Form Of Consequentialism Research Articles

The rights and wrongs of consequentialism

I argue that the strongest form of consequentialism is one which rejects the claim that we are morally obliged to bring about the best available consequences, but which continues to assert that what there is most reason to do is bring about the best available consequences. Such an approach promises to avoid common objections to consequentialism, such as demandingness objections. Nevertheless, the onus is on the defender of this approach either to offer her own account of what moral obligations we do face, or to explain why offering such a theory is ill-advised. I consider, and reject, one attempt at the second sort of strategy, put forward by Alastair Norcross, who defends a ‘scalar’ consequentialism which eschews the moral concepts of right, wrong and obligation, and limits itself to claims about what is better and worse. I go on to raise some considerations which suggest that no systematic consequentialist theory of our moral obligations will be plausible, and propose instead that consequentialism should have a more informal and indirect role in shaping what we take our moral obligations to be.

The Rejection of Scalar Consequentialism

In ‘The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism’ Alastair Norcross argues that scalar consequentialism is the most plausible form of consequentialism, but his arguments are flawed: he is simply mistaken when he suggests that there is a problem with deriving absolutes like right and wrong from gradable properties such as goodness; he cannot justify his claim that the choice of a threshold will always be arbitrary; and his ‘no significant difference’ argument only shows that the consequentialist doesn'tcareabout permissibility. Furthermore, I argue that, although Norcross was right to claim that a scalar theory can be action-guiding (to an extent), he was mistaken to think that ‘Abolishing the notion of “ought” will not seriously undermine the action-guiding nature of morality.’ If anything can be said in favour of scalar consequentialism, it is only that it is the mosthonestform of consequentialism, because it doesn't pretend to care about permissibility.

CAN THERE BE A KANTIAN CONSEQUENTIALISM?

AbstractIn On What Matters Derek Parfit argues that we need to make a significant reassessment of the relationship between some central positions in moral philosophy, because, contrary to received opinion, Kantians, contractualists and consequentialists are all ‘climbing the same mountain on different sides’. In Parfit's view Kant's own attempt to outline an account of moral obligation fails, but when it is modified in ways entirely congenial to his thinking, a defensible Kantian contractualism can be produced, which survives the objections which are fatal for Kant's own theory. This form of contractualism would then lead rational agents to choose consequentialist moral principles. I argue that Parfit significantly misrepresents Kant's project in moral philosophy, and that no genuinely Kantian moral theory could issue in a form of consequentialism.

SHOULD KANTIANS BE CONSEQUENTIALISTS?

AbstractParfit argues that a form of rule consequentialism can be derived from the most plausible formulation of the fundamental principle of Kantian ethics. And so he concludes that Kantians should be consequentialists. I argue that we have good reason to reject two of the auxiliary premises that figure in Parfit's derivation of rule consequentialism from Kantianism.1

BENEFITS, HOLISM, AND THE AGGREGATION OF VALUE

AbstractWe reject Moorean holism about value—the view that the value of the whole does not equal the sum of the values of its parts. We propose an alternative aggregative holism according to which the value of a state of affairs is the sum of the values of its constituent states. But these constituents must be evaluated in situ.We also argue that, in addition to value tout court, there are benefits that can go to individuals—where the value of a state of affairs need not equal the sum of the benefits it supplies. To deny this claim is to deny, among other things, the possibility of even raising distributional concerns, or that of stating egoism in a coherent fashion. And denying these possibilities is implausible. But once benefits are in the picture, there is, pace certain forms of consequentialism, pressure to acknowledge that we can have extra reason to pursue them beyond considerations of the effect of such pursuit on the general good.We conclude by applying these thoughts to, first, the claim that Pareto-optimality is necessary for maximal value (we argue that this thesis is false); and, second, Parfit's ‘repugnant conclusion’ (we use this conclusion to bolster our claim that value need not be the sum of benefits: if value were always the sum of benefits, the repugnant conclusion would follow; the repugnant conclusion is false; therefore value is not always the sum of benefits).

Consequentialism and the Autonomy of the Deontic

I distinguish between two forms of consequentialism: reductionist and anti-reductionist. Reductionist consequentialism holds that the deontic properties of rightness and wrongness are identical with the axiological properties of optimality and suboptimality, respectively. Anti-reductionist consequentialism denies this identification, hence accepting what I call theautonomy of the deontic. In this article I ignore reductionist consequentialism. Instead I argue that anti-reductionist consequentialism is deeply problematic or even incoherent. Simply put, the main point is that the criterion of rightness of any ethical theory that respects the autonomy of the deontic must entail that an object that meets that criterion is an action, and anti-reductionist consequentialism does not meet that requirement (while certain competing theories arguably do).

Consequentialism, Agent-Neutrality, and Mahāyāna Ethics

What kinds of comparisons can legitimately be made between Mahāyāna Buddhism and Western ethical theories? Mahāyānists aspire to alleviate the suffering, promote the happiness, and advance the moral perfection of all sentient beings. This aspiration is best understood as expressing a form of universalist consequentialism. Many Indian Mahāyāna texts seem committed to claims about agent-neutrality that imply consequentialism and are not compatible with virtue ethics. Within the Mahāyāna tradition, there is some diversity of views: Asaṅga seems to hold a complex and interesting version of rule consequentialism, whereas Śāntideva is closer to act consequentialism.

A New Argument Against Rule Consequentialism

We best understand Rule Consequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons, since it claims that we have reasons to perform some action because of the goodness of the pattern consisting of widespread performance of the same type of action in the same type of circumstances. Plausible forms of Rule Consequentialism are also pluralist, in the sense that, alongside pattern-based reasons, they recognise ordinary act-based reasons, based on the goodness of individual actions. However, Rule Consequentialist theories are distinguished from other pluralist theories of pattern-based reasons by implausible claims about the relative importance of act-based and pattern-based reasons in different cases. Rule Consequentialists should give up these claims. They should either embrace some other pluralist pattern-based view, or reject pattern-based reasons altogether. Note, though, that these arguments apply only to compliance-based, rather than acceptance-based, versions of Rule Consequentialism. This suggests that these two kinds of theory are more different from each other than we might previously have realised.

Pragmatism and Consequentialism

Legal Pragmatism is the view that judges should decide cases in a way that is, all things considered, in the best interests of the community. It is a forward-looking theory that rejects inviolable constraints by past judicial decisions. A pragmatist judge believes that the future should not be the slave of the past. In this paper, I argue that pragmatism is an attractive view because it is an idealized form of consequentialism: pragmatism captures the most desirable features of consequentialism while avoiding consequentialism's most powerful objections. I will also argue that rule pragmatism -- a version of pragmatism that is able to respect legal rules, just as rule consequentialism is able to respect moral rules -- is a viable theory of adjudication that is consistent with traditional legal values and the rule of law.

Inconsistency and the Theoretical Commitments of Hooker's Rule-Consequentialism

Rule-consequentialism is frequently regarded as problematic since it faces the following powerful dilemma: either rule-consequentialism collapses into act-consequentialism or rule-consequentialism is inconsistent. Recent defenders of this theory such as Brad Hooker provide a careful response to this objection. By explicating the nature and theoretical commitments of rule-consequentialism, I contend that these maneuvers are not successful by offering a new way of viewing the dilemma which retains its force even in light of these recent discussions. The central idea is that even the most well-developed contemporary form of the view is ensnared in the following dilemma: as an agent-neutral consequentialist theory, rule-consequentialism is either inconsistent or it is desperately unmotivated as a form of consequentialism since it is committed to a non-consequentialist form of ultimate moral value.

The Probabilistic Nature of Objective Consequentialism

Abstract: Theorists have consistently maintained that the most plausible forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic if and only if indeterminism is true. This standard position, however popular, lacks sufficient motivation. Assume determinism to be true and an attempt will be made to show that attractive forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic ‐ and not for reasons related to our epistemic limitations either.Here it is argued that all extant objective formulations of consequentialism fail to deliver the normative implications that the spirit of objective consequentialism requires. My argument rests upon the claim that certain pairs of subjunctive conditionals with identical antecedents and incompatible consequents are such that neither of the pair is true.Upon leveling the objection, the concept of an “objective” subjunctive probability is introduced and utilized in the transformation of a subjective version of expected act utility consequentialism into an objective version, one that is capable of dealing with the difficulties posed by the objection. I end by indicating some ways in which the closest thing to a plausible, objective form of consequentialism might be developed.

Right Motive, Wrong Action: Direct Consequentialism and Evaluative Conflict

In this paper I look at attempts to develop forms of consequentialism which do not have a feature considered problematic in Direct Consequentialist theories (that is, those consequentialist theories that apply the criterion of rightness directly in the evaluation of any set of options). The problematic feature in question (which I refer to as 'evaluative conflict') is the possibility that, for example, a right motive might lead an agent to perform a wrong act. Theories aiming to avoid this phenomenon must argue that causal relationship entails motives and acts (for example) having the same moral status. I argue that attempts to ensure such 'evaluative consistency' are themselves deeply problematic, and that we must therefore accept evaluative conflict.

Non-human animals and process theodicy

I argue that that the suffering of non-human animals poses some potentially knotty difficulties for process theodicy. To respond satisfactorily to the problem of evil as it involves animals, process theists will, I argue, need either to defend some form of consequentialism or make a number of potentially plausible but certainly contestable empirical claims. I begin this internal critique by explaining the nature of the process response to the problem of evil. I explain how process thought can respond with reasonable effectiveness to the general problem of the suffering of non-human animals while highlighting the special difficulty predation might be thought to pose for the process thinker. Then, I elaborate alternative consequentialist and non-consequentialist process accounts of divine goodness in the face of the harm to non-human animals caused by predation. After summarizing my analyses in the conclusion, I underscore the costs associated with these alternatives.

Intuitive Maximin

One standard objection to familiar utilitarian consequentialism queries its troubling commitment to the maximization of overall value irrespective of distribution, for instance among the well and badly off. Call this ‘the objection from distribution.'The simplest and most obvious alternative form of consequentialism deploys some sort of maximin principle. Maximin principles maximize the well-being of the worst off.Lexicalmaximin rules in particular, which are perhaps the simplest and most obvious subtype, maximize first the well-being of the worst-off, and then in case of ties among the worst-off, maximize the well-being of the second worst-off, and so forth. Maximin principles provide an obvious route to the unification of plausible concerns with maximization and with distributional equity.

CONSEQUENTIALISM, TELEOLOGY, AND THE NEW FRIENDSHIP CRITIQUE1

Abstract: A powerful objection to impersonal moral theories states that they cannot accommodate the good of friendship. This paper focuses on the problem as it applies to consequentialism and addresses the recent criticism that even the most sophisticated forms of consequentialism are incompatible with genuine friendship. I argue that this objection fails since those who pose this challenge either seriously oversimplify consequentialism's theory of value, misunderstand its theory of practical reason, or put too much weight on the good of friendship itself. I conclude by assessing a contemporary consequentialist response in order to suggest a workable conception of consequentialist friendship.

Consequences for Non-consequentialists

Both consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical reasoning have difficulties in accounting for the value of consequences. Taken neat, consequentialism is too fierce in its emphasis on success and disregard of luck, while non-consequentialism seemingly over-values inner states and undervalues actual results. In Uneasy Virtue Julia Driver proposes a form of objective consequentialism which claims that characters are good if they typically (but not invariably) produce good results. This position addresses the problems moral luck raises for consequentialism, but requires some form of realism about traits of character. However, if our knowledge of mental states is ascriptive, this form of objective consequentialism may make excessive demands. Non-consequentialists may gain in so far as the theories of action to which they are typically committed are less demanding, and are built to take account of the typical or systematic connections between states of character and results of action.

Opportunity as a Space for Individuality: Its Value and the Impossibility of Measuring It

Previous articleNext article No AccessOpportunity as a Space for Individuality: Its Value and the Impossibility of Measuring It*Robert SugdenRobert Sugden Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 113, Number 4July 2003 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/373953 Views: 158Total views on this site Citations: 41Citations are reported from Crossref © 2003 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Federica Nalli, Paolo Santori The Economic Principle of Political Liberalism: A Comparison of Rawls and Sugden, Review of Political Economy 35, no.22 (Aug 2021): 476–493.https://doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2021.1951476Roberto Fumagalli Preferences versus opportunities: on the conceptual foundations of normative welfare economics, Economics and Philosophy 82 (Dec 2022): 1–25.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267122000323Yukinori Iwata Evaluating opportunities when more is less, Theory and Decision 34 (Oct 2022).https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-022-09914-8Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti, Siddiqur Osmani, Mozaffar Qizilbash The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach, (Nov 2020).https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316335741Fabrice Le Lec, Benoît Tarroux On Attitudes to Choice: Some Experimental Evidence on Choice Aversion, Journal of the European Economic Association 18, no.55 (Jul 2019): 2108–2134.https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz036Ronen Shnayderman Overall Freedom Measurement and Evaluation: a Defence of the Partly Evaluative Approach to Freedom Measurement, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22, no.33 (Jun 2019): 715–729.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10008-8Constanze Binder Introduction, (Mar 2019): 1–21.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1615-2_1Constanze Binder Freedom’s Agency Value: What it is and why it matters, (Mar 2019): 23–42.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1615-2_2Constanze Binder Choice-Relevant Diversity Revealed, (Mar 2019): 43–61.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1615-2_3Constanze Binder Freedom Rankings and Freedom’s Agency Value, (Mar 2019): 85–104.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1615-2_5Robert A. 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Position‐Relative Consequentialism, Agent‐Centered Options, and Supererogation

Previous articleNext article No AccessPosition‐Relative Consequentialism, Agent‐Centered Options, and Supererogation*Douglas W. PortmoreDouglas W. Portmore Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 113, Number 2January 2003 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/342859 Views: 221Total views on this site Citations: 31Citations are reported from Crossref © 2003 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Benjamin Lange The ethics of partiality, Philosophy Compass 22 (Jul 2022).https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12860Daniel Muñoz, Theron Pummer Supererogation and conditional obligation, Philosophical Studies 179, no.55 (Sep 2021): 1429–1443.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01724-yMatthew Kotzen Standards and values, Philosophical Issues 31, no.11 (Oct 2021): 167–187.https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12208Alexander Prescott‐Couch Moral Psychology with Nietzsche, by Brian Leiter. 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A New Way of Doing the Best That We Can: Person‐Based Consequentialism and the Equality Problem

It has been suggested that moral law requires that we act in ways that “make people happy” but does not require that we act in ways that “make happy people.” It is important to keep in mind that moral law proscribes various things as well. We shouldn’t make people unhappy. Nor should we make unhappy people. There is some disrepute attached at the present time to all these “person-affecting,” or “person-based,” sentiments. In this article, however, I want to present an argument that works in their favor. More specifically, I want to develop a plausible case for a new, person-based form of consequentialism. Part of the motivation for this project derives from the fact that the more traditional forms of consequentialism have themselves been

Practice Consequentialism: A New Twist on an Old Theory

In this paper I defend a version of consequentialism that is neither of the act nor the rule variety. I argue that most, if not all, acceptable moral rules are formulations of intricate and interrelated practices that serve to promote harmonious co-existence between human beings; that these formulations – moral rules – are shorthand abbreviations of the lengthy formulations which would be required to actually describe the extremely complicated set of prescriptions and prohibitions which comprise our ethical practices; that we are culturally, perhaps even naturally, disposed to justify our actions in consequentialist fashion; that these underlying moral practices or ‘folk’ ethics provide the foundation for all forms of consequentialism; and finally, that the folk ethical practices practice consequentialism incorporates are empirically verified.