Frege: Evidence for Self-Evidence

Abstract

In 'Frege's Notions of Self-Evidence',1 I set out to articulate the role that self-evidence plays within Frege's philosophy of mathematics. I argued that within Frege's writings, there are two distinct notions that are translated 'self-evidence'. One notion is of a truth being foundationally secure without being grounded on any other truth. The other notion is of a truth being such that a reasoner can be justified in believing it simply by clearly grasping its content. I argued that both of these notions are needed to understand Frege's theory of ultimate foundational proofs, his method for discovering such proofs, and his motivations for proving the propositions of arithmetic. I situated my discussion of self-evidence within the debate regarding Frege's reasons for endeavouring to establish logicism. One of the goals of my paper was to advance a new rationale, which I called the Euclidean Rationale, for why Frege endeavoured to prove the propositions of arithmetic: