ABSTRACT Does governments’ ideology influence the likelihood of ransom payment? Despite a steady interest in hostage-taking events, this question remains unanswered. In this article, I argue that ideology contributes to explaining governments’ decisions to pay or not pay ransoms: guided by individualising moral foundations, left-leaning governments are more likely to concede to terrorists to save lives. I test the theoretical argument through a quantitative analysis of abductions between 1970 and 2020 whose victims are citizens of OECD member states. Two results stand out. The presence of leftist governments increases the likelihood of ransom payment, but the abduction of statesmen mitigates its impact. This work contributes to hostage-taking and Foreign Policy Analysis literature by covering an apparent gap in these fields. It also fosters studies on the role of ideology in security issues and moral dilemmas by focusing on a peculiar event that scholars have largely overlooked.
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