Prosecution Of Fraud Research Articles

Jobs, Crime and Money: Challenges for the G8 Summit in 1998

Since the abolition of exchange control in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it has been possible instantly to transfer money of any amount or denomination virtually anywhere in the world. It means that, because the criminal law is territorially based, and differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the investigation and prosecution of fraud and the related offences of money laundering and corruption are peculiarly dependent upon mutual legal assistance between states.

Fraud, prosecution and regulation: Achieving effective control

This paper reviews the issues surrounding jury trials in fraud cases in the context of the Home Office's consultation document in early 1998. It includes an account of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and concludes that a greater willingness to use regulatory institutions to deal with misconduct is essential to permitting the SFO, as the leading fraud prosecution agency, to discharge its responsibilities effectively.

Recent Developments Regarding the Misappropriation Theory in Securities Fraud Actions

On 25th June, 1997, the US Supreme Court issued an important decision in which it endorsed an expanded theory of insider trading liability under the federal securities laws. In United States v O'Hagan, the Court held, in a 6‐3 decision, that a person who misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information, may be found liable for securities fraud under s. 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘Exchange Act’) and SEC Rule 10b‐5, which prohibit the use of fraud or deception ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security’. In endorsing the ‘misappropriation’ theory, the Court resolved a longstanding split among the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal and upheld an important tool in the prosecution of securities fraud. Separately, the Court held that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) did not exceed its rulemaking authority under s. 14(e) of the Exchange Act when it adopted Rule 14e‐3(a), which prohibits trading on the basis of material, non‐public information concerning a tender offer, without requiring the government to show a breach of fiduciary duty.

The Policing of Commercial Malpractice — Public Law or Self‐Regulation

Whilst the criminal justice system has evolved over the last seven years, it can be argued that the ability of the current criminal justice system in England and Wales to deal with the investigation, prosecution and trial of serious and complex fraud can still be challenged. Using material gathered whilst undertaking research for the Diploma in Compliance Studies at Exeter University, this paper makes a number of recommendations in this context. The existence of civil remedies and the regulatory structure created under the Financial Services Act 1986 may offer a limited opportunity to deal with some categories of commercial malpractice in an expedient and cost‐effective manner, outside the scope of the criminal justice system. This paper derives from research carried out with the purpose of reviewing the investigation, prosecution and trial of serious fraud in England and Wales in order to assess whether commercial malpractice is in fact a proper subject for ‘public law’, or whether it could be more effectively and expediently dealt with through civil law remedies, or by the self‐regulatory agencies created under the Financial Services Act 1986. This paper represents a summary of the main findings and interpretations of that research, which included interviews with three experts in the field. In considering this issue, one is bound in two ways. If one concludes that the criminal justice system can offer an effective and efficient method of the disposal of commercial fraud, the arguments for and against the use of the regulatory system become commensurably less significant. If, however, the conclusions suggest that major legislative and procedural changes are required to facilitate the effective and efficient prosecution of commercial fraud, the scope for use of regulatory sanctions where appropriate takes on a greater significance. Thus there are two elements in the writer's conclusion. First, there was concern to assess the veracity of the conclusions drawn by the Fraud Trials Committee in 1986 to the present, and other problems faced by the criminal justice system in the investigation, prosecution and trial of commercial fraud. Secondly, it was important to consider arguments for and against the use of regulatory sanctions for the disposal of commercial crime. The conclusions drawn from a review of the problems faced by the criminal justice system are, it is suggested, fundamental to the question of whether the increased use of regulatory sanctions is necessary, or desirable.

Interview with George Staple, Director of the Serious Fraud Office

The Serious Fraud Office was set up on the recommendation of the Roskill Committee by the Criminal Justice Act 1987. It is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of serious and complex fraud. In recent years the Office has been criticised for the way in which it handles cases, largely as a result of the perception that there have been too many acquittals in the cases which it has chosen to prosecute. In this interview, Matthew Weait discusses the role and aims and problems of the Office with its present Director, George Staple. Mr Staple considers the problems which the Office faces, the extent to which he considers criticism justified and wider issues relating to the effective prosecution of fraud. George Staple, 52, took up the post of Director in April 1992. Formerly senior litigation Partner of Clifford Chance, he was appointed in 1986 as a Companies Act Inspector. Between 1987 and 1991 he sat as a Chairman of the Authorisation and Disciplinary Tribunal of the Securities Association and the Securities and Futures Authority. For many years Mr Staple was a member of the Commercial Court Committee and served as Treasurer of the Law Society from 1989 to 1992.

Investigation and prosecution of fraud in the European communities

Investigation and prosecution of fraud in the European communities

The Establishment of International Mechanisms for Enforcing Provisional Orders and Final Judgments Arising from Securities Law Violations

In the last ten years, securities regulators have made substantial progress in developing cooperative relationships to reduce the value of international borders as barriers to the detection and prosecution of securities fraud. Having made that progress, attention now should turn to ensuring that those committing fraud will not only be caught and prosecuted, but also will be deprived of the financial fruits of their illegal activities. Transactions on U.S. securities markets can originate virtually any place in the world. In order to carry out trades, one needs only a phone line and access to a wire transfer facility. Regulators, however, cannot cross borders with the same ease as the transactions they may need to investigate. While regulators have resolved many of the territorial and sovereignty issues that previously constrained their ability to investigate and pursue suspect foreign transactions, similar constraints hamper the freezing of assets and recovery of ill-gotten gains located in other jurisdictions. This article focusses on the development of mechanisms, similar to those used for information-sharing, pursuant to which regulators can assist each other in freezing assets and recovering illicit profits. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and many of its foreign counterparts have addressed territorial and sovereignty concerns by creating cooperative mechanisms for gathering and exchanging information for use in international investigations. These mechanisms, commonly referred to as Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), effectively extend a regulator's investigative reach beyond its national boundaries. Thus, through

Establishing the date of manufacture of a sheet of photocopy paper—a case example

A sheet of photocopy paper was traced back to the manufacturer, and examined for fibre content in an attempt to date the paper by comparison with the manufacturer's records. The investigation resulted in a successful prosecution for fraud.

Detection and Prosecution of Commercial Fraud: An English Perspective

Detection and Prosecution of Commercial Fraud: An English Perspective

Prosecution of Commercial Fraud in Germany

Prosecution of Commercial Fraud in Germany

Pacey v. Barroso.

Diplomatic Envoys — Secretaries of Legation — Prosecution for Fraud.