Formation Of Preferential Trade Agreements Research Articles

Spatial spillovers in trade agreement memberships: Does institutional proximity matter?

AbstractThis paper examines spatial spillovers in the formation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) through a new channel of institutional proximity. Our dependent variable is the status of PTAs between country attributes within a country‐pair. The explanatory variable of interest is the status of PTAs in neighbouring country‐pairs that share proximity in institutional development. We consider democracy and economic freedom as the main aspects of institutions, and use both as the fundamental components of institutional distance between country‐pairs. Employing a spatial econometric method, we find strong evidence of the institutional interdependence of PTAs: country‐pairs tend to influence each other's decision on the formation and the chosen type of PTAs (i.e., deep or shallow), such a neighbourhood effect increases with institutional proximity and is more prominent for the decisions on the type of PTAs. The institutional spatial channel is robust to various robustness checks.

Dynamic preferential trade agreement formation and the role of political economy

AbstractUsing a dynamic preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation model, we show that political biases in exporting and import‐competing sectors substantially impact the extent of PTA formation. While both exclusion and free riding incentives constrain the expansion to global free trade in a free trade agreement (FTA) game, only the former incentive arises in a customs union (CU) game. When we endogenize the choice between FTAs and CUs, the tension between the flexibility benefit of FTAs and the coordination benefit of CUs reveals that FTAs always serve as PTA building blocks while CUs may serve as PTA building or stumbling blocks.

Tariff Flexibility Amid Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements: WTO Law vs. PTA Law

AbstractThis paper examines the legal ramifications of using tariff flexibility arising from GATT unbound tariff lines or tariff overhangs under both WTO and preferential trade agreement (PTA) law when flexibility is exercised preferentially for PTA partners. Under WTO law, a WTO member that is a party to a PTA under GATT Article XXIV is required to use tariff flexibility on a non-discriminatory basis. However, PTA obligations including tariff elimination commitments and a standstill clause prohibit the WTO member from raising applied tariffs on imports from the PTA parties, thereby preventing the use of tariff flexibility on a non-discriminatory manner. In contrast, a WTO member entering into a PTA under the Enabling Clause may use tariff flexibility discriminatorily without violating WTO law. A WTO member has greater legal latitude in utilizing tariff flexibility if it forms a PTA under the Enabling Clause rather than under GATT Article XXIV. The discriminatory exercise of tariff flexibility by some WTO members in conformity with PTA obligations, but in violation of WTO law, is further evidence of the fragmentation of the world trading system, where WTO law is facing its limits.

International sourcing, complementary inputs, and the structure of trade agreements: Deep, shallow, narrow, and wide

We analyze Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) formation among a subset of members of a multilateral agreement when imported inputs are complementary to one another. A shallow (focused only on border policies) multilateral agreement does not place countries on the efficiency frontier. Furthermore, no subset of countries will form a shallow PTA. Alternatively, a deep PTA that addresses behind-the-border policies increases each country's welfare. This result suggests that the recent proliferation of PTA formation is driven by a need for deep integration. Although these deep PTAs increase welfare over a shallow multilateral agreement the efficiency frontier can only be reached by a deep multilateral agreement that covers both border and behind-the-border policies. Whether a deep PTA can generate consensus approval for further multilateral-deep integration depends on the structure of the PTA and the success of the multilateral-shallow agreement in lowering tariffs.

Implications of multilateral tariff bindings on the extent of preferential trade agreement formation

Using an endogenous preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation model, we examine the effects of continual reduction in tariff bindings on the extent of PTA formation and its role in attaining global free trade. When countries are completely symmetric, no country has an incentive to free ride from global free trade while exclusion incentives arise when tariff bindings are sufficiently tight. Due to the relatively flexible nature of the free trade area (FTA) formation, such exclusion incentives go unexercised and free trade always obtains as the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) of the FTA game. However, since customs union (CU) expansion leads directly to global free trade and member countries are able to veto CU expansion, they exercise the exclusion incentive and thus free trade fails to be a CPNE. We then consider a scenario where countries are asymmetric with respect to their comparative advantage. The country with a weaker comparative advantage has an incentive to free ride on trade liberalization of the other two countries and lower tariff bindings discipline this incentive via constraining the ability to set optimal tariffs. As a result, continual reduction in tariff bindings facilitates FTA formation in attaining global free trade.

Tariff bindings and the dynamic formation of Preferential Trade Agreements

We show that multilateral tariff binding liberalization substantially impacts the nature and extent of Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) formation. First, it shapes the nature of forces constraining expansion of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The constraining force is a free riding incentive of FTA non-members under relatively high bindings but an exclusion incentive of FTA members under relatively low bindings. Second, multilateral tariff binding liberalization shapes the role played by PTAs in the attainment of global free trade. Initially, tariff binding liberalization leads to Custom Union (CU) formation in equilibrium but in a way that undermines the pursuit of global free trade. However, further tariff binding liberalization leads to FTA formation in equilibrium and in a way that facilitates the attainment of global free trade. Our theoretical analysis also has implications regarding recent empirical discussions over the relative merits of FTAs versus CUs.

How Electoral Rules and Electoral Prospects Affect the Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements?

This paper proposes a novel explanation for why states form preferential trade agreements (PTAs). I argue that current governments, anticipating them losing power in the future, use PTAs to constrain future governments. This mechanism can generate two unique observable implications that are not compatible with existing theories. Because the demand for constraining opponents varies with electoral institutions and electoral prospects, I expect governments are more likely to ratify PTAs under the under majoritarian electoral rules and before losing elections. Empirical results from a dataset of all PTAs from 1945 to 2006 strongly support these hypotheses.

The Economics and Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements

The number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has skyrocketed over the past 20 years. In addition to reducing barriers at the border, modern PTAs remove many behind-the-border barriers by regulating foreign direct investment (FDI), liberalizing services, and protecting intellectual property rights. This article surveys the literature explaining the formation of PTAs and their consequences. Regarding the formation of PTAs, studies have gradually moved from exploring the macro-foundation of preferential liberalization to focusing on the micro-foundation of PTAs, relying on industry- and firm-level data. Regarding the effect of PTAs, there is robust evidence that PTAs substantively increase trade flows and FDI and are associated with economic reforms in developing countries, though the general welfare effect of preferential liberalization remains largely unexplored. I make some concrete suggestions on avenues toward which to push the research on PTAs. In particular, I argue that scholars interested in PTAs would benefit from engaging in debate about the distributional consequences of trade liberalization, which not only informs much of the current academic and policy research but also features in political debates taking place in democratic polities.

Dynamic formation of preferential trade agreements: The role of flexibility

AbstractIn practice, free trade agreements (FTAs) vastly outnumber customs unions (CUs). Nevertheless, the literature traditionally views CUs as optimal for members because CU members coordinate external tariffs. I show that a dynamic FTA flexibility benefit can help explain the prevalence of FTAs: individual FTA members have the flexibility to form their own future FTAs whereas CU members must jointly engage in future CU formation. I show how the relative prevalence of FTAs versus CUs depends on the structure of market size asymmetry across countries and use these predictions to shed some light on FTA versus CU formation in Europe and South America.

Tariff Bindings and the Dynamic Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements

We show that multilateral tariff binding liberalization substantially impacts the nature and extent of Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) formation. First, it shapes the nature of forces constraining expansion of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The constraining force is a free riding incentive of FTA non-members under relatively high bindings but an exclusion incentive of FTA members under relatively low bindings. Second, multilateral tariff binding liberalization shapes the role played by PTAs in the attainment of global free trade. Initially, tariff binding liberalization leads to Custom Union (CU) formation in equilibrium but in a way that undermines the pursuit of global free trade. However, further tariff binding liberalization leads to FTA formation in equilibrium and in a way that facilitates the attainment of global free trade. Our theoretical analysis also has implications regarding recent empirical discussions over the relative merits of FTAs versus CUs.

Preferential Trade Agreements under Declining American Hegemony

We examine the international determinants of the formation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) according to the theory of hegemonic stability. The main conclusions are as follows. First, as the theory of hegemonic stability argues, the lack of a stable hegemon fosters the formation of PTAs. When hegemony is measured by trade share and investment share in the global economy, the erosion of hegemony fosters PTAs. Second, hegemony measured by GDP share has a positive effect on PTA formation; however, this measure is not consistent with the theory’s prediction. Third, improvement in the level of democracy worldwide is unrelated to the formation of PTAs.

Assessing the trade impacts of the ASEAN + 6 FTA for Lao PDR

Using an unbalanced panel dataset of bilateral exports from 1992 to 2009, we assess the potential trade impacts of the expansion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN + 6 on the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR). It is found that bilateral exports are positively related to overall bilateral country size and similarity in country size but inversely related to the factor endowment differences, transportation costs, and import tariffs. Simulation results show that the formation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between ASEAN and the Plus‐6 economies (the People's Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea in East Asia; and the other three economies of Australia, India, and New Zealand) could increase bilateral trade between the Lao PDR and ASEAN + 6 by US$1 billion, and ASEAN + 3 by US$981 million. Nonetheless, the trade balance of the Lao PDR is likely to worsen in both the ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN + 6 PTAs because they stimulate more imports than exports.

On the different geographic characteristics of Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions

Casual observation reveals a striking phenomenon of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs): while Customs Unions (CUs) are only intra-regional, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are inter and intra-regional. Using a farsighted dynamic model, we endogenize the equilibrium path of PTAs among two close countries and one far country. Rising transport costs mitigate the cost of discrimination faced by the far country as a CU non-member and diminish the value of preferential access as a CU member. Thus, sufficiently large transport costs imply that an FTA is the only type of PTA that can induce the far country's participation in PTA formation. Unlike CU formation, FTA formation can induce participation because FTAs provide a flexibility benefit: an FTA member can form further PTAs with non-members but a CU member must do so jointly with all existing members. Hence, in equilibrium, CUs are intra-regional while FTAs are intra- and inter-regional.

Trading representation: Diplomacy’s influence on preferential trade agreements

A multidisciplinary literature explores the implications of economic diplomacy, but has largely ignored international cooperation on economic agreements. We provide a first exploration of the implications of bilateral diplomatic missions for the formation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). We argue that high-level diplomatic relations increase the likelihood of PTA ratification between two countries because diplomats have a number of political and economic incentives to see these agreements implemented. Evidence from a global panel of country dyads spanning 1960–2005 indicates that the presence of ambassadors is linked to an increased probability that a PTA will be concluded within a dyad, opening new avenues for further research.

EU Trade Policy Responses to the Proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements in Latin America and East and Southeast Asia

The fivefold increase of the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) during the last quarter century has been largely explained by the discriminative nature of such agreements, which has triggered “competitive liberalization” and PTA formation among nonmembers through a domino effect. Based on the author's interviews with European Union (EU) trade officials and policy makers at the European Commission, this article evaluates EU trade policy developments during the last quarter century and lays out EU policy responses to the proliferation of PTAs in Latin America and East and Southeast Asia. The article concludes that the EU has adopted “defensive” and “proactive” trade policy responses in Latin America and East and Southeast Asia, thus augmenting the discriminative pressures and reinforcing the discrimination‐fueled proliferation of PTAs.Related Articles Gruber, Lloyd. 2013. “.” Politics & Policy 41 (): 723‐764. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezp.biblio.unitn.it/doi/10.1111/polp.12034/abstract Collins, Stephen. 2010. “.” Politics & Policy 38 (): 737‐764. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00256.x/abstract Kirshner, Orin. 2009. “.” Politics & Policy 37 (): 151‐176. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00165.x/abstract Related Media . 2015. “Ink FTA with EU to Offset Adverse Impact of TPP on Textiles: Assocham.” The Economic Times. October 20. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/49467316.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst Miller, Nick. 2015. “Australia‐Europe Free Trade Agreement Talks Could Start within Months.” The Sydney Morning Herald. October 15. http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/australiaeurope-free-trade-agreement-talks-could-start-within-months-20151014-gk9ch3.html#ixzz3pNxhixcG

Hubs of Governance: Path Dependence and Higher-Order Effects of Preferential Trade Agreement Formation

In this paper, we investigate the causes and consequences of institutional design choices in the liberalization of services trade and investment in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). We distinguish between a positive-list and a negative-list approach to services liberalization, and analyze PTAs signed by countries of the Asia-Pacific. We develop an information-based argument that explains why these different types induce path dependence in subsequent choices, and derive hypotheses that capture the “history” effect of choosing either institutional model. In doing so, we examine whether particular “modes of governance” diffuse through the growing network of trade agreements through the adoption of rules by third parties in their own PTAs. The empirical analysis tests these hypotheses using simulation-based dynamic network analysis methods. We find evidence of strong path dependence in the choice of liberalization approach, affecting the evolution of PTA networks in the Asia-Pacific and the diffusion of services liberalization in general. Such path dependence has long-term consequences for the institutional features of the international trade regime.

Does Enforcement Matter? Judicialization in PTAs and Trade Flows

AbstractThis paper focuses on the variability of judicialization across preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and their impact on trade flows. We develop a categorization of PTAs that contrasts enforcement mechanisms with the level of trade policy discretion allowed by a trade agreement and the degree of flexibility allowed for members. Utilizing an original dataset of PTAs signed by countries in Asia, which has emerged as one of the most active regions of PTA formation and which exhibits wide variability in levels of judicialization, we compare the effects of trade policy discretion, flexibility provisions, and enforcement mechanisms in PTAs on trade flows. We examine the empirical strength of our theoretical framework distinguishing between discretion, flexibility, and enforcement using confirmatory factor analysis. The empirical analysis then goes on to examine their respective effects on trade flows. The results show that agreements with strong commitments, that is, those that remove more trade policy discretion from a government, lead to a greater expansion of trade between signatories. Enforcement and flexibility mechanisms, however, have mixed effects.

Multilateral determinants of regionalism revisited

The idea that some features of the multilateral trading system create incentives for countries to join preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is among the first and most influential explanations for the wave of regionalism in the last decades. Until recently, only a few empirical studies have explored this hypothesis and their results have been accepted by many researchers and policy-makers to be a fact. In this study we revisit the question of whether multilateral events are important determinants of regionalism. We use an extended dataset and implement several empirical specifications in the analysis. Unlike previous work, our results provide little support for the relevance of variables such as the number of GATT/WTO members, ongoing trade negotiation rounds, and trade disputes as predictors of PTA formation.

Book Reviews

Pravin Krishna of Johns Hopkins University reviews, “Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements” by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores the role of domestic politics in governments' decisions to enter trade pacts. Discusses a political economy theory of international trade agreements; systemic influences on preferential trade agreement formation; regime type, veto players, and preferential trade agreement formation; and auxiliary hypotheses about domestic politics and trade agreements. Mansfield is Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Milner is B. C. Forbes Professor of Public Affairs at Princeton University.”

Multilateral Stability and Efficiency of Trade Agreements: A Network Formation Approach

We study the endogenous network formation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements by means of hypergraphs and introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability. We consider multi-country settings with a firm in each country that produces a homogeneous good and competes as a Cournot oligopolist in each market. Under endogenous tariffs, we find that the existence of a multilateral trade agreement is always necessary for the stability of the trading system and that the formation of preferential trade agreements is always necessary for achieving global free trade. We also find that global free trade is efficient but not necessarily the only multilaterally stable trade equilibrium when countries are symmetric (heterogeneous) in terms of market size. We derive conditions under which such a conflict between overall welfare efficiency and stability occurs.