Full-face Veil Research Articles

Banning Islamic Veils: Is Social Cohesion (or Living Together) a Valid Argument?

Abstract Islamic veiling has attracted a remarkable degree of international and domestic attention in the current political climate. In the popular and political climate, the argument for social cohesion (or living together) is frequently invoked to justify bans on wearing Islamic veils. For example, the social cohesion argument was widely used in parliamentary debates leading up to the bans on wearing Islamic full-face veils (such as burqa or niqab) in France and Belgium. In response to the French and Belgian bans, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that a ban on wearing Islamic full-face veils is justified on the grounds of living together, rulings that many academic circles have criticized. Yet in this extensive commentary on the bans of Islamic veiling, one important question remains unanswered: Is social cohesion (or living together) a valid argument for banning the wearing of Islamic veils? The author explores this question through the lens of the European human rights framework and analyzes the ECtHR’s approach to French and Belgian anti-veil legislation enacted on the grounds of social cohesion.

Undetermined Implications of Islamic Veil Practicing for COVID-19 Diagnosis and Treatment

A recent systematic review demonstrated that among different religions, the association between COVID-19 risks and religious practice was different in terms of transmission, mitigation and adaptation to COVID-19. We argue that this difference might be partially correlated with strict full face and level of Islamic veiling practice. Strict full face veil techniques intuitively and practically mimic wearing facemasks, thus providing a protective role against COVID-19 viral exposure. It however prevents sufficient sunlight exposure needed to synthesis enough vitamin D in the skin, which is as an important factor in COVID-19 prevention and treatment. This letter specifically and intentionally focused on Islamic countries; however, its implications cover similar religious practices and settings. Based on preliminary observations from Iran and Arab countries, we will show that despite similar lower vitamin D status, veiling practice and full-face-veil-wearing probably put a protective –meanwhile differential- effect against COVID-19 cases and deaths.

Redefining status through burqa: Religious transformation and body politics of Indonesia’s woman migrant workers

Apart from being commonly understood as a symbol of religious identity, full-face veils (burqa) are also a process through which women redefine their bodies and social status. This article investigates Indonesian women’s commitment to wearing burqa after their work migration in Taiwan and Hong Kong. It focuses on the signification and the redefinition of the body through hijrah (transformation). In-depth interviews conducted with nine Indonesian women migrant workers (WMWs) revealed that this hijrah process characterised by the wearing of the burqa is not always motivated by a religiously radical mindset but more likely by practical considerations aiming to create a sense of security and comfort while working overseas. The burqa is perceived as a symbolic shift in body definition: from being a source of harm, to piety and privilege, paving the way for women to join an emerging elite community, rendering them a new noble and influential social status through socio-religious activities. This study recommends that further research on WMWs in the Middle East needs to acquire a more comprehensive picture taking into account its complexity.Contribution: Beyond the symbolic religious identity, burqa wearing is also a form of political participation. It illustrates women’s agency and transformation in redefining their bodies, public space, authority and public recognition.

What Happened to ‘Vivre Ensemble?’: Developments after SAS v France

Abstract In 2014, the European Court of Human Rights found that France’s prohibition on women wearing the full face veil did not violate Article 9. In doing so, it accepted that the ban was necessary in order to achieve ‘vivre ensemble’ or ‘living together’. The use of the concept was controversial and the response at the time was mostly critical. This article examines when and in what ways the Court has used vivre ensemble since that decision. It considers the arguments made by member states and applicants and the Court’s reasoning in later cases on the face veil and other Islamic clothing, as well examining reference to vivre ensemble by the Court in other contexts. It finds that the full face veil is constructed as fundamentally different to other forms of religious clothing and there is little reliance on the concept other than in the ‘burqa ban’ cases

Religious Behavior among Female University Students with Full Face Veil in East Kalimantan

One form of the expressions of islamic piety among female university is the use of full face veil (known as cadar) in public sphere. Among educated young Muslim women in Indonesia, particularly in university settings in East Kalimantan, the use of cadar as an expression of piety managed to gain substantial ground since 2016. The majority of people often identify the full face veil with the fundamental Islamic movement. Full-face veil users among educated young Muslims, mostly in those resided in urban settings, reject the stigma and labels of hardliners that often attached to them. Believing that such practice as covering face constitute their very understanding of Islamic tenets, this particular group of young educated Muslim women are struggling to challenge the narrative of covering face among Muslim women as indication of backwardness, radicalism and extremism. This paper, therefore, aims at discussing religious behavior among female students who use full face veil in several universities in East Kalimantan. A combination of in-depth interviews and survey technique are utilized to collect data while thematic analysis technique is applied to analyze collected data. Findings reveal that, ideologically speakings, female Muslim university students split into two factions; one that believes wearing cadar as a highly commendable action and one that believes the act to be merely a good deed. They also feel much safer once they started wearing cadar. Most of informants agree that wearing full face veil has made their private lives much safer in comparison to before they wear full face veil.
 Keyword: cadar, full face veil, religious behavior, female university student, East Kalimantan

Does the French law restricting the religious practice of the Islamic full-face veil amount to persecution within the remit of International Refugee Law, or is it a legitimate distinction under International Human Rights Law?

This article intends to prove that the general blanket ban restricting the public wearing of a full-face veil in France is a law that illegitimately discriminates against Muslim women who choose to cover their face with a Niqab and Burqa. The Niqab and Burqa are both full Islamic veils, which cover the whole body including the face, leaving just a narrow slit for the eyes (Niqab) or covering the eyes too (Burqa).[1] Muslim women who wear an Islamic veil, do so as a badge of honour—one that is liberating, empowering, and brings solace because it is worn solely as a religious act of compliance to God. Such face coverings are a valid form of manifestation of freedom of religion; a freedom enshrined as a non-derogable right under International Human Rights Law.[2] Yet, Muslim women have been severely deprived of such a right since the enforcement of Loi 2010-1192 du 11 Octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public - Law 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 on the Prohibition of Concealing the Face in Public Space.[3] This law has allowed for the nationwide marginalisation of a group of women simply trying to live in the comfort of their faith. I will contend that such a profane law is not only a clear form of indirect discrimination under International Human Rights Law through the State’s illegitimate justifications; but also, that the law amounts to persecution on cumulative grounds under the Refugee Convention 1951.

All About That Face (No Trouble?)

The Dutch ban on face-covering garments (BFG) has caused a considerable amount of debate in the Netherlands since its entry into force on August 1, 2019. Questions have been raised as to whether this law is discriminatory towards those who wear full-face veils for religious reasons, as these individuals, almost exclusively women, will be excluded from public life based on their religion. Inspired by this debate, this paper analyzes the Dutch BFG from a regional and international law perspective. More specifically, this paper seeks to analyze Dutch BFG in light of the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Additionally, feminist theories play an auxiliary role in specifying CEDAW obligations from a feminist perspective. While the ban may be justified from the point of view of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is problematic from the perspectives of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Further research should therefore investigate this tension to determine how these frameworks can be reconciled while considering that the standard set by the European Court of Human Rights only provides a minimum level of protection.

Demistifikovani zakon - o zabrani vela, kancelparagrafu i militantnom sekularizmu u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji

Despite being closely examined from the perspective of its political background , the 1950 Yugoslav burka ban as a legal text remained until now beyond interests of historians of law. Exposing this Yugoslav law to a strictly normative analysis and comparison with analogous contemporary bans, this paper delivers the findings that largely exceeded the results of historical studies done so far. Though a brief text, the Yugoslav burka ban was a composite legislation that surely contained full-face veil ban, but also penalized criminal acts against unveiling and introduced an embryo to the future socialist Kanzelparagraph i.e., pulpit law as well. Openly aiming to break a religiously inspired behavior, its militant advocacy was only apparently distinct from a more neutral wording of the present-day veil-bans. A thorough analysis of its ideological foundation, however, indicates a crucial common feature with the modern laical legislation: the paternalistic state action excluding religion as such from the open public space and free debate. As such, the legacy of the Yugoslav socialist burka ban contributes to better understanding of militant SEC-ularism as surely a modern, but not a new controversy.

Kecerdasan Emosi Mahasiswi Bercadar Serta Implikasinya Bagi Pelayanan Bimbingan dan Konseling di Perguruan Tinggi

This study aims to determine the emotional intelligence of female students who wear the full face veil. This research uses a quantitative approach with descriptive methods. The sampling technique was carried out with a total sampling of 38 students who wore the veil from several universities in Indonesia. The research instrument uses a Likert-shaped Emotional Intelligence Scale owned by Dika Sahputra. Questionnaires are distributed online through the Google Forms application from November 2019 to January 2020. The results showed that in general the emotional intelligence of students who wore the full face veil was in the high category. These results can be used as a basis for making programs for guidance and counseling services in tertiary institutions, as well as being the basis for policy making for university leaders and the government towards female students and women who use the full face veil

Opposing Laws with Religious Reasons

Opposing Laws with Religious Reasons

Eroding the protection against discrimination: The procedural and de-contextualized approach to S.A.S. v France

Can human rights law adequately address implicit modes of racism and gender discrimination? This question is discussed in this article through the analysis of the European Court of Human Rights case S.A.S. v. France (2014) concerning the ban on the Islamic full-face veil. The so-called ‘headscarf cases’ have been thoroughly discussed by many scholars, yet they seem to offer an endless source of different points of view. Departing from the previous discussion on the headscarf and full-face veil cases, which have largely concentrated on the questions of personal autonomy, identity and subjectivity, this article approaches S.A.S. v. France from the point of view of discrimination. It is suggested that the Court’s procedural and de-contextualized approach to rights results in eroding the protection against discrimination. Procedural approach refers to the Court’s tendency to emphasize procedural aspects of the Convention rights and not to engage sufficiently with substantive analysis. The de-contextual approach to rights on the other hand refers to lack of sensitivity to empirical information concerning the facts of the case at hand. Together the procedural and de-contextual approaches inadvertently erode the protection against discrimination of vulnerable groups, such as Muslim immigrant women.

Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication Nos. 2747/2016 & 2807/2016 (H.R. Comm.)

On July 17, 2018, the Human Rights Committee, the monitoring body of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), rendered decisions in two similar cases brought by two French nationals against the French state. Both petitioners were Muslim women who challenged Act No. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010, a French law under which wearing of the niqab, also known as a “full-face veil,” in public spaces is prohibited. These seminal cases constitute the first time that an international arbiter of human rights has ruled that France's face-veil ban violates the human rights of its citizens.

The politics of covering the face: from the ‘burqa ban’ to the facekini

In 2009, the French government established a commission to study the controversial practice among a minority of Muslim women of wearing the ‘voile integral’ (full-face veil). This led to the passage of a law the following year—widely referred to in the media as the ‘burqa ban’—designed to curtail what many lawmakers had described as a discriminatory, oppressive, and gendered practice that contravened the French values of liberty, equality, and brotherhood. The actual text of the law, however, simply banned citizens and visitors from covering their faces in public. As the law went into effect, the rhetoric shifted from symbolism to security. Five years later, linguistic confusion and increased concerns about security led to bans on the ‘burqini,’ a full-body swimsuit that does not cover the face. A few journalists, questioning the underlying rationale for the bans, compared the burqini to the ‘facekini,’ a face-covering swim garment from China invented in 2004. Although Chinese men and women wear the facekini for various reasons (primarily for protection from jellyfish and from tanning), it does not have any religious or political significance.

Legal Regulation of the Full-Face Veil in Public Spaces in Spain and Italy: Some Critical Reflections on the Applicability of the ECtHR Doctrine in S.A.S. v. France

Abstract This paper focuses on the use of the full-face veil in the public sphere, discussing the standpoint adopted by some local authorities in Spain and Italy and the content of different proposals that have been submitted to Parliament in both countries, aimed at restricting the use of this garment in public places. The doctrine of the ECtHR in S.A.S. v. France will be taken as a benchmark for a comparative study of this issue in both Mediterranean countries. It is assumed that from a legal approach the wearing of burqa is a very complex question that requires a detailed analysis of the different elements involved, including its social implications before giving it an enduring solution. A general ban can be detrimental for the goal of integration, and give way to new forms of discrimination. Therefore, prior to enacting any legislation that could affect fundamental rights, it should be considered what public interests are in real need of protection.

The 2018 Danish “Burqa Ban”: Joining a European Trend and Sending a National Message

In May of 2018, the strategy of law-making was utilized in the Kingdom of Denmark to respond to or, more to the point, respond against full-face garments along the lines of a democratic and secular society in which values like transparency inform and guide interaction, dialogue, and communication. The new legal norm and measure, law L 219, does not refer expressly to the veil, nor to women, or to Islam. Nevertheless, the national Parliament in the Kingdom of Denmark proceeded on the basis of premises that reveal, upon scrutiny, why the particular provision that prohibits full-face veils is widely known and referred to as the “burqa ban”.Like the niqab, the burqa is a full-face veil. Numerically speaking, between 50 and 200 Muslim women wear such a veil, a fact that enters them into a minority within a minority statistics of 0.1 or 0.2 percent. However, to trivialize the burqa ban would be an error. This point applies to all sides, including the stakeholders who assumed the responsibility of drafting the new norm and measure. As the Danish legislators see things, law 219 is not an instance of “shooting sparrows with a cannon”. After this, the need to legislate appears to be an instance of following a trend in Europe and, at the same time, sending a message about the prevailing (Danish) ideology in contradistinction to “political Islam” that gives rise to unwanted phenomena like gender inequality, religious extremism, and terrorism. The authors of The 2018 Danish “Burqa Ban”: Joining a European Trend and Sending a National Messageattempt to give an in-depth account of the burqa ban and the political context for this, as provided by the negotiations that led up to the ban’s final adoption. One objective is to identify the various variables in the legal equation and, as another objective, capture the wider prescriptively-proscriptive direction of the Danish case, thereby also establishing a platform for further discussion, reflection, and response. (This part of the project – an intended component and outcome since the formulation of the original research task, labor division, and methodology – is published in the concurrent but separate article, The Burqa Ban: Legal Precursors for Denmark, American Experiences and Experiments, and Philosophical and Critical Examinations.)

Case Note: Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium App no 37798/13 (ECtHR, 11 July 2017)

Abstract The freedom of the individual can easily come into conflict with his or her obligation to integrate in society. The present case provides a good example. That some restrictions of citizens’ freedoms must be accepted for a state to function and, more basically, persist is evident and that, as a consequence, certain demands, incorporated in criminal law, are made from citizens is acceptable. The issue to what extent such restrictions are justified has increasingly become a topic of discussion. The present case raises a number of important questions with respect to the right to wear a full-face veil in public if the societal norm is that the face should be visible, the most salient of which are whether women should be ‘protected’ from unequal treatment against their will and to what extent society may impose values on the individual. I will argue that the Belgian law places unwarranted restrictions on citizens and that the values behind it testify to an outlook that is difficult to reconcile with the freedom of conscience and religion.

A Veiled Threat:Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium

The freedom of the individual can easily come into conflict with his or her obligation to integrate in society. The case ofBelcacemi and Oussar v Belgiumprovides a good example. It is evident that some restrictions of citizens’ freedoms must be accepted for a state to function and, more basically, persist; as a consequence, it is acceptable that certain demands, incorporated in criminal law, are made of citizens. The issue of the extent to which such restrictions are justified has increasingly become a topic of discussion. The present case raises a number of important questions with respect to the right to wear a full-face veil in public if the societal norm is that the face should be visible, the most salient of which are whether women should be ‘protected’ from unequal treatment against their will and to what extent society may impose values on the individual. I will argue that Belgian law places unwarranted restrictions on citizens and that the values behind it testify to an outlook that is difficult to reconcile with the freedom of conscience and religion.

The “living together” argument in the European Court of Human Rights case-law

This article analyses the three cases where the argument of “living together” was engaged by the ECtHR and accepted as a legal justification for the prohibition of the full-face veils (burqa and niqab): SAS v. France (2014), Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium (2017), and Dakir v. Belgium (2017). It analyses the proposed concept of “living together” itself, explaining its content and its development in the French and Belgian contexts. The paper argues that there is a lack of a robust legal analysis sufficient to legitimize this new argument. Finally, it makes the case for more fact-oriented decisions and the need for the Court to engage in evaluating all the knowledge it obtains, including empirical material brought by the third parties’ interventions. This could be beneficial for two reasons: facilitating the application of the proportionality test and protecting the Court itself from dangerous challenges to its authority.

Pertinence of a General Prohibition of the Burqa and Niqab in Spain: A Human Rights Perspective

<p>The debate on whether to prohibit the <em>burqa </em>and <em>niqab </em>in Spain has been reopened after the recent decision of the Spanish Supreme Court on 14 February 2013. The Spanish Supreme Court held that a municipality could not pass a local law prohibiting the right to wear the full-face veil in public spaces. This article analyzes a conceptual and theoretical framework to establish that the full-face veil qualifies as an external manifestation of the right to religious freedom. Moreover, the pertinence of a <em>burqa</em>-ban in all Spanish public spaces is analyzed and a general prohibition is not found to be a suitable, necessary, and proportional measure to achieve gender equality, public order or «respect for the minimum requirements of life in society».</p><p><strong>Published online</strong>: 11 December 2017</p>

O Pragmatismo Legal de Holmes e sua Interpretação da Liberdade de Expressão: o Uso da Burca como um Problema da Liberdade de Expressão Religiosa

A proibição do uso do véu implica necessariamente na restrição da expressão do pensamento, da liberdade religiosa e da privacidade. Na fundamentação legal da decisão proferida no caso S.A.S v. França, a Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos reconheceu a questão da Liberdade como o problema central a ser analisado. Nesse sentido, o pragmatismo jurídico de Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. pode contribuir para o debate sobre a legitimação democrática da decisão adotada pela Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos, especialmente em relação às suas concepções de Liberdade de expressão e de manifestação do pensamento.