The International Realm, Framing Effects, and Security Strategies: Britain in Peace and War

Abstract

In combining the domestic and international levels, I contend that the international environment can enable a domestic win-set and thereby guide the formation of a state's international security strategy. The trigger is the nature of and changes in the extant international setting. Based on findings from framing effects and prospect theory, I contend that periods of external crisis, conflict, and war will shift the public's domain to one of relative losses. In this realm, it will be easier for foreign policy advisors who favor offensive security strategies to frame the national debate. Periods of international peace, tranquility, and prosperity will shift the public's domain to relative gains, which will make it easier for advisors who favor risk averse and defensive strategies to frame the national discussion. The outcome can be a more offensive or defensive strategy than the state would have otherwise pursued. I apply the model to Britain to examine Britain's decision to adopt a Limited Liability strategy between 1912 and 1914, and to escalate to a Continental Commitment by 1916. A version of this paper was presented at the 2003 Annual International Studies Association Convention. I would like to thank Jane Cramer, Tom Rice, and Jeffrey Taliaferro for their helpful comments and suggestions.