French Leadership Research Articles

Artisans Angkor: Reclaiming Cambodian Silk Crafts under French Patronage (1992–2017)

Following the 1991 Paris Peace Accords that granted a return to a relative political stability in Cambodia, the non-profit organization Les Chantiers Ecoles was launched with the support of the European Union to revive local traditional crafts and sericulture that had nearly vanished under the Khmer Rouge regime. This vocational institute was the result of a cooperation between the French and the Cambodian government. It provided training to disadvantaged young villagers of Siem Reap’s area in polychromic woodwork, stone carving, metal, lacquerware, and silk weaving. Eventually, the project turned into a social enterprise under the French name Artisans Angkor. Drawing its inspiration from the surrounding archaeological splendors of Angkor Wat, the company emphasizes its authentic making processes. Artisans Angkor welcomes tourists to its silk farm near Siem Reap, using this production site as a showcase for sericulture from silkworms breeding to weaving, promoting the revival of indigenous golden silk while selling a wide range of souvenirs. Relying on the performative value of silk craft practices, Artisans Angkor has developed an engaging storytelling as well as an educational and marketing tool, which elevates crafts as tokens of Cambodian cultural identity. Praised by the Cambodians who consider the brand a national success, the enterprise has however kept a French leadership. Tracing the company’s history, this paper examines to which extent Artisans Angkor follows the definition of a Transnational Artisan Partnership developed by anthropologist Susan Falls and how it pertains to a form of soft power for the French. Through the analysis of its aesthetic and discourses, this case study highlights the project’s hybrid nature and demonstrates how it relates to the colonial model of the School of Cambodian Arts implemented in 1920 under the French Protectorate to promote Cambodian crafts.

1812: Russian Intelligence in Paris (According to French Archive Documents)1

ABSTRACTThis article is devoted to the intelligence activities of the Russian Embassy in Paris on the eve of and at the beginning of the war between Russia and France in 1812. The author has introduced into scholarly circulation a large set of unpublished documents stored in France’s National Archives and the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has come to the following conclusions. On the eve of and beginning of the War of 1812 the Russian Embassy in Paris, led by the ‘brilliant’ Prince A. B. Kurakin, played a very important role in the plan for Petersburg to obtain valuable information about the plans and operations of the adversary. Contrary to previous impressions, when the prince was depicted as a kind of ‘dummy’ or, in the best case, a ‘cover’ figure, convincing facts contained in French archive documents add a truly dramatic nuance to this historical personage. Possessing a political flair and extensive connections in Europe and the United States, Kurakin was able to quickly and precisely understand the true meaning of Napoleon’s actions and words and to inform Petersburg about this in a timely fashion. The Russian Embassy in Paris was the main center for the collection and analysis of varied information that attested to the French leadership’s sequential preparations for war against Russia. Despite the widespread opinion about the key role of Colonel A. I. Chernyshev in obtaining secret information about Napoleon’s war machine, the true ‘resident’ in Paris was, nevertheless, Kurakin. Moreover, Chernyshev’s ill-conceived and reckless actions threatened the embassy’s fulfillment of its intelligence functions. However, despite the emergence of serious problems associated with the disclosure of the ‘Chernyshev-Michel group’, Kurakin continued to actively collect intelligence about both Napoleon’s actions and plans and the domestic situation in France itself. Under conditions of the commencement of war between the two powers and his actually being a hostage, the prince did not cease his efforts to collect information and find methods for delivering it to the Russian leadership.

France and the Origins of the United Nations, 1944–1945: “Si La France ne compte plus, qu’on nous le dise”

ABSTRACTDuring their long exile during 1940–1944, various components of the “Free French” were largely kept out of the “Post-War Planning” process that took place in the American State Department. They perceived this absence as a major, and often deliberate, humiliation that made the circumstances of their exile all the more exasperating. Charles de Gaulle was seen by the “Anglo–Saxon” Allies as a figure of dubious worth and usefulness, and Washington’s general tone was to dismiss the exiles as the “so-called Free French.” They were admitted to the decision-making process only slowly and grudgingly, and not until after many of the key decisions about organising the United Nations had been taken. This article shows how that exclusion affected the French leadership, how they reacted, and suggests some lasting results. It also assesses to what extent France had a coherent contribution to the formation of a global international organisation during 1943–1944, and what factors inhibited France properly articulating that contribution.

The cost of CEO duality: Evidence from French leadership compensation

This paper aims to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between board leadership structures and executive compensation. According to agency theory, the combined position of CEO and Chairperson of the Board (COB) entails greater compensation for the CEO in order to reduce conflicts of interest. In the literature, combined board structure is generally considered to generate additional costs for companies. However, the choice of two separate structures implies the payment of incentive compensation for the COB in addition to that defined for the CEO. This paper investigates the financial cost of duality when compensation packages are set for both leaders. Our results suggest that although combined board structure is associated with higher incentive compensation for the CEO, the overall compensation cost to the company is no higher when the chairperson's compensation is considered.

France and The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages: Dilemma without Solution

There are more than seven thousand of unique languages nowadays, that reflect the uniqueness of the living conditions, the worldview and cultural traditions of different peoples. According to UNESCO, 75 languages in Europe and Asia Minor and about 115 languages in the United States over the past five centuries have been lost. The regional or minority languages are part of the national heritage and play leading role in the process of national identity as bearers and guarantors of national culture and national identity, that is why the value of regional languages is constantly increasing. However, the danger of the growth of nationalism and separatism makes politicians wary of measures to protect the national languages. The article deals with the political debate in France around the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, adopted by the Council of Europe on 25 June 1992, which purpose was to protect the historical regional languages of the EU, some of which are in danger of eventual extinction.. The author provides analysis of the historical preconditions of the current debate as well as of the stance taken by the French leadership on this issue. The study is based on a set of scientific methods and approaches - the principle of scientific objectivity and system of historical research. The main methods are problematic and historical-comparative analysis, classification and comparison of the political and historical concepts. Modern France de jure firmly follows linguistic traditions laid down by previous regimes, as defined in its constitution as the principles of the indivisibility of the Republic and the unity of the French people. According to Article 2 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, French language is the only official. However, in addition to the French 75 languages are being spoken all over the Overseas Departments and Territories of France, including 24 languages of the indigenous population of the European part of France, and the languages of immigrants. Despite the fact that the ratification of the Charter serve certain political figures, the Conseil d'Etat, the highest judicial authority in administrative cases, and later the Constitutional Council refused to ratify the Charter, due to the fact that the provisions of the Charter are contrary to the Constitution. The question of amending the Constitution of France is facing fierce debate and remains unresolved for nearly a decade. The political problem is the impact of the application of the Charter, by the fact that at all times promoting one language at the expense of others become a catalyst for powerful and very dangerous social and political processes.

The European Union and sub-Saharan Africa – from intervention towards deterrence?

This article argues that aspirations of maintaining a dominant influence over sub-Saharan security issues has spurred the French and British leadership of European Union (EU) foreign and security policy integration, just as it has informed military capability expansions by the armed forces of the main EU powers. While Europe's initial African focus was on stabilising a continent marred by state failure, civil wars and genocides, changes in the global security context, especially the shift towards multipolarity manifest in China's growing engagement, has prompted a complementary focus on deterring other powers from making military inroads into the subcontinent. Hence Europe's sub-Saharan security focus is shifting from stabilisation towards deterrence. This helps explain recent military procurements which, in spite of the extremely challenging fiscal position of most EU member states, feature large-scale investments in long-range deterrence capabilities.

Germany and the Euroland Crisis: The Making of a Vulnerable Haven

This paper investigates Germany’s vulnerability to the ongoing Euroland crisis. In 2010-11, Germany experienced a strong rebound from the global financial crisis of 2008-09. The Euroland crisis then meant record low interest rates and a depressed euro that boosted German extra-area exports. But the crisis that started in Euroland’s so-called periphery has meanwhile reached the core. With pro-euro sentiments dwindling fast across the European Union (EU), the future of the euro remains uncertain no matter what European Central Bank President Mario Draghi may promise. Germany’s safe haven status may turn out to be a double-edged sword. In case of a euro breakup, swift appreciation of the new deutschmark would abruptly worsen German competitiveness and the German economy would crater as a result. Additional wealth losses on Germany’s international investment position would also loom. Appreciating Germany’s own vulnerability to the euro crisis should help the German authorities to understand that their policy prescriptions are anything but in Germany’s own best interest, which is also good for the authorities in euro partner countries to recognize. Germany is bound to catch up with the reality that it is very vulnerable to the enormous wreckage and unnecessary hardship German-style policies are causing across Europe. The EU, most likely under French leadership, will have to convince Germany to embark on a fundamental policy course change, or else call an ugly end to the euro disaster.

La Grande Nation and Agriculture: The Power of French Farmers Demystified

France is considered a strong state, but French governments have always fiercely defended the interests of French farmers in European and global negotiations. Why would a ‘strong state’ be unable to resist farm lobby pressure? Is agriculture an exception to the French ‘strong state’ rule? This article offers a structural model of varying state sensitivity to interest group pressure, and argues that farm lobby pressure cannot fully explain French foreign policy on agriculture, as governments often go against farmers' preferences and as the level of pressure varies more than the continuity of governmental preferences. From an analysis of the negotiations on the CAP and the GATT in the 1960s and in the 1990s it emerges that ideational constraints played a major role in French obstinacy. The defence of French identity as La Grande Nation, necessitating a presence in world agricultural markets, and the defence of a strong Europe under French leadership as a counterweight to the United States, have guided French preferences without regard to the farmers' positions.

The relativity of decline: a reappraisal of French leadership and influence in a time of global crisis

This article is an attempt, in the context of the Eurozone crisis that has shaken Europe since 2008, to explore and deconstruct two pieces of conventional wisdom on French leadership in Europe and the world. The stereotypical image of a country in decline and denial, out of touch with today’s globalised world, is reproduced so often in the Anglo-American media and even in scholarly discourse, that is has become a self-evident truism. The article examines this truism in two different perspectives: there is, on the one hand, the axiom that France has lost influence in Europe and that the balance of power has shifted inexorably to Germany and, on the other hand, the axiom that Europe does not matter in the global ‘power shift’ and that, as part of Europe, France does not count any more either. In questioning the origins and validity of these axioms, the authors argue that a strong perception bias persists and is constantly perpetuated even though reality has changed. Not only has France rather successfully adapted to globalisation in both political and economic terms, but it has also found new ways and discourses about its role as Germany’s partner in leadership in the European Union. The paper goes on to show that both France and the EU retain and use significant levers for action in three dimensions of power—coercion, agenda-setting and attraction. It concludes that going into 2012, France remains an active and important actor, both in the EU and on the global scene. It is present and influential in major international institutions, effectively builds international coalitions and floats important ideas on reforming laissez-faire capitalism.

The Union for the Mediterranean: An Intergovernmentalist Challenge for the European Union?*

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has had a troubled infancy. French ideas for enhanced Euro-Mediterranean co-operation, influenced by functionalism, actually brought increased disputation among the partners during its first two years. There has been deep disagreement over whether European Union (EU) Mediterranean policy should be based on common positions or accommodate French leadership ambitions. Adverse external conditions have affected the prospects of the infant UfM, but so too have intra-EU differences and problematical institutional structures.

The ‘Union for the Mediterranean’, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Barcelona Process: Old wine in new bottles?

Ever since ancient Roman times the Mediterranean is an important area for Europe and consequently nowadays also for the European Union. However, consecutive enlargements of the Union focussed the attention more eastward. The successive rotating presidencies of the Union always refocus and enlarge the ambit of European attention: While Finland was looking north, Germany traditionally east, the French Presidency of the Council made a conscious effort to redirect attention towards the Mediterranean, a project which had already been pushed earlier by the presidential candidate Sarkozy. The project underwent a considerable metamorphosis during its development: The original idea of a stand-alone Union of the littoral states only under French leadership was changed to an upgrading and reinforcement of the Barcelona Process initiated by the EU already in 1995. The paper traces the development of the project in its various stages, argues that the institutions of the Union played a crucial role in the Europeanization process of the project and puts it into the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The process is analysed from the point of view of international relations theory in general and interregionalism in particular. Finally a brief comparison of lessons learnt with another interregional process, the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) is made.

Trapped by their ideas: French élites' discourses of European integration and globalization1

Until relatively recently, French élites seemed to have found a winning combination for the communicative discourses through which they legitimated European integration and responded to globalization. First, the Gaullist discourse underplayed the loss of sovereignty by emphasizing the gains to interests and identity through French leadership in Europe. Next, the Mitterrandist discourse updated the ideas in the Gaullist paradigm to legitimate further institutional integration while it added a new rationale for greater economic integration: Europeanization as a shield against globalization. The discourse in the Chirac years did little to change or update this discourse. The problem today is that neither the institutional nor the economic ideas in the discourse are persuasive: the public is convinced that France no longer leads Europe and that Europe no longer protects against globalization. And yet, French élites seem trapped in the old discourse, unable to develop new ideas capable of legitimating France in Europe and the world. This was dramatized by the 2005 French ‘no’ vote on the Constitutional Treaty, and did not change with the 2007 French presidential elections.

A feeling for justice: French reactions to the ‘finnish cause’ between 1890 and 1917

At the turn of the century, Finnish networks in France managed to raise consciousness about Finland and the Finnish situation among certain groups within the French intellectual and political elite. If the French reactions to the ‘Finnish cause’ remained ambiguous, the Finns in Paris and their French interlocutors managed to paint a certain picture of Finland, its political and juridical situation with the Russian empire, and its national development. Until 1917 French leaders continued to emphasize the alliance with Russia against the German threat. Yet the image of Finland and the Finnish networks created in France before the First World War prepared France and the French leadership to see Finland in a certain way when the time came to decide whether or not to recognize Finnish independence.

Victory Through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War (review)

Reviewed by: Victory Through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War Robert K. Hanks Victory Through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War. By Elizabeth Greenhalgh. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-521-85384-2. Maps. Photographs. Tables. Figures. Notes. Bibliographic essay. Index. Pp. xvi, 304. $75.00. Many books about the Western Front during the First World War have been based solely on research in one country. As a result, the historiography of Franco-British relations on the Western Front has been plagued by persistent stereotypes and myths. Elizabeth Greenhalgh's admirable study does much to remedy this problem. Based on extensive archival research in both the United Kingdom and France, it blends together the themes of strategy, civil-military relations, liaison, and logistics. Greenhalgh's overall argument is that victory over the formidable German army was achieved only because Britain and France formed an effective partnership. That said, the path to 1918 was far from easy. The two countries began the war with no real tradition of military cooperation. This was reflected in Lord Kitchener's instructions that the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) should cooperate with the French but that it should also maintain its independence. Relations between the two commanders-in-chief, Marshal Joseph Joffre and General Sir John French, were thus rocky from the beginning. While the two cooperated on occasion against their civilian masters, Joffre found it difficult from the outset to bend Sir John to his will in spite of the French army's [End Page 543] numerical domination of the front. Joffre's authority was further eroded by the growth of the BEF and the ineffectiveness of the French Military Mission with the BEF, which was initially staffed by intriguers and anglophobes. As a result, the French and British armies fought parallel but separate battles on the Somme in 1916. The result was "a complete failure" (pp. 70–71). Franco-British relations deteriorated further in 1917 as the politically divided British cabinet failed to exercise control over Sir Douglas Haig's bloody assaults. Events reached a nadir when British Prime Minister David Lloyd George plotted to undermine Haig by subordinating him to the ambitious new French commander-in-chief, Gen. Robert Nivelle. As a result of his support for Nivelle's disastrous offensive, Greenhalgh argues, Lloyd George bears considerable responsibility for both the French army mutiny and Haig's futile Passchendaele campaign (p. 154). The creation of a new Supreme War Council in October 1917 gave more institutional strength to the alliance, but failed to force Pétain and Haig to give up control of their reserves in 1918, prompting Greenhalgh to label it "a talking shop" (p. 179). Only the German March offensive forced Haig to accept Marshal Ferdinand Foch as Allied commander-in-chief. Having learned from his experiences in Belgium in 1914 and at the Somme in 1916, Foch finally achieved effective unity of command through his judicious use of reserves and his ability to navigate the shoals of inter-Allied rivalries. Greenhalgh agrees with Canadian historian Tim Travers that Foch was chiefly responsible for the victorious Allied strategy on the western front in 1918 (p. 254). Foch's successful command was supported by the Franco-British logistical effort. Following the French navy's lead, Britain successfully implemented the convoy system to overcome the U-boat challenge (p. 116). As a result, there were enough vessels to transport the American army and to meet the needs of both the civilian populations and the Allied armies. The creation of the Allied Military Board of Supply in 1918 under American and French leadership allowed Foch to shuttle reserves between crisis points on the Western Front and to pool resources. Though not free from suspicion and rivalry, the Allies' superior logistical coordination was "just as large an element in the final victory as unity of command" (p. 264). Greenhalgh's analysis is rich and insightful but not above criticism. Although she has made better use of the papers of Franco-British liaison officers than any previous study, the result sometimes over-emphasizes the importance of relatively junior officers to the detriment of more important figures. For example...

Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War (review)

Reviewed by: Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War David French Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War. Edited by Brian P. Farrell. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004. ISBN 0-7735-2731-1. Maps. Notes. Pp. xxvii, 273. $22.95. This volume of essays is a tribute to the late Robert Vogel compiled by his friends, colleagues, and former students. Such volumes are often difficult to prepare given the likelihood that the contributors will each have their own distinct interests which might not mesh easily together. The result can be a book that is less than the sum of its parts. Professor Farrell has avoided that pitfall by asking each contributor to address a common theme, the meaning of the concepts of leadership and responsibility, within the limited timeframe set by the interwar period and the Second World War. The contributors have examined leadership at three different levels. Robert Vogel's own work is present in the shape of an essay on Chamberlain and appeasement that he was working on at the time of his death. Aaron Krishtalka has examined shifting opinions amongst Tory die-hard backbenchers in the Commons during the opening months of the war and culminating in Chamberlain's rejection by his own party, while Trevor Burridge looks at the role of the Labour Party's leader, Clement Attlee. The dilemmas that faced public officials are represented by two essays, one by Neil Cameron on the scientist A. V. Hill, and the second by Sidney Aster, who examines the effort of the British ambassador to Moscow, Sir William Seeds, to facilitate an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance that might have deterred Hitler from going to war. Finally, the difficulties of balancing their various responsibilities confronting military leaders are represented by three essays: the editor himself explores Sir Archibald Wavell's responsibility for the fall of [End Page 544] Singapore, Paul D. Dickson looks at the sometimes difficult relations between British and Canadian commanders in North West Europe in 1944; and, in the only essay that does not focus on Britain and its empire, Peter Hoffman explores the moral dilemmas that confronted Claus von Stauffenberg, Hitler's would-be assassin. The scholarly standards of the individual essays are uniformly high. Only one thing is missing from this book. There is no attempt to bring together the insights offered by the individual essays and to reflect in more general terms on the practical and moral problems of leadership in wartime. But on the whole the work represents a fine tribute to a scholar and teacher who, to judge by the tone and contents of Professor Farrell's summary of Robert Vogel's life and career, had a considerable impact on those he taught and befriended during his long academic career. David French University College London London, United Kingdom Copyright © 2006 Society for Military History

French colonial education and elite Moroccan Muslim resistance, from the treaty of fes to the Berber Dahir

This article explores colonial education as a site of interaction between French colonisers and elite Moroccan Muslims, from the beginning of the protectorate to the early 1930s. The French administration wished to implement an anti-assimilationist educational policy that would keep Moroccans rooted in traditional culture. However, this policy was challenged by Moroccan elites who hoped to minimise French influence over the traditional institutions of Moroccan society while maximising Moroccan access to French higher education, professions and administration. The resulting compromise was a French-based educational system that was nevertheless steeped in the anti-assimilationist philosophy of the French leadership. This article argues that while the French-based curriculum prompted nationalist accusations of assimilationism, the ethnological, anti-assimilationist ‘meta-curriculum’ complemented the ideas of Moroccan nationalists who denounced assimilationism and challenged the French Berber Policy.

Myths of Blitzkrieg —The Enduring Mythology of the 1940 Campaign

March/April 2005 · Historically Speaking1 1 Myths of Blitzkrieg—The Enduring Mythology of the 1940 Campaign James S. Corum The first great Blitzkrieg campaigns of World War II have provided a fertile field for the growth ofmilitary myths. There are many origins of military mythology , but the major myths that arose from the 1940 campaign originate from two sources: the need for the defeated powers to explain a disastrous campaign and, much later, the need to find historical justification for current military theories. Of the five most important myths of the 1940 campaign, some were refuted decades ago, but others seem to have an enduring appeal and still affect the way military historians and theorists conceptualize warfare. Myth 1: Blitzkrieg was a strategy. In the early years of World War II the form of war that quickly became known as "Blitzkrieg" became a major topic ofdiscussion by British and American soldiers, journalists, politicians , and most ofthe educated populace. The rapid German conquest ofPoland, the speedy campaign in Norway, and the fall of France and the Low Countries demanded an explanation . While the German victory in Poland could be explained by the enormous advantages of population, wealth, and technology that the Germans enjoyed, the defeat of the British and French in Norway and northern France in 1 940 signaled a genuine revolution in warfare. Why had the British and French succumbed so easily to the Germans? The answer was quick in coming: the Germans had employed a long-prepared Blitzkrieg strategy against the Western allies. Yet there really was no such thing as a Blitzkrieg strategy. Blitzkrieg, a term coined and popularized by journalists in the early years of World War II, was not commonly used in the Wehrmacht before or even during the war. Campaigns led by armored and motorized spearheads that aimed to outflank and destroy the enemy forces were known in German military doctrine as Bewegungskrieg (translation: war of maneuver). Maneuver warfare, to use the correct term, included several concepts such as combined arms (the effective use of infantry, artillery, tanks, engineers , and motor vehicles in concert) and joint operations (operational coordination of air and ground forces to attain an operational objective). The Germans were well trained in both the combined arms tactics and joint operations necessary to carry out a war of maneuver, and this operational method fit in well with the preference to fight short and decisive wars. But a tactical and operational method cannot in itself be called a strategy. In fact, while the Wehrmacht had long thought through the plans for a war against Poland, it was well behind the planning curve in the Scandinavian campaign. There had been no prewar planning or even a serious effort at intelligence gathering for a campaign in Norway. Only in December 1939 did the Germans put together a planning staff for the Norway/Denmark operation. It was a hurried and incomplete effort, and as late as three weeks before the invasion the German staff still lacked intelligence as to the location of some ofthe Norwegian airfields. It was still a successful effort because the British and French plan to intervene in Norway (started before the Germans) was worse than the German plan. The long-prepared German plan for the 1940 offensive was a fairly cautious piece of work, essentially a rehash of the 1914 Schlieffen Plan. In a lucky stroke for the Germans, a stray plane carrying a copy ofthe plan crashed in Belgium in January 1 940, so a new plan had to be created—one that was based on von Manstein's concept of concentrating most ofthe mechanized forces for one great breakthrough in the Ardennes. The German plan relied on poor French leadership to work, and in this assumption the Germans were quite correct. Myth 2: One of the most popular myths promulgated by the French and British leadership at the time is that the German army simply overwhelmed the Allies with masses of modern tanks. This explanation was circulated by many ofthe most prominent military commentators and served to insulate the French and British military leaders from charges of incompetence. Generals can scarcely be blamed if they are overwhelmed by superior numbers. If...

Franklin D. Roosevelt and World War II

“Roosevelt ‘had said that he would wage war, but not declare it, and that he would become more and more provocative.’ ”

Why the General said No

Based upon recently published volumes of French diplomatic documents, this review article examines the course of the negotiations for British entry into the European Economic Community from 1961 to 1963 and the reasons why France vetoed Britains application. It is clear that even before the British government launched its application, the French government was aware of the threat it posed to the cohesion of the Community and to French interests. It therefore pursued tactics of delay. The British, who were in a hurry to join, vainly sought to convince the French of their conversion to the Gaullist conception of a con–federal Europe that would be independent of both the Soviet Union and the United States, even dangling the prospect of nuclear cooperation before President de Gaulle. The latter’s position inside France was relatively weak until he won a referendum on the direct election of the president in October 1962 and his party triumphed in the legislative elections the following month. De Gaulle then felt secure enough to tell Prime Minister Macmillan quite bluntly at their Rambouillet meeting on 15–16 December 1962 that he did not believe that Britain was ready for EEC membership. He had thus already made up his mind to exclude Britain before the Nassau agreement between President Kennedy and Mr Macmillan in which the former agreed to supply Britain with Polaris nuclear missiles, although this agreement confirmed his belief that Britain was excessively dependent upon the United States. Although economic questions—particularly those relating to the system of agricultural support and to Britain’s request for special concessions to Australia, Canada and New Zealand—did play an important part in de Gaulle’s decision, it is clear that political factors were uppermost in his mind. He did not want either a diluted Community or one in which there was a possible rival to French leadership.

De Gaulle, the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, and the Algerian war

Rejecting the orthodoxy of French diplomatic historiography that de Gaulle was the founder of a new French independence and effected a revolution in French diplomacy after freeing himself from the Algerian yoke in 1962, this essay argues that de Gaulle sought from 1958 to make Algeria a central plank of his diplomatic strategy. That strategy sought to transform the relationship with Algeria in order forit to become the key to a neo-colonial French community, the basis for French leadership in Europe and the foundation of a new relationship of equality with Britain and the United States. However, largely as a result of de Gaulle's own making this policy failed to materialise.