Form Of Intuitionism Research Articles

The Methods of Ethics

The paper begins with an account of the intellectual background to Henry Sidgwick’s writing of his Methods of Ethics and an analysis of what Sidgwick meant by a ‘method’. His broad distinction between three main ethical theories – egoism, consequentialism, and deontology – is elucidated and accepted. Sidgwick’s different forms of intuitionism are explained, as are his criteria for testing the ‘certainty’ of a potentially self-evident belief. Section 3 discusses dogmatic intuitionism (common-sense morality systematized) and Sidgwick’s own view, in the light of his requirement for precision in ethics. The final section concerns the implications of Sidgwick’s position on disagreement for ethical theory. It is suggested that we have some knowledge in ethics, on which most converge, but not much. The paper concludes with a recommendation for a more eirenic and less dogmatic approach to philosophical ethics.

Reflective equilibrium and moral objectivity

Ever since the introduction of reflective equilibrium in ethics, it has been argued that reflective equilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms, reflective equilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method of reflective equilibrium against these objections. Defenders of reflective equilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying that either reflective equilibrium can in fact safeguard moral objectivity or alternatively, even if it cannot, that there simply are no reasonable alternatives. In this paper, I take issue with both responses. First, I argue that given the non-foundationalist aspirations of reflective equilibrium, moral objectivity cannot be maintained. Second, I argue that reflective equilibrium is not the only game in town once intuitionism has been discarded. I argue that given their own normative ambitions, combined with their rejection of intuitionism, proponents of reflective equilibrium have reason to take alternative methods of moral justification, and more specifically transcendental arguments, more seriously than they have done so far. I end by sketching the outlines of what this alternative methodology might look like.

O INTUICIONISMO MORAL E OS DILEMAS MORAIS

Na história da filosofia moral, por um lado, de Platão, passando por Aristoteles, I. Kant, J. S. Mill, e mais recentemente incluindo racionalistas como J. Habermas, J. Rawls, R. M. Hare e C. Korsgaard, várias tentativas foram feitas para mostrar que a razão é o melhor guia para nossas ações e julgamentos. Por outro lado, outros filósofos como D. Hume, A. Smith, A. J. Ayer, P. F. Strawson and S. Blackburn ensinaram que a moralidade deve ser uma tarefa para nossos sentimentos. Eu penso que é mais plausível aceitar que nossas duas capacidades devem ser consideradas na decisão moral, porque há novos importantes dados da psicologia, ciências cognitivas e neurociências que evidenciam a importância dos sentimentos nas nossas decisões, e não apenas a da racionalidade. Leis, valores e sentimentos morais podem todos nos dar boas razões para agirmos moralmente. Esta é a razão pela qual eu defendo aqui a visão que as abordagens da filosofia moral falham em oferecer uma boa maneira de tratar questões morais quando elas não abordam também o papel das emoções. Deste ponto de vista, eu pretendo mostrar aqui que uma forma de intuicionismo pode ajudar-nos a responder a questão sobre o conhecimento moral e aprender o modo como nós decidimos. Eu argumento que esta forma de intuicionismo pode nos ajudar a lidar com os dilemas morais. Na primeira parte do artigo eu considero as definições de dilemas morais, na segunda, na terceira e quarta partes eu explico três formas de intuicionismo – a racionista (D. Ross), a empirista (R. Audi) e a reflexiva (C. Gowans) – e finalmente na última secção eu indico uma forma de pensar as intuições. Eu chamo este tipo de intuicionismo naturalista. O naturalismo moral é a posição que nossas decisões e julgamentos são parcialmente determinados por um processo natural e propriedades naturais do mundo. Neste sentido, eu assumo que algumas de nossas capacidades emotivas (como a de sentir nojo, revolta por desaprovação, indignação, arrependimento, vergonha, etc.) ou capacidades cognitivas (e.g. racionalidade, cognição) estão gravadas e integradas na nossa psicologia. Isto significa que as normas morais sociais são aprendidas deste a infância, embora dadas pela evolução. Logo, elas podem ser tomadas como naturais no sentido que elas são produtos tanto do mundo social como da constituição biológica do ser humano.

SOME GOOD AND BAD NEWS FOR ETHICAL INTUITIONISM

The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible non-inferential knowledge in areas outside ethics (such as the past, the future, or the unobservable). However, each form of intuitionism does require a controversial stand on certain unresolved issues outside ethics.

Intuitionism and formalism

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the intuitionism and formalism. In Kant, one find an old form of intuitionism almost completely abandoned in which time and space are taken to be the forms of conception inherent in human reason. For Kant, the axioms of arithmetic and geometry were synthetic a priori judgments, that is, judgments independent of experience and not capable of analytical demonstration and this explained their apodictic exactness in the world of experience as well as in abstracto. Diametrically opposed to this is the view of formalism which maintains that human reason does not have at its disposal exact images either of straight lines or of numbers larger than ten, for example; therefore, these mathematical entities do not have existence in conception of nature any more than in nature itself. It is true that from certain relations among mathematical entities, which one assume as axioms, one deduce other relations according to fixed laws, in the conviction that in this way one derive truths from truths by logical reasoning, but this nonmathematical conviction of truth or legitimacy has no exactness.

Plato's Defense of Justice

The overall aim of the Republic is to provide a defense of justice by showing that a person is better off just than unjust. I shall try to see how successful this defense is. My starting point will be two well-known criticisms of Plato's defense of justice-that it commits a fallacy of irrelevance, and that it provides people with the wrong reason for being just. I shall argue that despite an obstacle that Plato places in his own way, he has an answer to the first of these two criticisms, one that also provides him with an answer to the second criticism. I shall point out that this answer commits him to a view much like the forms of intuitionism that were held in the early part of this century. This has two important consequences. First, it makes it doubtful that Plato should be taken to hold an agent-centered as opposed to an actcentered theory of justice. Second, it leaves Plato to face criticisms analogous to those that have been raised against those forms of intuitionism.

Criteria for Theories of Practical Rationality: Reflections on Brandt's Theory

There are various normative theories of practical rationality, i.e., theories about what it is rational for individuals to want and to do. According to Gewirth's theory,' for example, it is irrational for any agent, regardless of her psychological make-up and history, to deny any other agent freedom and well-being. According to Brandt's theory,' on the other hand, the psychological make-up and history of an individual determine what it is rational for that individual to want and to do. There have been various criticisms of individual theories of practical rationality, but there is no agreement about how to go about criticizing such a theory. For example, Daniels criticizes Brandt's theory on the grounds that it classifies as rational some desires that we intuitively consider to be irrational, and classifies as irrational some desires that we intuitively consider to be rational.' Brandt rejects all forms of intuitionism and so rejects Daniels' criterion. Parfit seems also to reject Daniels' criterion. He points out that our intuitions about what desires are rational have been formed by the self-interest theory of practical rationality. Thus, he claims, our intuitions about what desires are rational should not be allowed to prove the self-interest theory correct, nor should they be allowed to disprove rival theories of practical rationality.4 Since Brandt's theory is a rival to the self-interest theory, it seems to follow from Parfit's view that intuitions should not be allowed to refute Brandt's theory.

Romanticism, Nationalism, and the New Economics: Elisha Mulford and the Organic Theory of the State

varieties of European romanticism, but few historians have applied his insight to American romanticism.1 On the contrary, John L. Thomas' description of the phenomenon he calls Romantic Reform in America has gained wide acceptance with few objections that there were competing versions of the romantic impulse.2 All romantics, European and American alike, started from the same insight, a fundamental dismay with the Lockean associationalist psychology which underlay eighteenth-century rationalism and rooted virtue in sense associations of pain and pleasure. Romantics believed instead in some form of intuitionism which freed virtue and truth

Intuitionism and formalism

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the intuitionism and formalism. In Kant, one find an old form of intuitionism almost completely abandoned in which time and space are taken to be the forms of conception inherent in human reason. For Kant, the axioms of arithmetic and geometry were synthetic a priori judgments, that is, judgments independent of experience and not capable of analytical demonstration and this explained their apodictic exactness in the world of experience as well as in abstracto. Diametrically opposed to this is the view of formalism which maintains that human reason does not have at its disposal exact images either of straight lines or of numbers larger than ten, for example; therefore, these mathematical entities do not have existence in conception of nature any more than in nature itself. It is true that from certain relations among mathematical entities, which one assume as axioms, one deduce other relations according to fixed laws, in the conviction that in this way one derive truths from truths by logical reasoning, but this nonmathematical conviction of truth or legitimacy has no exactness.