian firms. By applying indicators of influence at different levels of aggregation, a strong positive linkage between voice and participation is located. Further, it is found that employee participation is more closely linked to voice exerted by workplace union delegates as opposed to full-time union officials, and the areas where delegates and officials maintain influence are generally identical to the areas where employees exert influence.

New Zealand under the Employment Contracts Act 1991: Career attitudes

Abstract Previous research has established that full-time trade union officials often perceive little in the way of career scope for themselves. This orthodoxy holds that because the careers of officials are very much a product of their own unions—the majority of officials tend to have come from the shopfloor—any opportunities for career development are likely to come only from within the current union. This paper examines the extent to which full-time union officials in New Zealand hold this rather pessimistic view about the range of career options open to them. The findings suggest that while most surveyed officials were relatively committed to their unions they did not, by and large, feel restricted to opportunities occurring within their current unions. They saw, and were prepared to consider, a wide range of different career avenues. It is argued that the findings, to some extent, reflect recent developments in New Zealand's industrial relations environment. Some of the direct and indirect consequenc...

Employment Characteristics of Full-Time Trade Union Officials in New South Wales

The findings of a survey of full-time union officials are discussed. It is suggested that there are two segments in the labour market for union officials. The first, the traditional, operates as an internal labour market and remains the principal method of selection for the occupations of organizer and executive officers. The second segment represents recent changes in the staffing of large unions. It consists of salaried experts who, unlike the traditional officers, are generally not recruited from within the ranks of the union. Not only is their pattern of recruitment different but they also have attitudes and expectations quite different from the traditional officials.