French-German Relations Research Articles

Nationalism, transnationalism and European socialism in the 1950s: a comparison of the French and German cases

ABSTRACTThis article explores national dimensions of transnational interaction between the French Socialist Party (SFIO) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the 1940s–1950s within a comparative framework. Doing so allows us to uncover why the French and German parties retained intensive transnational contacts with one another despite their disappointments with postwar socialist internationalism. The SFIO and SPD were eager to put a socialist stamp on reconstruction, European integration, and French-German relations. The article shows why transnational engagement with their cross-Rhine colleagues appeared the most promising path to do so. Despite lengthy conflicts on Cold War politics, the international politics of reconstruction, and, later, decolonization and the Algerian and Suez Wars, the SFIO and SPD successfully compartmentalized their differences by establishing an autonomous track for transnational relations in European parliamentary assemblies. French-German cooperation on matters of European integration yielded the period’s greatest transnational successes, including the establishment of the Congress of Socialist Parties of the European Communities. In the early 1960s, the two-track nature of French-German inter-socialist relations endured but structural factors eroded the balance of power between French and Germans needed to sustain the mutual satisfaction with transnational cooperation that had peaked in the mid-1950s.

Trójkąt Weimarski w latach 1991–1999 i jego znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa europejskiego

The aim of the article is to analyze theWeimar Triangle’s influence on the European security, focusing on the Polish-German and French-German relations, as they play a key role in forming a geostrategic and geopolitical structure in the European context. The way in which the European Union’s member states cooperated with Poland is a symbol of reconciliation for those three great nations. The objective of this initiative was to transform an area of the bygone fierce European wars into a pillar of the continent’s security. According to the author, theWeimar Triangle may serve as a perfect example of how the differences between the Central andWestern Europe in terms of the standards of living could be reduced and how the technological and civilizational gulf could be neutralized in order to guarantee peace and stability in the whole of Europe. Nowadays, the foundation and development of ESDP/CSDP is a chance for good inter-ally relations, while the most serious challenges for the Triangle’s countries include dealing with both the eastern policy and energy policy.

François Mitterrand wobec rozpadu Jugosławii w latach 1991-1995

The French President, Francois Mitterrand, followed with a great deal of attention a deepening collapse of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s of the 20th century. In the beginning, he believed that thanks to reforms and Serbians it will be possible to maintain Yugoslavia as a country. Mitterrand - as opposed to Kohl, who since the beginning of the conflict supported Croatian and Slovenian expectations of independence - was against a ‘wild’ independence. This caused a serious conflict in French-German relations during this time. Finally, in December 1991, France and other members of the European Community, facing a fait accompli by the German side, agreed to acknowledge the independence of all Yugoslav republics, on the condition that they met specified requirements concerning the observance of human rights, including the rights of minorities. Since the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict, Mitterrand was in favor of further mediations and against the military intervention of France or the European Community. He did not change his mind until the end of his presidency in 1995. He believed that one cannot respond with a war for a war. Mitterrand was in favor of sanctions against the fighting sides, he was ready to support the humanitarian aid. On June 28,1992, he went to the surrounded Sarajevo in order to support the local community. Although this trip met with a surprise and admiration of almost the whole world, Mitterrand’s policy became an object of criticism in France by some of French intellectuals. They accused him of supporting Serbians and of showing indifference toward their acts of genocide, above all, in Bosnia. Mitterrand did not agree with these accusations. He stressed that France did more than anybody else for Bosnia.

French–German relations: the Strasbourg–Kehl encounter, 1945–55

German–French relations have proved to be pivotal to the course of modern European history. Recent success, however, has somewhat obscured our memory of the difficult path that has been trod. Directing our attention to Kehl, a small village on the upper Rhine, we can revisit the difficulties inherent in resolving feelings of mutual animosity and longstanding historical problems. Kehl stands for the quest for reconciliation at the local and regional level. In the immediate postwar era, French dreams of continued influence over the Rhine valley would have to be put aside just like German anger over their treatment by the French.

Response to Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg

Three scholars offer separate responses to the article by Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg. The responses include some common points, but they diverge sharply in other respects. The first two respondents generally agree with the conclusions reached by Creswell and Trachtenberg, but one of them believes that the article goes too far (in its contention that France's anxiety about the Soviet Union eclipsed its concerns about Germany), whereas the other argues that the article does not go far enough in showing how the United States adapted its policy to accommodate French leaders. The second respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have added anything new to the latest “revisionist” works on French-German relations in the first decade of Cold War. The third respondent, unlike the first two, rejects the main thrust of the article by Creswell and Trachtenberg and seeks to defend the traditional view that France was very reluctant to go along with U.S. and British policies on the German question. This respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have focused on the most appropriate sources of evidence.

France and the German Question: Avant-garde or Rearguard? Comment on Creswell and Trachtenberg

Three scholars offer separate responses to the article by Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg. The responses include some common points, but they diverge sharply in other respects. The first two respondents generally agree with the conclusions reached by Creswell and Trachtenberg, but one of them believes that the article goes too far (in its contention that France's anxiety about the Soviet Union eclipsed its concerns about Germany), whereas the other argues that the article does not go far enough in showing how the United States adapted its policy to accommodate French leaders. The second respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have added anything new to the latest revisionist works on French-German relations in the first decade of Cold War. The third respondent, unlike the first two, rejects the main thrust of the article by Creswell and Trachtenberg and seeks to defend the traditional view that France was very reluctant to go along with U.S. and British policies on the German question. This respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have focused on the most appropriate sources of evidence.

Response to “France and the German Question, 1945–1955,” by Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg

Three scholars offer separate responses to the article by Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg. The responses include some common points, but they diverge sharply in other respects. The first two respondents generally agree with the conclusions reached by Creswell and Trachtenberg, but one of them believes that the article goes too far (in its contention that France's anxiety about the Soviet Union eclipsed its concerns about Germany), whereas the other argues that the article does not go far enough in showing how the United States adapted its policy to accommodate French leaders. The second respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have added anything new to the latest “revisionist” works on French-German relations in the first decade of Cold War. The third respondent, unlike the first two, rejects the main thrust of the article by Creswell and Trachtenberg and seeks to defend the traditional view that France was very reluctant to go along with U.S. and British policies on the German question. This respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have focused on the most appropriate sources of evidence.

Unequal Partners. French-German Relations, 1989-2000

Foreword by Simon Serfaty Preface Introduction Managing the Revolution of 1989 Moving toward Maastricht Ratification Crises and the Varieties of Euroskepticism, 1993-1996 Pessimism and Disappointment, 1995-1997 New Men and Old Problems Stumbling toward Enlargement Conclusions Bibliography Index

Franco-German Relations and European Integration: Peeling off the Labels

Books Reviewed in this article: Alistair Cole, Franco–German Relations Julius Friend, Unequal Partners: French–German Relations 1989–2000 Gisela Hendriks and Annette Morgan, The Franco–German Axis in European Integration Douglas Webber (ed.), The Franco–German Relationship in the European Union

L'occupation française après 1945 et les relations franco-allemandes

French Post-war Occupation in French-German Relations Since 1945, Rainer Hudemann. Recent research and the opening up of archives make it possible to reinterpret French-German relations concerning French occupation at the end of the Second World War. Many preconceived ideas have been challenged, particularly the fact that French policy concerning Germany in 1945 was a reprint of its 1919 economic and military security policy as well as its policy of obstruction on the Berlin Interallied Control Council in which it was very active. After 1945, important French initiatives were implemented on the ground in the occupation zone, preparaing for future cooperation.