Nowadays, green loans have been widely promoted to support the capital-constrained supply chain under carbon regulation. However, the borrowers in the supply chain may use the preferential green loans for other purposes which are not related to green development. That phenomenon is mainly attributed to the lack of valid information investigation under traditional information technology. Blockchain, as an innovative technology, can provide valid financial information and identify liability in the use of green loans, which could be an effective tool to restrict the misuse behavior. But will the high operating cost weaken the advantage of blockchain? To address this question, we consider a supply chain system composed of a supplier and a capital-constrained manufacturer. The manufacturer may misuse part of the green loans to purchase primary components from the supplier. Two operational modes corresponding to no-blockchain adoption (N case) and blockchain adoption (B case) are designed, in which the supplier determines the wholesale price, and the manufacturer determines the order quantity under green loans. By comparing the optimal decisions of supply chain members, we put forward and differentiate three types of effects: the carbon regulation effect, the information verification effect, and the blockchain cost effect, which influence the adoption of blockchain technology in the supply chain. In addition, we show that blockchain can restrict the misused amount of green loans and improve the environmental performance, but decrease the consumer surplus.
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