Full-scope Safeguards Research Articles

India and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was founded in 1974 in response to the Indian nuclear test in order to prevent nuclear proliferation by controlling nuclear exports. In 2008, the NSG exempted India from its full-scope safeguards (FSS) condition, making it the first country to be allowed to have nuclear trade with NSG members while retaining its nuclear weapons program. India won this waiver after tough negotiations and having resisted tough nonproliferation conditions. India is now bidding for NSG membership. This paper analyses the prospects for the membership in light of the waiver negotiations and how the waiver negotiations can guide us in assessing the likely path of the membership negotiations. This study concludes that India will resist any conditions and the US and India have to invest massive diplomatic efforts to reach a formula that addresses the nonproliferation concerns of member states.

India's Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Membership and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is an informal multilateral export control group. It is not legally binding but members have a political commitment to implement the NSG Guidelines. As part of the India-US Nuclear Agreement, the United States sought an India-specific NSG waiver, exempting India from its full-scope safeguards condition. India is now bidding on NSG membership. Some argue in favour of the membership and describe it as beneficial for the nuclear non-proliferation regime, while others fear it would undermine the attractiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the credibility of the NSG as an effective organisation in preventing nuclear proliferation. This paper analyses the implication of India’s prospective NSG membership for the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the light of the NSG waiver negotiations and argues that the NSG waiver has already committed India to adhering to the NSG Guidelines as a non-member state, while the membership would not strengthen the regime. The NSG waiver negotiations show that India would resist non-proliferation conditions and it would undermine the regime.

India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Membership

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was founded in 1974 in response to the Indian nuclear test to prevent the nuclear proliferation by controlling nuclear exports. In 2008, the NSG exempted India from its full scope safeguards (FSS) condition, making it first country to be allowed to have nuclear trade with NSG members along with its nuclear weapons program. India got this waiver after tough negotiations and resisted strong nonproliferation conditions. India is now bidding for the NSG membership. This paper analyses the prospects for the membership in light of the waiver negotiations and how the waiver negotiations can guide us about the likely path of membership. This study concludes that India will resist thenonproliferation conditions and the U.S. and India have to invest massive diplomatic efforts to reach a formula that addresses the nonproliferation concerns of member states.

The US India nuclear agreement: progress toward nuclear cooperation with India and a new paradigm in non-proliferation policy

The enactment of the Henry J. Hyde United States?India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act on December 18, 2006 opened the door to a sea change in US nuclear export policy toward India. The new legislation could reverse three decades of US nuclear non-proliferation policy by facilitating India's exemption from the requirement of full-scope safeguards as a prerequisite for nuclear trade and cooperation. Notwithstanding the Hyde Act, however, major US nuclear exports to India remain unlawful until further implementing steps are taken. This article outlines the history of the estranged nuclear trade relations between the US and India and the motivations for reviving substantial civil nuclear cooperation. It then describes the parties' recent agreements and the changes to US law necessary to fulfill those agreements. Finally, the article discusses the provisions of the Hyde Act itself and the remaining principal obstacles to US?India nuclear trade.

Indo-US Nuclear Agreement and IAEA Safeguards

Nuclear transfers to a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) are conditioned on IAEA safeguards on all current and future peaceful nuclear activities, what are called the full-scope safeguards (FSS) or comprehensive safeguards. Since India is a NNWS according to the NPT definition, the NSG Guidelines as currently implemented would, therefore, invoke FSS if India seeks nuclear technology or nuclear power plants — even on a turnkey basis — or nuclear fuel from any NSG member-country. The condition for any progress on the deal is the separation of civilian and military nuclear facilities that India has committed to and the sequencing of the reciprocal steps envisaged in the agreement. This seems quite feasible if the Indian policy-makers are clear about India's need of fissile material in quantitative terms. A properly negotiated INFCIRC/66 type safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA is also possible without compromising on India's strategic programmes and national security. Finally, IAEA is likely to treat India as a nuclear weapon state and apply safeguards selectively so as not to unduly burden its scarce funds and skilled human resource.

核不拡散輸出管理体制の強化と将来の課題

The Iraqi attempt to develop nuclear weapons which was detected in 1991 made the world recognize the need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the field of export control, the Nuclear Suppliers Group had implemented export controls on nuclear materials and equipments since 1977. In addition to this, the group introduced, in 1992, the control of nuclear-related ‘dual-use’ items such as machine tools and carbon fiber, which are usually used for non-nuclear products but can possibly be used for nuclear activities.Also, the control guidelines of nuclear export, which had already been under control (such as the transfer of nuclear materials), were made stronger by introducing the full-scope safeguards by IAEA as a condition of the transfer.The reinforcement of the nuclear export control regime should be appreciated from the viewpoint of preventing nuclear proliferation. However, this implies an increased flexibility of the regime entailing difficulties of export control and a need of harmonization among participating countries. Some directions, such as introducing more rigorous rules, promoting information exchange and enhancing transparency, are suggested to improve the regime.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Statement on Full-Scope Safeguards

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.

Breaking the rules without quite stopping the bomb: European views

While nonproliferation is no longer in the focus of international attention in the aftermath of the Afghanistan crisis, the problem of checking the spread of nuclear weapons was the subject of an intense controversy between the United States and Europe throughout the 1970s.Beginning with the Ford administration policy and continuing with the new Carter nonproliferation policy, a major nuclear controversy opposed the American and European nuclear suppliers.The first area of controversy was the question of technological transfers to the Third World and the conditions for such transfers (embargoes on sensitive technology, IAEA safeguards). The controversy also spread into the area of the plutonium economy—i.e., breeders and reprocessing. On both of these questions, most of the problems raised in the 1970s are still open despite some rapprochement between European and American positions. Major points of disagreement remain in the aftermath of the INFCE: full scope safeguards, the question of breeder reactors, and plutonium economy. The major uncertainty for the future will be whether nuclear energy as a whole will remain in the present state of depression or whether nuclear programs throughout the world will grow again.

India and Pakistan: nuclear rivals in South Asia

The new international nuclear regime requires accession to fullscope safeguards and an acceptance of the formal restraints imposed by the London Nuclear Suppliers Group on the worldwide availability of sensitive nuclear technology, materials, and equipment. The underside of the nuclear market, however, consists of surreptitious transfers by suppliers to special recipient states. Pakistan has capitalized on the existence of such a market to acquire the means to make nuclear weapons. Though South Asia is likely to be the first region outside of the central strategic system to harbor nuclear-armed national rivals, the situation is manageable through the imposition of innovative institutionalized constraints on the region. Neutrally conceived, these constraints can be adapted for other regions facing nuclearization. In the long run, the imbalance of capabilities between India and Pakistan will manifest itself in the nuclear field as it has in others.

The US-India safeguards dispute

The current U.S.-India dispute over nuclear safeguards is likely to be the single most important test of the Carter administration's anti-proliferation policies. The Carter administration wants India to accept comprehensive safeguards that would bar further production of nuclear explosives. The Desai government wants to maintain unsafeguarded facilities, in effect keeping the weapons option open. It has been a basic tenet of Indian nuclear policy since the mid-1950s that the big powers must disarm if the small powers are to renounce acquisition of nuclear weapons. As a matter of practical policy, India is willing to forego a nuclear deterrent only if sustained world pressure keeps China's nuclear aspirations in check. As a matter of basic principle, India regards it as unfair and imperialistic that the heavily armed big powers ask for special assurances from the lightly armed small powers. India takes the position that it will cooperate with the United States only voluntarily and only if the nuclear weapon states or at least the superpowers start to clean up their own act. The superpowers must (1) negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty; (2) accept full-scope safeguards themselves, which would be tantamount to a ban on any further production of weapons-grade materials;more » and (3) make significant moves toward total nuclear disarmament. The dependence of India on the United States for nuclear supplies is almost negligible. India's major nuclear facilities in operation or under construction include five research reactors, seven power reactors and three reprocessing facilities. Of these 15 facilities, the United States supplied only one (the Tarapur reactor) and 12 of them are not under IAEA safeguards. The United States, in short, is threatening to terminate supplies of low-enriched uranium for just one reactor unless India places these 12 facilities under IAEA safeguards. (MCW)« less