1. IntroductionParticipatory governance of natural resources, especially forests, has received a great deal of attention worldwide in recent years: highlighted by studies in Japan (McKean, 1992a); South Asia (Adhikari, 2005; Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001); and Western Europe (Bravo & Moor, 2008; Holmgren, Keskitalo, & Lidestav, 2010) to name a few. The increasing interest and importance of this area of study has also been underscored by the economics Nobel Prize to Elinor Ostrom in 2009 her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons.1 Notwithstanding the difficulties associated with the governance of the commons, particularly due to the subtractability of the resources such as forests and fisheries, and high cost of exclusion of non-members (Becker & Ostrom, 1995; McKean, 1998), studies worldwide have shown that many of the locally and traditionally managed commons can perform as good as or even better than public and private resource management institutions under certain conditions. These conditions have been promulgated as the design principles for successful and longenduring commons (Becker & Ostrom, 1995; McKean, 1992b, 1998; Ostrom, 1990). A more recent meta-analysis pointed out many of the same characteristics for successful community-managed forests around the world (Pagdee, Kim, & Daugherty, 2006). More importantly, commons share more characteristics with 'private property' than often assumed. McKean and Ostrom (1995) make this explicit when they state: It is crucial to recognise that common property is shared private property and should be considered alongside business partnerships, joint-stock corporations and cooperatives (emphasis original). This 'private property' characteristic is more nuanced in the case of modern forest commons in Sweden, as they are constituted from part of the private estates to which the shares are tied and cannot be owned or sold in isolation (see below).While the institutions such as forest commons should be participatory by definition, they often exclude large sections of their stakeholders in governance and in benefits sharing. These very stakeholders are, on paper, members of those institutions, a phenomenon Agarwal (2001) terms 'participatory exclusions'. She presents a 'typology of participation' where most of the marginalised sections' participation is limited to 'nominal' or 'passive' participation (ibid., pp. 1624-1625). Although the case of Swedish forest commons is rather different from many of these cases from developing countries, as we shall see later, the issue related to participation (or lack thereof) in the governance and decision-making-is rather similar, where the overwhelming proportion of shareholders' participation is limited to 'nominal' or 'passive' participation.Although participation in community-based forest governance in itself does not guarantee success of such institutions (Agarwal, 2001), active and dynamic participation of the members in the management, governance and has been linked to the success of forest commons (Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006). However, previous studies of some of the Swedish forest commons have not only pointed out the diminishing role of shareholders in terms of governance (i.e. decision-making rights) of their commons (Stenman, 2009), but they have also pointed to the fact that the shareholders in Swedish forest commons do not bear costs proportional to the benefits they obtain (Carlsson, 1997). Moreover, a more recent study has highlighted that although the resident shareholders seem to be generally satisfied in the way their forest commons is govemed/managed, the participation in management, governance and is rather low among the shareholders (Lidestav, Poudyal, Holmgren, & Keskitalo, 2013). Overall, previous research indicates a need to stimulate participation among the existing shareholders in these forest commons, in order to make them truly participatory forest governance institutions. …