The Influence of Legal Strategy in Dennis v. U.S. (1951) and Yates v. U.S. (1957) In 1951, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the convictions of eleven leaders of the Communist Patty of the United States of America (CPUSA) in Dennis v. United States despite a strong constitutional defense based on the First Amendment right of freedom of speech.' Six years later, in June 1957, the Supreme Court effectively reversed Dennis in Yates v. United States with a decision that greatly reduced the scope of the relevant legislation, the Alien Registration Act (1940), colloquially called the Smith Act.2 As this article demonstrates, current scholarship on that interpretive change neglects an important factor in the Court’s decision-making process—the influence of changes in legal strategy. In an atmosphere of heightened antiCommunist tension in the early stages of the Cold War, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Justice Department deployed Smith Act provisions against CPUSA leaders in New York, where the Party had its headquarters. The conviction of the CPUSA leaders occurred after a ten-month trial that ended in October 1949. The convictions were upheld by the HAYDEN THORNE Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.3 On appeal from that ruling, the Supreme Court’s majority in Dennis ruled that the Smith Act did not violate freedom of speech. In Dennis, the Justices relied on a 1919 precedent, Schenck v. United States, which used what was known as the “clear and present danger” test to allow limitations on civil liberties during periods of heightened threats such as wartime.4 In the case of the CPUSA defendants, the majority, upholding the con victions, accepted the U.S. District Court’s decision that, based on quotations from Marx ist-Leninist publications and speeches, the defendants intended to overthrow the govern ment. The Court also upheld contempt of court convictions against the defendants’ lawyers for their actions during the trial.5 After the Supreme Court had issued that decision, using the same Smith Act provisions, the FBI arrested other CPUSA officials, including fifteen Los Angeles-based leaders who were prosecuted in a six-month trial in 1952. The Los Angeles trial resulted in the conviction of fourteen defendants (one INFLUENCE OF LEGAL STRATEGY IN DENNIS I/. U.S. (1951) 171 defendant, Mary Doyle, was removed from the case in the early stages), and the imprisonment of Oleta Yates on the additional charge of contempt of court for refusing to testify about other defendants’ CPUSA membership.6 Again, the Court of Appeals upheld the convictions.7 In its 1957 decision, the Supreme Court strictly construed the Smith Act to protect free speech and freedom of assembly and set aside the convictions from the federal District Court in Los Angeles, rendering the Act unusable for the majority of CPUSA prosecutions.8 This ana lysis explores the contribution of legal strategies to that shift in interpretation. Many scholars have analyzed the Su preme Court decisions in Dennis and Yates. Despite emanating from a broad range of disciplines and approaches, the authors reach one of two different conclusions. Some scholars, including Michael Belknap and In 1948, eleven U.S. Communist Party leaders were arrested and charged with violating the Alien Registration Act (front row: Eugene Dennis, William Z. Foster, Benjamin Davis; back row: John Williamson, Henry Winston, and Jack Stachel). As they had never openly called for the violent overthrow of the government, the prosecution depended on passages from the works of Marx and Lenin that advocated revolutionary violence and on the testimony of former members of the party who claimed they had privately advocated the use of violence. 1* f ftp* ■ | jH ™ \_ _ • 7"'.'« fH \ I U ••• * ■! William Wiecek, attribute the change in interpretation to broad contextual factors, particularly the anti-Communist hysteria that was near its peak in 1951 and had greatly diminished in 1957.9 The alternative argu ment, taken up by Scott Martelle, Arthur Sabin, and others, is that the shift in interpretation was largely the result of changes to the composition of the Supreme Court.10 Both factors were undoubtedly important in shaping the 1957 interpretation, but examining the legal strategy adopted by...