Imperial Foreign Policy Research Articles

The Post-Pandemic World and the Foreign Policy Imperatives

Considering the destructive and disruptive potential of pathogens, this research identifies new lessons and policy imperatives in the governance of future scenarios of pandemics. Although foreign policy players and other critical stakeholders are beginning to recognise the values of global health in foreign policy thinking and decision-making, there are still major gaps in pandemic response, particularly as the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed. To plug the observed gaps, this paper calls attention to three political / foreign policy priorities. First, critical actors must enhance their preparedness for future pandemics by building massive health infrastructure, supersizing the health corps, and investing in programmes that will aid their capacity to predict a health emergency before it occurs. Second, foreign policy professionals must prioritize humanity over high politics in global pandemic response. Third, foreign policy actors must place adequate focus on migration health going into the future.

Позиции России и США по вопросам ядерной безопасности и перспективы новых договоренностей

In the modern complex system of international relations, in a situation of escalating confrontation between Russia and the United States, increasing tension in relations between Western countries and the "Global South", arms control, primarily nuclear, as well as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, continues to be one of the most important areas of Russian foreign and defense policy. The Russian Federation pays priority attention to strengthening and developing the system of international treaties in the fields of strategic security and arms control. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to consider the prospects for one of the key aspects of the Russian-American agreements - nuclear arms control and the achievement of sustainable strategic stability. This led to the active use of such methods as analysis and synthesis of data on the current state of nuclear strategic security, a historical approach that identifies the previous context of agreements, as well as a comparative analysis focused on comparing the basic approaches, interests, goals and priorities of the Russian and American sides. Based on foreign policy imperatives, including consolidating Russia's role as a guarantor of international stability and arms control, the authors propose a non-standard scenario for restoring the viability of the key START Treaty of 2010. The article suggests the outlines of possible concrete solutions and potential elements of agreements that can become the basic topic for the resumption of bilateral consultations on strategic stability and an integral part of the new agreement. The authors conclude that reaching mutually acceptable agreements on this topical issue will have a positive impact on reducing the military threat and reducing the risks of unleashing a nuclear conflict, which meets the strategic interests of Russian national security and global stability.

Pakistan’s defense industry amid "pivot to the East" and "saving traditional strategic ties"

With Pakistan having succeeded in developing relevant industries, it has taken a firm place in the second tier of weapons and military equipment producers. However, the Pakistan’s defense industry is still based on Chinese-Soviet and Western engineering thought. Such an equilibrium stems from both the country's capabilities in the sphere and traditional foreign policy imperatives of Pakistan's military elites. This logic is expected to remain relevant and will manifest itself in future Pakistani foreign and military-industrial policies.

Russian Colonization of Alaska: From Heyday to Sale, 1818–1867. By Andrei Val’terovich Grinëv

This third and final entry in Andrei Grinëv’s Russian Colonization of Alaska series takes the history of the Russian colonies in North America From Heyday to Sale, 1818–1867. The text, if billed as a monograph, is foremost a synthesis—a collation not only of other scholars’ findings, but of Grinëv’s own considerable scholarship as well. Anyone acquainted with the series thus far will find no surprises as regards Grinëv’s central thesis. As in previous volumes, the author reserves his most critical attention for arguing Russia’s imperial project in North America as an example of “colonial politarism,” with “politarism” here being Karl Marx’s “Asiatic mode of production” (p. 2). Its significance notwithstanding, the argument makes infrequent an appearance in what is otherwise an exceptionally thorough history of Russian America’s final decades. Beginning with the departure of the merchant Aleksandr Baranov as the colonies’ executive in 1818, Grinëv organizes his survey with similar keystones in Russian America’s political history, namely, the five-year terms of Baranov’s successors, nearly all of which serve as headings in one of five chapters. The first of these addresses the challenges of replacing the long-serving Baranov, and the importance of his successors being chosen exclusively from among the Navy’s officer-gentry. The second, bound 1825 to 1840, examines the relation between imperial foreign policy and the ruling Russian-American Company’s efforts to consolidate ties with the Alaska Natives on whose labor, land and waters the Company depended for profit. Readers familiar with the literature will recognize both topics as staples of the historiography, but Grinëv’s intention here is to probe and tweak, not overhaul.

In Search of Digital Sovereignty and Strategic Autonomy: Normative Power Europe to the Test of Its Geopolitical Ambitions

This article analyses the recent use of European Union (EU) terminology of digital sovereignty and strategic autonomy, aiming to identify tensions between policy considerations of fundamental rights, free market principles and geopolitical concerns. These tensions are rooted in the disparity between the EU's considerable economic and regulatory power in digital matters and its limited mandate and capabilities in foreign policy. The article also explores the translation of the notions of digital sovereignty and strategic autonomy into EU policy. It identifies three important trends in the geopoliticisation of the EU agenda on digital technologies: (1) the instrumental use of ‘classic’ internal market policies to exert geopolitical influence; (2) the imposition of foreign policy imperatives on national markets; and (3) new ‘hybrid’ digital policies that combine internal market concerns, fundamental rights and geopolitical concerns. Ultimately, digital sovereignty has inherent tensions with the EU's normative power in digital issues and may also result in a strategic cacophony.

1922 — the best year of the Comintern. Soviet Russia, German communists and the Genoa conference

The signing of the Declaration on the formation of the Soviet Union on December 30, 1922 marked a new stage in the history of international relations, and, at the same time, took stock of intense domestic and international political struggle unfolding in the previous years. The developments within the Communist International were of particular importance for both the outcomes of this struggle and the future of international labor movement. The author stresses that for the Comintern the year of 1922 was dominated by a struggle between the two opposing ideological and political trends: the inertia of the ‘storm and onslaught’ enthusiasm of the first post-revolutionary years and the rise of the ideas of peaceful coexistence. In this context, the paper assesses the role that the Bolshevik leaders envisaged for the Comintern during the preparation and conduct of the Genoa Conference and, particularly, for the policy of the united workers front. The author shows that the very idea of cooperation with socialists and social democrats received an extremely ambiguous reaction from representatives of Western communist parties. In this regard, the position of the German Communist Party (KPD) was of particular importance to the Bolshevik leaders. Indeed, the case of KPD was emblematic of those tendencies and contradictions that marked the development of the international communist movement in the period under review. The KPD leaders welcomed the Comintern’s turn towards a united workers front. However, the author notes that this support was based on a highly unstable compromise between multiple contradicting domestic and foreign policy imperatives, including opposition from the left-wing radicals within the party and continuous conflict with the government of the Weimar Republic, exacerbated by ideological and financial dependence on Moscow. As a result, the KPD’s actions were very often ad hoc and inconsistent, reflecting general issues typical to the international labor movement of that period. That became clear during the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, which took place at the end of 1922. It failed to outline a clear strategy for interaction between the Russian Bolsheviks and foreign communists. At the same time, the outcomes of the Fourth Congress were crucial for further evolution of the ideology and practical activities of the Comintern. The policy of the united workers front got a broader definition as the Communist International started to recognize the threat posed by fascism.

Indian Studies in Soviet Social Studies

The article is focused on the evolution of Soviet Indian studies in the course of the 1970s and 1980s, i.e. the period of the discipline’s indisputable academic upsurge. The present author maintains that factors instrumental of Indian studies’ ascendant development were many; among the latter foreign policy imperatives as well as high quality intellectual talent available are distinguished to explain the advancement of this area of social science research to the status of socially significant professional activities. Socio-economic, history and political studies are taken to demonstrate the academic accomplishments of Soviet scholars who exploited their own “wisdom” to comprehend India’s complex social reality and, also, utilized critical assessment of the existent social science research paradigms circulating in Indian scholarship. The “crisis” of Indian studies dating back to the late 1980s is discussed in basic aspects. The social and political origins of the “crisis” are being highlighted. The evolution of Soviet Indian studies during the late 1980s is investigated at the backdrop of sociopolitical development in the years preceding the USSR’s dismemberment. Tentative factors instrumental of the eventual “comeback” of Indian studies as an academic discipline of high societal stature are estimated.

Проблема України в російському національному дискурсі

The article refers to the position of Russian nationalists regarding Ukraine, according to which they refuse the idea of Ukrainian independence. They neither consider the state of Ukraine as an independent state nor the Ukrainian people as a separate nation. For years, Russian nationalists have been preparing an ideological basis for the legitimation of their aggressive and imperial foreign policy, the logical continuation of which was the annexation and occupation of the territory of Ukraine by Russia. The study of Russia’s aggressive invasion of Ukraine and the instrumentalization of historical narratives is one of the important topics of the contemporary political agenda, which deserves special attention from scientists and civil society. To scientifically oppose the views of Russian nationalists, the authors of the article analyze the issues of the origin of Russia and "Russians" based on a retrospective analysis of history; the imperial character of the modern geopolitical concept of Slavophile – "Russian World"; The process of Russification in Ukraine – the stages of forbidding the teaching of the Ukrainian language since the seventeenth century and the Russian narratives.The purpose of our study is to study and fundamentally analyze the Russian imperial nature. Such an integrated approach will help us explain its phenomenon and draw the right conclusions. Ukrainian identity and the idea of Ukrainian statehood are especially unacceptable for the Russian imperialist ideology, they cannot imagine a real, great Russia without Ukrainian lands. It is for this reason that at various times attempts were made to discredit the idea of Ukrainian statehood and called it at the official level various derogatory epithets: Malorossiya, Novorossiya and others.

The Illusion of the China-US-Europe Strategic Triangle: Reactions from Germany and the UK.

The dawn of the Sino-US peer competition has broken, denoting a new status quo of instability as Beijing and Washington vie for influence. As leader of the rules-based international order (RIO), Washington under the Trump administration nevertheless adopted an “America first” posture, which triggered a transatlantic discord. Simultaneously, Beijing, having signalled discontent with existing settlements, has sought to alter international arrangements to cement its leadership role. Europe has been identified as a significant theatre for the emerging competition, with Germany and the UK recognized as essential target states for Beijing’s efforts, yet are simultaneously major stakeholders in the US-led RIO. As such, this article sets out to operationalize a European narrative of hedging. The article poses the questions, how does the transatlantic discord and Beijing’s leadership ambitions impact the hedging strategies of Germany and the UK, and why do such coping behaviors differ in various indices? Utilizing key signals from policy practitioners, policy elites’ rhetoric and national strategies, it is contended that while the UK is struggling to formulate a coherent foreign policy and now finds itself aligned with US foreign policy narratives, Germany is unlikely to signal its wishes to become strategically independent, if the US and EU foreign policy imperatives accord with Berlin’s political and economic interests. These two case studies reveal that both European powers are decidedly wary about Beijing’s signals and intentions, and are likely to retain closer alignment with Washington, foregoing strategic independence and illustrating the temporary nature of the transatlantic discord. Both will not, however, wish to relinquish Beijing, so long as attractive economic benefits can be attained, resulting in an inexplicit strategic hedge.

Do declínio conservador e ascendência liberal

É crescente ao final do Império a crítica à política externa imperial por parte de elementos ligados ao Partido Liberal. Em comum, ambos liberais monarquistas e republicanos acusavam a diplomacia saquarema de antiamericana. Findado o ciclo de intervenção platina, emerge, a partir dos anos 1860, o clamor por maior aproximação continental. Partindo da análise dos anais parlamentares, diplomáticos e do Conselho de Estado, assim como de fontes jornalísticas, este trabalho terá por propósito a análise do panamericanismo no pensamento liberal brasileiro nas décadas finais do século XIX. Argumentaremos que, a partir da diferenciação axiológica entre liberais e conservadores, o discurso panamericanista foi uma constante no pensamento dos primeiros. Não por acaso, serão eles, quando no poder, os responsáveis pela aproximação continental da nascente diplomacia republicana.

The Projects of the Far East Development in Russian Social Thought at the Turn of 19th – 20th Centuries: the Modern Tendencies in Historiography

This article demonstrates the modern historians’ researches devoted to visions of Russian social thought concerning the Far East as the element of imperial foreign policy at the turn of 19th - 20th centuries. The author defines the basic areas of researches that include this issue’s analysis. Special attention is paid to current situation in historical knowledge. The conclusion demonstrates promising ways of this issue’s studying.

Transformation of the Political Discourse of the Ukrainian Elite in the Context of Competition between the Russian Federation and the West: 2004–2014

The article establishes the relationship between the interests of the Ukrainian establishment and the foreign policy vector of Kyiv. The author identified the main actors who determined the specifics of the transformation of the strategic course of Ukraine. On the one hand, the author revealed the critical problems of European integration and on the other hand, the improvement/ degradation of relations with the Russian Federation. The author evaluated the strategic doctrines used by the Ukrainian elite and analysed main changes in the approaches of the Ukrainian establishment. This article considers the reaction of Russian and Ukrainian political elites to the correction of the foreign policy imperatives of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, respectively. Also, the author, using the theory of the “heavy” and “light” fractions of Ukrainian political elites as an example, identifies specific features of the correlation between the replacement/renewal of key elite groups and the adaptation of the strategic vector, including a qualitative rethinking of the approaches inherent in the replaced establishment. On the other hand, the author compared between the declared positions/slogans and specific doctrines/concepts, initiated, for example, by individual actors of the political elite. The author analyses the main reasons for the soft dismantling of the so-called multi-vector diplomacy in favour of the Euro-Atlantic course. Also, in the article, concerning the realities of Ukraine, the influence of the political model of “shapeless pluralism” of hybrid regimes on the transformation of the foreign policy’ agenda.

Overseas bases and US strategic posture

‘In this timely Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson reminds us of the size and complexity of the American global footprint, and how foreign-policy imperatives have tended to override pressures to cut back on the number of overseas bases. In today’s tense strategic environment, this will most likely remain the case.’ Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London ‘Jonathan Stevenson offers an indispensable look at the United States’ overseas bases in 2022 and persuasively explains why they remain critical to American strategy today and for the foreseeable future.’ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security Overseas military bases have been the bedrock of the United States’ ability to project military power, exert political influence and deter potential adversaries since the Second World War. But fatigue with America’s ‘forever wars’, as well as more nuanced financial and strategic reasons, have inclined the public and policy community to favour reducing US global military activities and overseas presence. In this Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson argues that this desire does not necessarily translate into sound strategy. Overseas bases are a key element of the reassurance required to resurrect and bolster America’s reputation among its allies and adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic imperatives and geopolitical realities impose restraints in every theatre. The fluidity prevailing in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific counsels maintaining forward-deployed forces there at roughly the current level. Russia’s confrontational posture towards NATO and invasion of Ukraine, as well as NATO’s short- and medium-term reliance on US capabilities, require the American presence in Europe to increase and expand eastward. The US should not commit itself to a foreign policy that is heavy on forward-deployed military power and light on diplomacy. But paradoxically, reducing forward military presence may not be consistent with a policy that is less focused on military power as a means of achieving stability and security.

Optimising US regional footprints: China and the Indo-Pacific

‘In this timely Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson reminds us of the size and complexity of the American global footprint, and how foreign-policy imperatives have tended to override pressures to cut back on the number of overseas bases. In today’s tense strategic environment, this will most likely remain the case.’ Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London ‘Jonathan Stevenson offers an indispensable look at the United States’ overseas bases in 2022 and persuasively explains why they remain critical to American strategy today and for the foreseeable future.’ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security Overseas military bases have been the bedrock of the United States’ ability to project military power, exert political influence and deter potential adversaries since the Second World War. But fatigue with America’s ‘forever wars’, as well as more nuanced financial and strategic reasons, have inclined the public and policy community to favour reducing US global military activities and overseas presence. In this Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson argues that this desire does not necessarily translate into sound strategy. Overseas bases are a key element of the reassurance required to resurrect and bolster America’s reputation among its allies and adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic imperatives and geopolitical realities impose restraints in every theatre. The fluidity prevailing in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific counsels maintaining forward-deployed forces there at roughly the current level. Russia’s confrontational posture towards NATO and invasion of Ukraine, as well as NATO’s short- and medium-term reliance on US capabilities, require the American presence in Europe to increase and expand eastward. The US should not commit itself to a foreign policy that is heavy on forward-deployed military power and light on diplomacy. But paradoxically, reducing forward military presence may not be consistent with a policy that is less focused on military power as a means of achieving stability and security.

Conclusion

‘In this timely Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson reminds us of the size and complexity of the American global footprint, and how foreign-policy imperatives have tended to override pressures to cut back on the number of overseas bases. In today’s tense strategic environment, this will most likely remain the case.’ Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London ‘Jonathan Stevenson offers an indispensable look at the United States’ overseas bases in 2022 and persuasively explains why they remain critical to American strategy today and for the foreseeable future.’ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security Overseas military bases have been the bedrock of the United States’ ability to project military power, exert political influence and deter potential adversaries since the Second World War. But fatigue with America’s ‘forever wars’, as well as more nuanced financial and strategic reasons, have inclined the public and policy community to favour reducing US global military activities and overseas presence. In this Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson argues that this desire does not necessarily translate into sound strategy. Overseas bases are a key element of the reassurance required to resurrect and bolster America’s reputation among its allies and adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic imperatives and geopolitical realities impose restraints in every theatre. The fluidity prevailing in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific counsels maintaining forward-deployed forces there at roughly the current level. Russia’s confrontational posture towards NATO and invasion of Ukraine, as well as NATO’s short- and medium-term reliance on US capabilities, require the American presence in Europe to increase and expand eastward. The US should not commit itself to a foreign policy that is heavy on forward-deployed military power and light on diplomacy. But paradoxically, reducing forward military presence may not be consistent with a policy that is less focused on military power as a means of achieving stability and security.

Basing and US grand strategy

‘In this timely Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson reminds us of the size and complexity of the American global footprint, and how foreign-policy imperatives have tended to override pressures to cut back on the number of overseas bases. In today’s tense strategic environment, this will most likely remain the case.’ Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London ‘Jonathan Stevenson offers an indispensable look at the United States’ overseas bases in 2022 and persuasively explains why they remain critical to American strategy today and for the foreseeable future.’ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security Overseas military bases have been the bedrock of the United States’ ability to project military power, exert political influence and deter potential adversaries since the Second World War. But fatigue with America’s ‘forever wars’, as well as more nuanced financial and strategic reasons, have inclined the public and policy community to favour reducing US global military activities and overseas presence. In this Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson argues that this desire does not necessarily translate into sound strategy. Overseas bases are a key element of the reassurance required to resurrect and bolster America’s reputation among its allies and adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic imperatives and geopolitical realities impose restraints in every theatre. The fluidity prevailing in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific counsels maintaining forward-deployed forces there at roughly the current level. Russia’s confrontational posture towards NATO and invasion of Ukraine, as well as NATO’s short- and medium-term reliance on US capabilities, require the American presence in Europe to increase and expand eastward. The US should not commit itself to a foreign policy that is heavy on forward-deployed military power and light on diplomacy. But paradoxically, reducing forward military presence may not be consistent with a policy that is less focused on military power as a means of achieving stability and security.

Optimising US regional footprints: the Middle East

‘In this timely Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson reminds us of the size and complexity of the American global footprint, and how foreign-policy imperatives have tended to override pressures to cut back on the number of overseas bases. In today’s tense strategic environment, this will most likely remain the case.’ Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London ‘Jonathan Stevenson offers an indispensable look at the United States’ overseas bases in 2022 and persuasively explains why they remain critical to American strategy today and for the foreseeable future.’ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security Overseas military bases have been the bedrock of the United States’ ability to project military power, exert political influence and deter potential adversaries since the Second World War. But fatigue with America’s ‘forever wars’, as well as more nuanced financial and strategic reasons, have inclined the public and policy community to favour reducing US global military activities and overseas presence. In this Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson argues that this desire does not necessarily translate into sound strategy. Overseas bases are a key element of the reassurance required to resurrect and bolster America’s reputation among its allies and adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic imperatives and geopolitical realities impose restraints in every theatre. The fluidity prevailing in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific counsels maintaining forward-deployed forces there at roughly the current level. Russia’s confrontational posture towards NATO and invasion of Ukraine, as well as NATO’s short- and medium-term reliance on US capabilities, require the American presence in Europe to increase and expand eastward. The US should not commit itself to a foreign policy that is heavy on forward-deployed military power and light on diplomacy. But paradoxically, reducing forward military presence may not be consistent with a policy that is less focused on military power as a means of achieving stability and security.

Optimising US regional footprints: Europe

‘In this timely Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson reminds us of the size and complexity of the American global footprint, and how foreign-policy imperatives have tended to override pressures to cut back on the number of overseas bases. In today’s tense strategic environment, this will most likely remain the case.’ Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London ‘Jonathan Stevenson offers an indispensable look at the United States’ overseas bases in 2022 and persuasively explains why they remain critical to American strategy today and for the foreseeable future.’ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security Overseas military bases have been the bedrock of the United States’ ability to project military power, exert political influence and deter potential adversaries since the Second World War. But fatigue with America’s ‘forever wars’, as well as more nuanced financial and strategic reasons, have inclined the public and policy community to favour reducing US global military activities and overseas presence. In this Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson argues that this desire does not necessarily translate into sound strategy. Overseas bases are a key element of the reassurance required to resurrect and bolster America’s reputation among its allies and adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic imperatives and geopolitical realities impose restraints in every theatre. The fluidity prevailing in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific counsels maintaining forward-deployed forces there at roughly the current level. Russia’s confrontational posture towards NATO and invasion of Ukraine, as well as NATO’s short- and medium-term reliance on US capabilities, require the American presence in Europe to increase and expand eastward. The US should not commit itself to a foreign policy that is heavy on forward-deployed military power and light on diplomacy. But paradoxically, reducing forward military presence may not be consistent with a policy that is less focused on military power as a means of achieving stability and security.

Beyond an Imperial Foreign Policy?: India at the League of Nations, 1919–1946

ABSTRACTThis article argues that India’s role as the only non-self-governing member of the League of Nations provides a largely unexamined entry point into understanding the nature of Indian nationalism and public discourse during the first half of the twentieth century. Using previously unexplored archival documentation of India’s relationship to the League of Nations throughout the duration of the League’s existence, this article exposes the varied and contradictory perspectives through which imperial officials and Indian political figures engaged with international society within the framework of the British Empire. Through the distribution of League publications and the circulation of petitions seeking redress for imperial abuses, a wide range of Indians actively sought to stage India as a clearly defined nation at the level of the international in a way that was not possible within the subcontinent itself.

The Greater Menace to the Peace of Nations? The 1877 Mills Mission and Direct Canadian–American Diplomatic Relations

ABSTRACTIn 1877, employing the unwanted presence of armed Sioux in western Canada as a useful mechanism, Canada’s Cabinet, represented by Minister of the Interior David Mills, unhappy with perceived British indifference to Canada’s concerns, sought to initiate direct diplomatic relations with the United States. That effort failed, and British opposition to this endeavour was so sharp that Canada made no similar initiative for half a century. Although he failed, Mills’ effort marked the birth of the Functional notion that Canada’s voice should matter more in Imperial foreign policy formulation when its direct interests were at stake, especially when dealing with the United States.