Foreign Policy Principles Research Articles

India's Commitment to Peaceful Coexistence and the Settlement of the Indochina War

India could not be a passive onlooker of the Indochina War since it involved many basic principles of its foreign policy principles such as its opposition to colonialist and neo-colonialist activities of Western powers in Asia and the relevance of non-alignment as a diplomatic tool to ensure peaceful coexistence. India emerged as a force of proposals to reckon with in the search for a peaceful settlement between the contending parties before and during the Geneva Conference. In spite of adverse developments, the application of the Geneva agreements assumed great importance as they represented a validation of India's approach to crisis resolution. The article focuses on the reasons underlying India's intervention, an analysis of its interests and the view taken by other international players of this activism.

France and the US

IT HAS BECOME BANAL TO STATE THAT THE IRAQ CRISIS has generated profound tensions between the United States and France. The rift that resulted can be considered unprecedented, which makes the evaluation of its long-term consequences difficult. Throughout the crisis, newspapers in the US, and to a lesser extent in France, have told of a clash between two states that presumably have two visions of security management which not only are incompatible but would also dilute their relationship as allies.This essay aims to provide an analysis of Franco-American relations during and in the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, in the broader context of the transatlantic relationship. Three main issues will be addressed. The essay will look first at some of the inherent characteristics of the US and France that would lead to some form of confrontation between the only superpower on one side and one of the few states that aspire to play a global role on the other side. It then comes back to the crisis over Iraq as the source of the rift between the two countries. The French policy is analyzed by distinguishing motives deriving from an alleged grand from elements driven by fundamental divergences with the US on the very nature of the Iraqi threat, and hence on the way it should be tackled. Finally the essay addresses the nature of the transatlantic link after the Iraq crisis and war, with particular attention to France and the US. It looks at threat assessment and perceptions, the acrimony that developed in the two countries and their visions for international institutions. It argues that despite true discrepancies over the nature of the partnership, it remains an framework for addressing current threats.FRENCH VERSUS AMERICAN GLOBAL VISIONS: THE BASIS FOR CONFRONTATIONAmong the many reasons that make the analysis of the Franco-American relationship interesting is the fact that France and the US share some similarities in their approaches to their respective roles on the international scene. Notwithstanding the huge gap that separates the two countries in almost any aspect of what constitutes power nowadays, France and the US are the only countries in the world that cultivate with a degree of confidence the idea that they, as countries, are necessary to the world. The US is the indispensable nation(1) and the French leaders have always had a certain idea of France(2) that implies the notion of doing good. This can be encapsulated in the messianic approach of both countries, by which foreign policy is intimately linked to the promotion of values along with support of more narrowly defined national interests. Any analysis of the American and French foreign policies has to combine these two sets of elements, which fall within both the realist and the liberal paradigms.On the international scene, this peculiarity is associated with the idea of global vision, of a global role.(3) But while such characteristics come naturally with the power status that the US enjoys, they are the result of a permanent struggle for France, which can hardly pretend that it possesses the assets that would naturally give it a global vision or a global role. Yet one of the key principles of French foreign policy since the end of the Second World War, and particularly since the beginning of the Fifth Republic with Charles de Gaulle's return to power (1958), has been to maintain the rank of France on the international scene. With great regularity under all the Fifth Republic presidents, the obsession with France's status has led to a policy combining the optimization of the assets that France inherited from its past (permanent seat at the UN Security Council; relations with Arab states, former colonies and French-speaking countries), the acquisition and development of some elements of what constitutes hard power (nuclear capability and other military assets) and reliance on aspects other than hard power (discourse on human rights, promotion of values, relative independence from the two superpowers during the Cold War, i. …

Making the Best of Difference

THE IRAQ CRISIS ILLUSTRATED RIFTS IN SECURITY POLICY between the positions of the US and some European states as well as among the Europeans themselves. Snappy remarks about adventurism (Gerhard Schroder) and versus new (Donald Rumsfeld) have escalated a long-simmering debate about new risks and appropriate responses. European Atlanticists reacted nervously. Politicians in Europe minimized the crisis as mere dissent among old friends and stressed the efficient co-operation in many areas. Various transatlantic networks launched a number of declarations to detoxify relations during the crisis.(1) It was possible to put aside the aggressive wrangling and move back to normal.The better climate might be a relief, but the crisis is not over yet and could quickly resurface in a different shape. Although there is finally a debate in Europe about the use of force as an instrument in the fight against new risks like terrorism and proliferation, most Europeans have a different attitude than their allies. They also dislike the defiance of international law and multilateral institutions. While many pundits conjure the spirit of a new start, a redefinition of transatlantic relations or a new deal, none of these has taken shape yet. New tensions over the unilateral strong-arm politics of the US seem likely. New alliances opposing action are possible, as well as a lasting breakup, together with a marginalization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There remains an uneasy feeling of the ambiguous character of transatlantic relations.Pessimists look at diverging foreign policy principles in Europe and the US and their material causes. They see a fundamental rift that will change transatlantic relations, from co-operation to blockade or even competition. Robert Kagan argues that military power, or the lack of it, shapes the way Americans and Europeans look at the world. His frequently cited bon mot that the latter are from Venus and the former are from Mars alludes to the assumption that the chosen weakness of Europe shapes the way its inhabitants see the world, as a place where the use of force cannot change a lot and norms and institutions are the instrument of choice. The end of Atlanticism is looming, as Ivo Daalder has warned, since American and European foreign policies no longer center around the transatlantic alliance to the same overriding extent as in the past. The columnist Tom Friedman denies that the two sides pursue the same objective and only apply alternative approaches: no, he writes, have two different visions, not just tactical differences.(2)Optimists are equally worried but look at the seemingly close value systems and the transnational problems that make co-operation inevitable. Phil H. Gordon puts the irreconcilable into perspective, showing that Europeans and Americans are not so far apart in most issue areas, including the use of force. The assumption of fundamental differences itself could prevent the necessary co-operation.(3) Proliferation, international terrorism, civil war and failing states can be targeted by unilateral actions, but even the last remaining superpower will need the co-operation of allies to cope with these challenges. An opportunity for renewal would open up for NATO, an alliance based on coherent beliefs and attitudes. James B. Steinberg warns that despite a great potential for solving problems together, it is not enough to rely on an invisible hand to make this happen.(4)An analysis of transatlantic relations cannot stop at asking what went wrong but has to go beyond that to ask: What kind of transatlantic relations do we want? Having in mind both the pressing need for collaboration and the differences that cannot be negotiated away, finding ways to make the best out of the divergence must be top priority.This article will discuss the differences and the degree of co-operation that is feasible. …

Towards distant frontiers: the course of Israeli diplomacy

Conventional historical wisdom accords Israeli diplomacy a secondary or even marginal place in securing Israel's national interests. This article argues that despite the dominance of military considerations and some apparent lacunae, Israeli diplomacy has scored some remarkable successes. The article examines the principles of Israeli foreign policy, the domestic and conceptual sources nourishing it, and the problems of international orientation. Israel is accepted, for the first time, as an integral part of the international community, but the prospects for constructing new diplomatic strategies or of finding a proper regional role remain obscure.

Justice, Stability and Toleration – In a Federation of Well-Ordered Peoples

Europeans currently reflect on how to express and promote human rights and solidarity in their common institutions in new Constitutional Treaty now facing ratification. What is scope of toleration towards states that violate human rights, within and beyond its borders? And what is scope of permissible economic inequality across states in such a federation of democracies committed to domestic solidarity? John Rawls' Law of Peoples sought to be a plausible extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples, laying out the ideals and principles of foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people. The mixed reception of The Law of Peoples suggests that better justifications are required on at least two counts, concerning respect for states that deny its citizenry certain human rights, and concerning standards for distributive justice. The paper develops aspects of a theory of federal justice to offer further - and perhaps better - Liberal Contractualist arguments regarding these two issues. The European Union may need a differentiated human rights policy, and denies that Difference Principle, even if appropriate for domestic justice, should apply to a federal order. Disagreements with Rawls' Law of Peoples largely concern arguments offered for these conclusions.

In search of an identity: Russian foreign policy and the end of ideology

A number of ‘concepts’ and ‘doctrines’ relating to foreign policy have been articulated in Russia since 1993. Their initial purpose was to establish Russia’s new identity and fill the vacuum left by Marxism-Leninism. They also served to establish a consensus about the main principles of Russian foreign policy. Later concepts responded to perceived changes in Russia’s internal and external environment. They provide a map by which one can chart the evolution of Russian thinking about the world and Russia’s place in it. Although they reflect Russia’s current national values and fulfil important roles, they represent an attempt to deal with the end of ideology, rather than an endeavour to create a substitute ideology.

The Race to Tip the Scales: Nuclear Paradox for the Eastern Bloc

Drawing widely on archive material and recently published documents from both German states on the 1980s, the article examines the impact on a divided Germany of the nuclear arms spiral, from the end of the 1970s up to the collapse of socialist states East Germany and the Soviet Union. Drawing on personal reflections and talks with witnesses, the author describes contradictory attitudes in the World Peace Council and its East German counterpart towards the new European nuclear disarmament movement around the European Nuclear Disarmament Campaign (END). The Cold War dictated rules and defined the scope for the fight to end the nuclear arms race and avert the constant threat of an atomic inferno. In the state-socialist system centred on the USSR, ideology determined the struggle for nuclear disarmament and, in turn, the foreign and security policy principles of the Soviet system. This objective and subjective framework imposed limits of its own, was influenced by the hegemonic objectives of the Soviet system, and contradictory in itself. Inevitably, therefore, East German attempts at containing damage after the double-track decision were restricted.

The Swedish Midsummer Crisis of 1941: The Crisis that Never Was

Non-alignment in peace and neutrality in war have served as the guiding principles of Swedish foreign policy since 1815. For nearly two centuries, Sweden has successfully avoided armed conflict and entangling alliances. A policy of neutrality has been regarded as the best means of guaranteeing Sweden's continued independence and prosperity. Sweden had managed to remain outside the conflict in the first world war, and sought to do so again in 1939. Yet this proved to be more difficult during the second world war, since the war soon expanded into Scandinavia and directly affected all Sweden's immediate neighbours. The most serious challenge to Sweden's neutral tradition would present itself in conjunction with the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. On 22 June 1941, at the outset of the Nazi-Soviet war, Berlin presented Stockholm with a petition to transport one armoured division across Sweden into Finland. Sweden was then positioned firmly within the German sphere of interest, and it was already allowing unarmed nazi troops to transit to and from Norway through Swedish territory. The Wehrmacht was deployed in Finland, Norway and Denmark; the Third Reich's hegemony in the region was uncontested. Sweden had been brought into Germany's northern strategic perimeter following the nazi invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 and was not only strategically surrounded by, but also economically dependent upon the nazi regime. Sweden's relations with the Allies were pushed into the background and its foreign policy was now almost exclusively focused on maintaining a functional and cordial relationship with Hitler's Germany. Neutral Sweden adopted a policy of accommodation in the short run, in the hope that the final outcome of the war would allow for an independent Sweden.

China's ''Omnidirectional Diplomacy'': Cooperation with all, Emphasis on Major Powers

In the first half of 2001, China's relationship with the two economic power houses, the US and Japan, was anything but smooth. Tomoyuki Kojima, professor of political science and dean of policy management at Keio University describes the principle of China's foreign policy as ''omnidirectional'' diplomacy. The strained relations with the US and Japan, however, were contradictory to this principle which emphasizes international cooperation with a focus on world powers. In the following article, he examines the main reasons for China's problems with both countries. At the time of writing, Shanghai is to host the 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in October, China is poised to enter the World Trade Organization and Beijing had also won the bid to host the 2008 Olympics. As China becomes more and more internationalized, Kojima argues that the emphasis on cooperation will be perceived as having been of vital importance.

Russia and Korea: The Summit and After

Abstract Russian foreign policy toward the two Koreas reflects Putin's new foreign policy goals and orientations. His new leadership, the DPRK-Russian rapprochement, and improved inter-Korean relations combined to provide favorable circumstances for Russia's influence and cooperation vis-a-vis the two Korean states. This research explores Putin's foreign policy toward the two Koreas, focusing on the Putin-Kim Jong-il summit and Putin's diplomatic initiatives toward Korea. It discusses Putin's new foreign policy goals and principles, examines the new DPRK-Russian friendship treaty and Putin's July 2000 Pyongyang visit, and delves into Putin's diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis the Korean peninsula. Given the almost identical milieu in which Russian foreign policy has to operate, a complete and immediate departure from the past would be impossible. Putin's Russia shares many of the foreign policy goals and aspirations of his predecessor's. The main differences lie in style and priorities. Moscow wants to boost its prestige and influence on the Korean peninsula by promoting its role as an objective mediator and by leading a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia. Russia's contribution to inter-Korean reconciliation may come through trilateral economic cooperation. As Russia and the two Koreas jointly pursue projects such as the “iron silk road” project, the Nakhodka industrial complex plan, and the Irkutsk gas pipleline project, the remnants of the Cold War on the peninsula are likely to melt away.

South Africa's foreign policy: From international pariah to leader of the African renaissance

Although most observers have focused on the domestic impacts of South Africa's transition to democracy, most notably the dismantlement of its apartheid political system, this process has also entailed the transformation of South African foreign policy. As former President Nelson Mandela aptly explained in Foreign Affairs several months prior to victory in the presidential and legislative elections of 1994, he considered the charting of a new foreign policy as a 'key element' in the creation of a 'peaceful and prosperous' South Africa. The primary purpose of this article is to offer an assessment of the foreign policy adaptation strategies adopted by the Mandela and Mbeki administrations in their quest to further strengthen South Africa's ongoing transformation from an isolated international pariah to leader of the African renaissance. An initial section outlines five strategies designed to adapt South African foreign policy to the new realities of the post-apartheid era: restoring civilian control over the security apparatus; restructuring the foreign policy establishment; self promotion as the leader of the 'African renaissance'; adherence to the foreign policy principle of 'universality'; and assuming a leadership rôle in international organizations. Section two explores how the process of democratization has favoured the reemergence and strengthening of the rôles played by a wide variety of state and non-state actors within the foreign policymaking process. A final section sets out five issues that will continue to set the tone of debates over South African foreign policy well into the first decade of the new millennium. An important conclusion of the article is that although the case study of South Africa in many respects constitutes a microcosm of the foreign policy challenges confronting other African countries, it also offers insights into the foreign policy adaptation strategies pursued by emerging powers in other regions of the world.

China's Foundations: Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy

As the People's Republic of China assumes greater prominence in world affairs, the question of how its government will approach key issues in international politics becomes increasingly critical. By examining the public statements of Chinese leaders, one can identify fundamental principles that guide Beijing's policy. These principles are a robust approach to sovereignty, a determination to strengthen the ruling faction, and a continuing commitment to ideologic distinctiveness. China, in short, is determined to secure its own independence, and will seek power over all outside entities which could have power over it.

Admiralty Law and Neutrality Policy in the 1790s: An Example of Judicial, Legislative, and Executive Cooperation

The subject of admiralty law may have lost much of its luster over the years, but during the first decades of the nation's existence this branch of the law provided a vehicle for establishing foreign policy principles that helped protect the new nation. The admiralty cases that reached the U.S. Supreme Court in the mid-1790s were important to administration policy in the realm of foreign affairs and to the Court's own development as an independent arm of the national government.

Admiralty Law and Neutrality Policy in the 1790s: An Example of Judicial, Legislative, and Executive Cooperation

Admiralty Law and Neutrality Policy in the 1790s: An Example of Judicial, Legislative, and Executive Cooperation ELLIOTT ASHKENAZI The subject of admiralty law may have lost much of its luster over the years, but during the first decades of the nation’s existence this branch of the law provided a vehicle for establishing foreign policy principles that helped protect the new nation. The admiralty cases that reached the U.S. Supreme Court in the mid-1790s were important to administration policy in the realm of foreign affairs and to the Court’s own development as an independent arm of the national government.1 The outbreak of war among the European nations in 1793 provided the setting for these cases. In the naval battle between France and several European nations led by England, priva­ teering was rife in the West Indies and along the United States coasts.2 French privateers cap­ tured enemy or neutral merchant ships coming out of the islands and brought their prizes to United States ports for sale. They could not return to a French jurisdiction for condemnation proceedings because of the British naval blockades. Benjamin Moodie, the British vice-consul for North and South Carolina and Georgia after February 1794, tried to regain the British prizes for their original owners by beginning suits in admiralty in the United States district court in Charleston. The captured ships were not always British, and some suits began in Savannah rather than Charleston, but the Moodie cases stand out for their sheer number and for the dan­ gers presented to a neutral venue by confrontations between the main belligerents. Typically, the owner of a French vessel equipped it for war and received a commis­ sion from some French authority allowing it to make captures and disrupt British trade with the West Indies. In some cases the priva­ teer was a previously captured merchant ves­ sel converted to privateering. In others Ameri­ can owners sold ships to French nationals for the purpose of conversion. Once captured, a British prize would be accompanied into an American port or sailed in with a French prize master and a few crewmembers, with the in- 4 JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY tention of selling the prize and its cargo to the highest bidder for the benefit of the priva­ teer’s officers and crew.3 As the British prizes arrived, Moodie attached the more valuable of them in the district court sitting in admiralty, claiming that the ships and cargo still be­ longed to their original British owners. The attachments and the ensuing libels that served as the complaints in admiralty proceedings presented the court with the threshold ques­ tion of whether neutral American courts should, or even could, hear cases between belligerents when decisions had clear diplo­ matic consequences. Even if the cases were justiciable, was the capture itself invalid be­ cause the arming of a French privateer took place in American ports and violated some principle of American law or of the law of nations? Moodie asserted that judicial sanc­ tion of a capture amounted to an “unneutral” act. French owners and their captains sought protection behind articles of the 1778 Treaty of Amity & Commerce with the United States, which on the surface allowed French privateers to bring prize vessels into Ameri­ can ports without fear ofjudicial or executive seizure.4 Those of Moodie’s libels that reached the U.S. Supreme Court covered cases in which the captures had been made between Novem­ ber 1794 and September 1795 outside Ameri­ can territorial waters, but the outfitting or equipping of the privateers often occurred in 1793. At that time the administration had not even established what constituted the nation’s territorial waters, let alone what the laws of neutrality encompassed. In Moxon v. The Fanny, 19 Fed. Cas. 942 (D. Pa., 1793) (case no. 9895), a French privateer captured a Brit­ ish vessel five miles off the coast of Philadel­ phia. The Court knew of no government state­ ment on the extent of American waters or treaty on the subject. In circulars to the United States District Attorneys and to the various Foreign Ministers Thomas Jefferson ex­ plained that a policy was in...

Double standards, ethics and democratic principles in foreign policy: The European union and the Cyprus problem

The current so‐called ‘pragmatic’ EU policy towards the Cyprus problem is not producing any results and in fact is counter‐productive because it undermines declared EU principles, such as the promotion of democracy and human rights in the world. It also creates double standards which undermine the emergence of a truly efficient CFSP for the EU. A more democratic and ethical approach by the EU would not only facilitate a solution to the Cyprus problem but help promote a more efficient European foreign policy. Existing international democratic theory supports this kind of alternative approach to the current ‘pragmatic’, but unfruitful, EU policy towards Cyprus.

Human rights in European foreign policy: success or failure for post-modern diplomacy?

The foreign policy principles proclaimed by the Member States of the European Community in European Political Cooperation were founded upon the ideas which underpinned European integration: the abandonment of Westphalian norms and respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. From the Copenhagen Declaration in 1970 to the Treaty on European Union in 1992, the Member States developed certain means to promote these values, such as the submission of joint démarches and the adoption of common positions in international organizations. But the political constraints of the Cold War in general prevented the Member States from implementing vigorously the values which they endorsed. The end of the Cold War, the references to human rights and democracy in the TEU and the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy with improved instruments for foreign policy cooperation raised hopes that human rights might come to play a more prominent role in European foreign policy. However, economic competition and conflicting national interests continue to restrict Europe's common foreign policy on human rights issues to declarations of concern rather than action.

Pulpit Diplomacy

A recent public opinion poll underscores the point that Canadians are assertive internationalists who want Canada to 'make waves internationally.'(f.1) They are proud of Canada's diplomatic record, especially its peacekeeping legacy, and show considerable enthusiasm for the foreign policy of Jean Chretien's government. Several initiatives championed by the foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy -- the campaigns to ban anti-personnel landmines, control the international trade in light weapons, and prohibit the use of child soldiers in combat -- particularly reflect core Canadian values. 'Our biggest finding' noted Conrad Winn, president of COMPAS, in reference to the poll of 15-18 April 1998, 'was the powerful streak of democratic moralism that pervades almost all of Canadians' thinking about international affairs.' A stunning 82 per cent of the poll's 500 respondents believe Canada has more influence now than in the 1960s while 64 per cent are prouder now than they were a decade ago. Indeed, at the dawn of a new millennium, Canada is once again a significant player on the world stage whose voice is heard on a wide range of pressing international issues. Not since the so-called 'golden age' of Canadian diplomacy in the 1950s have Canadians appeared so self conscious of their global role or so assertively and overtly 'internationalist.'Much of the credit for this welcome state of affairs must go to Axworthy whose vigorous personal commitment to human rights, disarmament, and other causes has energized both his department and, frequently, his government. In continuing to make headlines, whether for banning landmines or visiting Cuba, he has brought foreign policy to the attention of Canadians, and the world, during his period as minister. 'Low-key Canada these days is enjoying a strut in the world spotlight,' noted the Boston Globes Colin Nickerson approvingly in December 1997 during the Ottawa signing conference on landmines. The Toronto Star echoed this sentiment more recently: 'Not since the days of Lester Pearson has Canada played such a visible and effective role on the world stage.'(f.2) While Canadians have traditionally eschewed the American practice of naming foreign policy 'doctrines' after presidents or foreign secretaries, historians might well refer to the 'Axworthy doctrine' in their writings on the Canadian foreign policy of the late 1990s.Drawing from the minister's statements, speeches, and recent actions, his foreign policy appears to rest on a number of core principles or propositions which might be summarized as follows: - the end of the cold war has fundamentally changed the nature of international politics; - security goals should be focused around human security and not state security; - soft power is the new currency of international politics; - military force is of declining utility in international politics; - public diplomacy is increasingly effective in a wired world; non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are in the vanguard of the 'new diplomacy'; - Canada can lead 'coalitions of the willing'; and - international change will come through the promulgation of new norms of which the key priorities for Canada are small arms, children's rights, international human rights, and peacebuilding.(f.3)Axworthy has not, of course, single-handedly invented, or even reinvented, Canada's commitment to human rights, peacekeeping, or international institutions, all of which have informed Canadian foreign policy for decades. Not without reason, after all, was Canada once referred to by a United States secretary of state, Dean Acheson, as the 'stern daughter of the voice of God.'(f.4) Nevertheless, Axworthy's careful articulation of foreign policy principles into a more or less cogent statement of goals is a striking departure from the often muddled and cautious musings of his predecessors. In journals like this one, on newspaper editorial pages, and in various speeches and policy statements, he has developed a complex, interlocking set of assumptions and foreign policy objectives to guide Canada into the next century. …

Three building blocks of a theory of Latin American foreign policy

towards developing theory. Scholarship on Latin American foreign policy-particularly, though certainly not exclusively, that emanating from Latin America-focuses heavily on international law, foreign policy principles and traditions and the role of individual leaders.3 Increasingly, researchers have expanded the scope of their examination of Latin American foreign policy, encountering in their analyses a broad range of foreign policy goals and explanatory forces.4 A review of the literature reveals that Latin American foreign policy makers include among their more important goals autonomy, development and the management of their relationship with the USA. Other key goals include developing policy to treat regional relationships, Third Worldism, drug trafficking, national security, arms control, border disputes and other local issues. A literature review also finds that the most frequently cited explanatory factors of Latin American foreign policy are US influence, poor economic resources, leader and regime ideology, and the global distribution of power and wealth. Researchers in this area rarely spend time pondering methodological issues. Overwhelmingly, the case study approach dominates the literature. Most examinations are qualitative studies of the foreign policy behavior of an individual state, regime or a few countries in comparative perspective. The research heavily focuses on the nation-state and often takes the form of story-telling, albeit in an analytical way which sometimes includes some loosely tested hypotheses.5 A 'kitchen sink' approach is also popular, in which researchers model and examine all the potential explanatory inputs into a particular country's (or countries')

Dean Acheson, the cold war, and the limits of politics

Abstract Dean Acheson's political theory of the cold war was grounded on an appreciation of the complementary role of prudence and principles in foreign policy. Always aware of the inclination toward moralism in American politics, Acheson attempted to forge a strategy that could meet the Soviet challenge without descending into a crusade against Communism. In this context, an examination of the decision to build the hydrogen bomb and the strategy document known as NSC 68 reveals the limits of American foreign policy in the era of an “armed truce.”

Afghanistan and the Soviet-Indian Influence Relationship

BY THE END of the 1970s, relations between the Soviet Union and India had developed to a point of closeness and cooperation few other major power-Third World relationships had achieved. Soviet economic, military, and political support, forthcoming earlier in the 1950s and 1960s, had been accelerated. Moscow could hardly have had a better Third World ally to work with against an expansion of Chinese or American influence or to represent claims of Soviet global power and responsibility (especially in Asia but also with the nonaligned movement and in the Third World generally). For New Delhi, the USSR served as the crucial bulwark against Pakistan and as a counterweight to both China and the United States. Although examples of actual influence, or leverage over behavior, of either one on the other's policies were very limited, the political leaderships of the two countries shared a wide ranging coincidence of interests, a broad set of perceptions that allowed them to see the world in similar, although not identical, terms. This agreement made for substantial cooperation between India and the Soviet Union on issues of local, regional, and international significance.The December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had the potential of disrupting this relationship. Most of the nonaligned world, not to mention Washington and Beijing, expressed sharp opposition to the Soviet move. For India, the introduction of actual Soviet army units into another country, one which had been nonaligned and not part of the Soviet bloc per se, was a situation repugnant to its historic foreign policy principles. How could India maintain its stature in world politics and not oppose Moscow's action? Yet, what would happen to India if it denounced its most important ally? Who would become New Delhi's major