Form Of Relativism Research Articles

Relativism, naturalism and reticulation

Gerald Doppelt's essay in the recent number of Synthese (69/2) poses a number of epistemic challenges to the theory of scientific change I sketched out in Science and Values. Chief among them is Doppelt's charge that my attempt to refute (Kuhnian) relativism, one of the central aims of that book, is a pyrrhic victory since even if I have disposed of the strong relativism of Kuhn in his more unguarded moments there is nonetheless a significant form of relativism which I am powerless to defeat, which indeed my view promulgates and presupposes. I believe that Doppelt's interesting essay usefully high lights some of the problems now faced by theorists of scientific change, and I intend to discuss it in those terms. But I might as well reveal part of my hand now by saying that I think Doppelt has missed the key argument in Science and Values against relativism; and because he has, most of his claims about my lack of resources for countering relativism must go by the board. If I am right about this, then Doppelt turns out to be attacking a straw man of his own invention. But, in the process of showing why Doppelt has missed the key argument against relativism, I think I can go some of the way to showing why relativists and non-relativists often seem to miss the force of one another's arguments. Such an exercise might prove of some modest aid in clarifying issues which both Doppelt and I take to be central to the theory of scientific rationality.

Rawlsian Relativism and Background Theories

Throughout John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (TJ) 1 there is tacit, but strong, reliance upon notion of intuition that was first developed in an earlier paper entitled, Outline of Decision Procedure for Ethics.* It is the role of intuition in decision procedure for ethics and, specifically, in the method of reflective equilibrium that is attacked by Peter Singer, R. M. Hare, and Richard Brandt. Attacks that, if successful, would reduce the Rawlsian scheme an undesirable form of relativism. This relativism reduces an internal test of coherence, where there are no external principles which we can appeal, no external standards by which we can judge the principles and intuitions themselves. Singer questions why the moral judgments we intuitively make are legitimate fixed points against which theories can be tested. Why not, he asks, make the opposite assumption, i.e., that such judgments are likely to derive from discarded religious systems, from warped views of sex and bodily functions, or from customs necessary for the survival of the group of social and economic circumstances that now lie in the distant past? 1 Hare claims that Rawls advocates narrow subjectivism that is the result of grounding his theoretical structure on a cosy unanimity in people'8 considered judgments.*

Die Philosophie der Antike 2: Sophistik und Sokratik. Platon und Aristoteles (review)

422 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 23:3 JULY 1985 the ES, and the dramatic interaction between them (esp. 61-69). One does not have to accept everything that Rosen says about this matter to realize that Plato does portray Socrates as partly suspicious of the ES and as holding him at arm's length, and that there is ground therein for doubting that the ES is simply Plato's mouthpiece . The chief virtue of the book is that it forces us to confront the possibility that the ES's account of falsity is at best only a part of Plato's realist conception of falsity and truth. If one finds it implausible (as I do) that Plato gave that conception up in his later works,5 then this book is a useful stimulus to further thought about how the contents of the Sophist are related to it. NICHOLAS WHITE The University of Michigan Andreas Graeser. Die Philosophie der Antike 2: Sophistik und Sokratik. Platon und Aristoteles . Vol. 2, Geschichte der Phitosophie in zwOlf B~nden. Reihe Beck'sche Elementarb~cher. Edited by W. ROd. M0nchen: C. H. Beck, 1983. Pp. 345. DM 38,oo. Within a 12 volume history of philosophy, Graeser's book covers the "classical" period of Greek Philosophy; it treats, in four chapters, of (1) the Sophists, (2) Socrates and some of his followers, (3) Plato, and (4) Aristotle. Graeser's style is lively and, for the most part, makes for easy reading. When he discusses competing interpretations of a philosopher's teaching, he can quite frequently base this on his own research. In a general introduction to the volume, the author draws attention to the historical setting against which the philosophical movements of 5th and 4th century Greece have to be seen. "Sophistik": The particular virtue of the chapter on the sophists is the emphasis on their significance for the history of philosophy. Graeser takes these philosophers seriously , although, understandably, he shows more respect for their questions than for their answers. Protagoras, e.g., presents us with questions as up-to-date as the following : What is the relation between what seems to me to be true and what is true? What forms of relativism or subjectivism, if any, are tenable? Or take the section on Gorgias: What are the objects of perception and of thought? How can something mean something else? How can we talk about what is not? Can your sense-impressions be compared with mine? (This section, by the way, is a little laborious to read. The inadequacy of the sources seems to lead Graeser to somewhat shaky and hazy interpretations here.) The individual contours of each sophist emerge quite distinctly. At the same time, Graeser is aware that the sophists' topics and even their positions exhibit a considerable convergence, apparently owing to a shared misunderstanding of language : words, esp., predicates, and even sentences tend to be construed as names of 5 See my Plato on Knowledge and Reality. This is not to deny that Plato changed some features of the theory that embodied that conception. BOOK REVIEWS 423 things (See 48 f.). Recurring themes are: (1) The problem of understanding "is" in sentences like "The man is wise," i.e., either we should never use such a form of proposition or else we are saying what is false, viz., that man = wise. (2) Accounts of knowledge on the model of seeing. (3) The possibility of negation and of falsehood. There is, of course, another area of thought where the sophists easily get in touch with more recent philosophers: questions of unconditional norms of behavior and of the foundations and function of legislation. I found particularly illuminating the pages on Thrasymachus (77-8o). According to Graeser's analytical treatment, his position concerns not so much the nature of justice as its intrinsic relationship with "the anatomy of social reality" (79). The second chapter, "Sokratik," deals with Socrates, Euclid of Megara, Antisthenes and Aristippus. In comparing Socrates with Aristotle (94 f.), Graeser observes that Socrates is the more critical moral philosopher of the two in regard to accepted moral values. The larger part of the book is taken up by two extensive...

Relativism as Reductio

Many philosophers believe that the relativistic consequences of a philo? sophical theory are sufficient to refute that theory. The reason relativism is treated as a reductio is that relativism is widely held to be self-refuting. In this paper I argue that there is at least one form of epistemological relativism which is neither self-refuting nor obviously false. If I am successful then any blanket treatment of epistemological relativism as a reductio must be mistaken. The relativist is frequently taken to be critical, not to say sceptical, of what we would as a matter of course claim to know. We would normally claim to know such things as that dashi, a Japanese soup stock, is made with giant kelp and bonito. There are forms of relativism which would deny that this claim can be known to be objectively true (or false). But these revisionary forms of relativism, by striking at what we would ordinarily say, are difficult to take seriously. Since my purpose is to determine if there is a coherent and plausible form of epistemological relativism, I shall consider it a decisive objection to any form of epistemological relativism that it is sceptical of what we would ordinarily call knowledge. On this account, the principal challenge of epistemological relativism is not a denial that what we call objective knowledge is objective knowledge; rather the principal challenge is a critique of a philosophical picture of what that objectivity consists in. In particular the relativist joins the attack on metaphysical realism recently made urgent by Dummett and Putnam. Objectivity does not consist in the agreement of our claims with what Putnam sarcastically calls THE WORLD. THE WORLD, on the meta? physical realist's account, might bear no resemblance to anything we claim to know. Here is Putnam: ' Verified (in any operational sense) does not imply true, on the metaphysical realist picture, even in the ideal limit.n So characterized, THE WORLD is like'. .. a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, [it] is not part of the mechanism'.2 Since this paper is primarily a consideration of the logical coherence of relativism it is immaterial whether, as I shall assume in this paper, THE WORLD is a world well lost. Nevertheless it must be said that if metaphysical realism

The Reasonableness of Relativism

I have for some time defended a form of relativism which, though formulated explicitly in the context of certain aesthetic concerns (chiefly, regarding the interpretation and appreciation of artworks), I suggested could be applied without much adjustment to a wide variety of judgments and conceptual schemes for instance, moral judgments, ontological analyses of what there is, characterizations and interpretations of human history and human action, and explanatory theories of intentionally specified phenomena. There are ways of applying relativism promisingly even to those domains that have been most stubbornly extensional or have claimed apodictic certainty and universal scope for instance, regarding the phenomena and causal laws of the physical sciences, and transcendental arguments. These and other applications appear reasonable at least to the extent that we cannot provide a compelling basis for demarcating realist and idealist accounts of the sciencesI or for proposing a criterion of the analytic/synthetic distinction among natural languages or for eliminating historicist constraints on theory and inquiry. Now, Michael Wreen has charged' that my theory, a moderate or robust relativism': (A) is not consistent, (B) is not moderate, and (C) entails skepticism. I am grateful to Wreen for an occasion to clarify the sense in which none of these charges may be made to stick hence, that relativism is a conceptually respectable option that fits our intuitions rather neatly in a variety of contexts

La objetividadde la moral cristiana y la filosofía del ser

The rejection of the objectivity of moral norms, considering them to be incompatible with human freedom, is one of the clearest manifestations of the present moral crisis. This question, which is often posed in relation to those norms which relate to the natural law, finds its most profound answer in a christian perspective. In effect the Gospel implies a definite anthropology. In order to express the message revealed by Jesus Christ not every anthropology is valid. Man's conditions as creature is a necessary presupposition on the gospel message. 11 this is ignored it is impossible to understand the universality of the christian message which necessarily presupposes a common basis, that is human nature. The divine initiative of salvation does not present itself as something radically heterogeneous to man but rather in terms of fulfillment, realization and restoration. It presupposes the presence of ethical requirements in the natural and universal reality of man. These ethical requirements belong to the range of natural law, a concept which has been the object of particular attack in relativist circles. It becomes necessary then, as an important task for ethics, to delimit clearly the concept of nature since in it the concept of natural law is in the balance. In a special way it must be stressed that nature is not a univocal concept but rather it is essentially analogical. It is predicated of all creatures and of God, of things and of man. Human nature should be considered as an open reality, since it is spiritual, and the moral requirements which spring from it, while granting that they are in accord with fundamental tendencies of nature, should be regulated by human reason. In this sense the moral norms of the natural law should not be considered to have been given once and for all but rather as a task of human reason. This approach, which is also thomist, does not leed to any form of relativism as long as it is situated within the context of the metaphysics of being which respects the spiritual openness of man. The vacuum created by the abandonment of metaphysics is being filled by use of the positive sciences which thus usurp the role which corresponds to metaphysics in the determination of ethical norms. The consequence is relativism as the sciences study the events and attempt to give them normative value. The sciences do have an important service to render to morality but should not grant themselves a role which is no theirs. Specifically the particular competence which corresponds to reason should be respected and that of reason illuminated by faith in the christian context. It is precisely the relationship between reason and faith that is the key to interpret the impact of the New Law on the natural law as well as the competence of the Magisterium in moral questions.

Kuhn's epistemological relativism: An interpretation and defense

This article attempts to develop a rational reconstruction of Kuhn's epistemological relativism which effectively defends it against an influential line of criticism in the work of Shapere and Scheffler. Against the latter's reading of Kuhn, it is argued (1) that it is the incommensurability of scientific problems, data, and standards, not that of scientific meanings which primarily grounds the relativism argument; and (2) that Kuhnian incommensurability is compatible with far greater epistemological continuity from one theory to another than is implied by the criticisms in question. The reconstruction of Kuhn is then used to show that while it constitutes a provocative form of relativism, it can also plausibly account for the sense in which scientific development is rational, involves standards external to particular paradigms, and exhibits progress of a sort. Finally, the article attempts to develop an adequate critical perspective on Kuhn's relativism by distinguishing a ‘short‐run’ from a ‘long‐run’ r...

Geometry and Convention: A Critical Discussion

GEOMETRY AND CONVENTION: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION A COLLECTION of essays/ together with the essays of George Schlesinger and the essay of Hilary Putman, replies to which are contained in this collection, provide contemporary philosophers of nature with a twentieth-century counterpart of the famous Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Griinbaum levels an all-out attack on that form of spatial and temporal absolutism which holds that distances and durations are intrinsic features of space and time. He upholds a form of relativism according to which space and time have distances and durations only relative to physical devices such as rods and clocks and according to which a significant conventional element is involved in specifying how such devices determine distances and durations. Schlesinger claims that hypothetical empirical facts-the lengthening of the day as measured by a pendulum, the increase of the velocity of light as measured by rods and pendulum clocks-could force us to accept the view that everything has doubled in size overnight. But how can one be forced to accept nocturnal doubling if one is free to account for the hypothetical facts by supposing that the laws of nature have changed their dependence on lengths and hence that things have not doubled in size at all? By rejecting this alternative Schlesinger is made by Griinbaum to appear as a spatial absolutist who holds that space has an intrinsic metric and that this metric can change. Putnam's long criticism of the first essay in Griinbaum's collection is an attempt to show that Griinbaum has exaggerated the role of convention in regard to spatial and temporal measures. One should consider geometrical and chronological matters in the context of an 1 Adolf Griinbaum, Geometry and Ch1·onometry in Philosophical Perspective, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1968. Pp. 386. $3.45. 343 344 MILTON FISK entire physical theory, and then, according to Putnam, it will be apparent there is little room left for convention. From this point of view, one can say that intervals in space and time have, in an objective way, magnitudes. In his 175 page reply to Putnam, Griinbaum denies he has been unaware of important theoretical and empirical constraints in the choice of a metric. But, granting the constraints, there is still an important element of convention since, he points out, space and time as mere sets of points and instants lack metrical properties. Such, then, in barest outline are the issues in this lengthy debate over the status of spatial and temporal magnitudes. It is with considerable misgivings that I add to this already voluminous discussion. Griinbaum's 196~ essay in the third volume of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Sciencethe substance of which appears again as Chapters 1-4 of his Philosophical Problems of Space and Time and is Chapter 1 of the present collection-sparked the discussion. This essay developed Reichenbach's emphasis, particularly in The Philosophy of Space and Time, on definitional or conventional elements in geometry and chronometry. Griinbaum finds the justification for the conventionalism Reichenbach advocates in the idea of Riemann that continuous manifolds have no intrinsic metric. In Chapter~. Griinbaum joins together replies to two of Schlesinger's papers, the first of Schlesinger's papers appearing in Philosophical Studies (15, 1964) and the second in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy (.~5, 1967). Griinbaum 's replies originally appeared along with these papers. The third and final chapter, published in the fifth volume of Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, is the reply to Putnam's critique in the second volume of The Delaware Seminar. The thoroughness of Griinbaum's exposition and of his replies is accompanied by an undesirable amount of repetitiveness . And the polemical bombast, especially of the reply to Putnam, has interferred with the possibility of a clear statement of the fundamental issue between the two. The elaborate attempts to show how " Putnam flies in the face of my writings, is unmindful of an important caveat of mme, GEOMETRY AND CONVENTION 345 and saddles me with" so-and-so's error could, without loss, have been saved for private correspondence with Putnam. Despite such attempts, the reply contains many valuable elaborations of points Griinbaurn made in the 1962...