In the paper there is an attempt to establish an unconventional typology of the stages of the classical German philosophy progressive movement. As the main milestones of this movement the sequence of philosophical concepts of I. Kant, J. Fichte, F. Schelling, and G. Hegel are considered. Herewith the criterion of this sequence is the basic forms of human intellectual activity: consciousness – self-consciousness – reason. Applied the methodological scheme of adequate estimation of the mentioned philosophical doctrines, and their upward movement: consciousness and self-consciousness are the opposition, reason is their synthesis, combination. At the same time, taking into account G. Hegel’s dialectics, the determined moments in their totality are components of the processional mechanism of progress of the German philosophical systems of the second half of the XVIII century – the first half of the XX century. This methodological basis led to a general conclusion, that I. Kant’s philosophy is the philosophy of consciousness, J. Fichte’s philosophy – of self-consciousness, F. Schelling’s philosophy is a combination of self-consciousness and reason, and G. Hegel’s philosophy – of reason. At the same time, it is emphasized that in each of these philosophies, these three forms of intellectual activity are a subject of research, but with the predomination of one of them. Distinguished criteria of historical progress of classical systems of German philosophy actualize the study of various forms of human intellectual life in the direction of their ordering. I. Kant’s philosophy is a philosophy of consciousness because there is a phenomenological relation «consciousness – subject». And at the same time there is a transcendental unity of self-consciousness of I (I think). But the one is only a particular case. Reason in I. Kant’s «critical» philosophy is not a synthesis of consciousness and self-consciousness. According to J. Fichte «critical» philosophy, on the contrary, comes from the absolute self-conscious I, thus it eliminates I. Kant’s thing-in-itself. At the same time, the phenomenon of consciousness in foundations of the science of knowledge follows from the factor of not-I’s «impetus» on I, in order to lead I to action (to cognize). However, in general the phenomenon of consciousness appears as a subordinate moment, because this phenomenon is determined by self-consciousness. Meanwhile, reason does not appear (as well as in I. Kant’s theory) as a combination of consciousness and self-consciousness. F. Schelling’s philosophy of nature did not give the opportunity (due to the specifics of its subject) to distinguish the problem of the relationship of consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason. The basic principle of F. Schelling’s transcendental philosophy is the principle of subjectivity, self-consciousness (I): through the act of self-consciousness I becomes an object of oneself. I as an absolute intelligentsia is both self-consciousness and pure reason (absolute synthesis). Instead, consciousness appears as a moment of self-consciousness. G. Hegel in the «Phenomenology of Spirit» considered consciousness in it’s opposition to the subject. In the «Science of Logic» implemented the principle of identity of consciousness and the subject, and, therefore, on the agenda is self-consciousness. The subject is realized as a thinking of oneself. Logic at the same time is the sphere of reason’s realization, where there is domination of identity (congruence) of thinking and being. However, logic also contains the moment of consciousness (and not only the moment of self-consciousness), which can be traced in the presence in it of the forms of sensory consciousness (quality, quantity, measure). G. Hegel’s philosophy of reason is an incarnation of the philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of self-consciousness. Key words: thinking, being, subjective, objective, I, consciousness, self-consciousness, reason (theoretical and practical).
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