Frank Schimmelfennig Research Articles

Rhetorical action in a liberal international order in crisis: theorising EU and NATO enlargements post-2022

ABSTRACT The Russian invasion of Ukraine has thrust the issue of European Union and NATO enlargement back into the political spotlight. However, it remains uncertain whether established theoretical frameworks are still applicable in today’s rapidly changing world. In response to this uncertainty, this debate section brings together five short reflection pieces, with a response from Frank Schimmelfennig, to assess the relevance of the theory of ‘rhetorical action’ in light of recent developments in European and international politics. How effectively does rhetorical action explain current EU and NATO enlargement processes, as well as broader forms of international cooperation? The authors find strong overall support for the theory’s continued validity. However, they caution that the increasing politicisation of issues, the rising competition from populist, non-liberal forces, and the broader crisis of the Liberal International Order require more careful reflection and specification of the scope conditions that define the theory’s limits.

De-bordering and Re-bordering the European Union After the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

This article seeks to grasp the current dynamic of the European Union’s enlargement policy as shaped by the exogenous shock of the Russian full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. It argues that external pressures matter as windows of opportunity, but the precise nature of the EU’s response to this geopolitical push is shaped by internal factors. Building on a recent work by Frank Schimmelfennig (2021), it further argues that the new enlargement dynamic can be usefully illuminated by the concept of bordering. More concretely, this research highlights external de-bordering and re-bordering strategies pursued by the relevant political actors within the EU, as they purposefully seek to use the geopolitical window of opportunity to transform existing bordering constellations in line with their preferences. Empirically, this article sheds light on Europe’s border-based games while drawing an analytical line between de-bordering and re-bordering strategies. The analysis reveals the limits of de-bordering, even under geopolitical and security emergency, but also underlines opportunities for agency.

Differentiated Integration in CSDP Through Defence Market Integration

Extract ----- Abstract New developments in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), such as PESCO or the European Defence Fund (EDF), challenge the differentiated integration framework put forward by Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leuffen and Berthold Rittberger: this policy is not and may have never been a case of low vertical integration and uniform horizontal integration. This paper presents an amended version of their framework based on constructivist institutionalist accounts of European integration. First, it discusses their explanatory variable. Rather than interdependence per se, this paper argues that it is the construction of interdependence that matters in order to understand integration. Second, rather than focusing on primary EU law, which often obscures many policy dynamics, this paper builds on legal, institutional and practice-level elements of CSDP. Based on these changes, this paper argues that national and European actors have constructed interdependence in this policy domain, by tying together armament-related issues with single market regulation and by linking armament-related issues with CSDP’s operational-military requirements around the issue of capabilities. These processes explain CSDP’s policy-making hybridity, i.e. the combination within CSDP of a more intergovernmental policy-making mode (especially but not restricted to operational-military elements) with more supranational elements (especially but not restricted to industrial armament-related elements), as well as its horizontal differentiation. The conclusion discusses the theoretical implications of policy-making hybridity. Keywords: Aarmament; CSDP; defence-industrial policy; differentiated integration; European Commission; European Defence Agency; European Defence Fund; hybridity; PESCO

Understanding the enlargement of the Eurasian Economic Union: The case of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan

The research note addresses the enlargement of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined shortly after its establishment in 2015. In theoretical terms, it aims to test Frank Schimmelfennig’s concepts on enlargement of integration communities. In practical terms, it seeks to answer why and how new members enter the EAEU. Qualitative research methods, such as historical, deductive and comparative analysis, to demonstrate that Schimmelfennig’s theoretical concepts can explain the process of enlargement of the EAEU.

EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Analysis

The author is grateful to Frank Schimmelfennig and Graham Timmins as well as the anonymous reviewers from Europe-Asia Studies for comments on earlier drafts of this article. Since 2002 the European...

The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe – Edited by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier

The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe – Edited by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier

The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe by Frank Schimmelfennig, and: Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality by James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse (review)

784 SEER, 84, 4, 2oo6 Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier Ulrich (eds). 7The Europeanization of Central andEastern Europe. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY and London, 2005. x + 256 pp. Tables. Notes. Bibliography.Index. $22.50: f12.50 (paperback). Hughes, James, Sasse, Gwendolyn and Gordon, Claire. Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and EasternEurope:The Myth of Conditionaliy. One Europe or Several? Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstokeand New York, 2004. xiv + 23I pp. Maps. Figures.Tables. Notes. Bibliography.Appendix. Index. f48.oo. To what extent has the European Union caused changes in Central and EasternEurope (CEE)in the past decade and a half?Some of the more sinmplistic accounts from the extremistwing of the Europeanizationbrigade have tended to view the CEE states as little more than passive recipients duly implementing the dictates of Brussels.The reality, however, has been very different.Thanks to a number of superb studiespublished recently including Milada Anna Vachudova'sEurope Undivided (Oxford,2005) and WadeJacoby's Orderingfrom theMenu(Cambridge,2004) we now have a much more sophisticated understanding of when, why and how the EU shaped, directed and occasionally determined change in CEE. Both Hughes et al.'s Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Centraland EasternEuropeand Schimmelfennigand Sedelmeier'sexcellent edited volume, TheEuropeanization of Central andEastern Europe, contribute to this burgeoning body of literature, but in very different ways. Whereas the former is a highly detailed study of one policy area, the latter is a collection of theoreticallyinformed essays exploring a range of policy areas and countries. In order to assess the impact of the EU, Schimmelfennigand Sedelmeier suggest three models: lesson-drawing,social learning and external incentives. According to the lesson drawing model states adopt EU rules because they 'judge them as effective remedies to inherently domestic needs and policy challenges, rather than out of considerations about the incentives the EU might offer for rule adoption' (p. io). Social learning, in contrast,is linked in with notions of identity,proposingthat rule adoption is more likelywhere the target government and society identify with the organization which established the rules. The external incentivesmodel, however, is based on a hardheaded calculation:a government will adopt EU rules if the benefits of the rewards granted by the EU exceed the domestic adoption costs. Although acknowledgingthe utility of the first two of these models, particularlyin t;he early I99OS before membershipwas on the EU's agenda, the contributorsto The Europeanization of Central and EasternEuropefind the external incentives model to be the most helpful explanatoryframework. Schimmelfenning et al., however, also develop the external incentives model. As they correctlyassert,the potency of externalincentivesdepends on a number of factors.Chief among these are the clarityof the ruleswhich need to be adhered to, the credibilityof the organizationissuingthe demands, the size and speed of reformsand the existence of domestic veto players. As the I99OS progressed the EU increasinglyclarified its requirementsof countries that wished to join. Initially states were asked to meet the Copenhagen criteria,but these ratherbroad demands were then fleshed out at the Madrid REVIEWS 785 European Council in I995 and in the numerousCommission reportscharting the aspirantstates'progress(or lack of). More critically, however, what mattered was the credibility of the EU's offer of membership. The Luxembourg European Council in 1997 passed judgment on the former Communist states of CEE. Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic were deemed to have met the criteria and were invited to begin accession negotiations.This willingnessto open the negotiation doors, therefore,seemed to demonstratethat the EU's offerof membershipwas genuine which provided a clear signal for those left out that enacting the changes requiredby the EU could yield the much sought after reward. As Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel's chapter argues, however, 'even if credibilityis high, rule adoption will depend on the size of governmental adoption costs' (p.33). Slovakia under the leadership of Vladimir Meciar provides the clearestexample illustratingthis point. Despite the huge potential benefits of joining the club and the government'sstated declaration of joining the EU, the I994-98 government was not willing to make the necessarysacrifices.The domestic adaptationcosts were too high. Nevertheless,Schimmelfenninget al. demonstratethat the EU could bring about changes even in...

The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe

The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Edited by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 256p. $22.50.The postcommunist transformations in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have generated a rich body of literature over the past 15 years. Most works on CEE transitions have drawn from the comparative politics literature and treated international factors, at best, as secondary. Yet with the recent eastern expansion of the Council of Europe, NATO, and the European Union, there has been a growing scholarly interest in the impact of international institutions on domestic changes in this region.

The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe ed. by Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier (review)

The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe ed. by Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier (review)

International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework

International institutions are a ubiquitous feature of daily life in many world regions, and nowhere more so than contemporary Europe. While virtually all would agree that such institutions matter, there is less agreement on exactly how they have effects. This special issue brings together European Union specialists and international relations theorists who address the latter issue. In particular, we explore the socializing role of institutions in Europe, with our central concern being to better specify the mechanisms of socialization and the conditions under which they are expected to lead to the internalization of new roles or interests. Drawing on a multifaceted understanding of human rationality, we consider three generic social mechanisms—strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion—and their ability to promote socialization outcomes within international institutions. This disaggregation exercise not only helps consolidate nascent socialization research programs in international relations theory and EU studies; it also highlights points of contact and potential synergies between rationalism and social constructivism.For comments on earlier versions, I am grateful to two anonymous referees, IO editors Lisa Martin and Thomas Risse, as well as to John Duffield, Alexandra Gheciu, Liesbet Hooghe, Peter Katzenstein, Ron Mitchell, Frank Schimmelfennig, Martha Snodgrass, and Michael Zürn. More generally, thanks are owed to all the project participants for numerous and valuable discussions on the themes addressed in this volume.

Overcoming Europe's Divide

1999. In The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, Frank Schimmelfennig poses some stark questions regarding the expansion of these two institutions. Most important, given that the economic benefits to the European Union as a whole and the security benefits to NATO as an alliance have been at best ambiguous and perhaps even negative, why did the members of these two institutions pursue policies of postCold War expansion? Schimmelfennig's answer is quite clever and of particular value to academic theorists. In essence, Schimmelfennig finds that, even though identity explanations are superior to rationalist arguments in helping us understand the decisions to expand these institutions, the specific positions taken by individual states during the processes of enlargement are much better understood by relying on rationalist approaches. Thus, Schimmelfennig is able to make excellent use of two major alternative perspectives in international relations theory. Moreover, due to his careful tracing of the political processes involved, Schimmelfennig's argument is persuasive. And his decision to explore both NATO and EU enlargement is quite ambitious, given that most other authors have chosen to focus on only one or the other institution (see, for example, Goldgeier 1999; Poole 2003). Although the casual observer might be tempted to see the inclusion of much of the former Soviet bloc into the European Union and NATO as inevitable, it did not seem so in the early 1990s. Schimmelfennig correctly highlights the very rational reluctance to pursue the enlargements felt by leaders in many Western capitals. Even though it was obvious why the Central and Eastern Europeans wanted to join, EU members understood the economic costs that would be involved in helping their poorer neighbors. Similarly, NATO countries feared that a larger alliance would be less effective and might even spur a renewed Russian threat, so recently diminished by the collapse of the Soviet Union. So why did they do it? Schimmelfennig argues that because these institutions (and their member states) represented a community of liberal democracies, shutting the door to countries aspiring to leave behind a communist-imposed past and rejoin Europe was not consistent with their identity. In short, their liberal identity necessitated an open door policy. How could old Europe say no, especially if the countries of new Europe adopted the norms of democracy, a market economy, respect for human rights, and the peaceful resolution of border disputes that were being demanded of them? Indeed, joining the European Union required that countries fulfill the body

International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions

International relations scholars increasingly debate when and how international institutions influence domestic policy. This examination of ethnic politics in four Baltic and East European countries during the 1990s shows how European institutions shaped domestic policy, and why these institutions sometimes failed. Comparing traditional rational choice mechanisms such as membership conditionality with more socialization-based efforts, I argue that conditionality motivated most behavior changes, but that socialization-based efforts often guided them. Furthermore, using new case studies, statistics, and counterfactual analysis, I find that domestic opposition posed far greater obstacles to socialization-based methods than it did to conditionality: when used alone, socialization-based methods rarely changed behavior; when they did, the domestic opposition was usually low and the effect was only moderate. In contrast, incentive-based methods such as membership conditionality were crucial in changing policy: As domestic opposition grew, membership conditionality was not only increasingly necessary to change behavior, but it was also surprisingly effective.Many panel and seminar participants have offered useful comments on this work, but my thanks goes in particular to Michael Zurn, Alexandra Gheciu, Frank Schimmelfennig, Jeff Checkel, Robert Keohane, Steven Wilkinson, Robert Putnam, Milada Vachudova, and the editors and anonymous reviewers of International Organization. I also thank Princeton University Press for allowing me to use material from my book Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives. The usual caveats apply. This research was funded by a grant from the Danish Research Academy (former Forskerakademiet), and by travel support from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard.

Change Rules

Previous articleNext article No AccessReview SymposiumChange Rules1József BöröczJózsef BöröczRutgers University Search for more articles by this author Rutgers UniversityPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by American Journal of Sociology Volume 106, Number 4January 2001 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/320303 Views: 56Total views on this site Citations: 12Citations are reported from Crossref © 2001 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Gábor Scheiring Dependent development and authoritarian state capitalism: Democratic backsliding and the rise of the accumulative state in Hungary, Geoforum 124 (Aug 2021): 267–278.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.08.011Gábor Scheiring The Political Economy of Illiberalism, (Aug 2020): 51–93.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48752-2_2Gábor Scheiring National Bourgeoisie and Economic Nationalism, (Aug 2020): 217–260.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48752-2_6Péter Róbert Stratification in Transition Economies, (Aug 2016): 1–4.https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeoss279.pub2Nina Bandelj, Katelyn Finley, Bogdan Radu Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: test of early impact, East European Politics 31, no.22 (Feb 2015): 129–148.https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2015.1007959Arista Maria Cirtautas, Frank Schimmelfennig Europeanisation Before and After Accession: Conditionality, Legacies and Compliance, Europe-Asia Studies 62, no.33 (Apr 2010): 421–441.https://doi.org/10.1080/09668131003647812Nina Bandelj How EU Integration and Legacies Mattered for Foreign Direct Investment into Central and Eastern Europe, Europe-Asia Studies 62, no.33 (Apr 2010): 481–501.https://doi.org/10.1080/09668131003647846Balazs Vedres Pathways from postsocialism: ownership sequence and performance of firms in Hungary, 1991-1999, European Management Review 4, no.22 (Dec 2010): 93–105.https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.emr.1500075Christos Kalantaridis Institutional Change in Post-Socialist Regimes: Public Policy and Beyond, Journal of Economic Issues 41, no.22 (Jan 2016): 435–442.https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2007.11507031 David Stark and Balázs Vedres Social Times of Network Spaces: Network Sequences and Foreign Investment in Hungary Stark and Vedres, American Journal of Sociology 111, no.55 (Jul 2015): 1367–1411.https://doi.org/10.1086/499507Balázs Vedres Testing Narratives of Post-socialism: Transition and Sequence approaches to the Ownership Histories of the Largest Hungarian Corporations, 1991-1999, Review of Sociology 10, no.11 (Jul 2005): 27–46.https://doi.org/10.1556/RevSoc.10.2004.1.2Nina Bandelj Supraterritoriality, Embeddedness, or Both? Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe, (): 25–63.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3759(07)89001-2