French Nuclear Forces Research Articles

Les inquiétudes européennes face aux systèmes de défense anti-missiles

European anxieties about ballistic missile defense, by David S. Yost European anxieties about US ballistic missile defense (BMD) initiatives are premature, because the US has so far only expanded its re- search and development efforts in response to Soviet BMD activities. The anxieties expressed in Europe ― a « destabilization » of the East-West military stalemate ; a collapse of arms control ; and Soviet neutralization of US guarantees to Europe and of British and French nuclear forces ― are understandable. But Europe and America can and should be prepared to work together to surmount these risks and devise a security posture adapted to changing threats and technological constraints.

French nuclear forces in the 1980s and the 1990s

Abstract : The author concludes that the French are engaging in a significant nuclear modernization program. They are increasing the numbers of targets which can be covered on Soviet territory. The nature of targets covered on the European battlefield are changing as well. They are building a force structure potentially more in tune with West German interests and an extended deterrence capability. The Soviets are already noting these changes and it is to be hypothesized that their warfighting approaches and arms control policies will be increasingly affected by them. The French nuclear forces, thus, will become a more significant factor in Soviet calculations toward Europe in the next decade.

The place of British and French nuclear weapons in arms control

The title of this article carries an implicit presumption that British and French nuclear weapons ought to have a place in arms control. Due to the way in which arms control negotiations have evolved-especially with the distinctly artificial separation of 'strategic' weapons from 'intermediate' weapons at Geneva-it is not obvious where that place should be. This is a proper subject for debate. But what the British and French governments cannot any longer do without laying themselves open to charges of gross inconsistency and obstructionism is to argue that American and Soviet nuclear weapons should be constrained through arms control while British and French weapons of the same general kind are not. To begin at the conclusion, Britain and France have no grounds, either in equity or in politics, for standing aside from taking proportional reductions if there are reductions in the nuclear weapons of the superpowers. This raises difficult questions for nuclear forces which their owners state (and believe) are 'minimum deterrent forces'. This article will present the argument that these forces seem to be developing to a point well beyond that which was previously regarded as the minimum deterrent level, and that it is not clear why it should be necessary, greatly to alter the retributive capacity of 'minimum deterrent forces' simply because the potential opponent increases his forces. There is a very respectable argument in deterrence theology for taking whatever steps are necessary to ensure the survivability of these minimum deterrent forces or 'weapons of last resort' in the face of a changing threat, but unacceptable damage remains unacceptable damage, in the absence of effective defences. If this calculus was initially based on the capacity to inflict a certain degree of pain on an opponent in retaliation, why should it now be necessary to increase the destructive potential of the deterrent force? In terms of practical politics, the subject of the planned expansion of the British and French forces could be introduced alongside the bilateral US-Soviet strategic arms negotiations, either by offering force increases lower than those planned if the Soviet Union reduces its forces threatening Britain and France, or, if the new weapons are already deployed here, reducing them back to consistency with earlier definitions of what constituted a minimum. If the time were ever to arrive when both superpowers had reduced so dramatically that reductions below the minimum were demanded of Britain and France, it would be a much safer world and they might be able to afford to do so. It is well known why the essential purpose of British and French nuclear forces differs from the superpowrers' strategic or intermediate nuclear forces; yet they share many of the latter's characteristics. They are basically ballistic missiles carried in nuclear-powered submarines-and these are systems genlerally acknowledged in SALT and START to be 'strategic' regardless of missile range and so 'central' systems for the superpowers. Whatever differences one can point to in technrical

The French nuclear force: Strategical objections

The French nuclear force: Strategical objections

The Impact of the Franco-German Entente

The Franco-German entente has a broad scope, treating of cultural, economic, and military matters. Its impact was initially encouraging, for a reconciliation between France and Germany appeared to be a symbol of the victory of the present era over history. Subsequent events have con tributed to a view of it as an effort to turn back history and to play an old game of power politics with a new alignment. De Gaulle has cast himself and France in the role of federator for Europe and tends to regard as intolerable any combination which includes close association with the United States. Adenauer is desirous of assuring his place in history by effect ing a Franco-German reconciliation, and many of his views correspond to a little-Europe policy. There are some indica tions that the Germans might be reluctant allies of the French. German opinion was disturbed by the French veto of British membership in the Common Market and De Gaulle's apparent repulse of the United States. Differences may arise over a German contribution to the development of a French nuclear force independent of NATO. De Gaulle is unenthusiastic about German reunification. The success of Caesaristic, di rected democracy in France may adversely influence the development of democratic institutions in Germany. The role of the individual in international politics seems to have been reasserted through the Franco-German association, yet the urgency of international problems occasioned by nuclear arma ments makes it vital to rise above purely individual considera tions in the broader arena of world politics.—Ed.

French nuclear forces

French nuclear forces