Free Will Research Articles

Al-Din al-Fit’rat’ Versus ‘Religion of Nature or Naturalism’: The Misunderstood Terms Regarding True Spirit of Islam

The two terms ‘al-Fitrat’ and ‘Nature’ have always been used as synonyms. Books and internet sources including encyclopaedias, provide abundant information based on the concept as these two terms as synonyms. But this paper will reveal that it is a mistake to regard them synonyms. When we expend this concept to Islam as Al-Din Al Fitrat and Western theory of Naturalism and Natural Religions, these terms become ambiguous or having different meanings. Situation becomes more grave when we use the term Nature about something as having some latent and permanent rules, inaccordance with the such thing is bound to work blindly such as the nature of wild animals e.g.snakes, the scorpion, the lion or the fierce phenomenon e.g. the natural forces.
 Application of the term ‘nature’ and use of the term ‘naturalism’ in comparison to Islamic concept of ‘Al-fitrat’is distorting image of Islam as Din al Fitrat. Western concept of ‘Nature’ and ‘Naturalism’ and ‘Natural explanation’, of the Universe are contrary to the concept of Al-Fitrat. The former is cruel, deterministic, and bound force to act according to its own deterministic rules and to act likewise towards other existents. But Islamic concept of ‘al Fitrat’, is neither deterministic nor static. It is creative and kind, that is why God calls himself Al Raheem, al Rehman, and claims that Islam as ‘Din Al- Fitrat’ as well as everyone is born on the basis of ‘al din al fitrat’. So the ‘Nature’ or ‘Naturalism’ does not qualify to be regarded as equal to ‘al-fitrat’. 
 Key Words: 
 Al-Fitrat, Creationism, Free Will and Determinism, Muslim Theology, Nature, Naturalism, Revealed and Natural Religions, Totemism

Locating Freedom in Bergson's Time and Free Will

Abstract The question of the nature of free will remains a perennial challenge for philosophy. The French philosopher Henri Bergson was one who sought to address this challenge. He argued that traditional conceptions of the free-will debate would not suffice. He suggested that both determinist and libertarian accounts fall foul of spatializing tendencies. Bergson's first major work, Time and Free Will, sought to ground his understanding of freedom, in contrast to traditional understandings, in the concept of duration. Bergson, however, actively resisted attempts to define clearly freedom, which he believed ultimately leads to a spatializing of freedom. By attending to Bergson's concept of duration in Time and Free Will, and how this concept relates to freedom, it becomes possible to articulate a positive conception of freedom. This becomes important when arguing for the validity of Bergson's ideas in the current climate. Thus, a positive conception of freedom for Bergson can be “defined” as “the creation of the new within the flow of duration.” It is, however, not something that can be defined, but is something that can be located.

The place of Free Will: the freedom of the prisoner.

Debates about the concept of Free Will date back to ancient times. About 40years ago, Benjamin Libet designed an experiment showing that the conscious intention to move is preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation. His finding suggested that unconscious processes determine our decisions. Libet-style experiments have continued to dominate the debate about Free Will, pushing some authors to argue that the existence of Free Will is a mere illusion. We believe that this dispute is because we often measure Free Will using arbitrary human decisions rather than deliberate actions. After reviewing the definition of Free Will and the related literature, we conclude that the scientific evidence does not disprove the existence of Free Will. However, our will encounters several constraints and limitations that should be considered when evaluating our deeds' personal responsibility.

Can Artificial Intelligence be Conscious?

All magic and mystery disappear as soon as an obscure mysterious concept gets a rigorous formal definition. In order to provide an opportunity to talk about the applicability of philosophical / cognitive concepts to the subject area of AI, it is necessary to "ground" these concepts by formulating rigorous formal definitions for them. The fundamental importance of such formal definitions is quite obvious, since any concepts applied to the field of Information Technology must be "codable", i.e. potentially implementable in program code. Thus, the "codable" formal definitions of cognitive terms are the necessary basis on which alone it is possible to build the architecture of AI technology that has the ability to embody these concepts in a real software. The question of the adequacy of such definitions of "reality" and their compliance with existing generally accepted philosophical theories is also very important and quite discussable, but this does not affect the priority and fundamental nature of the requirement for the formulation of "codable" formal definitions. The formulation of "codable" definitions for the concept of "consciousness" and related cognitive concepts and, based on them, statements about their applicability to the subject area of AI is the topic of this publication. Covering questions: Can AI have a Personality / Motivations / Free Will?

On the Will to Be Free in Spite of History: Tran Duc Thao and the Activist Roots of “French” Postcolonialism, 1944-1951

Between 1944 and 1951 a brilliant young philosopher from Vietnam addressed the Parisian public by means of activism and philosophical writing to teach them about the experience of colonial rule. This paper will answer the main question as to what Tran Duc Thao taught the Parisian intellectual scene concerning colonialism, freedom and democracy. To this end this paper investigates Tran Duc Thao’s activist attempt to rally the French public to the cause of decolonization. It will discuss how Tran Duc Thao’s activism shaped his anticolonial philosophy. The essay compares Tran Duc Thao’s conception of decolonial freedom to Jean-Paul-Sartre’s existentialist conception of freedom. The most important findings of this paper are first that Tran Duc Thao considered capitalism and colonialism to be related phenomena exploiting conscripts of modernity in a broad sense. Second, that his anticolonial philosophy was a means to explain why people in France did not understand this. Third, that Tran Duc Thao’s philosophy of freedom better fits contemporary postcolonial philosophy and environmental philosophy. While Tran Duc Thao’s work became obscured, he was nevertheless responsible for introducing anticolonial activism in the French university. His concept of the imperial horizon is a powerful tool for historians to understand why so many Europeans failed to support the wish for freedom and democracy of colonial peoples after WW II.

Divine Causality and Human Free Will: Ṭūsī’s Solution and Its Historical Background

Abstract This article aims to delve into the approach of Ḫwāǧa Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī to a fundamental philosophical question concerning human agency: How can human free will coexist with a necessitating causal framework, where every effect is bound by its complete cause? Ṭūsī’s solution, which left a lasting impact on subsequent philosophical discussions on the issue, particularly within Shiite scholarly circles, revolves around the introduction of a differentiation between types of causes. I will examine Ṭūsī’s elucidation delineated in two of his works: Ǧabr wa Qadar in Persian and a concise Arabic text on Afʿāl al-ʿibād. Additionally, I will endeavor to uncover the historical origins and intellectual influences that may have shaped Ṭūsī’s approach to the question of human free will.

A Tentative Study of John Steinbeck’s Morality in East of Eden

East of Eden is one of the most famous novels by American author and Nobel Prize winner John Steinbeck. The title of the novel, "East of Eden," is taken from the Bible, a place where sin and hope coexist. Although the book has been criticized by many literary critics, Steinbeck's unique moral ideas in the book are worthy of careful study by future generations. Based on East of Eden, this paper will analyze some important characters and metaphors in the novel from the two levels of "Free Will" and "Guilty Inheritance", and analyze Steinbeck's moral concepts and gain inspiration from them.

자유의지와 인과적 근원 －개입주의 인과론자의 조작 논증 비판과 그 문제점－

자유의지와 인과적 근원 －개입주의 인과론자의 조작 논증 비판과 그 문제점－

Free from your experiences to grow: belief in free will moderates the relationship between attachment avoidance and personal growth initiative

BackgroundAttachment theory proposes that attachment security facilitates personal growth. However, attachment security origins in relationship history, and thus, how people treat their experiences may influence the outcomes of attachment security. People differ in the degree in believing that human beings have free will, and belief in free will may influence the relationship between experiences and outcomes. The present cross-sectional study investigated the relationships between attachment security, belief in free will, and personal growth initiative.MethodsWe used the cross-sectional data of 346 Chinese college students for data analysis, including correlational analyses, regression, and moderation analyses. The nine-item Chinese version of the Experiences in Close Relationships-Relationship Structures Scale, the sixteen-item Chinese version of the Personal Growth Initiative Scale-II, and the seven-item Free Will subscale of the Chinese version of the Free Will and Determinism Plus Scale were utilized.ResultsResults showed attachment avoidance and belief in free will, not attachment anxiety, was associated with personal growth initiative. Belief in free will moderated the association between attachment avoidance and personal growth initiative. When the centered score of belief in free will was higher than 0.64, attachment avoidance was no longer associated with personal growth initiative. 85.84% of our data were below this Johnson-Neyman significance region, and 14.16% were above. In other words, only those who scored higher than 0.64 on free will beliefs were able to pursue personal growth despite their high attachment avoidance.ConclusionsThese findings suggest that when believing in free will, avoidantly attached people may believe in their ability to pursue personal growth and think their future has more possibilities, not influenced by other factors like social support, which they think they lack.

The Disintegration of Traditional Image: On Antigone’s Free Will and Action

In the great tragedy Antigone, for a long time, it seems that the study of female image, Antigone, is imprisoned in the Oedipus family and ancient Greek city-state, family ethics and city-state law, feminism and masculinity. However, based on deconstructionism, American scholar Judith Butler advocated breaking the binary opposition of gender category. In the paper, the image formula of Antigone is broken based on Butler’s revelation of the gender category and the construction of kinship, and combined with the “desire” doctrines of Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic ethics. It highlights Antigone’s free will and action, which is of great significance to clarify Antigone’s spirit of freedom and enrich her image.

Doyle’s Two-Stage Approach to Free Will: A Biophysics for Real Choice?

Robert Doyle has argued that traditional difficulties associated with the concept of free will can be resolved by a two-stage approach, explored by several philosophers and scientists. Possibilities for action can be generated within the brain, more or less randomly, from which an ‘adequately determined’ choice can be made. A similar selective process is well worked out within immune cells, which may provide a useful model. A degree of randomness is pervasive in the physical world but living systems have evolved to both tame and exploit this aspect at the interface between fluid and solid phases. Random and systematically determined processes are used in combination. These cell biological considerations support the plausibility of the two-stage model and may help point to specific mechanisms but may also raise a question about ‘who’ is doing the choosing. Computer modelling may sharpen the focus of that question. It may also highlight a paradox – that ‘freedom’ may only exist as the flipside of limitations or constraints imposed by real world situations.

Do group agents have free will?

ABSTRACT It is common to ascribe agency to some organized collectives, such as corporations, courts, and states, and to treat them as loci of responsibility, over and above their individual members. But since responsibility is often assumed to require free will, should we also think that group agents have free will? Surprisingly, the literature contains very few in-depth discussions of this question. The most extensive defence of corporate free will that I am aware of (Hess [2014], “The Free Will of Corporations (and Other Collectives)”, Philosophical Studies 168 (1): 241–260) rests on a compatibilist understanding which takes reasons-responsiveness and acting from one’s own ‘actional springs’ as key conditions for free will but says little about a condition that free-will libertarians emphasize: the possibility of doing otherwise. In this paper, I will argue that group agents can have free will not only in a (less demanding) compatibilist sense, but also in a recognizably libertarian sense, which includes the possibility of doing otherwise. In developing this account of corporate free will, I will bring together recent work on group agency and recent work on free will.

Концепция различия Божественной сущности и действий в древнерусской переводной книжности

The author examines the Old Russian reception of the Byzantine translated works that contain the famous doctrine of the essence-energy distinction in God including some aspects of participation to God. I divide works considered in the study into two main groups according to the chronology of translations (pre-Palamite translations (X–XIII centuries) and translations of the Palamite era (XIV century)). The selected and examined texts include the Catechetical Lectures of Cyril of Jerusalem, «Theology» and «Dialectic» of John of Damascus, «On the Free Will» of Methodius of Olympus, the sholia of Nicetas of Heraclea on Gregory Nanzianzus’s 45 Oration, Corpus Areopagiticum with sholia, «On how not to fall into the Heresy of Barlaam and Akindynos» of David Dishypatos. The author shows that the Old Russian readers could be acquainted with the almost complete doctrine of essence-energy distinction in God in such aspects as Divine unity and distinction, the participated and unparticipated sides of God, the creating the Divine names through the contemplating of His energies, the hierarchy of being and its participation in Good, and etc. Damascene’s «Dialectic» introduced the reader to the technical philosophical notion and definitions of action/energy as the one of the nine accidents of essence, following Aristotle and his commentators. The author notices that the most of examined works in this paper were clearly influenced by Pseudo-Dionysius. This fact together with the substantial influence of the Slavonic translation of Dionysius allows me to conclude on the prevalence of Dionysius’s neoplatonic version of essence-energy dsictinction in the Medieval Russia. The Palamite version of considered teaching (except for the writings of David Dishypatos) was very little known in Medieval Russia and could not be fully understood.

Концепция различия Божественной сущности и действий в древнерусской переводной книжности

The author examines the Old Russian reception of the Byzantine translated works that contain the famous doctrine of the essence-energy distinction in God including some aspects of participation to God. I divide works considered in the study into two main groups according to the chronology of translations (pre-Palamite translations (X–XIII centuries) and translations of the Palamite era (XIV century)). The selected and examined texts include the Catechetical Lectures of Cyril of Jerusalem, «Theology» and «Dialectic» of John of Damascus, «On the Free Will» of Methodius of Olympus, the sholia of Nicetas of Heraclea on Gregory Nanzianzus’s 45 Oration, Corpus Areopagiticum with sholia, «On how not to fall into the Heresy of Barlaam and Akindynos» of David Dishypatos. The author shows that the Old Russian readers could be acquainted with the almost complete doctrine of essence-energy distinction in God in such aspects as Divine unity and distinction, the participated and unparticipated sides of God, the creating the Divine names through the contemplating of His energies, the hierarchy of being and its participation in Good, and etc. Damascene’s «Dialectic» introduced the reader to the technical philosophical notion and definitions of action/energy as the one of the nine accidents of essence, following Aristotle and his commentators. The author notices that the most of examined works in this paper were clearly influenced by Pseudo-Dionysius. This fact together with the substantial influence of the Slavonic translation of Dionysius allows me to conclude on the prevalence of Dionysius’s neoplatonic version of essence-energy dsictinction in the Medieval Russia. The Palamite version of considered teaching (except for the writings of David Dishypatos) was very little known in Medieval Russia and could not be fully understood.

Статьи В.С. Соловьева в энциклопедическом словаре А.Ф. Брокгауза и И.А. Ефрона: история публикации, аутентификация, тематика

For the first time Solovyov's lexicographical heritage, as represented in A.F. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron's Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1890–1907), is comprehensively examined. The authentication of the materials from the dictionary itself, epistolary sources and a separate edition of Solovyov's dictionary works (1997) have yielded a list of 183 articles written by the philosopher for the dictionary. The reader is welcomed for the regularity of the ideological component of the articles. Nine thematic groups are distinguished, in particular: “Terms, concepts”, “Personalities (philosophy, religion)”, “Philosophical, social and religious schools/studies”, “Personalities (others)”, “Mythology”. The articles that stand out in particular in Solovyov's system of encyclopedic heritage are identified. These are “Freedom of Will”, “Hegel”, “Plato”, “Comte”, and “Kant”. It is demonstrated that at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. V.S. Solovyov created his own history of philosophy, thus realizing the original strategy of studying the world philosophy by the Russian-speaking readers of the present section of the Dictionary (from VI–V BC up to XIX c.). The author underlines that the choice of names of philosophers, which Solovyov wrote about, illustrates the author's all-embracing and large-scale thinking. The author emphasizes the role of bibliographical sources, which were developed and verified by Solovyov and which help present not only the most important works, in the author's opinion, but the cultural context of the epoch as a whole. The thematic references in the articles are found to reflect the specific organization of the whole corpus of Solovyov's lexicographical works.

Captiveness and Openness as Ontological Intuitions in Works of H. Bergson

The research focuses on the problem of freedom from that point of view which puts captiveness by being and openness to being in the middle of non-dialectical examination. This perspective clarifies not only the major course of Bergson’s thought, but also the subsequent incorrect shift to the pole of openness in the hermeneutical interpretation of facticity, implemented by Heidegger. The work is conventionally divided into two parts. The first one inquires about specifics of the method used by Bergson. It is emphasized the proximity in between Bergson's orientation to the common sense and phenomenological research, despite all differences in these approaches. Also it’s gives a general analysis of Bergson’s concepts used in “Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness” and in “Matter and Memory” in order to adequately questioning about the freedom of a person, acting on the basis of specific practical conditions of his existence. Bergson draws the roads of freedom through the adaptability of the intelligible to the prose of life, establishing the plane of immanence with its unbreakable boundaries. The second part analyzes aesthetic consequences of Bergson’s theory of perception and memory, thus opening access to descending pathways in sensory data processing. The theory of duration and the emphasis it places on retrospection in clarifying what accompanies the act of perception, argues for the connection of creativity with the process of actualization of the virtual. With reference to Deleuze, it is criticized the irrational attempt to assert the beginning of creativity both in nothingness and in the realization of the possible by its limiting. Thus, the appeal to Bergson’s ontological intuitions allows to refuse both the aesthetics of the origin and the logic of the readiness-to-hand-being as primarily encountered in the world. In conclusion, it is considered Bergson's polemic with Einstein, in the resolution of which the logic of differentiation seems preferable to the logic of dialectical sublation.

Problems of fate and free will in Hauptmann's “Iphigenia in Delphi” drama

The article is devoted to the problem of Gerhart Johann Robert Hauptmann’s interpretation of his own views concerning the problem of fate and freewill, which sheds light on the general problem of modern, connected with the eternal process of creative personality, formation. The objectives of the work correspond to this: to substantiate the leading role of anthropological patterns in the Art Nouveau era, to reveal the dynamics of G.Hauptmann’s formation on the basis of commenting his theoretical and artistic works, to reflect in this respect the overcoming of fate and gaining freedom by the heroine of the late drama “Iphigenia in Delphi”. In the course of the analysis, it was revealed that in his later work, G.Hauptmann retains the same views on the fatal predetermination deprived of real being, and he switches to the sphere of feelings. In this case, special attention is paid to the author’s revision of the romantic concept, in which the idea of immortality, transcend the borders of the visible world, became the main one for the said writer. It is from these positions that Iphigenia’s image is revealed. Seeking self-understanding and identity, she renounces the Olympian world, in which sacrifice and fear of gods is the norm, and she voluntarily returns to Hecate’s Palace, as it is in them that a new immortal existence takes place. The conclusion is made about the birth of a new personality through the conception of one’s own existence, the rejection of dogmatic conceptions from the power of the doom makes the individual free, strong and unbroken by anything or anybody.

William King on election, reason, and desire: a reply to Kenneth Pearce

ABSTRACT William King’s De Origine Mali has recently started to attract some attention in early modern scholarship. In a recent paper devoted to King’s theory of free will, Kenneth Pearce identifies a “lacuna” in his text, namely the fact that King “never explicitly describes the process whereby election leads to action” (Pearce, “William King on Free Will”, 4). In this paper, I analyse King’s theory of ‘election’ (roughly, free choice) and Pearce’s interpretation of it. I discuss his claim that there is a lacuna in King’s account and argue that the text provides us with important suggestions on how election generates action. Therefore, no speculative proposal to fill the lacuna is needed. This, in turn, allows me to develop a reading of King’s text that avoids a textual puzzle unsolved in Pearce’s interpretation: while he maintained that every election is “with reason”, my account can take King’s text at face value and explain how some elections are reasonable while others are not.

Doyle’s Two-Stage Approach to Free Will: A Biophysics for Real Choice?

Robert Doyle has argued that traditional difficulties associated with the concept of free will can be resolved by a two-stage approach, explored by several philosophers and scientists. Possibilities for action can be generated within the brain, more or less randomly, from which an ‘adequately determined’ choice can be made. A similar selective process is well worked out within immune cells, which may provide a useful model. A degree of randomness is pervasive in the physical world but living systems have evolved to both tame and exploit this aspect at the interface between fluid and solid phases. Random and systematically determined processes are used in combination. These cell biological considerations support the plausibility of the two-stage model and may help point to specific mechanisms but may also raise a question about ‘who’ is doing the choosing. Computer modelling may sharpen the focus of that question. It may also highlight a paradox – that ‘freedom’ may only exist as the flipside of limitations or constraints imposed by real world situations.

Quantum Indeterminism, Free Will, and Self-Causation

A view that emancipates free will by means of quantum indeterminism is frequently rejected based on arguments pointing out its incompatibility with what we know about quantum physics. However, if one carefully examines what classical physical causal determinism and quantum indeterminism are according to physics, it becomes clear what they really imply — and, especially, what they do not imply — for agent-causation theories. Here, I will make necessary conceptual clarifications on some aspects of physical determinism and indeterminism, review some of the major objections against libertarian conjectures, and show that there is no conceptual incompatibility preventing us from taking a 'quantum-libertarian' approach to the problem of free will. In particular, I will illustrate the possible role of self-causation (causa sui) as a potential solution to otherwise apparently incompatible or even paradoxical statements concerning free will and quantum indeterminism.