Abstract
If the connection between monism and totalitarian politics is a possibility rather than a logical necessity, value‐pluralists must consider what their attitude towards non‐totalitarian monisms should be. In particular, they must respond to Ronald Dworkin's claim that when a conflict between values is experienced, rather than treating the conflict as unavoidable, we should seek to eliminate it by reconstructing and harmonizing the meanings of the values involved. This paper shows, through a discussion of the concept of positive liberty, that there are non‐coercive monisms, and identifies a ‘monistic continuum’. It also determines the means of arresting the slide from weaker to stronger forms of monism. The paper concludes that stronger forms of monism, which collapse the boundaries between concepts, deplete our moral/political resources and leave us unprepared to understand value‐conflicts when we encounter them. Value‐pluralists should reject these forms of monism, even when it is unlikely that they will furnish support for totalitarian politics.
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