Foreign Policy Advisor Research Articles

Stosunki amerykańsko-francuskie w okresie poprzedzającym inwazję USA na Irak (2002–2003)

The aim of the article is to provide an insider’s account of the US-French dispute in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. By analysing data from 11 qualitative interviews with U.S. senior officials, the articles attempts to make an assessment of the state of US-French relations before the 2003 Iraq Crisis; analyses the rationale behind and development of the dispute, and finally tries to evaluate whether the confrontation has left a mark on bilateral relations two decades on. The central hypothesis tested in this study is that despite the magnitude of the crisis, it has not impacted the overall trajectory of the US-French relationship.The respondents to this study include senior U.S. foreign policy advisors and policy-makers from the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State who have been directly involved in the preparations to the war in the years 2001–2003.

ЗОВНІШНЯ ПОЛІТИКА ДЖ. КЕННЕДІ: ОСОБИСТІСНИЙ ЧИННИК У СПІВПРАЦІ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА ТА ДЕРЖСЕКРЕТАРЯ Д. РАСКА

The proposed article is devoted to the figure of Secretary of State Dean Rusk during the presidency of John F. Kennedy in 1961–1963, with special attention to the interpersonal relationship between him and the president. The purpose of the work is to emphasize the importance of studying the interaction between the president and the secretary of state, which often plays a key role in the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of the United States of America. The ability of the president and his secretary of state to listen to each other and communicate effectively can determine success or failure in implementing foreign policy initiatives and managing crisis situations. The research methodology is based on a critical analysis of scientific literature, as well as on the application of problem-chronological and systemic approaches. The basic principles of the article are the principle of historicism, objectivity and scientificity. Comparative, historical-systemic, historical-genetic methods are used for scientific understanding of the proposed problem. The scientific novelty of the article consists in drawing the attention of researchers to the figure of Dean Rusk, as well as in offering a different point of view on Dean Rusk’s place in the relationship with President J. Kennedy. Contrary to the prevailing view of Dean Rusk’s insecurity, mysteriousness, and modesty as the key to his failure as the president’s foreign policy advisor, we argue that these aspects became «victorious» in interaction with the president, acting as a certain «balancing factor» of J. Kennedy’s activism. Conclusions. The relationship between John F. Kennedy and Dean Rusk was complicated and occasionally strained. J. Kennedy and D. Rusk had different views on foreign policy issues. J. Kennedy often avoided the opinions of D. Rusk, did not always fully trust him, or did not consider his opinion reliable. Wanting to be the main initiator of the foreign policy of the United States of America. The crises that the US faced in the early 1960s were partly the result of the politics of interpersonal attitudes: both Dean Rusk and J. Kennedy were individuals who did not correspond to the essence of America in the late 1950s and early 1960s (in the context of a globalized understanding of foreign policy), however, it is unlikely that Kennedy would have been able to find a better candidate for the position of Secretary of State than Dean Rusk (in the context of interpersonal relations).

Jimmy Carter and the US–Turkish security relationship, 1977–1980

This article analyses Jimmy Carter’s policy towards Turkey between 1977 and 1980. It argues that the US-Turkish relationship represents another example of Carter’s pragmatism in foreign policy. Turkey remained a close US ally and NATO member throughout the Cold War. In the 1970s, the bilateral relationship confronted challenges, particularly following the 1974 Cyprus Crisis. Carter’s 1976 election accentuated bilateral tensions due to his perceived pro-Greek and pro-Cypriot – and, by implication, anti-Turkish – stance on Greece-Cyprus-Turkey issues during the election campaign. Once in office, however, Carter prioritized a traditional interpretation of US national interest towards a close Cold War ally, emphasizing the security dimension of the relationship. The administration’s policy required adjustments in terms of strategy to fit the ever-changing domestic Turkish politics and regional developments. President Carter and his top foreign policy advisors remained determined to repair and secure a crucial alliance with a strategic ally.

The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights

Rasmus Sinding Søndergaard’s Reagan, Congress, and Human Rights is a welcome addition to the rapidly growing scholarship on human rights and U.S. foreign policy.1 Based on excellent research in a wide range of primary sources, including the papers of numerous members of Congress that have not been previously used by scholars, Søndergaard’s work makes three significant contributions. It demonstrates convincingly that President Ronald Reagan, who entered office determined to downgrade human rights as a foreign policy concern, was forced to change course in 1981; places Congress at the center of the analysis to show how it built on the human rights breakthrough of the 1970s to influence U.S. foreign policy throughout the 1980s; and provides a new interpretation of Reagan’s approach to foreign policy. During the 1980 presidential campaign, Reagan attacked President Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy as well intentioned but harmful to American interests. He portrayed Carter as weak in standing up to America’s enemies while attacking the nation’s friends, ultimately leading to the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. As part of his promise to return to the verities of the United States’ policy of containing communism, Reagan pledged to stop using human rights to attack American allies. Yet, the effort to abandon human rights as a concern in foreign policy was quickly changed. As Søndergaard demonstrates, “within the first year, pressure from members of Congress had led Reagan and his foreign policy advisors to revise their position on human rights” (47). In making this argument, he follows the path breaking work of Sarah B. Snyder in finding that it was congressional opposition to the nomination of Ernest Lefever, an outspoken opponent of using human rights in the making of foreign policy, for the position of assistant secretary of the State Department’s Human Rights Bureau, and the ultimate rejection of Reagan’s selection, that led the administration to change course and develop a conservative human rights policy.2

Changes and adjustment in the foreign policy of Lithuania during Dalia Grybauskaitė’s presidency

ABSTRACT This article looks at the main changes in Lithuania’s foreign policy between 2009 and 2019, and tries to evaluate the major shifts caused by Grybauskaitė’s decisions and choices to concentrate on specific positions or priorities. Gustavsson’s model of different stages of foreign policy changes serves as the theoretical basis for evaluating the selected cases. The study is based on interviews carried out in 2017–19 with Grybauskaitė and all her foreign policy advisors. By investigating selected cases from the agent perspective, this study can help elucidate why some of their decisions deviated from traditional Lithuanian foreign policy.

A preponderance of stability: Henry Kissinger’s concern over the dynamics of Ostpolitik

Drawing on American and German evidence, Stephan Kieninger’s contribution looks into Henry Kissinger’s ambivalent relationship with Germany scrutinizing both the parallels between Kissinger’s detente and Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik as well as the frictions and the competition between both approaches. Richard Nixon’s and Henry Kissinger’s priority was international stability provided by the understanding between the USA and the Soviet Union, whereas Willy Brandt’s dynamic detente approach was aimed at Europe’s transformation overcoming the Iron Curtain. In Nixon’s and Kissinger’s balance of power policy, stability was essential to cement what they perceived as an endangered status quo in Europe. Brandt and his foreign policy advisor Egon Bahr saw detente as a way to facilitate liberalizing changes. They envisaged stability in international relations a precondition to guarantee the regimes behind the Iron Curtain the kind of security that would over time allow them to open up their societies for Western influence. Finally, the overlaps between both approaches prevailed. Examining Kissinger’s initial doubts over Ostpolitik’s feasibility, the essay depicts his way to control the detente process in Europe through the Quadripartite negotiations over Berlin in 1971. Eventually, Ostpolitik’s success was a catalyst and a prerequisite for Richard Nixon’s and Henry Kissinger’s own approach to the Soviet Union despite the escalation of the Vietnam War.

The Trump Administration's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Approach

After nearly two years, the Trump administration's approach to the Indo-Pacific region has finally taken shape. Its objectives are a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, in line with decades of U.S. policy in the region, but in a new context of outright strategic competition with China. Its means include familiar tools of U.S. engagement, with some modest improvements for the times. But in Donald Trump's America, actions often do not support stated goals and, in the case of policy in the Indo-Pacific, President Trump's personal instincts, in particular his dogmatic approach to trade, have undermined his administration's best efforts in the region. Early Days Over the course of two years, a series of formal speeches and documents have articulated in increasing detail the administration's Indo-Pacific approach. Throughout this period, the administration has also faced frequent criticism for the slow pace of policy formulation and in appointing key Asia policymaking officials. To understand why policy formulation has been so slow, it is important to go back to Trump's unconventional presidential campaign and presidential transition. While all major U.S. presidential campaigns in recent memory have been supported by networks of public policy professionals helping the nominees and crafting policy agendas for the event the candidate is elected, Donald Trump's presidential campaign was different. In stark contrast to Hillary Clinton's 2016 campaign — with an enormous team of unpaid foreign policy advisors working to develop a potential presidential agenda, including a strategy for Asia — Trump had almost no foreign policy advisors. During the 2016 Republican primary season, leading Republican foreign policy hands supported a range of candidates, but almost none signed up to support candidate Donald Trump. Instead, many leading Republican experts actively opposed Trump's candidacy. Furthermore, soon after the election, Trump disbanded his small presidential transition office, depleting any preparatory work that had been done. Without a coherent foreign policy framework and with little expertise on Asia within its ranks, the early Trump administration's approach to Asia became highly reactionary, guided by a deep scepticism of China and the reality that North Korea presented an increasingly untenable threat to the U.S. homeland. In particular, the North Korea threat forced the administration to focus considerable attention on Asia in its first few months with a flurry of meetings with Asian leaders.

<em>Alumni Spotlight</em>: Kelli Seybolt, Director of International Affairs and Foreign Policy Advisor for the United States Coast Guard

<em>Alumni Spotlight</em>: Kelli Seybolt, Director of International Affairs and Foreign Policy Advisor for the United States Coast Guard

The Sum of all Fears: Israel's Perception of a Nuclear-Armed Iran

Thucydides’ ancient logic still governs: uncertainty (over Iran’s nuclear intentions) and the fear this inspires (in Israel) increases the risk of another war (in the Middle East). Even if Israel’s response to the Iranian nuclear program does not lead the region into a war, Israel’s fears will be crucial in shaping Middle Eastern politics and will help to determine the stability of the region in the years ahead. The U.S. public has been hearing about Israeli fears of a nuclear Iran for several years. It is understandable if most Americans discount this drama as

The Euro: Crisis and Collapse?

By the end of the last decade, the European project appeared secure. Monetary union had been successfully negotiated and Eurozone members who had previously lagged, like Greece and Ireland, had sustained high rates of growth since their entry to the single currency in 1999. It did not seem ridiculous for a former foreign policy advisor to Tony Blair, Mark Leonard, to tell us in breathless style Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (2005) . Citing Europe's new synthesis of social democracy's concern for welfare with the liberalism's support for freedom, Leonard happily forecast the spread of the European model to the rest of the world. That vision, needless to say, now lies in ruins. Europe, both as a constellation of supranational institutions making up the European Union, and as a collection of different nation states, is in a deep, and deepening, crisis. For the last eighteen months, its political leaders have met with increasing frequency to offer a succession of failed solutions, with the gap between the summit's final statement of intent and its collapse seemingly shrinking on every occasion. The malaise looks incurable.

Review: The Horseshoe Table

THE HORSESHOE TABLE An Inside View of the Security council Chinmaya R. Gharekhan New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley (India), 2006. 328pp, US$20-95 cloth (ISBN 81-7758-453-7)Ambassador Gharekhan provides a useful glimpse into how the security council really works, and it's not a pretty sight. Indeed, it was particularly unlovely in the opening years of the post-Cold War era, the period during which he represented India on the council (1991-92). On completion of his two-year term, then-secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked Gharekhan to join the executive office and act as the secretary general's personal liaison to the security council, in which capacity the author served until 1996.While lucid, informative, and thoughtful, his account is overly protective of the UN secretariat and his own key role therein vis-a-vis the security council, particularly when he recounts the two principal disasters that befell the United Nations on his watch: Srebrenica and Rwanda. In both instances, his efforts at explanation and detachment grate and are unconvincing.The book remains, however, required reading for countries seeking a seat on the security council, particularly for those that might harbour delusions that service on the council will allow their high ideals to flower and flourish. He portrays Boutros Boutros-Ghali generally as a brave and steadfast man of principle, even if others, including members of the secretariat and Gharekhan himself, do not fare as well.His broader reflections on the extent to which the security council is owned and dominated by the veto-wielding five permanent members (P$) were precisely mirrored in my own experience a few years later. Indeed, this point cannot be overemphasized and Gharekharis contribution to making it more broadly appreciated is welcome indeed.When Canada was elected to the security council in October 1998 to serve a sixth term, our then-foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, was pleased that Canada would have an opportunity to walk our human security talk. I cautioned him that our successful four-year campaign had been the easy part, and that the realities of service on the council, about which Gharekhan writes so persuasively-particularly the unbridled power of the P 5-would sorely limit what Axworthy was so anxious to achieve during Canada's brief time at the UN's high table. Specifically, I urged him to consider how he was going to react when Washington called to encourage him to straighten me out.Surely, that would not happen, he replied, and if ever it were to occur, it would be on a matter of such overriding importance that the nature of such a demarche could not be anticipated. Not so, I insisted, the subject was likely to be well-nigh irrelevant. It would be the principle that would be at issue, and I predicted that he would face this challenge within our first month on the council. In fact, he received his first call on 18 January, and, of the six additional demarches that were directed variously to our prime minister, his foreign policy advisor, again to the foreign minister, and to the deputy minister of foreign affairs over our first eight months on the council, all with a single purpose-to put me under Washington's discipline-all were rejected out of hand in Ottawa. Then they stopped. A number of my elected colleagues on the council, however, were not so steadfastly supported, and such unsubtle exercises of raw power were never pleasant to witness. Gharekhan recounts a few similar stories involving his own country and others.His more detailed recollections of how specific issues were handled by the council in the first half of the post-Cold War decade will not cause readers to be inspired by the courage and foresight of council members, but nonetheless offer useful insight into the Realpolitik of council operations and the limits to their effectiveness.His account of the advice being offered by secretariat officials to their boss, the secretary general, is particularly intriguing if no more inspiring. …

Searching for the North in North American Foreign Policies: Canada and the United States

Canada needs to bring a comprehensive northern dimension to its foreign policy. To be effective, the new policy must be an integral part of Canada's broader foreign policy, and must be reinforced by domestic policies. The Northern Dimension of Canada's Foreign Policy (2000) A northern foreign policy? We don't do north in our foreign policy-- unless you're talking about relations with the polar bears, walrus or caribou. Unattributed foreign policy advisor to President George W. Bush For many observers of Canadian-American affairs it was a bit of a surprise to find that the first problem to emerge in the bilateral relationship following the election of the new Harper government was related to the North. Rather than being a trade issue linked to softwood lumber or a border security concern tied to differing national immigration regulations, it was the question of Arctic sovereignty that was to disrupt briefly the promise of renewed positive relations between the two countries. In late January of 2006, the American ambassador to Canada, David Wilkins, appeared to raise questions in a speech to a Canadian audience about Ottawa's need to exert complete control over its northern lands and waters. The newly-elected Canadian prime minister, Stephen Harper, was forced to make a quick response, offering the opinion that Arctic sovereignty was indeed an important concern for Canadians and that it would be a foreign policy priority for his new government. He further indicated that the American ambassador might wish to refrain from making further comments on the matter (Galloway 2006). What puzzled many observers on both sides of the border concerning this brief, heated exchange was why either Canadian or American interests in the Arctic should be given such attention. Neither country had made the North an issue of prominent concern in their mutual relations for several years. Nor had either country appeared to devote much attention to the North in its overall foreign policy behavior. The idea that Canada and the United States might have different and contending approaches to their international relations in the North was a new idea to many. For those who had been carefully following the development of Canadian and American foreign policies in the North over the past several decades, however, such a sudden diplomatic outburst was not totally unexpected. The two countries did, in fact, have somewhat different visions of their roles in the North and their contributions to current circumpolar diplomacy. While there had been a good deal of common cause between Ottawa and Washington in their dealings in the North prior to the end of the Cold War, the two countries had begun to diverge in their attitudes and approaches to the region since the decline of that international system. It. might be important, some suggested, that these differences be detailed. The Nature of the Inquiry This essay discusses the problems that both Canada and the United States have faced over the past several decades in envisioning and articulating a northern dimension to their respective foreign policies. As noted above, both countries have suffered from a certain reluctance to consider the North as an important component of their foreign relations and have only belatedly begun to look at themselves as circumpolar states. Nonetheless, northern issues and concerns have become increasingly visible features of both Canada's and the United States' dealings with other members of the global community and in their relations with one another. The essay begins by providing a historical overview of the United States' and Canada's interests in the North over the past century It considers the political, economic, social, and strategic concerns that have driven each country to become involved in the region. Here, attention is focused on the evolution of their interests from exploration and establishment of sovereignty in the North to economic exploitation, strategic defense, and ultimately international cooperation. …

The International Realm, Framing Effects, and Security Strategies: Britain in Peace and War

In combining the domestic and international levels, I contend that the international environment can enable a domestic win-set and thereby guide the formation of a state's international security strategy. The trigger is the nature of and changes in the extant international setting. Based on findings from framing effects and prospect theory, I contend that periods of external crisis, conflict, and war will shift the public's domain to one of relative losses. In this realm, it will be easier for foreign policy advisors who favor offensive security strategies to frame the national debate. Periods of international peace, tranquility, and prosperity will shift the public's domain to relative gains, which will make it easier for advisors who favor risk averse and defensive strategies to frame the national discussion. The outcome can be a more offensive or defensive strategy than the state would have otherwise pursued. I apply the model to Britain to examine Britain's decision to adopt a Limited Liability strategy between 1912 and 1914, and to escalate to a Continental Commitment by 1916. A version of this paper was presented at the 2003 Annual International Studies Association Convention. I would like to thank Jane Cramer, Tom Rice, and Jeffrey Taliaferro for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Israeli Settlement Activity in the West Bank and Gaza: A Brief History

Negotiation JournalVolume 21, Issue 2 p. 171-175 Israeli Settlement Activity in the West Bank and Gaza: A Brief History Karen Tenenbaum, Karen Tenenbaum Harvard Law School. Email: [email protected] Karen Tenenbaum is a student at Harvard Law School. She worked as a researcher at the Program on Negotiation from 2003 to 2004. Her e-mail address is [email protected].Search for more papers by this authorEhud Eiran, Ehud Eiran Harvard Law School. Email: [email protected] Ehud Eiran is a senior visiting fellow at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School and a Ph.D. candidate in politics at Brandeis University. He previously served as an assistant to former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's foreign policy advisor. His e-mail address is [email protected].Search for more papers by this author Karen Tenenbaum, Karen Tenenbaum Harvard Law School. Email: [email protected] Karen Tenenbaum is a student at Harvard Law School. She worked as a researcher at the Program on Negotiation from 2003 to 2004. Her e-mail address is [email protected].Search for more papers by this authorEhud Eiran, Ehud Eiran Harvard Law School. Email: [email protected] Ehud Eiran is a senior visiting fellow at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School and a Ph.D. candidate in politics at Brandeis University. He previously served as an assistant to former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's foreign policy advisor. His e-mail address is [email protected].Search for more papers by this author First published: 22 March 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2005.00055.xCitations: 4 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Citing Literature Volume21, Issue2April 2005Pages 171-175 RelatedInformation

The Growth of International Law between Globalization and the Great Power

International Law is not only growing fast, but is virtually exploding: between 1864 and 1919, an estimated 257 multilateral treaties were concluded, and from 1919 to 1971, 1090 entered into force. In August 2003, a total of 40,000 treaties (among them 2799 multilateral ones), were registered with the UN. The question of this agora, is, however, not only whether international law is changing in quantity, but whether the international legal system is changing “in nature”. The principal reason for such a change might be the termination of the bipolar world order with its balance of power between two rivaling Great Powers and the increasing contempt of international law by the remaining single Superpower, the United States. Although the international legal system has always been shaped and dominated by Great Powers, America’s current global supremacy constitutes, as US Foreign Policy Advisor Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out, a “hegemony of a new type”. Hegemony means, since Greek antiquity, the political phenomenon of leadership or predominance, which may or may not be legally to some extent

Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda

This article examines strategic framing efforts within the president’s inner circle of foreign policy advisors. The comparative case study method is used to describe and explain the framing process involved in President Jimmy Carter’s arms control decisions with respect to the Soviet Union. Carter’s two central foreign policy advisors, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, portrayed the Soviets in very different terms. The premise underlying this study is that advisors attempt to frame their policy preferences favorably in order to influence the group process and the president’s policy choice. Advisors do so by playing up the positive aspects of an option and downplaying any negative aspects. Three components of the framing process are explored: historical/cultural symbolism, personal beliefs and values, and political cost assessments.

AGGRESSIVE FOREIGN POLICY MARKETING Public Response to Reagan's 1983 Address on Lebanon and Grenada

Building public support for the use of force has become a primary preoccupation for presidents in the post-Vietnam era. Rather than let popular opposition to military actions fester, they pay special attention to public opinion and they attempt to orchestrate these actions in a way that enhances mass support. These strategies and tactics are often aggressive in nature, involving prime-time television appearances, high-profile speaking tours, and a concerted effort by the president's foreign policy advisors to echo the messages delivered by the commander-in-chief. The effect of these actions has been the subject of past research. Unlike other studies of the effects of presidential speeches (Ragsdale, 1984, 1987; Brace and Hinckley, 1992), this one focuses on changes in substantive policy opinion, as opposed to changes in presidential approval. A before/after survey design that incorporates a control group that was not exposed to Ronald Reagan's October 27, 1983 speech on the use of U.S. troops in Lebanon and Grenada reveals that public support for each of these policies increased following the speech. It also reveals that support increased more for Grenada than for Lebanon. The result is consistent with findings by Jentleson (1992) that support is more likely to follow the use of troops to repel a state's violation of another's sovereignty than the use of troops to resolve a political conflict internal to a single sovereign state.

The United States and Asia in 1993: Year of Asia and the Pacific

The Clinton administration surprised many during 1993 with its bold assertion of the primacy of Asia in U.S. foreign policy and high profile efforts to generate regional support for U.S. concepts of market opening, trade expansion, and democratic reform under the rubric of a New Community. Some hyperbole notwithstanding, 1993 shaped up as the Year of Asia and the Pacific for American foreign policy, along with a seeming diminishment of U.S. attention to Europe. Neither Asians nor Europeans took the American shift at face value, but imputed global economic and domestic political motives both to the emphasis on Asia and the Pacific, and the parallel strengthening of ties to the Western Hemisphere via the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Starting with Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the administration's top level appointments had provided few indications that Asia would get high priority attention, although a number of foreign policy advisors with global responsibilities such as National Security Advisor Anthony Lake had substantially built their careers on Asian issues. Clinton's choice of Winston Lord as assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the touched off a media debate over whether China experts would dominate in policymaking councils to the neglect of Japan. For the most part, Asian countries viewed the formation of the new administration with considerable anxiety, anticipating increased confrontation over trade and human rights issues and a reduced American political and security interest in the region. The actual result has proved to be considerably more complex.

Humanitarianism versus Restrictionism: The United States and the Hungarian Refugees

The waning days of October 1956 marked start of what President Dwight David Eisenhower referred to his memoirs as the most crowded and demanding three weeks of my entire Presidency. The presidential election was entering its final most hectic stage a severe drought was menacing agriculture Southwest Suez War was raging and threatening to cut off vital oil supplies to Western Europe and President’s chief foreign policy advisor Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been taken to Walter Reed Army Hospital to undergo a serious emergency operation for cancer of intestine. Finally to further compound this domestic uncertainty and foreign turmoil American policymakers were confronted with Russian suppression of a revolution which had erupted Soviet Eastern European satellite of Hungary. Despite some hawkish saber-rattling American press and Congress United States says Eisenhower could do nothing to aid rebels because of danger of a war with Soviet Union. However President felt that it was imperative for United States to help in every way possible those refugees fleeing from the criminal action of Soviets. (excerpt)