IT HAS BECOME BANAL TO STATE THAT THE IRAQ CRISIS has generated profound tensions between the United States and France. The rift that resulted can be considered unprecedented, which makes the evaluation of its long-term consequences difficult. Throughout the crisis, newspapers in the US, and to a lesser extent in France, have told of a clash between two states that presumably have two visions of security management which not only are incompatible but would also dilute their relationship as allies.This essay aims to provide an analysis of Franco-American relations during and in the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, in the broader context of the transatlantic relationship. Three main issues will be addressed. The essay will look first at some of the inherent characteristics of the US and France that would lead to some form of confrontation between the only superpower on one side and one of the few states that aspire to play a global role on the other side. It then comes back to the crisis over Iraq as the source of the rift between the two countries. The French policy is analyzed by distinguishing motives deriving from an alleged grand from elements driven by fundamental divergences with the US on the very nature of the Iraqi threat, and hence on the way it should be tackled. Finally the essay addresses the nature of the transatlantic link after the Iraq crisis and war, with particular attention to France and the US. It looks at threat assessment and perceptions, the acrimony that developed in the two countries and their visions for international institutions. It argues that despite true discrepancies over the nature of the partnership, it remains an framework for addressing current threats.FRENCH VERSUS AMERICAN GLOBAL VISIONS: THE BASIS FOR CONFRONTATIONAmong the many reasons that make the analysis of the Franco-American relationship interesting is the fact that France and the US share some similarities in their approaches to their respective roles on the international scene. Notwithstanding the huge gap that separates the two countries in almost any aspect of what constitutes power nowadays, France and the US are the only countries in the world that cultivate with a degree of confidence the idea that they, as countries, are necessary to the world. The US is the indispensable nation(1) and the French leaders have always had a certain idea of France(2) that implies the notion of doing good. This can be encapsulated in the messianic approach of both countries, by which foreign policy is intimately linked to the promotion of values along with support of more narrowly defined national interests. Any analysis of the American and French foreign policies has to combine these two sets of elements, which fall within both the realist and the liberal paradigms.On the international scene, this peculiarity is associated with the idea of global vision, of a global role.(3) But while such characteristics come naturally with the power status that the US enjoys, they are the result of a permanent struggle for France, which can hardly pretend that it possesses the assets that would naturally give it a global vision or a global role. Yet one of the key principles of French foreign policy since the end of the Second World War, and particularly since the beginning of the Fifth Republic with Charles de Gaulle's return to power (1958), has been to maintain the rank of France on the international scene. With great regularity under all the Fifth Republic presidents, the obsession with France's status has led to a policy combining the optimization of the assets that France inherited from its past (permanent seat at the UN Security Council; relations with Arab states, former colonies and French-speaking countries), the acquisition and development of some elements of what constitutes hard power (nuclear capability and other military assets) and reliance on aspects other than hard power (discourse on human rights, promotion of values, relative independence from the two superpowers during the Cold War, i. …