Foreign Intelligence Research Articles

Lithuanian Intelligence Services’ Strategic Communication: 2012–2022 National Threat Assessments, Activity Reports and Recruitment Videos

This study examines the communication of the State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and the Second Investigation Department under the Ministry of National Defence in 2012–2022. It identifies the aspects relevant to the strategic communication of the intelligence services, analyses specifics of the texts and tendencies in national threat assessments and activity reports, and examines how these institutions present themselves. The study applies the theory of securitisation and critical discourse analysis. It includes other research related to the topic, practices of foreign intelligence services in publishing annual reports and using the YouTube social media platform, media publications and other sources. The study concludes that strategic communication for intelligence agencies is essential for the long-term success of their operations. By focusing on strategic objectives, they inform and educate the public about themselves and national security and develop a cooperative relationship, contributing to deterrence. Both institutions examined in this study are becoming not only formally more open to the public, but also aim to build and maintain a high institutional reputation, connect with their audience and create an image of professionalism, modern accountability and openness to the public.

Проект Стратегии противодействия экстремизму в Российской Федерации – политический анализ новых подходов в спектре современных угроз

The article delves into the analysis of the document titled “Strategy for Counteracting Extremism in the Russian Federation”, proposed for adoption by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, with a focus on its alignment with current challenges and threats in the sphere of national security. The author concludes that the project successfully develops and complements the provisions of the existing Strategy for Counteracting Extremism in the Russian Federation until 2025, incorporating new threats arising from the exacerbated geopolitical situation. These threats include the intensified activities of foreign intelligence and sabotage services aimed at recruiting underage Russian citizens, the introduction of non-traditional forms of Islam unfamiliar to the indigenous peoples of Russia and their subsequent radicalization, and the covert use of sports organizations for the preparation of extremists. However, the author observes that certain provisions and formulations within the project require clarification. Specific terms such as xenophobia, Russophobia, and the correlation between extremist and terrorist activities need to be defined with greater precision. The author also highlights potential issues that may arise from the use of quantitative indicators for measuring the success of the Strategy’s implementation. In conducting this research, the author employed various methods including a systematic approach, multifactor analysis, the principle of historicism, and logical and semantic analysis of documents. These methodological frameworks facilitated a comprehensive examination of the proposed strategy in light of modern challenges and the evolving landscape of threats to national security.

Total war and Ottoman military intelligence, 1914-1918: an inquiry into its expanding tasks through intelligence reports

ABSTRACT Domestic politics and the conditions of the Total War led the Ottoman ruling elite to expand the workload of the Intelligence Section of the Ottoman General Staff during the First World War. Originally established as a military intelligence organization, the Second Branch dealt with foreign intelligence, but became increasingly involved in domestic security, propaganda, and censorship during 1914–18. This article examines the variety of tasks of the Second Branch. It introduces the practice of reporting and disseminating intelligence within and beyond the Ottoman armed forces. By doing so, the article aims to explain organizational change in military intelligence under wartime conditions.

In the Service of the Eastern Bloc: Czechoslovak Intelligence and the Cyprus Conflict 1974–1989

ABSTRACT Even after the division of the island in 1974, the ‘Cyprus Issue’ remained a significant determinant in the relations between Greece and Turkey. In the context of the ongoing Cold War, the Eastern Bloc sought to exploit this situation, aiming to undermine the cohesion of NATO’s southeastern wing. The primary objective of this study is to assess how one of the socialist states, Czechoslovakia, attempted to influence the Cyprus conflict between 1974 and 1989 through its foreign intelligence services. The study illustrates this through the example of the Czechoslovak residency in Nicosia, showcasing Czechoslovakia’s intelligence methods in recruiting foreign collaborators, acquiring information, and conducting intelligence operations in one of the world’s most geopolitically exposed regions.

“Raiders of the past”: Bulgarian state Security’s cultural historical intelligence in service of Regime’s quest for “socialist patriotism”

ABSTRACT The essential purpose of this article is to revisit the functions and role of the Bulgarian State Security’s Department XIV, also known as the Cultural Historical Intelligence Department (CHI or Kulturno istorichesko razuznavane). This analysis examines how the department served as a policy support tool for the regime’s pursuit of legitimacy in the late 1970s. It also explores how the department supported cultural nationalism while combatting ‘ideological subversion.’ This overview aims to add to a more nuanced understanding of the foreign intelligence apparatuses’ roles and functions in the former Eastern Bloc totalitarian states in the shadow of their Soviet counterpart. In this case, nuances are sought to improve understanding of Todor Zhivkov’s totalitarian regime’s inception and instrumentalization of CHI in the quest for internal and external credibility and prestige while attempting to trace a path to a unique form of national communism.

The Triumph of HUMINT: The GDR Foreign Intelligence Services’ Collection of Defense Intelligence, 1951–1989

During the Cold War, the German Democratic Republic (GDR)’s foreign intelligence agencies collected much defense intelligence from human sources in West Germany. By the mid-1960s, the two services had created agent networks in their principal targets in West Germany’s government, armed forces, industry and universities. For the next 25 years, these agent networks supplied a wealth of varied and valuable military intelligence and scientific and technological intelligence. At their heart was a small number of outstanding human sources. The GDR’s intelligence agencies significantly strengthened the Soviet Bloc’s intelligence collection. The intelligence they obtained was more valuable to the Warsaw Pact than the GDR’s armed forces and would have been of great benefit to the Pact if war had broken out. Their success ran counter to the trend of military intelligence collection at that time, which was to rely increasingly heavily on technical collection.

The Narrative Power of Russian Foreign Intelligence

This study examines the narratives created and exploited by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in its official history. It views the official history as part of a broader campaign to influence domestic and foreign perceptions of the SVR, starting in the 1990s. The narratives are examined in terms of narrative power; namely, the ability to cause intended effects by creating a certain understanding of events. The study finds that the SVR substantiates a “derzhavniki master narrative” in which Russia is a great power that must continuously balance the power of other states and prevent these states from achieving relative gains. The SVR’s narratives integrate the history of foreign intelligence into the history of Russia. This integration has narrative power because a strong foreign intelligence service is both natural and legitimate in the derzhavniki narrative. The study moreover finds that the SVR deals with the KGB’s history of repression by portraying itself as a victim.

Comrade Kryuchkov’s “War Scare” (1983), or the Bureaucratic Origins of the “Able Archer” War-Scare Thesis

Many historians argue that the world came to the brink of nuclear war during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Able Archer nuclear-release exercise in November 1983. This war-scare thesis originated with Soviet defector Oleg Gordievsky, who made this assertion based on several telegrams that he had seen at the State Committee for Security (KGB) residency in London in 1983. The article contextualizes and analyzes the telegrams based on the statements of leading officers of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate (FCD), responsible for foreign intelligence, to their Soviet-bloc colleagues in the years 1981 to 1983. Based on this analysis, the telegrams that Gordievsky cited had not “created a vicious spiral which was steadily and dangerously raising tension in Moscow,” as he later asserted. Instead, they reflected the bureaucratic strivings of the head of the FCD, Vladimir Kryuchkov, to finally develop an early-warning system against Western military attack, which he had narrowed down to potential nuclear-missile attack (Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie).

Дани Червения, или как със 142 души се събаря Петата република

The present study draws on a wealth of documentary material on the activities of the French security services such as the Paris Prefecture, intelligence and counter-intelligence, the police and special anti-riot units, as foreign intelligence services such as the CIA, much of which was recently declassified well ahead of the usual term for such sensitive documents. It also includes in-depth interviews, conducted by the author with Bulgarian intelligence officers. This source base makes it possible to analyze in the historical context of the landmark events of May 1968, and the role and activities of Daniel Kohn-Bendit, leader of the March 22 Movement. It becomes possible to present day by day and hour by hour every step of this leader who grows up to be the leader of a nationally representative movement such as the National union of the French students. In addition, his connections with foreign intelligence agencies can be traced. The purpose of the study is to reject the elaborately layered notions and mythologies that Danny the Red was able to “pull the rug” from under de Gaulle’s feet and to destroy his Fifth Republic with only 142 men. Despite his undisputable charisma and qualities as a leader and orator, the cult of which constantly strengthens, this was not possible even for a moment

The subject of criminal trespass in forensic characteristics of obstructing the lawful activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations

The article states that Russia's military aggression against our country created, among other things, the need to make changes to domestic legislation in order to criminalize certain activities of people. In particular, by supplementing the Criminal Code of Ukraine with Article 114-1 "Obstructing the lawful activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations.” And with the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the territory of Ukraine, unfortunately, the number of the specified criminal offenses only increased: 7 criminal offenses in 2021, 76 in 2022, 159 in 2023.
 It has been established that the subject of a criminal offense in the studied category of criminal offenses will be the lawful activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations in a special period.
 It has been investigated that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are a military formation that, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, is entrusted with the defense of Ukraine, the protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability. And other military formations include the State Border Service of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Special Service of Transport, the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, as well as the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine
 It was concluded that the subject of criminal trespass is a criminal offense provided for in Art. 114-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is the legal activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service, the State Service for Special Communication and Information Protection of Ukraine and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine. The obstruction itself may consist of a certain intervention aimed at complicating the successful performance of the tasks of the Armed Forces and other military formations within the framework of their legitimate activities. Such obstacles can arise both in the form of actions that pose a threat to society, and in the form of inaction. In the first case, obstruction can be manifested in active measures aimed at creating physical barriers (for example, damage to vehicles) and/ or informational barriers (for example, spreading disinformation). In the second case, it may arise due to non-fulfillment or improper fulfillment of legal obligations (for example, sabotage), which as a result leads to the corresponding obstruction.

Types of military formations as part of a criminal offense under art. 114-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine

In the context of constantly changing geopolitical realities and expanding terrorist threats, the problem of military formations in the context of a criminal offense is becoming more relevant than ever. This article will examine the current state of this problem, determine its relevance and suggest possible ways to protect against this type of threat. The purpose of the work is to define the types of “military formation” and to establish their typical features. The methodological basis of the study is a combination of theoretical and practical approaches, within which general scientific and special legal methods are applied. The author analyzes the concept of “military formation” and identifies its types at the regulatory, legal and theoretical and legal levels. The article focuses on the issues related to the types of military formations and their inherent features, and their place in the criminal offense under Article 114-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The author concludes that legislative regulation of military formations in the area of criminal offenses requires immediate attention and effective measures. This issue is global, and therefore international cooperation and development of special forces are key factors for protection against crime. Our research allows us to distinguish the types of military formations: The Armed Forces of Ukraine and their structural subdivisions, characterized by the presence of all mandatory features of such formations as military; the National Guard of Ukraine and the Foreign Intelligence Service; military formations of the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service; other military formations, which include the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, the State Protection Department of Ukraine, etc.

A partner, not a combatant: the U.S. Congress, intelligence reform, and civil liberties after Vietnam

ABSTRACT In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, scholars and commentators concerned about civil liberties looked back to the 1970s with an air of nostalgia. Back then, they argued, Congress exposed and constrained executive abuses of civil liberties, most notably through the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the ‘Church Committee’) and the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); whereas, since 9/11, Congress has largely accepted a variety of constitutionally dubious activities as part of the ‘War on Terror.’ This article argues that these accounts get the history wrong. Drawing on the Church Committee’s hearings and reports, internal executive branch communications, and the legislative history of FISA, it makes three core claims. First, the Church Committee was more valuable as a source of historical documentation rather than real-time exposure. Second, executive officials took crucial steps towards intelligence reform before the Church Committee was established. Third, the two legislative fruits of the Church Committee – FISA and the creation of permanent intelligence committees in Congress – were forged in a cooperative, rather than adversarial interbranch environment. Thus, the post-Vietnam Congress is best described as a partner, rather than a combatant, in the process of intelligence reform.

The Sino-Indian war and the evolution of wireless monitoring capabilities in the Indian Intelligence Bureau (1959–1968)

ABSTRACT This article is the first academic work exploring the evolution of wireless monitoring capabilities (COMINT) in India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) between 1959 and 1968. Until 1968, the IB was India’s foreign intelligence agency and experienced its biggest failure in providing estimates for the 1962 Sino-Indian war. B.N. Mullik, the then IB chief, argued that the availability of foreign exchange was directly responsible for determining the COMINT capabilities prior to, and after the war. Consulting recently declassified governmental documents, this article contests this claim and highlights that bureaucratic politics played an impactful role. It reveals that pre-war weaknesses were a result of bureaucratic lethargy among some individuals and factionalism within the IB. In the post-war period, even though foreign exchange became available, bureaucratic battles continued and compelled the IB to explore domestic and in-house alternatives to imports. Therefore, the article offers fresh insights into the history of India’s intelligence by exploring a hitherto unexplored domain.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND FIRST LINES OF DEFENSE IN AN AGE OF HYBRID WARFARE

On November 16, 2023, Prof. Philip Davies presented Counterintelligence and First Lines of Defense in an Age of Hybrid Warfare for this year’s West Coast Security Conference. The key points discussed were the relationship between Full Spectrum Conflict/Hybrid Warfare (FSC/HW) activities and counterintelligence (CI), especially with reference to the role of Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) in delivering sub-threshold/grey zone operations, inconsistencies in current NATO counterintelligence thinking and professional practice, and the consequent difficulty adapting that CI theory and practice to meeting the CI aspects of the FSC/HW threat.
 
 Received: 01-05-2024
 Revised: 01-30-2024

The Establishment of the Directorate Military Intelligence upon South Africa’s Exit from the Commonwealth 1961–1971: In Pursuit of Recognition

After South Africa had left the Commonwealth in 1961, the South African Defence Force had to develop its own intelligence capacity, as the British intelligence services ceased intelligence provision to South Africa. The Defence Force had limited experience in the field of intelligence as far as personnel, training and structures were concerned. It had no mandate, an insubordinate position in the higher military hierarchy, and no national legislation or departmental prescripts existed to direct its functions. Certain of its functions continuously migrated to other structures in the Defence Force, which hampered its development. Towards the end of the decade, the organisation was temporarily disbanded, and its functions taken over by a newly created Bureau of State Security. Despite these limitations, the Directorate Military Intelligence evolved into a comprehensive autonomous intelligence organisation over a period of ten years, directed by national legislation, and legitimised as one of the three principal intelligence organisations in South Africa. It performed the main intelligence functions as is globally accepted from the role of an intelligence organisation, viz. collection, analyses, counter-intelligence, and covert action. This article will provide a narrative, based mainly on primary archival sources, of the evolution of Directorate Military Intelligence between 1961 and 1971 despite the developmental challenges it faced. Keywords: Intelligence, Covert Collection, Foreign Intelligence Services, Analysis, BOSS, Psychological Operations, National Legislation

How intelligence tales are made real: Le Bureau des légendes as a cover story for the French DGSE

ABSTRACTThe French spy series Le Bureau des légendes (2015–2020) has been acclaimed for its allegedly realistic depiction of French foreign intelligence. Drawing on the concept of ‘legend’, this article adapts actor-network theory to understand how Le Bureau was able to make a significant impact on public discussions of secret intelligence in France. The article shows how the series was constituted as a ‘virtually true’ cover story for the Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE), which supported the series’ production, and how this story impacted the DGSE itself.

Agnes M. Driscoll: documents on FBI suspicions of the cryptographic and feminist icon

ABSTRACT Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) records drawing on the interrogation of the German spy Ignatz T. Griebl indicate that Agnes M. Driscoll, the cryptographic and feminist icon buried at Arlington National Cemetery, sold a US Navy code machine to the Nazi foreign intelligence service in 1937. The Bureau started an investigation but dropped it prior to the Nazi spy trial that took place in New York in 1938. Since the Germans declared it was their intention of pass the code machine secrets to Japan, this may have had significant repercussions. The reasons why the FBI abandoned its investigation remain unclear. There may have been, in Navy circles, some compassion for Driscoll, as she had been seriously injured in an automobile accident in the autumn of 1937. A cover-up may also have occurred in order to protect the reputation of America’s cryptographers, or to hide the fact that US intelligence ran a deception operation via Driscoll. There is no available explanation of why Driscoll was allowed to continue her career into the era of the National Security Agency. Two FBI documents are appended to the article.

The Phantom Eye: New Zealand and the Five Eyes

ABSTRACT New Zealand’s involvement in the Five Eyes is under-reported in academic and general literature. New Zealand’s participation was initially due to its integration within World War II western alliance intelligence systems, which evolved further after the war ended. Once in, New Zealand’s role became something of a self-fulfilling prophecy, but genuine nonetheless. Changes in communications technology, access to US technical capability, and geopolitical changes in the Pacific have all led to a viable New Zealand role in Five Eyes, as both contributor and beneficiary. But to retain this, New Zealand must increase its foreign intelligence capability in the future.

Agroterrorism involving biological agents and related threats in Poland and Europe in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine

With the growing threat of agroterrorism and the highest level of risk in Poland and the European region since the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977) came into force, it is important to analyse the challenges in the area of biosecurity and food security and make recommendations. The analysis carried out by the author of this article indicates that the COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to the dissemination of knowledge of the basics of microbiology and epidemiology and to the increased availability of low-cost, portable microbiological diagnostics, which may also have negative effects. The analysis took into account the possibility of foreign intelligence influencing food production in Poland, e.g. through disinformation via social media. Conclusions of the analysis include: expanding monitoring of the expert community and social media, strengthening the vigilance of food producers and agricultural experts, simulating introduction scenarios, studying radicalisation processes and using epidemiological assessment tools in case of alarming events.

The “Blurriness” of Boundaries between Activity Spheres of Intelligence Agencies as an Amplifier of Power in Russia

This article examines the foreign intelligence activities of three Russian spy agencies. Using open sources, it studies the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Fifth Service of the Federal Security Service. It considers to what extent their respective roles are clearly delineated in legal terms and concludes that these roles overlap to a considerable degree. The “blurriness” of Russian intelligence is an indicator of bureaucratic concentration and amplification of power.