Frege's Theory Research Articles

Remarks on the problem of Sense in a pragmatic reading

The division of the problems about Meaning in an extensional and an intensional theory was accused of unnecessarily duplicating the theoretical problems involved in the knowledge of Meaning. The result was either 1. an aggressive rejection of the intensional part of the problem or 2. the adoption of non-classical semantics to account for intensions. This paper suggests a reading of Frege's theory of Meaning that preserves the contribution of the intensional aspect of the question without sacrificing the benefits of the classical insights. For this, however, we need to expand his theory to cases of semantic values which are not directly assertive, that is, what Micheal Dummett called ingredient value. This solution preserves the direct and intuitive insights of classical semantics, expanding it to cases where the designation of truth or falsehood does not have a unified interpretation: speculative, modal, ambiguous, relative cases or cases in which theories disputing Meaning is not straightforwardly mapped to the truth or the not-truth. The paper is a contribution to support the pragmatic interpretation of Frege's legacy by Micheal Dummett.

Frege's Answer to Kripke

AbstractIn his Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke puts forth a series of arguments against theories of proper names he calls Frege‐Russell theories. As the title reveals, Kripke takes Gottlob Frege's theory of sense and Bedeutung to be a good representative of these theories. In this essay, I characterize how Frege might have answered Kripke. I agree with Kripke that presumably Frege thought that the sense of a proper name is the same as some definite description. I, however, question his assumption that Frege's theory of proper names was a theory of meaning as he uses the term. I go even further and suggest that it is not so obvious that Frege thought, at least always, that the role of the concept of sense in his theory is a semantic concept at all. This constitutes the heart of my reconstruction of Frege's answer. I argue that this, together with Frege's conception of natural languages, would have allowed him to hold that the sense of a proper name may sometimes be the same as the sense of an indefinite or even a wrong description. This makes Frege's theory immune to Kripke's counter‐arguments.

‘The bang was not as loud as I had expected’

AbstractIn 442 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein criticises the application of Russell's theory of descriptions to the sentence in the title without mentioning Russell or his theory. Wittgenstein is making a general point of wider interest. I have two aims. The first is to situate Wittgenstein's critique within the larger theoretical setting of Russell's theory of descriptions and Frege's theory of indirect reference in light of the familiar problem of quantifying into attitude contexts. The second is to draw broader methodological implications from the foregoing for how best to think of the role of individual semantic paraphrases within the formal semantic study of natural language.

Biçimsel Bir Dil Olarak Müzikte Anlam

Since the time that people began to theorize about music, it has been approached from opposite poles –either as an emotion or as a mathematical form. The same binary approach has also continued to influence the ideas that claim music as a language. In this context, music has been viewed as either a language of emotion or as a formal language. Music as the language of emotions offers a subjective analysis in terms of focusing on the emotions it arouses, rather than the music itself. Moreover, despite its focus on emotions, this subjective analysis claims that it provides a direct analysis to music. Although our study does not reject the power of music for evoking emotions, it opposes the claim that the bond between music and emotions is direct. By analyzing the elements of music, music as a formal language addresses a work on the piece. Music as a formal language is a work on the work itself. To illustrate this, we will show how music is approached as a formal language. In doing so, we will first discuss the structure of music and analyze how emotions take place in this structure. Then, we will explain the formality of the elements of music, pointing out what these elements are. After that, we will discuss the dilemmas of the expression of “music as an emotional language,” by addressing the problematic aspects of the emotion-language assumption. Then, we will focus on the distinction between formal languages and natural languages. From this point of view, we will explain how music, which we have positioned as a formal language, deserves this approach. Finally, we will point out the opportunities of the objective meaning provided by the approach that takes music as a formal language. We will discuss the objective sense drawing on Frege's theory of sense. Considering Frege's distinction between sense, reference and representation, and adopting the distinction between sense and representation in music is essential for understanding the sense of music. Frege distinguishes between the two with an emphasis on the objectivity of sense and the subjectivity of representation. We think that it is necessary to maintain this distinction made by Frege and adapt it to the music in order to capture the objective sense of the music. The objective sense approach would give us the opportunity to focus on the art of music itself. Therefore, providing an alternative approach to the question of how musical sense can be grasped, our study distinguishes itself from other theories that considers music as an instrument of emotion through objective sense.

Frege’de Yargıların Formel Mantıksal Analizi ve Düşünceler Üzerine

Frege made a derivative of the distinction that he made between the meanings of senses (Sinn) and references (Bedeutung) on judgments, and named the judgments which he treats as hollow functions; ‘Unsaturated’ (ungesättigt) phrases and the phrases which completed an argument as, ‘Saturated’ (gesättigt) phrases. Saturated phrases consist of first and second level concepts and are considered to be meaningful expressions with an accurate value. Frege became the founder of modern symbolic logic with the language of formal logic he developed in ‘Concept Writing’, and based all this formal analysis on the distinction of ‘function (Funktion) – argument (Argument)’ and ‘concept – coverage’. The philosopher, who makes sense of the judgments as their ‘thoughts’; determines the logical value accuracy of the reference on the basis of this distinction, has adopted a contradictory acceptance in terms of both considering the judgments as a condition of being able to receive a truth value and reducing them to the senses of the sentences. Then, if the thoughts were indeed the sense of the sentences, as Frege thought, then it would not be possible to speak of sentences that were meaningful but lacked truthfulness. That is why, to overcome this distress, we propose to change the definition of thought in Frege's theory and to consider it as function values, not the sense of sentences. Likewise for us, thoughts are not the senses of the sentences, nor are they references. Contrariwise, thoughts are the function value of the sentences. To put it in a different way, if a sentence lacks function value, it can be meaningful but not true or false, and if the sentence has a function value, it can be true or false. Thus, for us, thoughts are neither the expression of the sentence in the language nor the logical value of the sentence; thoughts are function values that can be true or false.

Reformulation of Frege's Theory of Thoughts

Reformulation of Frege's Theory of Thoughts

Extensionality, Indirect Contexts and Frege's Hierarchy

It is well known that Frege was an extensionalist, in the following sense: he held that the truth-value of a sentence is always a function only of (its syntax and) the references (the ‘extensions’) of its parts. One consequence of this view is that expressions occurring in certain linguistic contexts – for example, the that-clauses of propositional attitude ascriptions – do not have their usual references, but refer instead to what are usually their senses. But although a number of philosophers have objected to this result, no one has yet attempted to see what happens to Frege's views – and, in particular, to his theory of sense and reference – if his extensionalism is abandoned while his other views are (so far as possible) maintained. This paper thus does two things. First, it clears the way for such an attempt, by arguing that recent defences of Frege's extensionalism – by Tyler Burge, Saul Kripke, Terence Parsons and Christopher Peacocke – fall short. Second, it sketches a positive proposal for a non-extensionalist application of Frege's theory of sense and reference to sentences of indirect discourse and ascriptions of propositional attitude.

Is Church’s Picture of Frege a Good One?

A. Church has contributed a lot to the safeguard of G. Frege's theory of meaning after the discovery of antinomies in it. To achieve this he has adapted it by keeping parts, discarding others and adding new ones, most of which are clearly exposed in an informal way in the introduction to his Introduction to Mathematical Logic. As for any modification of a theory by another person, it is interesting to understand how the thoughts of the former survive in the new theory even though radical changes have occurred, or on the contrary how it retains only the appearance of the initial theory. We shall therefore go through the basic concepts of logic he introduces in this introduction and assess their relation to Frege's original theory.

Frege's Approach to the Foundations of Analysis (1874–1903)

The concept of quantity (Größe) plays a key role in Frege's theory of real numbers. Typically enough, he refers to this theory as ‘theory of quantity’ (‘Größenlehre’) in the second volume of his opus magnum Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Frege 1903). In this essay, I deal, in a critical way, with Frege's treatment of the concept of quantity and his approach to analysis from the beginning of his academic career until Frege 1903. I begin with a few introductory remarks. In Section 2, I first analyze Frege's use of the term ‘source of knowledge’ (‘Erkenntnisquelle’) with particular emphasis on the logical source of knowledge. The analysis includes a brief comparison between Frege and Kant's conceptions of logic and the logical source of knowledge. In a second step, I examine Frege's theory of quantity in Rechnungsmethoden, die sich auf eine Erweiterung des Größenbegriffes gründen (Frege 1874). Section 3 contains a couple of critical observations on Frege's comments on Hankel's theory of real numbers in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Frege 1884). In Section 4, I consider Frege's discussion of the concept of quantity in Frege 1903. Section 5 is devoted to Cantor's theory of irrational numbers and the critique deployed by Frege. In Section 6, I return to Frege's own constructive treatment of analysis in Frege 1903 and succinctly describe what I take to be the quintessence of his account.

Kripke's Frege

In a recent essay, “Frege's Theory of Sense of Reference: Some Exegetical Notes”, Saul Kripke shows that in addition to being an astute critic of Frege, he is also an insightful interpreter. Kripke's Frege emerges as a closet Russellian, who, like Russell, relies heavily on a doctrine of acquaintance. Is Kripke right? Where exactly does his approach resemble, and where depart from earlier interpretations, and what should one take away about whether or not Frege really was a Russellian and the effect this has on his theory?

Diagnosis in the field of psychotherapy: A plea for an alternative to the DSM‐5.x

This paper studies how diagnosis is currently conceptualized in the field of psychiatry, and examines whether this mode of diagnosis is relevant for psychotherapeutic intervention. Narrative literature review was used in this study. In the context of the DSM, diagnosis is equated with classification. Symptoms and complaints are approached in terms of a medical semiological model, and are seen as signs of underlying illness processes. In discussing this approach the author makes use of Gottlob Frege's theory, in which three aspects of a sign are discerned: the reference/referent or Bedeutung, the sense or Sinn, and the representation/idea or Vorstellung. Based on this distinction, it is argued that in the transition from the DSM-III to the DSM-5 much effort has been taken to disambiguate the sense attributed to symptoms and complaints, while person-specific ideas and representations have been excluded. This exclusion of the Vorstellung is criticized, both from a psychiatric and a psychotherapeutic perspective. Subsequently it is argued that whereas the DSM-III and DSM-IV avoided strong statements on etiology, the DSM-5 makes clear choices. The DSM-5, and more recently the RDoC group within the NIMH, aims at developing systems of classification that start from the assumption that psychiatric disorders are brain disorders. It is argued that by doing so a referent is classified that is different from the object of intervention that psychotherapeutic theories are concerned with. Such a view of diagnosis is not workable for psychotherapy. The exclusion of personal experiences associated with symptoms and complaints is problematic and the referent that recent psychiatric classification uses, that is, brain processes, is not compatible with the referent that psychotherapeutic theories use. Case formulation can be seen as an alternative to standard classification.

What Frege's Theory of Identity is Not

The analysis of identity as coreference is strongly associated with Frege; it is the view in Begriffsschrift, and, some have argued, henceforth throughout his work. This thesis is incorrect: Frege never held that identity is coreference. The case is made not by interpretation of “proof-quotes”, but rather by exploring how Frege actually deploys the concept. Two cases are considered. The first, from Grundgesetze, are the definitions of the core concepts, zero and truth; the second, from Begriffsschrift, is the validity of Leibniz's Law. In both cases, if identity is coreference, results ensue that would be unacceptable to Frege.

Sense, Reference and Hybridity

In his paper on ‘Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference’ Saul Kripke remarks: “Like the present account, Kunne stresses that for Frege times, persons, etc. can be part of the expression of the thought. However, his reading is certainly not mine in significant respects . . .”. On both counts, he is right. As regards the differences between our readings, in some respects I shall confess to having made a mistake, in several others I shall remain stubbornly unmoved. Thus I shall insist on the need for distinguishing Fregean sense from linguistic (lexico-grammatical) meaning, I shall resist Kripke's function-theoretic account of ‘hybrid’ thought-expressions, and I shall deplore his transformation of Gottlob Frege into Gottrand Fressell. As regards this transformation, I shall argue that some of the main points Kripke wants to drive home do not depend on it.

The Senses of Functions in the Logic of Sense and Denotation

AbstractThis paper discusses certain problems arising within the treatment of the senses of functions in Alonzo Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation. Church understands such senses themselves to be “sense-functions,” functions from sense to sense. However, the conditions he lays out under which a sense-function is to be regarded as a sense presenting another function as denotation allow for certain undesirable results given certain unusual or “deviant” sense-functions. Certain absurdities result, e.g., an argument can be found for equating any two senses of the same type. An alternative treatment of the senses of functions is discussed, and is thought to do better justice to Frege's original theory.

Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes1

Abstract:Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well‐known ‘unlearnability’ argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is specified in a particular way, so that giving a reference implies giving a sense; and that one must be ‘acquainted’ with the sense. It is argued that an indirect sense must be ‘immediately revelatory’ of its reference. General principles for Frege's doctrine of sense and reference are sated, for both direct and indirect quotation, to be understood iteratively. I also discuss Frege's doctrine of tensed and first person statements in the light of my analysis. The views of various other authors are examined. The conclusion is to ascribe to Frege an implicit doctrine of acquaintance similar to that of Russell.

Reviews

TheoriaVolume 71, Issue 4 p. 368-384 Reviews First published: 11 February 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2005.tb00893.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom Tapio Korte, Frege and his Epigones. A Historical Study of the Role of Sense in Gottlob Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference. Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae Ia 75–89 Volume71, Issue4December 2005Pages 368-384 RelatedInformation

Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Developed and Defended

Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Kiinne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why Frege held the hybrid proper name view, I will defend it against recent criticism, and argue that it is superior to views that take demonstrative pronouns to be the bearer of semantic properties.

On the “Gray's Elegy” Argument and its Bearing on Frege's Theory of Sense

In his recent book, The Metaphysicians of Meaning (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so‐called “Gray's Elegy” argument (the GEA) in “On Denoting”, Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege's theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege's theory than against Russell's own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects of Makin's interpretation of the GEA, I differ with him regarding some significant details and present an interpretation according to which the GEA emerges as simpler, stronger, and more integrated.

Frege, Boolos, and Logical Objects

In this paper, the authors discuss Frege's theory of “logical objects” (extensions, numbers, truth-values) and the recent attempts to rehabilitate it. We show that the ‘eta’ relation George Boolos deployed on Frege's behalf is similar, if not identical, to the encoding mode of predication that underlies the theory of abstract objects. Whereas Boolos accepted unrestricted Comprehension for Properties and used the ‘eta’ relation to assert the existence of logical objects under certain highly restricted conditions, the theory of abstract objects uses unrestricted Comprehension for Logical Objects and banishes encoding (eta) formulas from Comprehension for Properties. The relative mathematical and philosophical strengths of the two theories are discussed. Along the way, new results in the theory of abstract objects are described, involving: (a) the theory of extensions, (b) the theory of directions and shapes, and (c) the theory of truth values.

Frege: Evidence for Self-Evidence

In 'Frege's Notions of Self-Evidence',1 I set out to articulate the role that self-evidence plays within Frege's philosophy of mathematics. I argued that within Frege's writings, there are two distinct notions that are translated 'self-evidence'. One notion is of a truth being foundationally secure without being grounded on any other truth. The other notion is of a truth being such that a reasoner can be justified in believing it simply by clearly grasping its content. I argued that both of these notions are needed to understand Frege's theory of ultimate foundational proofs, his method for discovering such proofs, and his motivations for proving the propositions of arithmetic. I situated my discussion of self-evidence within the debate regarding Frege's reasons for endeavouring to establish logicism. One of the goals of my paper was to advance a new rationale, which I called the Euclidean Rationale, for why Frege endeavoured to prove the propositions of arithmetic: