There are at least three ways to respond to Richard Lichtman’s critique of Habermas’ Freud interpretation and the use of psychoanalysis as a prototype of critical social science. One way is to defend Habermas’ interpretation by comparing it with Freud’s own writings; if this comparison proves accurate, one would still have to ask whether Freudian psychoanalysis can serve as the desired prototype. A second way is to argue that Habermas misunderstood Freud and thus misused him in formulating a model of critical self-reflection; this might result in a defense of an alternative interpretation of Freud concerning the very points Habermas had misunderstood, followed by revisions of the prototype. Yet a third strategy, which is the one I shall pursue, is to disregard, for the most part, whether Habermas interpreted Freud correctly, on the assumption that Habermas’ purpose in interpreting and using Freud was to establish the normative foundation of critique and that what we should examine here is whether this foundation is adequate. The measure of adequacy should be the demands of critique itself, not the correctness of Habermas’ Freud interpretation. In taking this strategy, it will be necessary, first, to examine Lichtman’s major criticism of Habermas, as well as Habermas’ indirect response to it published after the text on which Lichtman focuses;t second, to identify why Habermas analyzed Freud to begin with and thereby to clarify why he adopted the interpretation he did; third, to investigate some of Lichtman’s other objections to Habermas, asking what relevance they have to Habermas on-going project. The purposes of this strategy are to understand what the limits are on Habermas’ reconstruction of Freudian psychoanalysis and to evaluate critically whether he has succeeded in developing a normative foundation of critique that is philosophically defensible and practically efficacious, that is, emancipatory. To treat this latter purpose thoroughly would, of course, require more time and space than the format of this commentary will allow. However, at least I shall be able to establish the framework of my response to Lichtman in such a way that it is compatible with Habermas’ interest in social critique, an interest that, judging from Lichtman’s own comments at times, he shares as well. The main thesis of Lichtman’s “critical reflections” is that Habermas is wrong to claim that Freud’s psychoanalysis represents “the only tangible example of a