In many sectors, such as retailing or fast food, franchising agreements are ubiquitous. On top of its empirical relevance, franchising has developed into a testbed for contract theory, due to its very good data availability. This is highlighted by a recent book by Blair and Lafontaine (2005), which provides a nice overview of the voluminous empirical literature on the topic. For example, franchising data have been employed to investigate the risk–incentive trade-off predicted by moral-hazard models (see, e.g., Lafontaine and Bhattacharyya, 1995), or the relative merit of vertical integration as well as its coexistence with franchising (see, e.g., Lafontaine and Shaw, 2005). Klick, Kobayashi, and Ribstein (2012) add to the empirical literature on franchising by studying the effects of legal termination restrictions in franchising relationships, using U.S. data. Roughly speaking, in the absence of a termination restriction, the franchisor is allowed to terminate his relationship with the franchisee at will. First, the authors are interested in the question how the presence of termination restrictions affects the attractiveness of franchising as the organizational form of choice. From an intuitive perspective, the presence of termination restrictions seems to deter franchisor opportunism, but might lead to more franchisee opportunism: franchisees knowing that they cannot easily be terminated might provide less effort, while franchisors might be prevented from taking over successful outlets themselves. Consequently, from a theoretical perspective the effect of termination restrictions on the attractiveness of franchising relative to other organizational forms seems to be ambiguous. Second, even if termination restrictions are in place, they might not be binding, in the sense that contracting around might be possible. That is, franchisor and franchisee might be allowed to lift termination restrictions by specifying an alternative arrangement in their franchising agreement. Klick, Kobayashi, and Ribstein (2012) hypothesize that, if such contracting around is possible, the presence or absence of legal termination restrictions should not matter for the choice of organizational form (at least in a Coasian world).