Formation Of Minority Governments Research Articles

Investiture rules and formation of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies

In parliamentary systems, political parties must often bargain with each other in order to form a government. Do parliamentary rules regulating government formation impact the type of government that is formed? Existing scholarship suggests that the need for an investiture vote—a requirement that a new government must face a parliamentary vote at some point during its formation—reduces the likelihood of a minority government. This article suggests that while real-world investiture rules can vary across several dimensions, only the investiture decision rule—which specifies the size of the majority required for a decision to be made—impacts the propensity for parties to form minority governments. Using new data on investiture rules for 26 European countries since 1946 or the first year of democracy, we find that parliamentary democracies that have an investiture requirement are not less likely to experience minority governments than those where governments come to power without an investiture vote. However, when an absolute majority is required for a government to succeed at the investiture stage, minority governments are considerably less likely to form; absolute majority investiture rules reduce the frequency of minority governments.

Under the Influence: Pay-Offs to Legislative Support Parties under Minority Governments

AbstractPrevious studies show that in multiparty systems the formation of minority governments can be a rational choice. To ensure survival and policy implementation, minority governments make concessions to non-cabinet parties. In this study, we empirically analyse the pay-offs given to support parties under minority governments. We argue that the content of support agreements is conditioned by support party type. Results are based on a two-stage empirical investigation: a text analysis of 10 explicit support arrangements for minority governments in Romania and a within-case comparison of two Romanian minority cabinets with different support arrangements. We employ an original data set of support agreements and elite interviews with former minority cabinet members. We empirically confirm that ethno-regional parties are mostly policy-seeking and target benefits for their specific groups. In contrast, mainstream parties make stronger claims for office distribution. The analysis challenges the widespread understanding that all support parties are mostly policy-seeking.

Party system factors and the formation of minority governments in Central and Eastern Europe

The formation of governments without a majority in parliament is a counterintuitive, albeit empirically relevant phenomenon: Minority governments make up about one-third of all governments in Europe. Yet minority governments in Central and Eastern Europe have hardly been studied. By means of a Qualitative Comparative Analysis, this article analyses the interplay of party system factors leading to the formation of minority governments in selected Central and Eastern European Countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Romania) from the early 1990 s up to 2010. The interplay of a strong bifurcation of the party systems with a high percentage of parties excluded from coalition building or a lack of parties sharing the main policy positions turns out to be influential.

Hung Parliament and Minority Government Formation in Westminster Parliamentary System (selected aspects)

Hung Parliament and Minority Government Formation in Westminster Parliamentary System (selected aspects)

Party Behavior and the Formation of Minority Governments - Experiences in Denmark

In many modern democracies, the leaders who make important influential political decisions are highly likely to be party politicians or indeed party leaders. Very often they cannot prepare an adequate strategy for their political parties because it is usually impossible to find out all necessary elements for projecting the goals. It is not surprising that political parties are the most important organizations in modern politics and in the contemporary world, only a few states do without them. The reason that political parties are well-nigh ubiquitous is that they perform functions that are valuable to many political actors. Political parties play a major role in the recruitment of top politicians, on whom the momentous and painful political decisions often fall. With very few exceptions, political chief executives are elected on the slate of some established political party, and very often the head of government continues to serve as the head of the political party that propelled him or her into office. Democracy may be conceived as a process by which voters delegate policy-making authority to a set of representatives, and political parties are the main organizational vehicle by which such delegation takes place. The main aim of this article is focus on the minority government, which are especially common in the Scandinavian countries. They can be more easily formed and maintained where the party system makes it difficult to secure support for an alternative majority coalition to be formed, a vote of investiture is not required, and a government can stay in office unless there is an absolute majority against it. In the article will be emphasized some case studies of Denmark minority government formation and durability. General findings will be confronted with empirical data, which will allow to formulate conclusions about the specific of minority cabinet in Denmark. Key words: party leaders, minority government, coalition, Nordic States, Denmark, party behavior, elections, majority, parliamentary members

Minority governments in the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism: emphasis on the features of european systems of negative parliamentarism

The article is dedicated to analyzing the features of formation, principles of functioning and stability of minority governments in European systems of negative parliamentarism. The author identified the role of governments in the systems of inter-institutional relations in European parliamentary democracies, specified the nature parliamentary democracies distribution into the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism, outlined minority governments role and variations in the systems of negative parliamentarism, tested the hypothesis that the negative parliamentarism promotes the formation of minority governments, detailed the history of minority governments in the European systems of negative parliamentarism, outlined the key reasons/motives of formation and resignations of minority governments in the systems of negative parliamentarism, characterized the features of minority governments’ stability in European systems of negative parliamentarism.

Votes of confidence/investiture as conditions for formation of minority governments in the European Parliamentary Democracies: a statistical cut.

Political theory and practice show that parliamentary democracies, including in Europe, independently or almost independently of the forms and systems of government that they are implementing, are divided into systems of positive and negative parliamentarism. An indicator of the dichotomy is presence (constitutionally provided) or absence (constitutionally unprovided) of the vote of confidence/investiture in expected/hypothetical government. It actualizes the issue of the influence of vote of confidence/investiture on the formation of minority governments (and other types of governments) in the European parliamentary democracies. Accordingly, the article is dedicated to analyzing the institute of vote of confidence/investiture and statistical outlining its impact on the formation of minority government in European parliamentary democracies. It is argued that the presence or absence of votes of confidence/investiture and their combinations and procedural patterns affect the frequency of formation of minority governments in different ways. Among such patterns there are the following: participation or non-participation of parliament in the procedure of vote of confidence/investiture and formation of government (presence or absence of vote of investiture); type of parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture («ex ante» or «ex post»); the rule of deciding on a parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture in a government (by absolute, relative or negative parliamentary majority); permissible number of formateurs or alternatives of governments for parliamentary vote of investiture; the right to nominate prime ministers/formateurs or alternatives of governments; the number of attempts to obtain a parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture; consequence of the failure to get vote of confidence/investiture. As a consequence, checking the correlation between the various patterns of votes of investiture and the frequency of formation of minority governments generally shows that the institutional design of votes investiture mostly and averaging does not affect the frequency of formation of minority governments, although some patterns of votes of investiture are decisive.

Political, institutional and legal determinants, essence, features and peculiarities of minority government in parliamentary democracies

The article is dedicated to analyzing the phenomenon of minority governments in parliamentary democracies. The author examined the political, institutional and legal determinants, essence, features, peculiarities and causes for the formation of minority governments in parliamentary democracies. From the position of Political Science, it was argued that minority government is an alternative of a minority situation. The researcher determined that a minority government is a governmental cabinet, consisting of persons acting as representatives of the parliamentary parties or parliamentary groups, totally not controlling more than a half of the seats in a parliament or relevant chamber of a parliament, to whom by a constitution the government is responsible.

Governos minoritários no presidencialismo latino-americano: determinantes institucionais e políticos

The view that minority governments are anomalies in the Parliamentary system has been abandoned for some time. However, in Presidential systems, minority governments are still seen as problematic, especiallywhen combined with unilateral Presidential agenda-setting powers. This article analyzes the formation of governments (or cabinets), defined by their party composition and not by Presidential mandates, in 14 Latin American countries from 1979 to 2011. We test various hypotheses on the impact of institutional and political factors on the formation of minority governments. Our findings contradict predictions based on the prevailing theories. Specifically, we observed that the probability of minority governments increases proportionally with the strength of the President's veto power. We also observed that the President's agenda-setting power and party fragmentation both have a negative effect on the formation of minority governments.

Coordination problem and grand coalition: the puzzle of the government formation game in the Czech Republic, 1998

After the 1998 general elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, the largest party, the Social Democrats, formed a minority government. The formation of this government was puzzling for at least four reasons. First, according to the so-called Opposition Pact, the minority government was supported from the outside by the conservative Civic Democratic Party, the principal opponent of the Social Democrats in the party system. Second, the grand legislative coalition was not followed by the sharing of executive portfolios between the two largest parties. Third, the two parties entered into this agreement only weeks after they had explicitly stated their unwillingness to govern together. Fourth, neither theories of coalition formation nor those of minority government formation provide an accurate prediction for this outcome. This article provides a solution for these puzzles based on a game theoretic analysis.

Foreign Allegiance: A Vexed Ground of Parliamentary Disqualification

Public disillusionment with the major political parties has had a profound effect on the Australian political landscape during the last decade of the twentieth century. Most significant has been the increased number of independents elected to Australian parliaments resulting in the formation of minority governments in several States. Such a political climate encourages a sharper focus on the grounds of disqualification prescribed for candidates and sitting members of parliament. While often ignored in the past, either deliberately or accidentally, this is unlikely to continue. Such grounds have the potential to destabilize the political process by undermining slim government majorities or the election of crucial independent members. Given these risks, all grounds of disqualification in relation to members of parliament should be revised to ensure they are justified and clearly understood. This article selects for revision that ground of disqualification concerned with foreign allegiance.

Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia

Denmark, Norway, and Sweden share a record of frequent minority governments in the postwar period. Conventional explanations of minority government formation fail to account for this Scandinavian propensity. This article argues that the frequency of minority cabinets in Scandinavia can be explained as a rational response to a peculiar set of institutional conditions. Scandinavian party politics is characterized by (1) strongly organized and future-oriented parties, (2) decentralized and relatively nonhierarchical legislatures, where the opposition can be effective, and (3) competitive elections. These conditions induce political parties to defer the gratification of holding office and thus facilitate minority government formation.

Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies

From assumptions of parties as rational actors, this study develops four measures of government performance: duration, mode of resignation, subsequent alternation, and electoral success. These measures are used in a test of competing hypotheses concerning minority government performance in parliamentary democracies. Minority governments are conventionally portrayed as poor performers, but tests of this proposition have been seriously limited. An alternative hypothesis depicts minority governments as rational cabinet solutions without significant performance liabilities. These hypotheses are tested against an extensive cross-national data set including 323 postwar governments in 15 parliamentary democracies. The conventional wisdom about minority governments is not supported by the evidence. In some respects, minority governments are clearly superior to majority coalitions. Moreover, minority government formation may enhance systemic responsiveness and accountability. The findings support the explanation of minority governments as rational cabinet solutions.

Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies

From assumptions of parties as rational actors, this study develops four measures of government performance: duration, mode of resignation, subsequent alternation, and electoral success. These measures are used in a test of competing hypotheses concerning minority government performance in parliamentary democracies. Minority governments are conventionally portrayed as poor performers, but tests of this proposition have been seriously limited. An alternative hypothesis depicts minority governments as rational cabinet solutions without significant performance liabilities. These hypotheses are tested against an extensive cross-national data set including 323 postwar governments in 15 parliamentary democracies. The conventional wisdom about minority governments is not supported by the evidence. In some respects, minority governments are clearly superior to majority coalitions. Moreover, minority government formation may enhance systemic responsiveness and accountability. The findings support the explanation of minority governments as rational cabinet solutions.

Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies

Minority cabinets account for about 35% of all governments in 15 parliamentary democracies since 1945. Conventional explanations associate minority government formation with political crises, instability, polarization, factionalization, and failures of interparty bargaining. Such explanations are tested and found lacking in empirical support. Instead, minority governments are explained as rational solutions under specified conditions. Minority cabinets form when even oppositional parties can influence parliamentary legislation, and when government participation is likely to be a liability in future elections. This rationalist explanation receives substantial empirical support in tests against competing hypotheses. The results suggest important modifications to theories of government and coalition formation.