Frugal Heuristics Research Articles

Shared online spreadsheets and hidden profiles: Technological effects on dyad decision strategy

We report a study in which dyads use Instant Messaging to agree a preference among a set of three apartments. The information given to participants is partially overlapping, and contains a “hidden profile” (HP), such that a single apartment emerges as the best according to an unweighted sum of feature values only if dyad members pool information that is presented to only one of them. When dyads were additionally provided with a shared online spreadsheet, their decision strategy was more likely to be compensatory and relatively exhaustive, even if the distribution of importance among the cues in which the apartments vary meant that a “fast and frugal” heuristic such as take-the-best would be a rational strategy. This study shows the potential of classic experimental tasks, the HP task in particular, for understanding technological constraints on group decision making and signals the importance of understanding decision-making strategies, and the potential of fast and frugal heuristics, for informing the design of decision support systems.

Economics Imperialism Under the Impact of Psychology: The Case of Behavioral Development Economics

Economics imperialism is broadly explained as economics having an impact on other disciplines. But how should economics imperialism be understood when it is in some sense the product of other disciplines having an impact on economics? The paper examines psychology’s impact on economics in connection with the emergence of behavioral development economics, and then discusses the nature of behavioral development economics imperialism associated with development economists’ explanations of non-market dimensions of life in developing economies in behavioral economics terms. The paper argues that this new form of economics imperialism reflects economics’ selective appropriation from psychology of the Kahneman-Tversky heuristics and biases view of choice behavior and rejection of the Gigerenzer-ABC group fast and frugal heuristics view. This selective appropriation, however, causes behavioral development economics imperialism to also function as a social and cultural imperialism since its utility theory-based policy recommendations impose liberal society economic values on developing economy societies. Thus recent economics-plus-psychology imperialism might be said to function as social science imperialism under the leadership of economics.

On the suitability of fast and frugal heuristics for designing values clarification methods in patient decision aids: a critical analysis

Increasingly, patient decision aids and values clarification methods (VCMs) are being developed to support patients in making preference-sensitive health-care decisions. Many VCMs encourage extensive deliberation about options, without solid theoretical or empirical evidence showing that deliberation is advantageous. Research suggests that simple, fast and frugal heuristic decision strategies sometimes result in better judgments and decisions. Durand et al. have developed two fast and frugal heuristic-based VCMs. To critically analyse the suitability of the 'take the best' (TTB) and 'tallying' fast and frugal heuristics in the context of patient decision making. Analysis of the structural similarities between the environments in which the TTB and tallying heuristics have been proven successful and the context of patient decision making and of the potential of these heuristic decision processes to support patient decision making. The specific nature of patient preference-sensitive decision making does not seem to resemble environments in which the TTB and tallying heuristics have proven successful. Encouraging patients to consider less rather than more relevant information potentially even deteriorates their values clarification process. Values clarification methods promoting the use of more intuitive decision strategies may sometimes be more effective. Nevertheless, we strongly recommend further theoretical thinking about the expected value of such heuristics and of other more intuitive decision strategies in this context, as well as empirical assessments of the mechanisms by which inducing such decision strategies may impact the quality and outcome of values clarification.

Simple heuristics in over-the-counter drug choices: a new hint for medical education and practice

IntroductionOver-the-counter (OTC) drugs are widely available and often purchased by consumers without advice from a health care provider. Many people rely on self-management of medications to treat common medical conditions. Although OTC medications are regulated by the National and the International Health and Drug Administration, many people are unaware of proper dosing, side effects, adverse drug reactions, and possible medication interactions.PurposeThis study examined how subjects make their decisions to select an OTC drug, evaluating the role of cognitive heuristics which are simple and adaptive rules that help the decision-making process of people in everyday contexts.Subjects and methodsBy analyzing 70 subjects’ information-search and decision-making behavior when selecting OTC drugs, we examined the heuristics they applied in order to assess whether simple decision-making processes were also accurate and relevant. Subjects were tested with a sequence of two experimental tests based on a computerized Java system devised to analyze participants’ choices in a virtual environment.ResultsWe found that subjects’ information-search behavior reflected the use of fast and frugal heuristics. In addition, although the heuristics which correctly predicted subjects’ decisions implied significantly fewer cues on average than the subjects did in the information-search task, they were accurate in describing order of information search. A simple combination of a fast and frugal tree and a tallying rule predicted more than 78% of subjects’ decisions.ConclusionThe current emphasis in health care is to shift some responsibility onto the consumer through expansion of self medication. To know which cognitive mechanisms are behind the choice of OTC drugs is becoming a relevant purpose of current medical education. These findings have implications both for the validity of simple heuristics describing information searches in the field of OTC drug choices and for current medical education, which has to prepare competent health specialists to orientate and support the choices of their patients.

Credit Card Behavior, Financial Styles, and Heuristics

The paper makes four contributions. First, it provides new data and findings about credit card usage segmentation in respect to spending and borrowing behavior. Second, it sets the new findings against the backdrop of the newly emerging literature on financial literacy. There is great variability in financial literacy across American consumers. Third, it describes fast and frugal heuristics aimed to help consumers make effective, and in some cases better, budgeting decisions when they use credit cards. Fourth, it describes the introduction of a new set of online financial tools, offered by a large credit card company, which consumers are now using to make decisions about their spending and borrowing, and links these tools to the heuristics under discussion. Fast and frugal heuristics are likely to be especially valuable to consumers with low confidence in their online skills. Notably, 25 percent of credit card holders report they have low confidence using online technology to manage their finances, with the corresponding figure being 44 percent for those most at risk.

Design and usability of heuristic‐based deliberation tools for women facing amniocentesis

Evidence suggests that in decision contexts characterized by uncertainty and time constraints (e.g. health-care decisions), fast and frugal decision-making strategies (heuristics) may perform better than complex rules of reasoning. To examine whether it is possible to design deliberation components in decision support interventions using simple models (fast and frugal heuristics). The 'Take The Best' heuristic (i.e. selection of a 'most important reason') and 'The Tallying' integration algorithm (i.e. unitary weighing of pros and cons) were used to develop two deliberation components embedded in a Web-based decision support intervention for women facing amniocentesis testing. Ten researchers (recruited from 15), nine health-care providers (recruited from 28) and ten pregnant women (recruited from 14) who had recently been offered amniocentesis testing appraised evolving versions of 'your most important reason' (Take The Best) and 'weighing it up' (Tallying). Most researchers found the tools useful in facilitating decision making although emphasized the need for simple instructions and clear layouts. Health-care providers however expressed concerns regarding the usability and clarity of the tools. By contrast, 7 out of 10 pregnant women found the tools useful in weighing up the pros and cons of each option, helpful in structuring and clarifying their thoughts and visualizing their decision efforts. Several pregnant women felt that 'weighing it up' and 'your most important reason' were not appropriate when facing such a difficult and emotional decision. Theoretical approaches based on fast and frugal heuristics can be used to develop deliberation tools that provide helpful support to patients facing real-world decisions about amniocentesis.

Homo heuristicus outnumbered: comment on Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009).

Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) have argued for a "Homo heuristicus" view of judgment and decision making, claiming that there is evidence for a majority of individuals using fast and frugal heuristics. In this vein, they criticize previous studies that tested the descriptive adequacy of some of these heuristics. In addition, they provide a reanalysis of experimental data on the recognition heuristic that allegedly supports Gigerenzer and Brighton's view of pervasive reliance on heuristics. However, their arguments and reanalyses are both conceptually and methodologically problematic. We provide counterarguments and a reanalysis of the data considered by Gigerenzer and Brighton. Results clearly replicate previous findings, which are at odds with the claim that simple heuristics provide a general description of inferences for a majority of decision makers.

On the theoretical precision and strategy selection problem of a single‐strategy approach: A comment on Glöckner, Betsch, and Schindler (2010)

AbstractAccording to the fast and frugal heuristics (FFH) program, humans make decisions by selecting from a repertoire of strategies. Glöckner, Betsch, and Schindler criticize such multi‐strategy frameworks for not explaining how people select between the different strategies. As an alternative, they propose a parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model that assumes a single strategy for all tasks. However, contrary to Glöckner et al.'s assertions, the FFH and other multi‐strategy frameworks have developed a number of approaches to strategy selection, tackling a difficult modeling problem that the PCS model disguises but cannot solve itself. Moreover, in contrast to the PCS model, which has not been completely spelled out, the repertoire of strategies assumed by the FFH framework is precisely defined, enabling researchers to make quantitative predictions about behavior. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Accounting for critical evidence while being precise and avoiding the strategy selection problem in a parallel constraint satisfaction approach: A reply to Marewski (2010)

AbstractIn Glöckner, Betsch and Schindler (2010) we observed predecisional information distortions (coherence shifts) in probabilistic inferences that indicate bidirectional reasoning. In response to Marewski's (2010) critique, we explain why coherence shifts cannot be explained by currently specified fast and frugal heuristics (FFH). In contrast, parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) models can easily account for such effects. We show that the PCS model used in the target paper is sufficiently well specified with respect to predicting the observed effects and demonstrate that it circumvents the problem of strategy selection by using a single‐strategy approach. Taking a broader perspective, we argue that empirical and theoretical challenges to the FFH approach have become so substantial that a mere extension of the suggested toolbox might not sufficiently solve the problem. We suggest that further theoretical work in the field of judgment and decision making should be more responsive to well‐established findings and insights from other fields of cognition such as memory and perception. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Naturalistic Heuristics for Decision Making

Over the last 20 years, both naturalistic decision making and fast and frugal heuristics programs have radically broken with mainstream decision science, moving beyond the confines of artificial tasks and safe academic laboratories. We document commonalities of these programs and discuss ways in which a synthesis could contribute to a more relevant, precise, predictive, and effective decision science. We begin by reviewing the common roots and philosophies of the two programs, such as their respect for the capable decision maker and their acknowledgment of the importance of task ecology. We then identify four specific areas of synergetic potential, including ecological rationality and metacognition. Our review culminates in a case study of naturalistic heuristics based on a particular class of fast and frugal heuristics. These fast and frugal trees provide examples of effective, well-specified decision-making algorithms applied in a naturalistic domain: emergency medical diagnosis. By leveraging the strengths of each program, we point out some of the ways in which more sustainable progress can be fostered on issues that matter the most—for example, decisions that save and transform lives.

Five Principles for Studying People’s Use of Heuristics

The fast and frugal heuristics framework assumes that people rely on an adaptive toolbox of simple decision strategies—called heuristics—to make inferences, choices, estimations, and other decisions. Each of these heuristics is tuned to regularities in the structure of the task environment and each is capable of exploiting the ways in which basic cognitive capacities work. In doing so, heuristics enable adaptive behavior. In this article, we give an overview of the framework and formulate five principles that should guide the study of people's adaptive toolbox. We emphasize that models of heuristics should be (i) precisely defined; (ii) tested comparatively; (iii) studied in line with theories of strategy selection; (iv) evaluated by how well they predict new data; and (vi) tested in the real world in addition to the laboratory.

We favor formal models of heuristics rather than lists of loose dichotomies: a reply to Evans and Over

In their comment on Marewski et al. (good judgments do not require complex cognition, 2009) Evans and Over (heuristic thinking and human intelligence: a commentary on Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2009) conjectured that heuristics can often lead to biases and are not error free. This is a most surprising critique. The computational models of heuristics we have tested allow for quantitative predictions of how many errors a given heuristic will make, and we and others have measured the amount of error by analysis, computer simulation, and experiment. This is clear progress over simply giving heuristics labels, such as availability, that do not allow for quantitative comparisons of errors. Evans and Over argue that the reason people rely on heuristics is the accuracy-effort trade-off. However, the comparison between heuristics and more effortful strategies, such as multiple regression, has shown that there are many situations in which a heuristic is more accurate with less effort. Finally, we do not see how the fast and frugal heuristics program could benefit from a dual-process framework unless the dual-process framework is made more precise. Instead, the dual-process framework could benefit if its two “black boxes” (Type 1 and Type 2 processes) were substituted by computational models of both heuristics and other processes.

Heuristic thinking and human intelligence: a commentary on Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer

Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer (2009) present a review of research on fast and frugal heuristics, arguing that complex problems are best solved by simple heuristics, rather than the application of knowledge and logical reasoning. We argue that the case for such heuristics is overrated. First, we point out that heuristics can often lead to biases as well as effective responding. Second, we show that the application of logical reasoning can be both necessary and relatively simple. Finally, we argue that the evidence for a logical reasoning system that co-exists with simpler heuristic forms of thinking is overwhelming. Not only is it implausible a priori that we would have evolved such a system that is of no use to us, but extensive evidence from the literature on dual processing in reasoning and judgement shows that many problems can only be solved when this form of reasoning is used to inhibit and override heuristic thinking.

The Conceptual Connection between Lens Models and Fast and Frugal Heuristics

I explore the conceptual connection between two judgment- and decision-making research programs: social judgment theory and fast and frugal heuristics. I point out that a main difference is in the modeling of the cues-to-criterion function that describes the organism (lens in Brunswikian jargon). Social judgment theorists typically use linear models while the fast and frugal program employs heuristics. I ask two questions: Can fast and frugal heuristics play the role of lenses? Which lens can model fast and frugal heuristics? I synthesize previous work and extend it with new analyses that focus on processes. First, I argue that fast and frugal heuristics can play the role of lenses because they can model the process of successful vicarious functioning. Second, I argue that a compensatory lens should be used for modeling the outcomes of heuristics and that a noncompensatory lens is more appropriate for modeling the cognitive processes postulated by heuristics.

Fast and Frugal Heuristics: Tools of Social Rationality

Homo economicus cannot help but be puzzled by people's baffling array of social behaviors that conflict with economic theory. To accommodate these “deviant” behaviors within the standard view of rationality, defined in terms of probability theory, logic and rational choice theory, economists and psychologists tend to inject some psychology into the rational choice framework. In contrast, we propose to start afresh: We put forth the thesis that humans' social intelligence is not qualitatively different from their nonsocial intelligence, and that important aspects of both kinds of intelligence can be modeled in terms of boundedly rational fast and frugal heuristics. These heuristics can be ecologically and socially rational in that they exploit the structure of physical and social environments as well as evolved capacities to foster performance both in games against nature and in social games.

A Belief-Based Model of Air Traffic Controllers Performing Separation Assurance

A model of an air traffic controller performing a separation assurance task was produced. The model was designed to be simple to use and deploy in a simulator, but still provide realistic behavior. The model is based upon an evaluation of the safety function of the controller for separation assurance, and utilizes fast and frugal heuristics and belief networks to establish a knowledge set for the controller model. Based on this knowledge set, the controller acts to keep aircraft separated. Validation results are provided to demonstrate the model's performance.

Simple mechanisms for gathering social information

Social contexts are notoriously complex, yet decisions are nevertheless made by using simple strategies. We argue that the concept of fast and frugal heuristics provides a promising framework for understanding how we gather social information to make decisions in social environments. That is, we assume that under limitations of time, energy, and computational resources people use cognitively based shortcuts that rely on information from social environments to solve different types of real problems. We review three successful applications of heuristics to the social arena. We first introduce some commonly faced social inference problems (e.g., selecting a mate or deciding whether to cooperate with someone) and then discuss how individuals can use simple strategies to solve such problems. For each problem, we consider how social environments are structured, and how we take advantage of this structure when using heuristics to make inferences and decisions.

Fast and frugal forecasting

Simple statistical forecasting rules, which are usually simplifications of classical models, have been shown to make better predictions than more complex rules, especially when the future values of a criterion are highly uncertain. In this article, we provide evidence that some of the fast and frugal heuristics that people use intuitively are able to make forecasts that are as good as or better than those of knowledge-intensive procedures. We draw from research on the adaptive toolbox and ecological rationality to demonstrate the power of using intuitive heuristics for forecasting in various domains including sport, business, and crime.

Ignorance or integration: the cognitive processes underlying choice behavior

AbstractThe fast‐and‐frugal heuristic framework assumes noncompensatory tools for human preferences (i.e., priority heuristic) and inferences (i.e., take the best heuristic). According to this framework, these heuristics predict choice behavior as well as model the cognitive processes underlying such behavior. The current paper presents two studies that juxtapose predictions derived from these two simple heuristics with alternative predictions derived from compensatory principles. Dependent measures that included reaction time, choice pattern, confidence level, and accuracy were better predicted by compensatory indices than by noncompensatory indices. These findings suggest that people do not rely on limited arguments only, but tend to integrate all acquired information into their choice processes. This tendency was replicated even when the experimental task facilitated the use of noncompensatory principles. We argue that the fast and frugal heuristics can predict the final outcome only under certain conditions, but even in these particular situations they are not applicable to the processes underlying choice behavior. An integrative model for choice behavior is proposed that better represents the data. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Rationality for mortals: how people cope with uncertainty

Preface 1. Bounded and Rational 2. Fast and Frugal heuristics 3. Rules of Thumb in Animals and Humans 4. I Think, Therefore I Err 5. Striking a Blow for Sanity in Theories of Rationality 6. Out of the Frying Pan Into the Fire 7. What's in a Sample? Manual for Building Cognitive Theories 8. A 30% Chance of Rain Tomorrow 9. Simple Tools for Understanding Risks: From Innumeracy to Insight 10. The Evolution of Statistical Thinking 11. Mindless Statistics 12. Children Can Solve Bayesian Problems 13. In the year 2054 Innumeracy Defeated References Subject Index Name index