Value Of Free Speech Research Articles

Illusory interparty disagreement: Partisans agree on what hate speech to censor but do not know it

Whether and when to censor hate speech are long-standing points of contention in the US. The latest iteration of these debates entails grappling with content regulation on social media in an age of intense partisan polarization. But do partisans disagree about what types of hate speech to censor on social media or do they merely differ on how much hate speech to censor? And do they understand out-party censorship preferences? We examine these questions in a nationally representative conjoint survey experiment (participant N = 3,357; decision N = 40,284). We find that, although Democrats support more censorship than Republicans, partisans generally agree on what types of hate speech are most deserving of censorship in terms of the speech's target, source, and severity. Despite this substantial cross-party agreement, partisans mistakenly believe that members of the other party prioritize protecting different targets of hate speech. For example, a major disconnect between the two parties is that Democrats overestimate and Republicans underestimate the other party's willingness to censor speech targeting Whites. We conclude that partisan differences on censoring hate speech are largely based on free speech values and misperceptions rather than identity-based social divisions.

Taking Seriously Campus Debates Surrounding Invited Speakers: Open-Mindedness and the Ethics of Inquiry in Higher Education

Context: College campuses in the United States are currently engaged in public and ongoing negotiation of the value and limits of free speech in educational contexts. Responses to invited campus speakers from students, faculty, and campus leaders point to diverging perspectives on the roles and responsibilities of higher education institutions and their members as communities of inquiry. Considering these perspectives raises questions about the epistemic aims of colleges and universities. Purpose: The purpose of this article is to investigate perspectives on the ethics of inquiry and on the value and demands of open-mindedness in higher education. Specifically, I examined one case of an invited campus speaker who sparked considerable debate—Charles Murray’s invited talk at Middlebury College in 2017. Research Design: This study employs the methods of empirically engaged philosophy, a philosophical approach to inquiry that engages with empirical evidence in considering educational aims and implications for institutional structures and policies. I apply conceptual tools stemming from the philosophical theories of knowledge and justice to a thematic content analysis of public statements made by faculty, administrators, and students in the Middlebury case. Conclusions or Recommendations: Through analysis of this campus speaker case, I observed two alternative perspectives on the ethics of inquiry—rational individualism and just collectivism. These two perspectives shared a number of common commitments, including the importance of cultivation of the mind as a primary aim in higher education; the value of open-mindedness, debate, and protest in the pursuit of truth; and the importance of justice, equality, and inclusion. They diverged in their epistemic orientations (individual vs. collective responsibility), their views on the proper bounds of open debate within an institution oriented toward truth-seeking, and what virtuous open-mindedness requires of individuals and collectives. This study contributes to a contemporary understanding of the unique ethical responsibilities of colleges and universities as inquiring organizations, whose members may hold divergent epistemological orientations. By investigating the relationship between open-mindedness, inquiry, and justice in contemporary public discourse in higher education, this study addresses a need for deeper engagement with the philosophical foundations of higher education.

Prejudicial Speech: What's a Liberal to Do?

AbstractThis paper discusses potential responses to harmful prejudicial speech. More specifically, it considers how different types of prejudicial speech merit different responses. The paper distinguishes hate speech, discriminatory speech, and toxic speech as different types of speech that are prejudicial or oppressive – they are not of the same kind diverging only in their severity and explicitness. As these sorts of problematic speech are categorially distinct, the paper holds, they also demand differential remedies. The task of this paper is to consider such remedies, their potential effectiveness, and compatibility with the liberal value of free speech.

No Platforming and Academic Freedom

Much of the popular debate that surrounds no platforming centres on its putatively corrosive impact on free speech. This is apt to give a misleading picture of the particular puzzle that no platforming presents. Focusing on the university specifically, I contend that no platforming is distinctively objectionable not because it necessarily runs counter to general free speech values but when and because it is inconsistent with principles of academic freedom. This is because it conflicts with the status of members of the academy as those with the legitimacy to determine the appropriate bounds of free inquiry within the university. No platforming is objectionable insofar as it undercuts the authority of academic faculty in determining which speech, and by whom, is consistent with its purpose as an academic institution. Existing debates over no platforming have been too focused on which views are (or are not) given a platform and insufficiently attentive to the question of who decides who or what to platform. On the view defended here, no platforming by students is objectionable because, under principles of academic freedom, they should not be included in the constituency with the right to constrain the platforming of others.

Understanding UK university academic staff attitudes towards recognising and responding to student radicalisation

AbstractHigher education institutions in England, Scotland and Wales have an obligation under the 2015 Counter Terrorism and Security Act to protect students from being drawn into terrorism. This legislation has proved controversial, with concerns about the securitisation of education, as well as fears of over‐reporting which could stigmatise individuals or communities. Despite the significance of the Act to the education sector and concerns about the implications of compelling educators to report radicalisation concerns, there is limited empirical research exploring how teachers and academics have engaged with the policy. The evidence for higher education settings is particularly limited. This study employed a survey experiment with 1003 academics working in British universities to examine willingness and ability to recognise and respond to student radicalisation. Our data provides no evidence for over‐reporting. Rather, it suggests that academics teaching in British universities are uncertain about radicalisation risk and ambivalent about reporting concerns. Reporting ambivalence is driven by a lack of confidence about appropriate reporting thresholds, concerns about negative consequences of reporting and free speech values. Previous experience of dealing with a student of concern and Prevent training are associated with increased commitment to reporting concerns. The results suggest that Prevent training could be enhanced by targeting more experienced academics and tackling concerns about the tensions between the Prevent duty and freedom of speech policies and values. However, for this training to be effective it is essential that it is credible for an audience that is used to engaging with deep thinking on challenging issues.

Stability and disruptive speech

Stability and disruptive speech

Free Speech and the Legal Prohibition of Fake News

Western European liberal democracies have recently enacted laws that prohibit the diffusion of fake news on social media. Yet, many consider that such laws are incompatible with freedom of expression. In this paper, I argue that democratic governments have strong pro tanto reasons to prohibit fake news, and that doing so is compatible with free speech. First, I show that fake news disrupts a mutually beneficial form of epistemic dependence in which members of the public are engaged with journalists. Second, I contend that laws against fake news enhance rather than thwart personal autonomy. If these suggestions are plausible, then the same considerations about truth and autonomy that underpin the value of free speech give us strong reasons to prohibit fake news.

An Analysis of the coverage of the 2008 presidential election campaign in periodical press in Cyprus

This article examines the performance of what is considered non-partisan newspaper periodicals in Cyprus during the 2008 presidential election campaign, in order to elucidate how the 21st-century periodical press engages with election campaigns and how liberal values of free speech and press freedom are put into practice in this cluster of periodicals. Implementing qualitative content analysis this article is differentiated from what has been published in JEPS and opens a new stream of thought and research with regards to the periodical press, as it sets in the centre of the examination the 21st-century newspaper periodicals and adopts a social sciences perspective and methodology. The findings provide evidence of the content of 21st-century periodicals during an election campaign and reinforce the distinctiveness of periodical press as a cultural object and not simply as a means to distribute information. The analysis illustrates that newspaper periodicals in the contemporary era constitute cultural objects that are autonomous and have certain policy lines. It further provides insights in order to understand better liberal values, such as the free speech and the freedom of the press and to clarify the understanding of the practice of journalism in the newspaper press and of the self-regulation by the press.  This article supports that newspaper periodicals remain valuable for historical research and essential in order to clarify the understanding of the functioning of the newspaper press industry. It further suggests that periodicals constitute key resources for restoring, at any time, the miscellany of conditions and circumstances that characterise different eras and various historical, social, and political moments.  

Cartoons go global: Provocation, condemnation and the possibility of laughter

Since their publication, the Muhammad cartoons featured in Jyllands Posten and Charlie Hebdo have become a symbol of free speech and Western values. These cartoons used provocation as a tool to discuss the limits of free speech and the scope of social self-censorship. In a just society, should the possibility of laughter be distributed equally? Should cartoonists and editors only publish jokes that are universally laughable? What is the proper reaction to these kinds of provocative jokes once the possibility of censorship is ruled out in a liberal context? Is counterspeech or even cancellation a legitimate response?

Content moderation as language policy

Commercial content moderation removes harassment, abuse, hate, or any material deemed harmful or offensive from user-generated content platforms. A platform’s content policy and related government regulations are forms of explicit language policy. This kind of policy dictates the classifications of harmful language and aims to change users’ language practices by force. However, the de facto language policy is the actual practice of language moderation by algorithms and humans. Algorithms and human moderators enforce which words (and thereby, content) can be shared, revealing the normative values of hateful, offensive, or free speech and shaping how users adapt and create new language practices. This paper will introduce the process and challenges of commercial content moderation, as well as Canada’s proposed Bill C-36 with its complementary regulatory framework, and briefly discuss the implications for language practices.

Heckling and free speech

Heckling receives little attention in the vast literature on freedom of speech. But, in a recent contribution, Jeremy Waldron explores a positive case for the practice. Waldron asks us to see heckling as a spectrum of activities, some of which should be both protected and encouraged. In his view, a primary speaker’s right to speak is not a right to a perfectly tailored (or choreographed) presentation before a subdued audience. A great deal of heckling should be treated as legitimate counter speech, covered by audience members’ own expression rights. Waldron also sees heckling as making an important contribution to broader free speech values such as pursuit of truth and political accountability. I argue that the case for treating heckling as wrongful interference with the free speech rights of primary speakers and their willing listeners is much stronger than Waldron makes out. More boisterous forms of heckling should usually be restricted to presentations by political officials or state sponsored events. In other cases, heckling should be restricted to visual forms and displays that do not directly interfere with a primary speaker’s voice.

DISINFORMATION AND CRIME IN GEORGIA: CAN WE CRIMINALISE IT?

The impetus of this paper is to explore disinformation, crime and criminalisation in the context of new media and critically evaluate the statement whether criminalising media or people who deliberately spread false information is logical response to this problem. In doing so, the paper firstly, tries to define what is disinformation, then it explores the process of criminalisation, describes the harm principle and conceptualises the types of harms. Paper then analysis challenges for defining crime in the era of new media, then it explores the value of free speech and finally, infers that criminalisation of disinformation is extreme act from the state, it usually causes only remote harms and therefore, criminalising disinformation shall be resisted.

Post-Materialist Values of Smart City Societies: International Comparison of Public Values for Good Enough Governance

This study aims to analyze the application of good enough governance in considering the citizens’ value propositions that shape smart city societies. This paper applied a quantitative method with cross-country comparisons. Survey data were derived from the World Values Survey. Malaysia was chosen as the main study area, and compared with Indonesia and other countries worldwide. The findings revealed that politics is the value of least concern across all samples. In terms of qualities for children to develop, respondents in both Malaysia and Indonesia were less concerned about imagination and unselfishness. As for materialist versus post-materialist, the ratios of Malaysia and Indonesia were slightly higher than the average; the post-materialist value of free speech was the lowest value chosen. In the long term, all countries are experiencing the trend of moving toward post-materialist societies. To be sustained under the Collective and Adaptive System of smart city societies, good enough governance in Malaysia and Indonesia should consider the cultural context of the Muslim majority, prioritize governance content that allows more space for political participation and free speech, and cultivate the imagination and unselfishness of children. The generated insights underline the critical role that smart societies play in establishing smart cities.

Who's Afraid of Free Speech? It's Critics of Political Correctness Who Shrink from the Values of Free and Robust Expression

Critics of political correctness and cancel culture argue that liberals - especially on college campuses - are hypocrites who care little about the supposed liberal values of free speech and tolerance. In this essay, I argue that it is actually the critics who are afraid of free speech. Much of the social pushback and protest that critics complain about is itself expression. More fundamentally, such pushback is a form of counterspeech and is therefore an indispensable part of our free speech system. This does not mean that all forms of social censure are consistent with free speech. Violence and property damage are so coercive that they are akin to government censorship. But other types of social censure - such as insults, shaming, delegitimizing, demonizing, and even social ostracism - are all compatible with free speech since, although unpleasant, they do not cross the line from persuasion to coercion.

Lying and Freedom of Speech

This Article, prompted by recent criminal cases involving alleged false claims to have been awarded particular military medals, addresses broad questions of lying and freedom of speech. The Supreme Court has held that false assertions of fact – let alone outright lies – have no value for free speech purposes. With more nuance, the Court has also said that as a realistic matter, courts should protect some false speech in order to provide “breathing space” for, or to avoid inhibiting, good faith speech on important matters. This Article argues, however, that lies can actually have substantial, direct, and independent free speech value. Such lies can, under given circumstances, uniquely promote one or more of the standard reasons for protecting speech. While this may initially seem paradoxical, the Article considers in particular two kinds of extreme cases: first, lying in the context of fugitive slave cases, where the lie is told either by the fugitive slave, or by someone assisting the fugitive slave; and second, lying, especially to officials, by threatened Jews, or by others seeking to protect them, in Nazi-controlled territories. The alternatives to lying in such cases are carefully considered as well. The Article then considers less extreme cases, and concludes that in particular circumstances, lying, on any reasonable definition, may distinctively promote any or all of the standard free speech values. Whether a particular lie, or kind of lie, should ultimately be constitutionally protected will of course depend upon an appropriate judicial free speech test.

Dignity and Conflicts of Constitutional Values: The Case of Free Speech and Equal Protection

'Dignity' can mean many things. In no sense is dignity itself a recognized constitutional right. But that hardly shows that dignity is constitutionally trivial. Dignity may help explain why we recognize constitutional rights in the first place. Dignity may also help explain the value and the scope and limits of constitutional rights. Of more immediately practical interest, dignity may help to fairly adjudicate between constitutional claims in conflict. This Article focuses on dignity in a fundamental sense as a value that can commensurate and fairly adjudicate between the often conflicting constitutional values of free speech and equal protection. As it turns out, the idea of dignity does not invariably push conflicts between free speech and equal protection toward the same resolution in every case. Dignity in the crucial sense can support or oppose the priority of either free speech or equal protection claims, depending upon the circumstances.

Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions on Speech

The category of time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, as supposedly distinct from absolute bans, appears to be central to free speech law. Even a modest examination of the case law, however, suggests the arbitrariness of any such distinction. Any familiar time, place, or manner restriction on speech can be reasonably re-described as an absolute ban on speech, and vice versa. Any differences in how the relevant regulations of speech should be judicially tested, whether by differing degrees of rigor or otherwise, are correspondingly arbitrary. This Article recommends abandoning any attempt to substantively distinguish between time, place, and manner restrictions and absolute prohibitions of speech. The three currently used judicial tests for presumed content-neutral restrictions on the supposed time, place, and manner of speech should be substantially revised and consolidated. Any replacement test should then de-emphasize concerns for any degree of narrowness of tailoring, focusing instead on whether the regulated speakers are now meaningfully worse off, in terms of their own free speech values, given whatever channels of communication remain available to them after the speech regulation in question has been imposed.

Liberal and Illiberal Internationalism in the Making of the League of Nations Convention on Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace

The 1936 League of Nations Convention on the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace sought to shape a liberal international public sphere, through encouragement of empathetic and neighborly broadcasts to other nations and prohibitions on international broadcast of hostile speech and false claims. It expressed 1920s liberal hopes that adding protocols and rules to international communications would foster peace. How was it then that by the late 1930s these same hopes for an international public sphere of civil and peace-fostering international discourse appeared to many liberals in national contexts as not only fantastical, but illiberal, a clear threat to the emerging core liberal value of free speech? Analysis of the making and early implementation of the Convention facilitates understanding of the rapid change in the valency of these ideas and illuminates the historical contours of the always-contested line between liberal and illiberal policies in communications history. That line is difficult to discern clearly in this case for two main reasons: removing offensive criticism of other nations from international broadcasting was perceived as illiberal censorship by some and as laudable self-restraint and international good manners by others; positive liberal internationalist content was perceived as educational by liberal internationalists and as potentially illiberal propaganda by nationalists. Viewing the making of the Convention through the lens of the contest about what constituted liberal and illiberal internationalism helps us better understand both its high ambition and some of the reasons why it was so quickly labelled a failure. [End Page 165]

Uneven Epithets

In this paper, I derive a test for distinguishing between derogatory terms by expanding upon Seana Shiffrin’s recent “thinker-based approach.” Protection on her account extends to many forms of speech due to a connection between speech and an individual’s development of autonomous thought. Shiffrin questions whether there is protection for corporate and commercial speech. The latter have a tendency to interfere with autonomous thought processes and do not clearly serve their development. I argue that these reasons for limitation serve as a basis for making nuanced distinctions for general regulation and applying this approach to controversies surrounding derogatory team names in sport. Many kinds of speech can be offensive and derogatory, yet I argue that only some may be said to be parasitic on communicative endeavors and legitimately fall outside free speech values as a result. Regulation should not be concerned with the content of speech, the manner in which certain words are spoken, or even the speaker’s positive or negative intent. Instead, the focus should remain on autonomous mental development of speakers and hearers.

The White Nationalist on Campus: Re-examining University Free Speech and Leading Through Crisis

One month after the Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, left three dead and many injured and arrested, another university faces a tough decision about whether to allow controversial alt-right leader, Richard Spencer, to speak on campus. What seems like a simple decision to allow or deny a speaking request becomes a much deeper conversation about leadership, the value of free speech, and the role of the university to facilitate debate and critical analysis of controversial ideas and viewpoints.