Foundations Of Liberalism Research Articles

Idea, Sovereignty, Eco-colonialism and the Future

This article argues that human-caused climate change reveals previously unrecognised or overlooked aspects of the liberal concept of private property. It suggests that the concept of private property facilitates the ‘climate-change relationship’, a connection between human activities, the natural world and the human consequences of climate change. Based upon this link, the article offers four reflections on private property and its role in global phenomena like climate change: first, that the ‘idea’ of private property (the popularly held belief about what it is) is a primary culprit; second, that private property is ‘sovereignty’, power over others, which gives its holders global reach; third, that because the idea informs the exercise of sovereignty, private property makes eco-colonialists of individuals; and finally, that the future of private property may require us to give greater attention both to a shift in the idea and a global focus regarding the concept. While these ruminations are preliminary and programmatic, what they necessitate is further research and a willingness to rethink and reconceive the liberal foundations of the way we live with and relate to others.

Rortyian Hope

Rortyian Hope This is a paper about Richard Rorty's notion of hope, and the role that it plays in breaking down Rorty's public/private distinction, and connecting philosophy to politics. The argument that philosophy can be engaged in and with the social-political world is one that is coherent with Rorty's position if philosophy is understood as striving towards its goals with a sense of contextualism and fallibilism. Placing Rorty within the tradition of the classic pragmatists, James and Dewey, I will argue that pluralism can and should serve as a contextual foundation for liberalism. Through an examination and analysis of Rorty's liberal ironist and anti-foundationalism, I will explore how Rortyian hope can be understood as socially and politically transformative, transforming our conception of knowledge from one based on certainty to one based on fallibility.

Beyond liberal Utopia: freedom as the problem of modernity

This essay critiques the concept of the “punctual” or autonomous self that served as the foundation of classical liberalism and its moral philosophy, beginning in the work of A. Smith, T. Paine, and I. Kant. Grounded in the language of “rights,” personal liberty, and rational self‐possession, the modern individual is paradoxically characterized as a unique agent and as formally equivalent to all other such beings. Furthermore, its political and epistemological claims rest on unexamined assumptions about freedom that would be severely challenged by the pessimistic turn of much nineteenth‐century literary and philosophical narrative.

Herbert Spencer and the invention of modern life

Preface List of Illustrations Introduction Part I An Individual and his Personal Culture 1. A Portrait of a Private Man 2. The Longing for Passion 3. The Problem with Women 4. Feminist Politics 5. Culture and Beauty 6. Eccentricities: Health and the Perils of Recreation Part II The Lost World of Spencer's Metaphysics 7. The New Reformation 8. Intellectuals in the Strand 9. The Genesis of a System 10. Common Sense in the Mid-Nineteenth Century 11. From Philosophy to Psychology Part III Spencer's Biological Writings and his Philosophy of Science 12. On Goodness, Perfection and the Shape of Living Things 13. The Meaning of Life 14. Science and the Classification of Knowledge Part IV Politics and Ethical Sociology 15. The Spencerian Foundations of Liberalism 16. Early Victorian Radicalism 17. Sociology as an Ethical Discipline 18. Sociology as Political Theory 19. Progress 'versus' Democracy Notes Bibliography Index

Self-Directedness and the Human Good

Abstract This review of Norms of Liberty by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl seeks to outline the authors' attempts to provide a foundation for liberalism. Their solution emerges from a synthesis of the liberty implied in acts of deliberative choice and norms rooted in knowledge of human nature. This synthesis, however, proves to be unstable. Deliberative choice must be conditioned and determined by knowledge of human nature, but free choice must be unconditioned and autonomous. The attempt to square this circle through the notion of individualistic perfectionism conceals rather than solves the difficulty.

Self-Directedness and the Human Good

Abstract This review of Norms of Liberty by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl seeks to outline the authors' attempts to provide a foundation for liberalism. Their solution emerges from a synthesis of the liberty implied in acts of deliberative choice and norms rooted in knowledge of human nature. This synthesis, however, proves to be unstable. Deliberative choice must be conditioned and determined by knowledge of human nature, but free choice must be unconditioned and autonomous. The attempt to square this circle through the notion of individualistic perfectionism conceals rather than solves the difficulty.

MODERN LIBERALISM AND PRIDE An Augustinian Perspective

ABSTRACTIn “Toward an Augustinian Liberalism,” Paul Weithman argues that modern liberal institutions should be concerned with the political vice of pride as a threat to the neutral, legitimate use of public power that liberalism demands. By directing our attention to pride, Weithman attempts to provide an incentive to and foundation for an Augustinian liberalism that can counteract this threat. While Weithman is right to point to the centrality of pride in understanding the modern liberal tradition, an investigation of the early modern reflections on pride in politics reveals a deeper tension between Augustine and modern liberalism than Weithman's analysis acknowledges. This essay discusses this tension by focusing on Hobbes's account of pride and equality in the commonwealth, asking whether Hobbes can be understood as a thinker in the Augustinian political tradition. In order to provide a background on pride as a political vice, this essay contrasts Aristotelian magnanimity with Augustinian humility. Finally, Aquinas's attempt to reintroduce magnanimity into the Augustinian political tradition is considered as a more consistent development of Augustine's thought, thereby revealing more pointedly the tension between Augustine and modern liberalism. By way of conclusion, the possibility of deflating this tension is briefly addressed by considering Jean Bethke Elshtain's discussion of an Augustinian liberalism that does not rely upon a “secular” conception of human nature.

Report from the Field: Left Media and Left Think Tanks — Foundation-Managed Protest?

Left media and left think tank staff people generally deny that the acceptance by their organizations of grants from liberal foundations has transformed their organizational priorities, subjected them to elite control, or channeled their energies into safe, legalistic, bureaucratic activities and mild reformism. In this report, we will be discussing organizations, e.g., Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), Middle East Research & Information Project (MERIP), Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR); and media, e.g., Nation, Progressive, Mother Jones, In These Times, widely regarded as left-wing. Some originated in the 1960s and 1970s with bold challenges to the United States political and economic system; we can read (some are online) their early publications and mission statements to be reminded of the initial militancy. In the popular mind, these media and think tanks are clearly distinguished from, on the one hand, the liberal media, e.g., New York Times, Harper's, and think tanks, e.g., Brookings Institution, Urban Institute, and on the other, the “far” left, e.g., Workers' World, Maoist Internationalist Movement. A few of the left-wing organizations are primarily concerned about threats to media independence, yet all their attention is focused on for-profit corporate (or government) control; they ignore the possible influence of large subventions from non-profit institutions such as foundations.

Hate Speech and Pornography in Canada: A Qualified Deontological Response to a Consequentialist Argument

InThe Hateful and the Obscene, Sumner offers a consequentialist reading of John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy that blinds him to the complexity and normative attractions of Canadian law's response to hate speech and pornography. This essay argues that qualified deontological moral philosophy provides a more adequate basis on which to understand the bodies of law examined by Sumner. The qualified deontological analysis is more adequate since it (unlike consequentialism) provides a basis on which to account for the presence within Canadian law of incommensurable values. The analysis offered here also addresses three further weaknesses in Sumner’s text. Sumner offers an inadequate account of the role played by the concept of community in the law’s operations. He also fails to recognise that a strong commitment to identity politics has shaped the development of Canadian law. But perhaps the most significant weakness inThe Hateful and the Obsceneis Sumner’s adoption of a ‘Millian’ position on free expression that fails adequately to address the threats posed by those political activists who seek to undercut liberal democracy's foundations.

Latin America: a new interpretation

Introduction The Politics of Expertise in Latin America: Antecedents and Actualities Privatization and the Public Interest: Partial Theories, Lopsided Outcomes Economies in Mexico: The Power of Ideas, the Ideas of Power Beyond Neo-Liberalism: Bolivia's Capitalization as a Route to the Universal Entitlement and Substantive Citizenship Rights? The Shifting Foundations of Economic Liberalism in Latin American Public Policy Democratization and Social Injustice

Review: Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism

Review: Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism

Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism

Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism. By Graham Long. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2004. 250p. $59.00.A work that treats relativism without mentioning Nietzsche, the foundations of liberalism without mentioning Locke, and universalism without discussing any of the great philosophers from Plato to Hegel is apt to be defective. Yet Graham Long's book proves that such a work can still merit serious attention. Through his taste for rigorous arguments, his seriousness of purpose, and his knowledge of the literature written in the spirit of English analytical philosophy and academic liberalism more generally, he has succeeded in producing a book that is both thoughtful and thought-provoking.

Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism by Graham Long, Imprint Academic, Exeter, 2004, pp. x+276, £30 hbk.

New BlackfriarsVolume 86, Issue 1005 p. 556-557 RELATIVISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM by Graham Long, Imprint Academic, Exeter, 2004, pp. x+276, £30 hbk. Gerard J Hughes SJ, Gerard J Hughes SJSearch for more papers by this author Gerard J Hughes SJ, Gerard J Hughes SJSearch for more papers by this author First published: 11 August 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0028-4289.2005.0109c.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume86, Issue1005September 2005Pages 556-557 RelatedInformation

Relative Justifications - Gerald F. Gaus: Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project. (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003. Pp. 240. $32.95.) - Graham Long: Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism. (Exeter, UK and Charlottesville, USA: Imprint Academic, 2004. Pp. 276. $59.00.)

Relative Justifications - Gerald F. Gaus: Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project. (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003. Pp. 240. $32.95.) - Graham Long: Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism. (Exeter, UK and Charlottesville, USA: Imprint Academic, 2004. Pp. 276. $59.00.)

The Tenuous Case for Conscience

If there is any single theme that has provided the foundation of modern liberalism and has infused our more specific constitutional commitments to of religion and of speech, that theme is probably freedom of But some observers also perceive a progressive cheapening of - even a sort of degradation. Such criticisms suggest the need for a contemporary rethinking of conscience. When we reverently invoke do we have any idea what we are talking about? Or are we just exploiting a venerable theme for rhetorical purposes without any clear sense of what conscience is or why it matters? This essay addresses two questions. The first is discussed briefly: what is conscience? What do we have in mind when we say that someone acted from conscience? A second question receives more extended discussion: granted its importance to the individuals who assert it, still, why should conscience deserve special respect or accommodation from society, or from the state? That question forces us to consider the metaethical presuppositions of claims of conscience. The discussion suggests that claims to may be defensible only on certain somewhat rarified moral and metaethical assumptions. The discussion further suggests that shifts in such assumptions have transformed the meaning of claims to freedom of conscience, so that such claims typically now mean almost the opposite of what they meant when asserted by early champions of such as Thomas More, Roger Williams, and John Locke.

Life-And-Death Matters

When I grow up, I want to be a bioethicist. It would give me the opportunity to weigh in on all manner of life-and-death matters, mostly for liberal foundations and health care companies that are, in the main, irritated by the fact that we spend too much money on health care. The only thing stopping me is that in the end, as bioethicist Daniel Callahan calls for in What Price Better Health? I would be left supporting antismoking campaigns instead of research on a cure for spina bifida. According to Callahan, the research imperative is a philosophical view that regards medical research as more important than any other moral value or as a justification for certain “wrongs,” which for him is the “high” (we never find out relative to what) price of pharmaceuticals. In other words, Callahan believes that people (such as I) who see medical progress as the key to increasing life span, improving the quality of life, easing pain, and boosting productivity also believe that medical research has an absolute moral value that cannot be trumped by other concerns. He explains: “As health has improved, and mortality and disability declined, the drive for research has increased, not decreased. There seems to be no such thing as enough, no level of...health that leads to a reduction in research aspiration. A naive witness to discussions of American health might think that we have never been worse off, with a long...list of miseries still to be dealt with” (p. 33). On the one hand, Callahan believes that the research imperative is really fueled by a foolish desire by people who are not really sick, who are really healthy, to become absurdly and wastefully healthier still. But what about the fact that most of the research dollars in both the public and private sectors are devoted to finding better ways to prevent, treat, or cure diseases such as AIDS, Alzheimer’s, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, and mental illness? Or that genetic research is allowing scientists to more quickly translate molecular disease mechanisms into potential drugs or vaccines? On the other hand, Callahan believes that “as the success of research...portends, oldfashioned fatalism seems to have, so to speak, received a fatal blow.” There is no reason to accept any disease or disability with stoicism, more’s the pity, according to the author. Either way, Callahan seems to believe that the research imperative moves medical research in a wrong-headed direction: We spend too much money on health care in general instead of more socially useful things. But I digress. The research imperative, Callahan asserts, is to blame for people mistreating human subjects and lab animals alike in medical experiments. In making this assertion, he ignores a whole body of psychological research on the effects of environment on behavior (remember the Zimbardo prison experiment?), let alone the horrific “research” conducted by Nazi scientists on Jews without the research-imperative excuse. But this is not Callahan’s big beef. Rather, he has it in for drug companies, which he complains make way too much money, charge prices that are way too high, and try to get away by invoking the research imperative. B o o k R e v i e w s

The Struggle Inside Democracy: Modernity, Social Movements and Global Solidarity

The essay develops two interrelated arguments. The first argument brings into play the concepts of globalization, democracy and social movements, and underlines their mutually constitutive character in the development of Western societies since the 18th century. The second argument points to an uncertain future by looking at a confusing present. Extrapolating from the analysis of the historical relationship between globalization, democracy and social movements, it identifies the incipient development of a global solidarity position. This position is anchored in radical democratic ideas and expressed by contemporary social movement networks whose activities involve the crossing of physical, social and cultural distances. The emphasis on radical democracy and the decidedly global nature of the position implies a challenge to the traditional national and state anchored conception of democracy and its liberal and representative foundations. Theoretically, the article draws from a number of currents in the social movements and globalization literatures.

Public Reason and the Moral Foundation of Liberalism

AbstractI argue against Rawls’s freestanding conception of liberalism. On my view, the moral foundation of liberalism can be defended in one of three ways: (1) as a conception one accepts as a result of one’s affirmation of political liberalism, (2) as a conception one must affirm as a presupposition for political liberalism, or (3) as a philosophical truth about practical reason and persons. The first option makes it impossible to distinguish a moral consensus from a modus vivendi. The second renders the moral foundation of liberalism dogmatic because it affirms a moral foundation for which no justification is provided. Since there are good reasons for rejecting (1) and (2), that leaves option (3). I argue that (3) should be the preferred option for liberals who advance liberalism as a political doctrine with a moral foundation.

Spain, from liberalism to Fascism, 1808-1977

CHARLES ESDAILE, Spain in the Liberal Age: From Constitution to Civil War, 1808-1939 (Blackwell, London, 2000), xii +434 pp., ISBN 0-631-14988-0 (hb), £18.99STANLEY G. PAYNE, Fascism in Spain, 1923-1977 (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 1999), xiii +601 pp., ISBN 0-299-16564-7 (pb), $24.95 The two works under review constitute a remarkable and welcome analysis of the complex and too often violent making of modern Spain. To most Anglo-Saxon readers accustomed to the relatively political and constitutional normality of their countries, the history of Spain could appear as a chaotic succession of strife, insurrections and military intervention. Indeed, few countries in Europe have experienced in the space of some 130 years such a number of civil wars, royal departures and restorations, and praetorian rule. The shortcomings and fragile foundations of Spanish liberalism explain this constant cycle of political and social instability. This long period of turmoil initiated by the French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808 to the end of the Civil War in 1939 is the framework for the book by Charles Esdaile. The complexity of the subject and the gigantic shadow still cast by the pioneering study of Raymond Carr, Spain 1808-1939, meant that it was not an easy undertaking. Thus one has to recognize both the urgent necessity for this text and admire the author's ability to carry it off. Ironically, Esdaile, a 19th century expert, excels in the chapters dealing with the period 1898-1936, a notable updating and improvement on Carr's masterly work. Yet, and perhaps because of his expertise, the breathless narrative of the first half of the text often conceals the overall analysis.

Retrieving the Virtues in Psychotherapy

This article considers the possibility that democratic liberalism is a virtue tradition. Given the centrality of the liberal tradition in American psychotherapy, the clinician risks imposing a particular set of virtues on the ethnic or religious client. A review of the historical and philosophical foundations of liberalism suggests that psychotherapy is a moral encounter based on its handling of virtue language. Liberal psychotherapy may, when it displaces the client’s tradition, contribute to a departicularized self. Drawing on the thought of Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer, an argument is developed that the meaning and cultivation of virtue is context dependent. Suggestions are offered for a tradition-sensitive psychotherapy that functions emically within the client’s own virtue grammar. A concluding case study illustrates tradition-sensitive, virtue psychotherapy with a conservative Jewish seminary student.