Franco-British Cooperation Research Articles

History and Foreign Policy: Franco-British Cooperation towards Greek Independence 1828–1830

On 6 July 1827 the Treaty of London committed France, Britain, and Russia to working together to mediate the question of Greek independence. This was one of the first examples of Franco-British cooperation after the Napoleonic Wars. Although officials on both sides of the Channel publicly celebrated Franco-British cooperation over the Greek affair, behind closed doors policy makers remained suspicious of each other's intentions. This article explores how the memory and experience of the Napoleonic conflict influenced French and British policy making during the Greek independence struggle between 1828 and 1830. It argues that the memories of these conflicts fostered cultures of Franco-British rivalry that were discernible in the highest levels of policy making as well as in parliamentary and press opinion. These misgivings, embedded in notions of natural and historic rivalry, played an important role in mediating how policy makers viewed, judged, responded to, and justified their own and their counterpart's policies and policy motivations.

UK in European Security: New Opportunities or a Path to Nowhere?

Despite Britain's traditionally ambivalent attitude towards deepening the European integration, in late 1990s - early 2000s London seemed to become a key driver of European defence and security cooperation. T.Blair and J.Chirac have set ambitious goals including the development of a European Rapid Reaction Force. However most targets have never been achieved due to concerns about undermining NATO's role and Britain's as well as other EU members' unwillingness to undertake real steps to strengthen defence and security cooperation. In late 2000s the prospects of defence integration within the EU were becoming more and more vague, and the D.Cameron coalition government opted for bilateral Franco-British cooperation. Today London remains among key opponents to the European defence but the paradox is that EU defence integration without Britain - which is along with France a leading EU military power-would be at least ineffective. With US activities gradually shifting from Europe to Asia-Pacific Britain may well take the lead in European security without any damage to Transatlantic Relations.

Understanding the workings of interstate cooperation in defence: an exploration into Franco-British cooperation after the signing of the Lancaster House Treaty

Cooperation occurs more often than conflict in the international system. However, its practicalities have been little conceptualised in International Relations. Through an empirical study of the workings of contemporary Franco-British cooperation in defence, this article offers a multidimensional analysis of interstate cooperation taking into account organisational, political, material and cognitive factors. By studying their centripetal and centrifugal effects, this article shows why each factor is relevant for understanding what favours and impedes the emergence and continuation of intergovernmental cooperation. It notably demonstrates how domestic interorganisational dynamics have an impact on relations with foreign partners. This article also shows how bridging the traditional divide between approaches based on interests and approaches based on beliefs allows us to identify the evolutionary dynamic of cooperation.

Errors and Omissions in Franco–British Co-operation over Munitions Production, 1914–1918

The opening weeks of the First World War depleted stocks of guns and munitions for all belligerents. For Britain and France the potential existed for co-operation to overcome the slow rate of the necessary industrial mobilization. French expertise combined with British resources might have given the two countries a vital advantage over the Central Powers, but national sentiment vitiated this potential. Although the two countries co-operated in less vital matters such as finance and coal imports, and the first munitions ministers of both countries worked well together, no big project (such as an Allied artillery reserve of heavy guns mounted on railway wagons to be used between Italy and the North Sea as required) ever materialized. When the USA joined the war, problems were compounded. The struggle for influence in arming the new American armies presented an unedifying spectacle. The bureaucratic successes in transport matters contrast sharply with the missed opportunities chronicled here.