Frans De Waal Research Articles

Empathy’s purity, sympathy’s complexities; De Waal, Darwin and Adam Smith

Frans de Waal’s view that empathy is at the basis of morality directly seems to build on Darwin, who considered sympathy as the crucial instinct. Yet when we look closer, their understanding of the central social instinct differs considerably. De Waal sees our deeply ingrained tendency to sympathize (or rather: empathize) with others as the good side of our morally dualistic nature. For Darwin, sympathizing was not the whole story of the “workings of sympathy”; the (selfish) need to receive sympathy played just as central a role in the complex roads from sympathy to morality. Darwin’s understanding of sympathy stems from Adam Smith, who argued that the presence of morally impure motives should not be a reason for cynicism about morality. I suggest that De Waal’s approach could benefit from a more thorough alignment with the analysis of the workings of sympathy in the work of Darwin and Adam Smith.

BRAIN MATTERS : NEUROSCIENCE, EMPATHY, AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY

“Effective pastoral care, that is, meeting a person at the point of his [sic] need, demands that the pastor become involved in the very existence and predicament of the person, his [sic] tensions, sufferings, meanings, values, joys. This involvement can take place only through a deeply empathie experience” (Carroll Wise, 1966, p. 14)“Our bodies and minds are made for social life, and we become hopelessly depressed in its absence. This is why next to death, solitary confinement is our worst punishment.” (Frans de Waal, 2009, p. 10)

Recent Work on Evolution and Social Contract Ethics

Peter Singer has claimed that what we know about evolution today discredits a social contract understanding of ethics, because the notion of an original or natural condition is a fantasy, and a social contract theory relies on a ‘‘distant Foundation Day.’’ Yet when writing about ethics many evolutionists such as E.O. Wilson, Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Dawkins, Robert Axelrod, and Matt Ridley employ the concepts of reciprocity and cooperation, and the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma, all of which are part and parcel of social contract ethics. Furthermore, the evolutionists E.O. Wilson, Christopher Boehm, and Frans de Waal explain that agreements need not be egalitarian, since hierarchies of dominance can work well in both the human and non-human realm of mammalian societies. These kinds of evolutionary

Negotiating the BoundaryThe Question of Animal Culture. Edited by Kevin N. Laland and Bennett G. Galef. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Negotiating the Boundary<i>The Question of Animal Culture</i>. Edited by Kevin N. Laland and Bennett G. Galef. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.

ARE ANIMALS MORAL? A THEOLOGICAL APPRAISAL OF THE EVOLUTION OF VICE AND VIRTUE

Abstract.I discuss controversial claims about the status of non‐human animals as moral beings in relation to philosophical claims to the contrary. I address questions about the ontology of animals rather than ethical approaches as to how humans need to treat other animals through notions of, for example, animal rights. I explore the evolutionary origins of behavior that can be considered vices or virtues and suggest that Thomas Aquinas is closer to Darwin's view on nonhuman animals than we might suppose. An appreciation of the complexity of the emotional lives of social animals and their cooperative behaviors in light of the work of animal ethologists such as Frans de Waal and Marc Bekoff suggests that social animals can be considered moral in their own terms. I discuss the charge of anthropomorphism, drawing on the work of archaeologist Steven Mithen, and consider arguments for the evolution of conscience in the work of anthropologist Christopher Boehm. Only the biological basis for the development of conscience and religion has evolved in nonhuman animals, and this should not be confused with sophisticated moral systems of analysis or particular religious beliefs found in the human community.

Moral markets: the critical role of values in the economy

Like nature itself, modern economic life is driven by relentless competition and unbridled selfishness. Or is it? Drawing on converging evidence from neuroscience, social science, biology, law, and philosophy, Moral Markets makes the case that modern market exchange works only because most people, most of the time, act virtuously. Competition and greed are certainly part of economics, but Moral Markets shows how the rules of market exchange have evolved to promote moral behavior and how exchange itself may make us more virtuous. Examining the biological basis of economic morality, tracing the connections between morality and markets, and exploring the profound implications of both, Moral Markets provides a surprising and fundamentally new view of economics--one that also reconnects the field to Adam Smith's position that morality has a biological basis. Moral Markets, the result of an extensive collaboration between leading social and natural scientists, includes contributions by neuroeconomist Paul Zak; economists Robert H. Frank, Herbert Gintis, Vernon Smith (winner of the 2002 Nobel Prize in economics), and Bart Wilson; law professors Oliver Goodenough, Erin O'Hara, and Lynn Stout; philosophers William Casebeer and Robert Solomon; primatologists Sarah Brosnan and Frans de Waal; biologists Carl Bergstrom, Ben Kerr, and Peter Richerson; anthropologists Robert Boyd and Michael Lachmann; political scientists Elinor Ostrom and David Schwab; management professor Rakesh Khurana; computational science and informatics doctoral candidate Erik Kimbrough; and business writer Charles Handy.

Primates, philosophers and the biological basis of morality: a review of primates and philosophers by Frans De Waal, Princeton University Press, 2006, 200 pp

Philosophical inquiries into morality are as old as philosophy, but it may turn out that morality itself is much, much older than that. At least, that is the main thesis of primatologist Frans De Waal, who in this short book based on his Tanner Lectures at Princeton, elaborates on what biologists have been hinting at since Darwin’s (1871) book The Descent of Man and Hamilton’s (1963) studies on the evolution of altruism: morality is yet another allegedly human characteristic that turns out to be built over evolutionary time by natural selection. This sort of intellectual project has historically generated tension between ‘‘the two cultures’’ (Snow 1959), and just a few years ago E. O. Wilson (1998) was predicting an eventual reduction of all humanities to biology by a continuing expansion of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. It is interesting, therefore, to find in De Waal’s book a clear willingness toward dialog, both on the part of the scientist and by the four philosophers (Robert Wright, Christine Korsgaard, Philip Kitcher and Peter Singer) called upon to comment on the main essay. Indeed, the idea that science can and should inform philosophical debates is becoming rather popular among both scientists and philosophers (e.g., Gibbard 1997; Sober and Wilson 1998; Skyrms 2000; Green et al. 2001; Pigliucci 2003; Clayton and Schloss 2004). That said, there is plenty of room for disagreement, which is of course were things get interesting. De Waal’s objective is two-fold: to make a case for the idea that humans are by nature moral, and to sketch out how such morality could have evolved from simpler building blocks present in our ancestors and our current close relatives. I will first examine De Waal’s case for his two conclusions, then move on to some of the four philosophers’ objections to parts of his thesis, and finally consider the merits and limits of De Waal’s own response to his critics.

Our inner ape: the best and worst of human nature – By Frans De Waal

Our inner ape: the best and worst of human nature – By Frans De Waal

Book ReviewsFrans de Waal, . Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. Pp. 209. $22.95 (cloth).

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook Reviews Frans de Waal, . Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. Pp. 209. $22.95 (cloth).Zed AdamsZed AdamsUniversity of Chicago Search for more articles by this author University of ChicagoPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 117, Number 3April 2007Symposium on Brian Barry's Why Social Justice Matters Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/512209 Views: 87Total views on this site Permission to reprint a book review printed in this section may be obtained only from the author.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Introduction. Social intelligence: from brain to culture

Humans are perhaps the most social animals. Although some eusocial insects, herd mammals and seabirds live in colonies comprising millions of individuals, no other species lives in such a variety of social groups as Homo sapiens . We live in many different sized societies, from small, nomadic hunter

A family resemblance

We are closely related to other apes, but how similar are we really? In Our Inner Ape, Frans de Waal (an author in this week's chimpanzee genome special, page 56) unbundles the many misconceptions about the evolution of the social behaviour of primates for the nonspecialist reader. En route we learn that chimpanzees are from Mars and bonobos (‘pygmy’ chimpanzees) from Venus, though not literally. And that neither reflects what we were in our ancestral past.

Bonds smooth conflicts

Humans tend to respond differently between each other to rewards being dished out unfairly in different social groups, yet little is known about the potential for such variation in other species. A new study has examined responses to such inequity in several groups of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). The study, by Sarah Brosnan, Hillary Schiff and Frans de Waal, at the Yerkes National Primate Center at Emory University, Atlanta, in the Proceedings of the Royal Society series B (published online), demonstrates that chimpanzees show a response to inequity that depends to considerable extent on the social context that the rewards are given. The researchers used an experimental procedure whereby animals were given a token, in this case a piece of white PVC pipe, which they then had to give back to the researcher to receive a food reward. Food rewards were placed in identical buckets on the floor in front of the chimpanzees so that all animals in the experiment could see what was in the buckets, but none knew what reward they would receive until they had successfully returned the token. The rewards were chosen on the basis of previous preference tests in which grapes were most highly prized by the animals and cucumber and celery, the least sought. The researchers found that the animals were averse to any inequity but only in subjects that lived in pairs or in a relatively newly established social group. In a far older group, with a tightly knit social structure characterised by intense integration and social reciprocity, inequity caused barely a ripple from the animals disappointingly receiving a cucumber or celery reward. This finding may reflect human responses in close relationships, and inequity may be tolerated more as apes develop the mutual dependencies and bonds that serve a wide range of benefits derived from sociality. “If so, tolerance of inequity may increase with social closeness between partners, such as friends and family, in a wide variety of species, a hypothesis that deserves further testing in humans and non-human primates,” the authors say. Such tolerance may not marry with the experience of some humans, but its apparent existence in our closest cousins is intriguing.

Animal cognition

Animal cognition

PLoS Biology Issue Image | Vol. 2(4) April 2004

Robert Sapolsky and Lisa Share show that olive baboons (Papio anubis) can acquire a more pacific culture and that females, such as this one, help maintain the peaceful behavior of males (see article). Frans de Waal explores whether such studies can shed light on human aggression (see article). Image Credit: Photograph by Frans de Waal

Economy of the Mind

Frans de Waal's laboratory monkeys won't work for unequal pay. If a partner monkey gets a grape (big bucks) for little or no work (trading a token), a monkey will reject her measly cucumber pay from her human “boss.” And she makes her disdain known, hurling her cucumber or token out of her cubicle—even though she would happily gobble down cucumbers in other circumstances.

Mixed Bag: A review of Frans de Waal’s The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections of a Primatologist

Frans de Waal challenges the belief that only humans manifest cultural transmission and asserts that because apes also do, human distinctiveness is seriously undermined. de Waal emphasizes the importance of social learning for ape culture. Issue is taken with de Waal’s intentional stance regarding nonhumans and his negative, erroneous characterizations of aspects of behaviorism.

Ethics and Evolutionary Continuity: Comments on De Waal, Lyons, Moran, and Kraemer

Coming to understand ourselves as existing in evolutionary continuity with the rest of the living world is critical to a reexamination of our relationship with the other animals. Frans de Waal’s latest book is of great importance in contributing to the transfer of ethical behavior—in addition to tool use, “language” ability, “self-awareness,” and other such traits—out of the realm of supposed markers for “human uniqueness” and into the arena for examination as characteristics developed to differing degrees in many lifeforms through the process of natural selection. Identifying his work as a part of the growing, interdisciplinary field of cognitive ethology, de Waal makes no apologies for considering nonhuman animals as “knowing, wanting, and calculating beings.” 1 While a good Darwinist, he looks askance at the proclivity of proponents of “gene-centric sociobiology” to exploit the vernacular connotations of selfishness even as they speak technically of “selfish genes” and to emphasize competition, aggression and the negative aspects of animal behavior over cooperation, reconciliation and positive actions taken by individual animals, as noted by Lyons. Most of de Waal’s work has been with captive primates, from his landmark study of the chimpanzee colony at the Arnhem Zoo in the Netherlands, documented in his earlier books Chimpanzee Politics and Peacemaking in Primates, to his observations of rhesus and stumptailed macaques at the Wisconsin Primate Center and bonobos at the San Diego Zoo and his ongoing research at the Yerkes Primate Center in Atlanta. As one who has spent thousands of hours in face-to-face encounters with these nonhuman others, he has a lived awareness of and respect for their individuality in all its concreteness. This allows him to get beyond mere armchair

Darwin's Doubts and the Problems of Animal Pain

It is a truism that the influence of Darwin’s work on evolution is profound and ubiquitous. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the first chapter of Frans de Waal’s book, Good Natured, is entitled “Darwinian Dilemmas.” In this chapter, which sets the stage for his splendid discussion of observation of various kinds of moral behavior in primates, de Waal outlines the history of the debate over the biological status of morality since the implications of Darwinism began to be understood. Assuming Darwinism to be correct, moral behavior must have evolved along with all other features of living beings. The rest of de Waal’s book goes on to make a strong inductive case for the evolution of moral behaviors. In so doing, he provides a powerful attack on the traditional supernatural understanding of the origin of morality which takes morality to require a supernatural creator. Although most mainstream Western religious institutions now claim that evolution is consistent with their doctrines of the supernatural creator, the present discussion challenges this alleged consistency of traditional religion and evolution. The main contention of this paper is that if we take both evolution and concern for animal suffering seriously (as Darwin did), then we should reject traditional theism. If one is earnestly moved by the sufferings of nonhuman animals, must this really affect the religious views one holds? For those concerned about animal rights who are not philosophically inclined, the question may not be one that causes any anxiety. But for serious thinkers, the relation between animal suffering and religion is one that needs to be examined. The present paper begins its exploration of the connection between traditional religion and animal suffering by considering the religious opinions of Charles Darwin, who had serious doubts about religion based on the problem of animal pain. Although not all of Darwin’s views on animal suffering have been appreciated by defenders of animal rights, Darwin’s religious progress is of considerable interest, as it demonstrates the development of a persuasive agnostic stance out of a strong concern for animal suffering. The structure of my paper is as follows. Before setting out and defending Darwin’s arguments concerning religion, I begin by considering Alvin Plantinga’s recent (and influential) discussion of a controversial Darwinian passage (dubbed by Plantinga “Darwin’s Doubt”) which casts doubt on the standard interpretation of Darwin as a

The alpha factor and the conquest of Mexico: A study in ethological history

“Alpha behavior” affected human politics and social organization during the sixteenth-century conquest of Mexico by Spanish imperialists. The behavior of Spanish conquistadores is compared to that of other primates in the well-known studies of Jane Goodall and Frans de Waal. Parallels between Spanish and Aztec behavior are also noted so as to identify the shared patterns of behavior that cross human cultures and may be called primate universals. One of these universals is the alpha factor. It administers the social order through the ability to balance benevolence and brutality in order to maintain coalitions and the loyalty of subordinates. The alpha factor is expressed through display behaviors that vary with culture, but all cultures, including those of chimpanzees and bonobos, build around it. It may be tempered by the presence of female coalitions or of a bonobo alpha female, but it is a visible focal point of a society, thereby making display a necessary part of leadership.

Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes. Frans de Waal

Previous articleNext article No AccessNew Biological BooksChimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes. Frans de Waal Peter Ungar and Mary Jo SchneiderPeter Ungar Search for more articles by this author and Mary Jo Schneider Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Quarterly Review of Biology Volume 74, Number 2Jun., 1999 Published in association with Stony Brook University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/393142 Views: 6Total views on this site Copyright 1999 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.