Are individuals likely to have political belief systems which allow them to behave in ways consistent with their needs for power, affiliation, and achievement? This question is explored by re-analyzing Holsti's typology of operational code belief systems. An examination of points of consensus and dissensus among the types indicates that Holsti's six-fold typology can be collapsed into four types without much loss of distinction among belief systems. A TAT motivational imagery analysis of these systems reveals that the power motive dominates four of the types; the affiliation motive dominates a fifth type; and the achievement motive is strong in the sixth type. The results support and refine Holsti's contention that his typology identifies belief systems, and they suggest potentially interesting linkages among needs, beliefs and decision-making behavior. At the present time personality and cognitive approaches constitute two major modes of psychological research into the foreign policy behavior of elites. While there has been some investigation of the overlap between these two approaches (Etheredge, 1979), their interrelationships have not received intensive scrutiny. Whatever gaps one finds between the two approaches are primarily based upon differences in conceptualization and methodology. Thus, many disagreements exist among scholars about the relevancy of each approach for understanding political behavior. I propose to investigate the possibilities for closing some of these gaps by examining the relationships between two variants of these approaches: the 'psychological motivations' approach developed by McClelland (1961), Atkinson (1958, 1966), and Winter (1973); and the 'operational code' approach pioneered by Leites (1951, 1953), George (1969), and Holsti (1977). Although these two approaches have evolved independently, they share a common concern for the explanation of several political variables, such as bargaining style, the selection of political goals, the adoption of risk-taking strategies and tactics, and the exercise of political influence (Terhune, 1968; Winter and Stewart 1977; George, 1969; T,-J1ti 1077A