Fraser Government Research Articles

The Fraser Government and South Korea: Human Rights in Foreign Policy, 1975–81

This study uses recently declassified documents to analyse the Fraser government's human rights policy towards South Korea. It demonstrates that when the Fraser government made its first human rights representation to the South Korean government in August 1976, it was under limited public pressure to do so, and human rights issues were of limited importance in the bilateral relationship. By late 1980, however, when political opposition figure Kim Dae Jung was sentenced to death, human rights considerations dominated Australian foreign policy towards South Korea, and public pressure on the Fraser government to try and prevent Kim's execution was substantial. The Fraser government's policy response to Kim's case was in part a reaction to public pressure, human rights considerations were also involved, but perhaps the most substantial factor driving the government's policy response was that Kim's execution was sure to sour the bilateral relationship and jeopardise the economic relationship. Overall, South Korea was a place where the Fraser government grappled with key questions about how to pursue human rights in foreign policy and where it had to address a human rights issue that had the capacity to seriously disrupt bilateral relations.

Calamity or commodity? Conceptualising security in the nuclear debate in Fraser’s Australia

This article examines conceptualisations of security in the debate over uranium mining and export in Fraser’s Australia. Drawing together archives from the Fraser government, the Movement Against Uranium Mining, and newspaper coverage, the article demonstrates that pro- and anti-uranium groups held conflicting visions of (in)security: Fraser saw the exploitation of natural resources as an opportunity to strengthen Australia’s geopolitical influence, while anti-uranium activists feared the risks that mining and export posed to the environment, Indigenous communities, public health and the survival of the planet. Tracing these competing visions of security through key developments in the nuclear debate in Australia, the article demonstrates that Fraser maintained his uranium policy by avoiding the security concerns of the anti-uranium movement. Nonetheless, the debate marked an early shift in the broader reformulation of narrow ideas of ‘national security’ to more expansive understandings of the term.

1985 reform of the Australian tax system

After the tumult of the Whitlam government, the Fraser government (1975-1983) saw consolidation with less reform. The 1975 Asprey report remained largely unactioned, despite the fundamental problems that burdened the Australian tax system. The 1983 election of the Hawke government, however, set in train a series of economic reforms, and tax would play a big part in these. This paper tracks those developments, starting with the tax avoidance and evasion issues that plagued the era and the 1981 Campbell Committee financial system review. The main focus, though, is on the 1985 draft white paper and tax summit that delivered the first instalment of the Asprey blueprint. While the broad-based consumption tax didn’t get up, the package reformed Australia’s income tax system, with a capital gains tax, a fringe benefits tax, a foreign tax credit system and a dividend imputation system.

Australia’s Journey to Ratification of the ICESCR and ICCPR

Abstract This article explores Australia’s journey to ratification of the ICESCR and ICCPR. From a somewhat languorous consideration of the Covenants following their adoption by the General Assembly in 1966, the Australian federal government moved to enthusiastically support signature and ratification after the election of the Whitlam government. However, tensions over federal-State demarcations and the potential use of the external affairs power stymied progress. It was not until the Fraser government period that each Covenant was ratified. Exploring this history reveals the depth of divisions concerning respective roles of the Commonwealth and the States in the human rights arena and highlights the role of ‘lighter’ interpretations of obligations in facilitating consensus.

Australia's diplomatic asylum initiative at the United Nations: comparing international law rhetoric with foreign policy practice

ABSTRACT In 1974, Australia took the initiative to have an item on diplomatic asylum inscribed on the UN General Assembly's agenda for that year. Its original ambition was to procure an international treaty on the subject. This article traces the history of that initiative from its inception to the acknowledgement seven years later that it had come to nothing. It also investigates the impact that Australia's initiative at the UN had on its foreign policy practice in relation to diplomatic asylum through two administrations: the Whitlam government (5 December 1972–11 November 1975) and the Fraser government (11 November 1975–11 March 1983). It demonstrates that, while the initiative generated a great deal of bureaucratic work, it wrought no real change in Australia's practice on the ground.

The evolving narrative of denial: the Fraser government and the Timorese genocide, 1975–1980

ABSTRACTAs research by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor documents, the years 1975–1980 constituted the worst period of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, during which grave human rights took place involving a high loss of life. In Australia, the government headed by Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser (1975–1983) sought to present itself as a supporter of human rights and the international rule of law. It also prioritized relations with the Suharto regime, which it saw as key to its policy position in Southeast Asia. These two positions came into conflict due to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. The Fraser government therefore worked to propagate a narrative concerning East Timor which denied the seriousness of the situation, distorted the historical narrative, deflected blame from Indonesia, and depicted the Australian position as principled and realistic. This paper examines the development of this narrative as events progressed and information concerning the crisis in East Timor came to the attention of the outside world. It also examines how the Fraser government employed this narrative internationally in order to protect the Suharto regime from scrutiny.

The Fraser Government and the East Timor Question

The Fraser Government and the East Timor Question

Status Determination of Indochinese Boat Arrivals: A ‘Balancing Act’ in Australia

This article examines the assessment of Indochinese refugees through Australia’s first formal refugee status determination procedure between 1978 and 1983. Drawing from a unique set of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) records, this is the first study to detail how the newly established Determination of Refugee Status (DORS) Committee’s decision-making on Indochinese boat arrivals evolved over time. The Committee provided a basis on which the then Fraser government could process the Indochinese who sailed directly to Australia, while attempting to reassure the Australian public that it remained in control of their arrival. Through revealing new details of DORS’ deliberations, this article provides an insight into inter-departmental debates about the Indochinese boat arrivals, and provides historical context for the Fraser government’s public insistence on accepting only ‘genuine’ refugees.

Welcome to Australia? A reappraisal of the Fraser government's approach to refugees, 1975–83

The Fraser government's response to the Indo-Chinese refugee crisis and the presentation, for the first time, of asylum-seekers arriving in Australia by boat is almost universally acclaimed as having been proactive, generous and humanitarian in spirit—the antithesis of both the preceding Whitlam Labor government and subsequent governments, particularly since 2001. Adopting a policy of ‘forward selection’ of refugees from camps in South-East Asia, the Fraser government was able to stem the flow of boats and oversaw the relatively uncontroversial resettlement of nearly 70,000 Indo-Chinese. However, the author argues that this was not the brave and principled course of action for which Fraser and his immigration ministers are regularly fêted, but rather a delayed response that was motivated by fear and desperation rather than pure humanitarian intent. The celebrated outcomes of Fraser's policies belie the self-interested way in which they were constructed and neglect the fact that the government did not act until it was forced. Fraser's policies were neither a departure from the past nor the antithesis of current polices; to the contrary, they were the seeds of the contemporary Australian model of asylum.

Australia's Little Known In-Country Programme in Latin America

Through the 1980s the Australian Government ran an in-country programme out of Chile and El Salvador, rescuing and resettling dissidents, trade unionists, and former political prisoners. This programme operated discreetly, and relied on careful negotiation with local authorities. It complicated Australia’s diplomatic relationship with the Reagan administration and caused tensions between the departments of Immigration and Foreign Affairs. As a result, the in-country programme left little documentary evidence and has remained unexamined by immigration historians and refugee scholars. This article provides an original study of the programme, drawing on archival records from the Fraser Government and the first Hawke Government, from 1979 to 1984, as well as oral history interviews with former politicians and Australian and Canadian Immigration officials. The in-country programme was a unique initiative, driven by humanitarian concerns and a desire to diversify the refugee intake. It offers an important contribution to the historical debate about the virtues of Australia’s refugee policy at this time.

How a study lost its funding: Jean Martin and public knowledge of the refugee experience

In 1975 the Whitlam Labor government invited Professor Jean Martin, then Australia’s leading sociologist of migration, to conduct a five-year study of the settlement experience of the first refugees from Vietnam. She had barely begun the study when the incoming Fraser government terminated its funding. Drawing on internal government documents, this article tells the inside story of that decision. The fate of the project became intertwined with the dismissal of the Whitlam government, but the links were indirect. Archival sources show state actors raising concerns about academic autonomy, the utility of academic research for public policy, and independence of academic publication. The social science of the period saw research as a public good, generating knowledge at once for its own sake and for application in public life. The withdrawal of Martin’s funding marks the end of an era when Australian social scientists could see research collaboration with government as unproblematic.

Political Debates on Asylum Seekers during the Fraser Government, 1977–1982

Between 1977 and 1982, the Australian Government resettled over 54,000 Vietnamese refugees. It also admitted 2,059 Vietnamese asylum seekers who arrived by boat without state authorisation. Although the number of Vietnamese asylum seekers was significantly smaller than the number of Vietnamese refugees processed offshore in refugee camps, the unexpected arrival of these boat people stimulated debate in Parliament and in the press about an appropriate response. This article examines the language politicians used to describe Vietnamese asylum seekers and the arguments used to justify their inclusion or exclusion. The evidence demonstrates that the political rhetoric used in this period in Australia's immigration history cannot be solely categorised as inclusive or humane. Rather, the overall impression is one of resistance and pragmatism.

The Fraser Government's “Uranium Decision” and the Foundations of Australian Non‐Proliferation Policy: A Reappraisal*

The Fraser era represents a defining moment in Australia's approach to the issues of uranium exports and non‐proliferation policy. In contrast to some well‐established positions in the literature, this essay argues that the Fraser government's August 1977 decision to approve the export of uranium was framed not only by domestic political considerations stemming from the Ranger Environmental Inquiry but also by important international factors. In particular, I argue that the non‐proliferation initiatives of the Carter administration presented the Fraser government with an opportunity to portray the export of Australian uranium as means to strengthen the non‐proliferation regime and enhance Australia's influence.

The Necessity for Multi-disciplinary Research: Ralph Jacobi's Institute of Freshwater Studies

In spite of many proposals, Australia has no national freshwater research centre. Thus the passing in the Senate of Ralph Jacobi's private member's bill for an Institute of Freshwater Studies in 1982 was unusual. His driving force was the need to overcome State boundaries and for research to inform policy and management of water resources. It gained widespread support, and not just from the parliamentary Labor Party, but was strongly opposed by the Fraser government, State and federal water bureaucracies, and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). The election of 1983 prevented further discussion in parliament, but the proposal was part of the Labor Party platform taken to the election. An Interim Council set up to investigate whether or not such an institute should be established, but with narrow terms of reference very different from those in Jacobi's bill, sided with the large water bureaucracies and CSIRO, in spite of majority support for an institute. An institute was rejected and the government accepted the recommendation. Jacobi's proposal failed primarily because of a fear of independent advice by many in the bureaucracies, a potential loss of power and influence, and inter-governmental rivalries. The status quo remained; the bigger picture is still unseen.

The Yellow Cake Road: Malcolm Fraser, the Ranger Enquiry and Australia's Role in the US International Fuel Cycle Project

The 1975–1983 Fraser Government failed to develop an enrichment industry in Australia but did see the initiation of uranium sales following the adoption of the Ranger Enquiry. Both of these developments were shaped by US nuclear commercial and non‐proliferation policies during the Ford and Carter Administrations, which aimed to restrict the spread of enrichment technology. Fraser would come to realise that it was not a question of private ownership of the nuclear fuel cycle, but of accepting a role for Australia in the international fuel cycle as a supplier of cheap yellowcake.

Poland, 1980–1984: A witness to history

The late Francis Stuart, the first Australian Ambassador to be resident in Poland, wrote an interesting book about his long career in the Foreign Service. Towards Coming of Age was published in 1989 and Stuart's reflections on his last post abroad, to Poland, included the following: It is fanciful to believe that the Soviet leadership would ever question the infallibility of their official doctrine or relinquish the glacis of subordinate states protecting the Soviet borders... Sadly then, Poland and like countries can expect no more freedom in the future than the circumscribed autonomy they have now. Many would have agreed with him in the late 1980s, but that which he considered fanciful was actually to happen within a few short years. I was fortunate to be a witness to part of this historic transition. I arrived in Poland as Australian Ambassador on 30 September 1980, about three months after the first strikes and just a month after the signing of the Gdansk Agreements between Solidarity and the Polish government. I stayed on until the end of 1984. A previous posting in Moscow had not prepared me for what I found in Poland. The country was in ferment. In Moscow under Brezhnev, the foreign community had been effectively kept in isolation from the local society. Kremlinology had consisted largely of reading between the lines of the tightly controlled Soviet media. In Poland in 1980-81, the local society was not only accessible but positively welcoming and disarmingly outspoken. The Polish media was lifting the lid on what had actually been going on in the country. The inner workings and manifold failings of what professed to be a workers' state were revealed for all to see. As a general rule, diplomats study their host country as detached outsiders from a privileged and protected position. Sometimes, however, they will encounter situations where they will feel drawn to take sides. In my case, Poland in 1980-81 was such a situation. A great majority of Poles, whether farmers, workers or university-educated people, were plainly deeply dissatisfied with their party-dominated governments and their Soviet overlords and had come together determined to insist upon a better future. This was not an overnight development but one born out of a very bitter and troubled history as a Soviet satellite since World War II. Just about everyone I met seemed to know their Polish history intimately and to be guided and inspired by it. This was a nation rebelling against the state, and it was hard not to be drawn to a people so dismissive of the odds stacked against them. I recall no controversy during those years over what Australian policy towards the situation in Poland should be, either within Canberra or between Canberra and the Embassy. Nor do I recall that the Embassy received any strong policy directions from Canberra under the Fraser government. The Embassy's reporting and analysis - generally sympathetic to Solidarity's cause - seemed to be accepted. By and large, Australians in general seemed instinctively sympathetic towards Solidarity's struggle. One unexpected exception that comes to mind was an Australian shipping magnate visiting Poland - much bruised over the years by encounters with Australian unions - who felt sympathy for a government being challenged by a trade union. It is perhaps worth recording here that in the early 1980s there was little institutional expertise in the Department of Foreign Affairs on Eastern Europe as we then called it. Few resources were devoted to it. Our embassies there were small, including the one in Moscow. The Soviet Union - superpower though it then was - did not loom large in the department's priorities. Junior diplomats might think of carving out a career path in South-East Asia or East Asia, but not in Eastern Europe. I sometimes reflected on the oddness of this low priority. There was the fact of the Soviet Union's superpower status, and there was the further fact that Australia hosted significant minorities from the region - regularly augmented by the periodic eruptions there. …

Sir Henry Bland and the Fraser Government's Administrative Review Committee: Another Chapter in the Statutory Authority Wars?

The release of the 1976 Commonwealth cabinet records on 1 January 2007 provided the opportunity to review the work of the Administrative Review Committee (ARC) appointed by the Fraser government and headed by Sir Henry Bland and so to open up a hitherto little appreciated chapter in Australian administrative history. At first glance, it appeared that Bland's ARC had been strongly opposed to widespread use of statutory authorities, for so long a regular part of Australia's machinery of government, thus providing an interesting point of comparison with the Uhrig inquiry of 2003-04, which attracted much notice for its antipathy towards statutorily independent agencies. Given the unusual methodology of the ARC, it was also likely that an account of its work would shed further light on public inquiries generally, perhaps assisting in development of a typology of such inquiries.

Bullying the public broadcaster: Threatening the ABC's role

Public broadcasting in Australia has been under sustained attack for around 18-years now, both politically and through reduced funding. Although the Fraser Government (1975-1983) enacted legislation converting the ABC from the old broadcasting commission into a corporation (with its own borrowing and corporate treasury powers), the then Malcolm/Fraser/Doug/Anthony Liberal/National Coalition Government did not seem to hold more than the usual superficial grudges about our current affairs programmes' treatment of some of their practitioners.

Australia’s Battle against the Common Agricultural Policy: The Fraser Government’s Trade Diplomacy and the European Community

The aim of this article is to offer a different interpretation of Fraser Government’s diplomacy towards the European Community. In particular, it will be argued that, although Fraser’s European policy was unsuccessful, this was not principally his fault since no matter what sort of approach he adopted, no major result could have been obtained from Brussels. Second, this article will argue that Fraser clearly understood the EC’s internal political dynamics and acted accordingly. If he failed to achieve results, it was not because he lacked an understanding of the complexity of the EC’s constitutional realities, but because these realities were too complex for anyone to overcome. Thirdly, it will be argued that Fraser did not attribute a disproportionate importance to agriculture, since this was far and away the most important issue for Australia.

Time's Up for TUTA—a Corporatist Casualty

The Australian Trade Union Training Authority (TUTA) had, by 1983, established itself as a major training and information resource, generally trusted and supported by unions. It had achieved this by adopting a full range of adult education principles that ensured a flexibility of approach that not only catered for the diverse needs of unions, but appeared to satisfy even the Fraser Government. This situation changed dramatically after the signing of the Accord Agreement and the election of the Hawke Government. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) actively intervened in the operations of TUTA, including its curriculum, methodology and structure, in order to mould TUTA into its neo-corporatist Accord strategy. This meant changing TUTA's ‘independent educational’ image to one of a ‘partisan’ promoter of the Accord and its processes. Whilst it is accepted that the ACTU's strategy in respect to TUTA may have been valid and imperative in the circumstances, this paper argues that it was this changed use of TUTA by the ACTU and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) government that ensured that TUTA would not survive when, and if, the Coalition won power federally. The paper examines how significantly TUTA changed during the Accord years and suggests that there are some useful lessons to be considered from the TUTA story.