Form Of Monism Research Articles

Does Truth Have Degrees? Bradley’s Doctrine of Degrees of Truth

What is the nature of truth? This question has been answered by philosophers in quite different ways, while F. H. Bradley asserts that truths have degrees and that no proposition can be stated to be simply true or false. In this paper, I briefly illustrate what he calls the doctrine of degrees of truth and try to address the problems it entails. I first explain what he means by truth and error/falsehood (he does not make a clear distinction between the two terms); then, I concentrate on his criticisms of three theories of truth, followed by a discussion of his own identity theory of truth. I will be focusing on his doctrine of the degrees of truth and highlight its difficulties. I show that his theory faces some insurmountable difficulties, and it should be motivated by a particular form of monism that he insisted on, saying existence monism.

Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules

We argue that there is a tension between two monistic claims that are the core of recent work in epistemic consequentialism. The first is a form of monism about epistemic value, commonly known as veritism: accuracy is the sole final objective to be promoted in the epistemic domain. The other is a form of monism about a class of epistemic scoring rules: that is, strictly proper scoring rules are the only legitimate measures of inaccuracy. These two monisms, we argue, are in tension with each other. If only accuracy has final epistemic value, then there are legitimate alternatives to strictly proper scoring rules. Our argument relies on the way scoring rules are used in contexts where accuracy is rewarded, such as education.

Tamers, deniers, and me

This paper critically examines a prominent and perennial strategy—found in thinkers as diverse as Kant and Shamik Dasgupta—of simultaneously embracing the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and also limiting it so as to avoid certain apparently negative consequences of an unrestricted PSR. I will argue that this strategy of taming the PSR faces significant challenges and may even be incoherent. And for my (nefarious) purposes, I will enlist a generally derided argument by Leibniz for the PSR which will help us to see the connections between the PSR and a radical form of monism.

Panpsychism, Conceivability, and Dualism Redux

In contemporary philosophy of mind, the conceivability argument against physicalism is often used to support a form of dualism, which takes consciousness to be ontologically fundamental and distinct from physical matter. Recently, some proponents of the conceivability argument have also shown interest in panpsychism, which is the view that mentality is ubiquitous in the natural world. This paper examines the extent to which panpsychism can be sustained if the conceivability argument is taken seriously. I argue that panpsychism’s ubiquity claim permits a strong reading or a weak reading. This presents a dilemma. On the one hand, the strong reading, which is typically characterised as a form of monism, is undermined by the conceivability argument. On the other hand, the weak reading, while compatible with the conceivability argument, turns out just to be a special case of dualism. I also show that the related position of panprotopsychism cannot provide a tenable monist position because it too cannot withstand the challenge of the conceivability argument. Therefore, if the conceivability argument is taken seriously, then we are committed to a dualist metaphysics, regardless of whether or not we accept the ubiquity claim.

Pragmatism and “Existential” Pluralism: A Reply to Hackett

In this reply to J. Edward Hackett’s “Why James Can Be an Existential Pluralist,” we show that Hackett’s argument against our 2005 thesis that pragmatism and pluralism are inconsistent fails. First, his rejection of our distinction between epistemic and metaphysical forms of pluralism does not affect our original argument’s soundness. Second, his proposed existential pluralism is a form of monism, and so fails as an example of pragmatist pluralism. Though we no longer hold the inconsistency thesis that we defended in 2005, Hackett’s criticism of it nevertheless fails.

Seneca e la passione come esperienza fisica

AbstractIf the ancient Stoics conceived passion as a judgment or the consequence of a judgment referring to external reality, it is correct to define their conception of the psyche as ‘monistic’; it is very different if we consider that passion is due to another faculty independent of reason. In this second case, a scenario opens up in which a realistic and ‘reified’ conception of passion emerges. With reference to this, in theLetter113 Seneca discusses the paradoxical thesis of the ancient Stoic scholars according to whom “the soul is an animal”, just as virtues and passions are. Through a series of close logical arguments, he shows the absurdities that can be reached in this way. By comparing this letter with theDe irawe can define the position of Seneca as a type of practical/operational imaginary dualism: the development of an original coherent form of monism. Not to give in to passion (for example to anger or libido) will not be just or not so much a psychological exercise of reason and will, but certainly a physical experience of resistance.

La "normatività" tra etica e metafisica

The Author’s aim is to highlight the limits of monist metaphysics which underpin the paradigm of Secular Humanism. In fact, all forms of monism consider good and evil either as internal momentums to the logic of development of the world, or as mere illusions within the evolutionary process. Can tragedies as the Holocaust be interpreted by such a monistic approach? The distinction between ‘polar opposition’ and ‘logic of contradiction’ is introduced by Romano Guardini. This is based on a creationistic metaphysic and it is useful to show that our practical-moral investigation is legitimated only by a theist approach. By considering good and evil as two aspect with mutual implications, monistic logic risks to weaken both freedom and human responsibility within human history.

MODELLO, COPIA, RICETTACOLO: MONISMO, DUALISMO 0 TRIADE DI PRINCIPI NEL TIMEO?

In this paper, I examine Plato’s onto-cosmological conception in the Timaeus, trying to find out how many principles or set of principles are established in Timaeus’ description of the constitution of kosmos. The intelligible model, the sensible copy, the receptacle and the demiurge: these are the different kinds of the things that are and the agents of their relations. But it is not clear at all if this perspective can be represented as a form of monism, dualism or anything else.

Causation: Many Words, One Thing?

How many notions of cause are there? The causality literature is witnessing a flourishing of pluralist positions. Here I focus on a recent debate on whether interpreting causality in terms of inferential relations commits one to semantic pluralism (Reiss, 2011) or not (Williamson, 2006). I argue that inferentialism is compatible with a `weak' form of monism, where causality is envisaged as one, vague cluster concept. I offer two arguments for this, one for vagueness, one for uniqueness. Finally, I qualify in what sense the resulting form of monism is `weak'.

What's the matter with monism?

If the connection between monism and totalitarian politics is a possibility rather than a logical necessity, value‐pluralists must consider what their attitude towards non‐totalitarian monisms should be. In particular, they must respond to Ronald Dworkin's claim that when a conflict between values is experienced, rather than treating the conflict as unavoidable, we should seek to eliminate it by reconstructing and harmonizing the meanings of the values involved. This paper shows, through a discussion of the concept of positive liberty, that there are non‐coercive monisms, and identifies a ‘monistic continuum’. It also determines the means of arresting the slide from weaker to stronger forms of monism. The paper concludes that stronger forms of monism, which collapse the boundaries between concepts, deplete our moral/political resources and leave us unprepared to understand value‐conflicts when we encounter them. Value‐pluralists should reject these forms of monism, even when it is unlikely that they will furnish support for totalitarian politics.

Putnam i ontologia, czyli czym jest względność pojęciowa

The paper tries to clarify, as far as possible, Hilary Putnam's attitude toward ontology by means of a careful interpretation of his doctrine of conceptual relativity. I think there is a great deal of confusion about the real meaning of this doctrine. It is true that the idea of conceptual relativity has been modified a few times by Putnam himself. However, in his most recent work he gives an accurate and succinct presentation of it. He puts strong emphasis on showing how much his philosophical position differs from that of Quine and Davidson. He accuses both of them of neglecting human subjectivity and reducing the colorful world of human experience and language. At the same time he insists that one should accept the pluralism of our world and avoid all forms of monism. Since ontology leads often to monism, Putnam rejects ontology. But it seems to me that one can develop an ontology that is free of monistic tendencies and does full justice to the plurality of our world.

Domestic judicial deference and the ECHR in the UK and Netherlands.

This comparative article explores the interrelationship of domestic and international human rights law in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, with reference to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The two jurisdictions offer a valuable comparison, in that the UK’s dualist approach to international law has meant that it is only very recently that the ECHR has been directly enforceable in UK domestic law. The Netherlands, meanwhile, appears to the English lawyer to present a completely different approach to international law, being based as it is upon a form of monism. Whilst the two systems appear opposed in logic because of their dualist and monist bases, they in fact have much to learn from each other.

Dualism, monism, physicalism

Dualism can be contrasted with monism, and also with physicalism. It is argued here that what is essential to physicalism is not just its denial of dualism, but the epistemological and ontological authority it gives to physical science. A physicalist view of the mind must be reductive in one or both of the following senses: it must identify mental phenomena with physical phenomena (ontological reduction) or it must give, an explanation of mental phenomena in physical terms (explanatory or conceptual reduction). There is little reason to call a view which is not reductive in either of these senses “physicalism”. If reduction is rejected, then a non-physicalist form of monism is still available, which may be called “emergentism”.

Reply to Hameroff from Emmet Spier and Adrian Thomas

We thank Stuart Hameroff for detailing the intellectual history of the Orch OR model. However, re-rooting its foundations in a form of monism begs more questions than it answers. Even ignoring the problematic conclusion that—then—all forms of matter (rocks, air, grass, protozoa etc.) have minds, we still find it hard to understand how his mind-component of matter influences the substance-component of matter. Either its influence is local—in which case `learned behaviour' and `intensity of deterministic drives' would be neural juggernauts affected by rain drops—or global, in which case our previous, single-Platonic-mind criticism still stands.Neither are we convinced that the mechanistic side of the brain is a computer, even less a quantum computer. A computer manipulates memory elements. Merely identifing the memory elements (qubits) as `microtubule quantum superpositions' completely ignores the fact that machinery must exist for these bits to be fetched, processed and re-stored. This is the job of the central processing unit (CPU) and is wholly ignored in models of the brain as a computer. We also note that there is nothing particularly useful about being a quantum computer, unless factorizing large numbers[1xPolynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer. Shor, P. SIAM J. Comp. 1997; 26: 1484–1509CrossrefSee all References][1](their one establised novel capacity) is a fundamental process of mind.Hameroff agrees with Bray's conclusions that protein molecules are the basic operational elements in living cells, but goes on to suggest that quantum mechanics might play some role too. Bray[2xProtein molecules as computational elements in living cells. Bray, D. Nature. 1995; 376: 307–312Crossref | PubMedSee all References][2]has clearly demonstrated that chemistry is sufficient to explain the complex behaviour of single-celled organisms such as E. coli. Furthermore, mutations that alter the chemistry of E. coli's proteins change its behaviour in ways that are predictable from the effect of the mutations on protein chemistry. Conventional chemical mechanisms can explain how single cells process such information—invoking the Orch OR model is neither necessary nor justified.We also note that Hameroff has suggested that the emergence of consciousness in primitive metazoans (worms) might explain the Cambrian explosion. However, recent fossil finds have reduced the Cambrian anomaly. Papers[3xThree-dimensional preservation of algae and animal embryos in a neoproterozoic phosphorite. Xiao, S., Zhang, Y., and Knoll, A.H. Nature. 1998; 391: 553–558Crossref | Scopus (446)See all References, 4xPrecambrian sponges with cellular structures. Li, C-W., Chen, J-Y., and Hua, T-E. Science. 1998; 279: 879–882Crossref | PubMed | Scopus (309)See all References]describe 570 million-year-old (Precambrian) fossils of metazoan embryos; such fossil finds establish that metazoans originated long before the Cambrian explosion[5xThe breath of life: did increased oxygen levels trigger the Cambrian Explosion?. Thomas, A.L.R. Trends Ecol. Evol. 1997; 128: 44–45Abstract | Full Text PDFSee all References][5], but these Precambrian animals did not fossilize.Crucial to the Orch OR model is the idea that `brain microtubules are quite stable' and that they can maintain some thermal isolation from the rest of the body. This is a misconception. Microtubules in the axons of neurons (but not in the dendrites or cell body) are indeed held in a stable configuration; but even in axons the microtubules turn over at high rates and being shorter than the axon their open ends are exposed to the cell contents[6xSee all References, 7xMicrotubule transport from the cell body into the axons of growing neurons. Slaughter, T., Wang, J., and Black, M.M. J. Neurosci. 1997; 17: 5807–5819PubMedSee all References]. The fluid-filled lumen of microtubules can act as a transport route—for example, during bacterial sex, DNA is transported down the centre of a microtubule-like protein[6xSee all References][6]. It seems unlikely, when molecules as large as DNA, let alone water, can flow through microtubules, that they could possibly maintain the thermal isolation that is an essential requirement for the Orch OR model.Indeed, `how many roads must a man walk down before you call him a man?'—possibly, according to the Orch OR model, `the answer [might well be] blowing in the wind'[8xSee all References][8].

Ideology after the Collapse of Communism

The collapse of communism has not, as might be expected, led to the end of ideologies. Instead of the grand revolutionary projects of the past, however, we now have a set of overlapping fragments of revelation which cooperate with each other in social transformation. These fragments exhibit an ‘identity monism’ which can tell us something about the character of ideology in general. This form of monism is the necessary condition of turning a modern state into a managed enterprise for the satisfaction of human needs – a project which happens also to be adumbrated in much normative political philosophy. A managed civil state responds to opinion rather than interest, and the opinions on which the project rests commend themselves by some version of self-evidence.

Mind as a Living Process

THE second of the L. T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust lectures was given by Dr. Charles S. Myers on May 19, 1932, and has been published under the title of “The Absurdity of any Mind-Body Relation” (Oxford University Press. 2s. net). Dr. Myers maintains the view that any relation between mind and body is absurd because mental activity and living bodily activity are identical. The mechanical principles of the natural sciences are only an abstraction from the quasidual set of principles—direction and mechanism—that govern the entire universe. Each is an abstraction from the whole activity. Mind and life are identical properties of living matter, which differs from lifeless matter in its inherent, purposive, self-directive, and finally purposeful struggle for existence. From this point of view then, the hypotheses of psycho-physical parallelism, of interactionism, and of either form of monism are untenable. Dr. Myers quotes with approval from Hobhouse to the effect that life arose not from dead elements, but from pre-material elements which also gave rise to inanimate matter, so that all life contains a germ of mind. Mind is thus to be regarded as the expression of the directive activity of living matter. This directive activity is to be regarded as the highest unitary activity of the nervous system: the lower directive activities may not always be in harmony with the highest and hence the mental conflicts, conscious and unconscious. Dr. Myers discusses the relation of the cognitive, affective and conative aspects of experience and the part played by instinct and intelligence. The point of view is most lucidly expressed and raises interesting questions for philosophy, psychology, biology and physical science. It is worthy of note that ancient and medieval thought realised the problem also, and that only from the context in many writings can one know whether the word ‘anima’ is to be translated life or mind.