Free Allocation Of Allowances Research Articles

Quantifying Impacts of Consumption Based Charge for Carbon Intensive Materials on Products

After the Paris Climate Agreement, it is anticipated that carbon prices will differ across regions for some time. If countries use free allowance allocation as carbon leakage protection, only a fraction of carbon prices are passed through to consumers particularly by carbon intensive materials producers. Adding a consumption charge based on benchmarks applied to the material content can reinstate the carbon price signal. The paper investigates the implications of such a consumption charge for industry and consumers based on material flow analysis and material flow cost accounting. The material‐related carbon liabilities for production, import, export, and consumption are estimated for 4000 commodity groups that contain one or more of the five bulk materials steel, aluminium, plastics, paper, and cement. Assuming an underlying carbon price of 30 Euros per ton of CO2, the total charge to European final consumers is estimated to be about 17 billion EUR. The total charges levied on imports and those waived for exports are each of similar size and roughly amount to half of the total charge to European final consumers. To reduce administrative efforts, the charge is not levied on imported products for which the value of the consumption charge compared to product price falls below a threshold. Thus administrative efforts for 77 to 83% of imports could be avoided while still 85% to 90% of import‐related carbon liabilities are included.

Extending the EU Commission's Proposal for a Reform of the EU Emissions Trading System

Pursuing an evidence based approach we summarize the key elements of the European Commission’s proposal of July 2015 for a reform of the EU Emissions Trading System and offer facts about the current state of EU ETS that underline the needs for such a reform. We supply key data for understanding the current state of EU ETS and report in particular the share of freely allocated allowances in emissions for the various sectors since the start of EU ETS in 2005. This is the most relevant parameter for evaluating the stringency and cost impacts of the EU ETS on sectors and installations. We provide propositions for enhancing the allocation procedure of both free and auctioned allowances, the fundamental element in the cap and trade design of this system. We link this procedure closely to the relevant suggestions of the Commission proposal and offer extensions that can make in particular the allocation of free allowances more targeted and effective. We indicate how the impacts of free allowances can be calculated both for sectors and installations and conclude that these reform steps could reduce the administrative burden of the system.

Inclusion of Consumption into the EU ETS: The Legal Basis under European Union Law

Traditionally discussed measures to prevent carbon leakage under the European Union (EU) emissions trading system, such as the free allocation of allowances or border carbon adjustments, either suffer from significant economic drawbacks or have seen their political, legal and administrative feasibility questioned. Recently, a novel approach has been proposed in the form of the inclusion of consumption into emissions trading schemes. Under this approach, a charge would be imposed on carbon‐intensive products at the time of their release for consumption within the EU. After sketching this proposal, this article discusses the correct legal basis under EU law. It develops the argument that the inclusion of consumption may be based on Article 192.1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and thus be adopted without unanimity voting in the Council of the EU.

Pass-Through of CO2 Emission Costs to Hourly Electricity Prices in Germany

AbstractI estimate the level of emissions cost pass-through to hourly wholesale electricity prices in Germany, based on spot market data. I control for contemporaneous shocks to demand and supply by constructing a detailed supply curve for fossil generation and intersecting it with residual demand for fossil-based electricity for every hour. Determining the marginal generator allows me to use marginal fuel and allowance costs (rather than prices) as explanatory variables in order to identify the level of cost pass-through directly and with a high level of precision. I find that allowance costs are passed through to electricity prices completely (or nearly completely) on average, but that the degree of pass-through varies over the load curve. My results suggest that there is no economic reason for free allowance allocation to the German electricity sector, and thus I support the updated allocation rules in phase 3 of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.

The construction of Shenzhen׳s carbon emission trading scheme

The Shenzhen ETS is the first urban-level “cap-and-trade” carbon emissions trading scheme to operate in China. This paper gives an overview of the economic and emissions situation in Shenzhen and focuses on the development of the Shenzhen ETS regulatory framework. It is devised as an ETS with an intensity-based cap, output-based allocation and a market for trading of allowances. The design of the Shenzhen ETS attaches great importance to coordinate the dynamic relationships between economic growth, industrial transition and emissions control. The cap and its allocation are determined by carbon intensity reduction targets and economic output, with an aim to slow down emissions growth while mitigating shocks from economic fluctuation and industrial adjustment to market stability. The Shenzhen ETS features extensive coverage consisting of three types of regulated entities and four categories of covered emissions, in order to control carbon emissions by both improving energy efficiency and restraining growing energy demand. A competitive game theory method is created for allocation of free allowances to manufacturing enterprises. Mechanisms for carbon offsets and market stabilization are developed to promote active and orderly trading in the carbon market. Moreover, several challenges and their policy choices are detailed for the development of the Shenzhen ETS.

Carbon Leakage, Free Allocation and Linking Emissions Trading Schemes

A sub-global emissions trading scheme (ETS) risks harming competitiveness and causing carbon leakage. These concerns cast doubt on the efficiency and environmental effectiveness of unilateral climate policies. ETSs implemented thus far include measures to address competitiveness and leakage concerns. This paper analyses the extent to which these unilateral measures affect linking of ETSs by taking the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism (ACPM) as case studies. In both the EU ETS and the ACPM, the free allocation of allowances to emissions-intensive trade-exposed sectors is the primary instrument of addressing leakage and competitiveness concerns. They, however, use different systems of free allocation. Although linking ETSs with different systems of allocation is technically possible, certain differences give rise to efficiency, competitiveness, equity, and environmental effectiveness concerns.

Using the Tax System to Address Competition Issues with a Carbon Tax

This paper considers how tax reductions financed by a carbon tax could be designed to mitigate the need for specific relief for firms in select energy-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) sectors. In particular, I consider impacts on manufacturing sectors at the six-digit North American Industry Classification System level, with a special focus on firms that would be presumptively eligible for competitiveness relief using the criteria in the Waxman-Markey bill (H.R. 2454). The paper has a number of findings. First, determination of eligibility for relief analogous to the free allowance allocation in H.R. 2454 is sensitive to energy intensity. Second, providing compensation to EITE sectors through the corporate income tax — analogous to the output-based allowance allocation in Waxman-Markey — is certainly feasible, but tax appetite within the EITE sectors is insufficient to fully use any credits that attempted to offset more than about one-quarter of their carbon tax liability. Third, certain reforms do better than others at providing disproportionate relief to EITE sectors. Finally, economic theory predicts a substantial cost to diverting carbon tax revenue toward compensation of specific sectors. Theory also suggests that firms should treat policy risk no differently from the way they treat the other risks they face as they do business. But politics may dictate otherwise; if so, the analysis here suggests that certain approaches may work better than others to ensure that relief is appropriately targeted at minimal cost.

USING THE TAX SYSTEM TO ADDRESS COMPETITION ISSUES WITH A CARBON TAX

This paper considers how tax reductions financed by a carbon tax could be designed to mitigate the need for specific relief for firms in select energy-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) sectors. In particular, I consider impacts on manufacturing sectors at the six-digit North American Industry Classification System level, with a special focus on firms that would be presumptively eligible for competitiveness relief using the criteria in the Waxman–Markey bill (H.R. 2454). The paper has a number of findings. First, determination of eligibility for relief analogous to the free allowance allocation in H.R. 2454 is sensitive to energy intensity. Second, providing compensation to EITE sectors through the corporate income tax—analogous to the output-based allowance allocation in Waxman–Markey— is certainly feasible, but tax appetite within the EITE sectors is insufficient to fully use any credits that attempted to offset more than about one-quarter of their carbon tax liability. Third, certain reforms do better than others at providing disproportionate relief to EITE sectors. Finally, economic theory predicts a substantial cost to diverting carbon tax revenue toward compensation of specific sectors. Theory also suggests that firms should treat policy risk no differently from the way they treat the other risks they face as they do business. But politics may dictate otherwise; if so, the analysis here suggests that certain approaches may work better than others to ensure that relief is appropriately targeted at minimal cost.

EU ETS: Upholding the Carbon Price Without Incidence of Carbon Leakage

The internalisation of the social cost of carbon carries regulatory implications, the most significant of which is the loss of competitiveness in both domestic and international markets. The European Union’s ambition for leadership in a global attempt to tackle climate change has exposed its industries to competitive disadvantages. In response to this threat, measures aimed at levelling the playing field between foreign and domestic businesses were enacted in Directive 2009/29/EC. However, whether all of these measures will prove effective remains to be seen, as free allocation of allowances and financial compensation to energy-intensive industries will raise the overall cost to society without conferring any tangible benefits to the environment. On the other hand, the enactment of border adjustment measures (BAMs) is an idea that is not currently favoured by legislators, despite the fact that this option holds significant promise in terms of resolving the problem of carbon leakage.

Addressing leakage in the EU ETS: Border adjustment or output-based allocation?

The EU ETS has been criticised for threatening the competitiveness of European industry and generating carbon leakage, i.e. increasing foreign greenhouse gas emissions. Two main options have been put forward to tackle these concerns: border adjustments and output-based allocation, i.e. allocation of free allowances in proportion to current production. We compare various configurations of these two options, as well as a scenario with full auctioning and no border adjustment. Against this background, we develop a model of the main sectors covered by the EU ETS: electricity, steel, cement and aluminium. We conclude that the most efficient way to tackle leakage is auctioning with border adjustment, which generally induces a negative leakage (a spillover). This holds even if the border adjustment does not include indirect emissions, if it is based on EU (rather than foreign) specific emissions, or (for some values of the parameters) if it covers only imports. Another relatively efficient policy is to combine auctioning in the electricity sector and output-based allocation in exposed industries, especially if free allowances are given both for direct and indirect emissions, i.e. those generated by the generation of the electricity consumed. Although output-based allocation is generally less effective than border adjustment to tackle leakage, it is more effective to mitigate production losses in the sectors affected by the ETS, which may ease climate policy adoption.

Impacts of alternative emissions allowance allocation methods under a federal cap-and-trade program

This paper examines the implications of alternative allowance allocation designs for industry profits and GDP under a federal cap-and-trade program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We employ a general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy with a unique treatment of capital dynamics that permits close attention to profit impacts. Effects on profits depend critically on the relative reliance on auctioning or free allocation of allowances. Freely allocating fewer than 15% of the emissions allowances generally suffices to prevent profit losses in the most vulnerable U.S. industries. Freely allocating all of the allowances substantially overcompensates these industries. When emissions allowances are auctioned and the proceeds employed to finance cuts in income tax rates, GDP costs are about 33% lower than when all allowances are freely allocated. Our results are robust to policies differing in stringency, the availability of offsets, and the opportunities for intertermporal trading of allowances.

Are electricity risk premia affected by emission allowance prices? Evidence from the EEX, Nord Pool and Powernext

The links between emission and energy markets are of great interest to practitioners, academics and policy makers. In this paper, it is conjectured that a positive relationship exists between emission allowance spot returns and electricity risk premia within the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). We discuss how this can be justified on the basis of the substantial uncertainties in the carbon markets. We also argue that this link could be due to trading strategies followed by electricity producers who attempt to exploit their initial allocation of free allowances. Analysis of data from three major markets, the EEX, Nord Pool and Powernext, offers empirical support to our conjecture. These findings have significant policy implications since they imply that efforts should be made in order to reduce the uncertainty in the carbon markets by clearly defining the EU ETS regulative framework and design over the next years. Moreover, our results suggest that the allocation of free allowances and their unrestricted trading enable electricity producers to accomplish windfall profits in the derivatives market at the expense of other market participants.

Implications of CO2 emissions trading for short-run electricity market outcomes in northwest Europe

We examine the short-run implications of CO2 trading for power production, prices, emissions, and generator profits in northwest Europe in 2005. Simulation results from a transmission-constrained oligopoly model are compared with theoretical analyses to quantify price increases and windfall profits earned by generators. The analyses indicate that the rates at which CO2 costs are passed through to wholesale prices are affected by market competitiveness, merit order changes, and elasticities of demand and supply. Emissions trading results in large windfall profits, much but not all of which is due to free allocation of allowances. Profits also increase for some generators because their generation mix has low emissions, and so they benefit from electricity price increases. Most emission reductions appear to be due to demand response not generation redispatch.

Refunded emission taxes: A resolution to the cap-versus-tax dilemma for greenhouse gas regulation

Regulatory instruments for greenhouse gas control present a policy dilemma: Market-based instruments such as cap and trade function to reduce regulatory costs; but because they provide no guarantee that costs will be reduced to acceptable levels it is infeasible to set caps at sustainable levels. Emission taxes provide cost certainty, but their comparatively high cost makes it infeasible to set tax rates at levels commensurate with sustainability goals. However, there is a straightforward solution to this dilemma: Just as cap and trade uses free allowance allocation to minimize regulatory costs, an emission tax's cost can be mitigated by refunding tax revenue in such a way that emission reduction becomes profitable. A refunded tax, like cap and trade with free allocation, would be revenue-neutral within the regulated industry. Marginal competitive incentives for commercializing emission-reducing technologies would not be diminished by the refund, and the refund could actually make it politically and economically feasible to increase the incentives by an order of magnitude. Whereas cap and trade merely caps emissions at an unsustainable level while subjecting the economy to extreme price volatility, refunded emission taxes could create a stable investment environment with sustained incentives for emission reduction over a long-term investment horizon.

A Sensible Policy Approach for Greenhouse Gas Regulation

The two regulatory approaches traditionally employed for greenhouse gas control - caps and taxes - tend to be ineffectual or politically unviable because they either lack cost certainty or impose unacceptably high costs. Both obstacles are overcome by the regulatory model represented by the Swedish nitrogen oxide program, which provides price stability and cost certainty (as does a conventional tax), but which is revenue-neutral within the regulated industry (as is cap and trade with free allowance allocation). Such a regulatory approach, applied to greenhouse gas control, would provide both long-term incentives and a stable investment climate that could help facilitate a rapid and orderly transition to a low-carbon economy.

Free allocation of allowances under the EU emissions trading scheme: legal issues

This article provides a legal analysis of some of the key issues that arise in examining the system for allocating emissions allowances under the EU's emissions trading scheme directive (EU ETS). There is a strong series of arguments in support of the view that the free allocation of allowances under the various national allocation plans (NAPs) involves an element of State aid, which has neither been formally notified to, nor cleared by, the Commission under the EC Treaty. Even if it is found properly to have been notified, there are serious doubts as to whether the extent of aid granted satisfies the proportionality principle. As a result, the operation of the EU ETS may be subject to some legal uncertainty with regard to possible legal challenges to the current allocation of allowances. Going forward, proposals to amend the operation of the EU ETS must take into account similar State aid considerations (particularly proportionality) and the experience gained from the working of the EU ETS in phase I. The structural outline of a possible legislative package has been suggested, which could achieve the safeguarding of commercial and legal certainty under the current allocation regime, while at the same time providing a basis for amendment of the allocation mechanism under the EU ETS for phase II and beyond.

Free allocation of allowances under the EU emissions trading scheme: legal issues

This article provides a legal analysis of some of the key issues that arise in examining the system for allocating emissions allowances under the EU's emissions trading system directive (EU ETS). There is a strong series of arguments in support of the view that the free allocation of allowances under the various national allocation plans (NAPs) involves an element of State aid, which has neither been formally notified to, nor cleared by, the Commission under the EC Treaty. Even if it is found properly to have been notified, there are serious doubts as to whether the extent of aid granted satisfies the proportionality principle. As a result, the operation of the EU ETS may be subject to some legal uncertainty with regard to possible legal challenges to the current allocation of allowances. Going forward, proposals to amend the operation of the EU ETS must take into account similar State aid considerations (particularly proportionality) and the experience gained from the working of the EU ETS in phase I. The structural outline of a possible legislative package has been suggested, which could achieve the safeguarding of commercial and legal certainty under the current allocation regime, while at the same time providing a basis for amendment of the allocation mechanism under the EU ETS for phase II and beyond.

CO<SUB>2</SUB> abatement, competitiveness and leakage in the European cement industry under the EU ETS: grandfathering versus output-based allocation

A recurring concern raised by the European GHG Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is the fear of losses to EU industry through competition: both loss in domestic production and loss in profits. This article analyses how production and profits in the European cement industry may be affected by different approaches to the allocation of emissions allowances. We analyse two contrasting methods for the allocation of free allowances. With ‘grandfathering', the number of allowances a firm gets is independent of its current behaviour. With ‘output-based allocation', the number of allowances is proportional to the firm's current production level. Whereas almost all the quantitative assessments of the EU ETS assume grandfathering, the real allocation methods used by Member States, notably because of the updating every 5 years and of the special provisions for new plants and plant closings, stand somewhere between these two polar extremes. We study the impacts of these two contrasting allocation methods by linking a detailed trade model of homogeneous products with high transportation costs (GEO) with a bottom-up model of the cement industry (CEMSIM). The two allocation approaches have very different impacts on competitiveness and emissions abatements. Grandfathering 50% of past emissions to cement producers is enough to maintain aggregate profitability (EBITDA) at its business-as-usual level, but with significant production losses and CO2 leakage. For an output-based allocation over 75% of historic unitary (tCO2/tonnecement) emissions, the impact on production levels and EBITDA is insignificant, abatement in the EU is much lower, but there is almost no leakage. Policy makers need to recognize to what extent different allocation approaches may change the impacts of emissions trading, and adopt approaches accordingly.

CO2 abatement, competitiveness and leakage in the European cement industry under the EU ETS: grandfathering versus output-based allocation

A recurring concern raised by the European GHG Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is the fear of losses to EU industry through competition: both loss in domestic production and loss in profits. This article analyses how production and profits in the European cement industry may be affected by different approaches to the allocation of emissions allowances. We analyse two contrasting methods for the allocation of free allowances. With ‘grandfathering’, the number of allowances a firm gets is independent of its current behaviour. With ‘output-based allocation’, the number of allowances is proportional to the firm's current production level. Whereas almost all the quantitative assessments of the EU ETS assume grandfathering, the real allocation methods used by Member States, notably because of the updating every 5 years and of the special provisions for new plants and plant closings, stand somewhere between these two polar extremes. We study the impacts of these two contrasting allocation methods by linking a detailed trade model of homogeneous products with high transportation costs (GEO) with a bottom-up model of the cement industry (CEMSIM). The two allocation approaches have very different impacts on competitiveness and emissions abatements. Grandfathering 50% of past emissions to cement producers is enough to maintain aggregate profitability (EBITDA) at its business-as-usual level, but with significant production losses and CO2 leakage. For an output-based allocation over 75% of historic unitary (tCO2/tonnecement) emissions, the impact on production levels and EBITDA is insignificant, abatement in the EU is much lower, but there is almost no leakage. Policy makers need to recognize to what extent different allocation approaches may change the impacts of emissions trading, and adopt approaches accordingly.

Implications of announced phase II national allocation plans for the EU ETS

We quantified the volume of free allowances that different national allocation plans proposed to allocate to existing and new installations, with specific reference to the power sector. Most countries continue to allocate based on historic emissions, contrary to hopes for improved allocation methods, with allocations to installations frequently based on 2005 emission data; this may strengthen the belief in the private sector that emissions in the coming years will influence their subsequent allowance allocation. Allocations to new installations provide high and frequently fuel-differentiated subsidies, risking significant distortions to investment choices. Thus, in addition to supplying a long market in aggregate, proposed allocation plans reveal continuing diverse problems, including perverse incentives. To ensure the effectiveness of the EU ETS in the future, the private sector will need to be shown credible evidence that free allowance allocation will be drastically reduced post-2012, or that these problems will be addressed in some other way.