Reviewed by: Conradian Contracts: Exchange and Identity in the Immigrant Imagination by Tamas Juhasz Alex McCauley (bio) Tamas Juhasz. Conradian Contracts: Exchange and Identity in the Immigrant Imagination. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011. 219 pp. ISBN: 9780739145531. The contract, in fantasy, is an agreement between two equal parties, drawn up without coercion and resulting in mutual benefit. Sailors unhappy with their working conditions can jump ship, and workers unhappy with their compensation can negotiate a better deal at the factory down the road. The contract, both in practice and in Joseph Conrad's fictions, is something much different—coerced, unequal, and rejected only at the cost of bodily ruin or social death. The sailor who jumps ship in the middle of the ocean can either sink to the bottom or be hounded across the world by the memory of that act. For Tamas Juhasz in Conradian Contracts, such debts are the engine of Conrad's narratives. It is important to Juhasz's work that contracts may be formal or informal, explicit or tacit agreements. They might be endorsed by two parties sitting across the table from each other but, more often, there is no founding document to return to, or to which the indebted party has recourse. Conrad's contracts are not on display here, either, and Juhasz, after the first page of the preface, looks only rarely to the details of Conrad's life, his finances, his obligations. Juhasz understands Conrad not in relation to print cultures but [End Page 86] instead through structural anthropology, primarily represented by Claude Levi-Strauss, and through Lacanian psychoanalysis. On one level, the book is about making distinctions—many of the readings rely, for instance, on the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real. But on a broader level, the book is interested in performing precisely the opposite gesture. Commerce collapses the difference between the home and the marketplace, Falk's cannibalism becomes a form of incest, and the various disciplinary apparatuses are employed to reveal, in Conrad's narratives, a fundamental sense of loss. "In the present study," writes Juhasz towards the end, "this has been called castration in the psychoanalytic sense, disembeddedness in the anthropological, displacement in the colonial, or merely unrelatedness in the Conradian terminology. As such a void becomes greater, the more eager and desperate the individual is to fill it" (203). While the book is structured as a series of readings, its primary interventions are more visible when looking between chapters, at these intersections, rather than at each one specifically. When the contract disappears as a document, it reappears in the form of speech. Juhasz insists that "some primordial social contract is inherent in basic instances of language use," and, in the context of Lord Jim, "Speech in the novel is in a condition of always belonging to another and always being affected by a number of real or imagined marketplaces" (76, 153). Here, there are a number of recurring concerns: what limits speech, what language is able to represent, who is able and allowed to speak, language as a form of debt or possession, and what makes language impossible. But the limits of language are not the limits of contract, exchange, and transaction, and what first appears as a problem of language becomes a problem of optics. Juhasz is concerned throughout with mirrors and doubling, duality (as in duels), and images that might be either external or part of some inner vision. "Looking," he writes, "or the experience of being looked at, may well be regarded as a most fundamental process of rewarding and punishing, accepting or rejecting" (144). Whether through language, or speech, or vision, the contract is a form of recognition, and the one who is not recognized cannot be part of the contract. This is not to say that Conrad's form of recognition is reciprocal. Indeed, the bind here for Juhasz is that desire for a unified self and for "unconditional reciprocity" is exactly what "characterizes the Imaginary, the Lacanian domain of deceptive coherence and autonomy" (16). There are no tools, it seems, to distinguish deceptive coherence from actual coherence—or even from incoherence. Conrad's narratives may be defined by a fundamental sense...
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