Foreign Intelligence Agencies Research Articles

The Triumph of HUMINT: The GDR Foreign Intelligence Services’ Collection of Defense Intelligence, 1951–1989

During the Cold War, the German Democratic Republic (GDR)’s foreign intelligence agencies collected much defense intelligence from human sources in West Germany. By the mid-1960s, the two services had created agent networks in their principal targets in West Germany’s government, armed forces, industry and universities. For the next 25 years, these agent networks supplied a wealth of varied and valuable military intelligence and scientific and technological intelligence. At their heart was a small number of outstanding human sources. The GDR’s intelligence agencies significantly strengthened the Soviet Bloc’s intelligence collection. The intelligence they obtained was more valuable to the Warsaw Pact than the GDR’s armed forces and would have been of great benefit to the Pact if war had broken out. Their success ran counter to the trend of military intelligence collection at that time, which was to rely increasingly heavily on technical collection.

Дани Червения, или как със 142 души се събаря Петата република

The present study draws on a wealth of documentary material on the activities of the French security services such as the Paris Prefecture, intelligence and counter-intelligence, the police and special anti-riot units, as foreign intelligence services such as the CIA, much of which was recently declassified well ahead of the usual term for such sensitive documents. It also includes in-depth interviews, conducted by the author with Bulgarian intelligence officers. This source base makes it possible to analyze in the historical context of the landmark events of May 1968, and the role and activities of Daniel Kohn-Bendit, leader of the March 22 Movement. It becomes possible to present day by day and hour by hour every step of this leader who grows up to be the leader of a nationally representative movement such as the National union of the French students. In addition, his connections with foreign intelligence agencies can be traced. The purpose of the study is to reject the elaborately layered notions and mythologies that Danny the Red was able to “pull the rug” from under de Gaulle’s feet and to destroy his Fifth Republic with only 142 men. Despite his undisputable charisma and qualities as a leader and orator, the cult of which constantly strengthens, this was not possible even for a moment

The Sino-Indian war and the evolution of wireless monitoring capabilities in the Indian Intelligence Bureau (1959–1968)

ABSTRACT This article is the first academic work exploring the evolution of wireless monitoring capabilities (COMINT) in India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) between 1959 and 1968. Until 1968, the IB was India’s foreign intelligence agency and experienced its biggest failure in providing estimates for the 1962 Sino-Indian war. B.N. Mullik, the then IB chief, argued that the availability of foreign exchange was directly responsible for determining the COMINT capabilities prior to, and after the war. Consulting recently declassified governmental documents, this article contests this claim and highlights that bureaucratic politics played an impactful role. It reveals that pre-war weaknesses were a result of bureaucratic lethargy among some individuals and factionalism within the IB. In the post-war period, even though foreign exchange became available, bureaucratic battles continued and compelled the IB to explore domestic and in-house alternatives to imports. Therefore, the article offers fresh insights into the history of India’s intelligence by exploring a hitherto unexplored domain.

Restarting Track II Diplomacy in Intractable Conflicts: How Psychoanalytic Concepts May Be Relevant.

Since the 1980s, psychiatrists, psychologists, and diplomats have proposed psychoanalytic theories to inform peacemaking in international relations through Track II negotiations, defined as unofficial meetings among influential stakeholders with access to government policymakers. These contributions have focused on initiating or maintaining Track II negotiations (Aggarwal et al., 2023). In this article, we apply psychoanalytic concepts to the problem of restarting negotiations that have previously failed. This study introduces theories based on a dialogue that a cultural psychiatrist trained in South Asian Studies moderated with the past directors of India's and Pakistan's foreign intelligence agencies to consider how both countries could recommence negotiations. The two former directors have participated together in five Track II initiatives between India and Pakistan. All three authors reviewed best practices for addressing impediments to Track II negotiations and how Track II negotiations may be reinstituted once stalled. We did this in a far-reaching discussion devoted to the psychology of peacemaking. We introduce the theories of trust as interpersonal authenticity, the normalization of conflicts, the back channel as a process to work through diplomatic resistance, and negotiator selection criteria. Our theories and method present new ways to apply psychoanalytic concepts to diplomacy.

Neprijateljska propaganda, napadi na organe reda i propagandno delovanje stranih obaveštajnih službi u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji 1953–1973.

The article analyzes the enemy propaganda and the violation of public order and peace, as well as the secret services’ propaganda activities as a form of resistance and subversion towards the regime in Serbia and Yugoslavia by the early 1970s. With illegal forms of active resistance eradicated until the beginning of the 1950s, dissatisfaction mostly manifested itself through an increased number of enemy propaganda acts and the attacks on law and order authorities. Unlike those from the time immediately after the war, the culprits of these deeds were to be found predominantly among the young people who grew up after the war, and who mostly originated from communist families. The phenomena to blame for “corrupting Yugoslav youth” were to a significant extent the activities of “foreign intelligence agencies”, as well as the activities of Yugoslav political emigration.

Intelligence Analysis and Policy Making: The Canadian Experience by Thomas Juneau and Stephanie Carvin

Thomas Juneau and Stephanie Carvin have produced an excellent and unique contribution to the intelligence studies field. Compared with research books on aspects of the U.S. intelligence community and perhaps to some extent Australia's intelligence community, works on Canada are still rare, and empirical studies such as this even rarer. The central theme is the role of intelligence analysis in policy-making within Canada from a contemporary institutional rather than “how to” perspective. The methodological approach draws on sixty-eight interviews with intelligence and policy-maker staff at all levels both current and former, which, along with the detailed analysis of secondary sources, provides an impressive foundation to explore how intelligence analysis has been used—or as they authors argue not used sufficiently by policy-makers in Ottawa. The semistructured interview approach used here is one I have used several times in my own research on intelligence governance and organizational reform across the “Five Eyes” intelligence communities over the last decade (see for example, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis). Armed with a coherent methodological approach, the book thematically explores via five chapters the many structural/cultural barriers and even what they describe as sudden threats (or “electro-shock”) events that sometimes have resulted in improved connection between Canada's intelligence enterprise and the policy-makers it serves. All five chapters provide a coherent analysis of relevant themes, though I think chapter five (“Recommendations and the Way Ahead)” is the richest in terms of how these applied researchers offer prescriptions to the many problems of why intelligence analysis and products continue to be unseen as vital to policy deliberations in many parts of the government of Canada. The authors offer several useful recommendations for improving the overall governance and structure under which intelligence analysis occurs within agencies and across the intelligence community. For example, the focus on strengthening the analytical capabilities, leadership, and coordination of the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat (IAS) in a similar vein to what occurred in Australia (2018) when the Office of National Intelligence (ONI) was established could be a critical way forward for helping improve intelligence analysis excellence and influence with policy-makers. But as my own research suggests, the ONI after four years is still a work in progress on a range of the intelligence leadership and coordination functions it has responsibility for. Though as the authors rightly point out, Canadian intelligence reformers need to learn the good and bad lessons from Australia and be mindful of not “australiadizing” Canberra's solutions to Ottawa's problems (176). Other useful though potentially equally costly suggestions for improving intelligence analysis influence in the policy context included the long-debated consideration of Canada creating its own foreign (HUMINT) intelligence agency, and in the interim, CSIS taking up a greater role in foreign intelligence collection. There are also many other good ideas, but as the authors say, intelligence has not been a priority for policy-makers and any reforms have only occurred in “fits and starts” (172). But Canada's immediate and global security environment is now much less benign, and what is likely needed is a comprehensive independent review of the intelligence community—similar to the regular five yearly ones in Australia that take stock of the ever-changing security environment and how holistically meaningful reforms can take place. The authors show us in detail what recommendations in the area of intelligence analysis an independent reviewer would find useful. An excellent and timely contribution.

Editor's Note

Editor's Note

How Psychoanalytic Theory and Track II Diplomacy Can Inform Each Other: A Dialogue with the Former Heads of India and Pakistan's Foreign Intelligence Agencies.

Starting with Sigmund Freud, psychoanalysts have considered the psychological dimensions of peacemaking in international relations. In the 1980s, psychiatrists, psychologists, and diplomats began developing theories on Track II negotiations, defined as unofficial meetings among influential stakeholders with access to government policymakers. In recent years, psychoanalytic theory building has waned with the decline of interdisciplinary collaborations among mental health professionals and practitioners of international relations. This study seeks to revive such collaborations by analyzing the reflections of an ongoing dialogue between a cultural psychiatrist trained in South Asian studies, the former head of India's foreign intelligence agency, and the former head of Pakistan's foreign intelligence agency on applications of psychoanalytic theory to Track II initiatives. Both former heads have participated in Track II initiatives to build peace between India and Pakistan and agreed to react on the record to a systematic review of psychoanalytic theories on Track II. This article describes how our dialogue can offer new directions for theory building and the practical conduct of negotiations.

The Confrontation between Soviet Intelligence and Japanese Special Agencies on the Eve of the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation (1945)

The article is devoted to the confrontation between Soviet intelligence and Japanese counterintelligence agencies on the eve of the Manchurian Strategic Offensive operation (1945). According to the point of view officially accepted in Russian historical science, the Soviet military, naval and foreign intelligence agencies were able to provide the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army with reliable information about the state of the Japanese grouping of troops in Manchuria and Korea. This became one of the factors of the rapid defeat of the Kwantung army during the Manchurian strategic offensive operation in August 1945. However, the documents put into circulation indicate that, despite the efforts made by the Soviet command to collect intelligence information about the enemy, it had a distorted idea of the combat composition, deployment, number and operational plans of the Japanese troops. The reason for this was the strict counterintelligence and administrative-police regime that Japan established on the territory of Manchuria and Korea that it captured. By the beginning of 1945 there was a passport system, a special regime for staying in the border zone, and military and agent protection of the Soviet-Manchurian border was organized. The diplomatic institutions of the USSR were under close surveillance by Japanese counterintelligence, measures were taken to identify unreliable elements among Russian white emigrants, as a result of punitive operations, the anti-Japanese partisan movement was practically destroyed by 1941. In addition, several well-equipped radio counterintelligence services operated on the territory of Manchuria, which, in cooperation, identified Soviet radio-equipped intelligence groups and, after the arrest of radio operators, conducted radio games.

THE EFFECT OF MILITANCY ON EDUCATION AND ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCIES

Background: The study was conducted in 2017 to know about the effects of militancy on education in the form of dropout from schools, destroyed infrastructure of educational institutions, decrease in literacy rate and to probe out the community perception about education in the context of adverse law and order situation in district Mohmand Agency. The study was significant because Mohmand Agency is the worst terrorist affected area.
 Objectives: The objectives of the study were examining the factors causing militancy, and to determine the effects of militancy on education in Mohmand Agency.
 Methodology: For this purpose, 250 sample respondents out of the total population from four selected villages viz Gurbaz, Masood, Sultan Khel and Baro Khel from tehsil Safi and Halimzai were selected. The respondents were randomly interviewed through an interview schedule. Chi-square test was used as statistical instrument to determine the association between education and different factors that cause terrorism.
 Results: It was found that majority of the respondents were agreed that unemployment, poverty, drone attacks, unidentified Pak-Afghan border were the main factors that caused militancy in the area and had greatly affected the primary and secondary education in the area. Respondents were of the view that brutal activities against Muslims across the globe and presence of NATO forces in the region increased terrorism. Involvement of foreign intelligence agencies in our county and weak national security network to handle terrorist activities properly were the main causes of terrorism. Parents remain worried about their children’s education due to security threats and insufficient schools remaining in the area.
 Conclusion: It was concluded that due to insecurity, lack of infrastructure and insufficient schools; education in the area under study was greatly affected. The study suggested that bringing of peace and reasonable security measures against militants can rebuild the educational environment in the study area.

Formation of the counter intelligence strategy of Ukraine: national and legal dimension

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to develop the Counterintelligence Strategy as a conceptual document in the field of state security of Ukraine, identifying current security threats to Ukraine, which global landscape has been significantly transformed since the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Counterintelligence”, is substantiated. It is proved that the provisions of such Strategy should determine the current and projected counterintelligence environment via a set of the following elements. The nature of real and potential threats in the process of implementing state foreign and domestic policy course determined by Ukraine. Sources of such threats (individual states and their intelligence agencies, terrorist organizations, transnational organized crime, etc.). Features of the identified encroachment objects of foreign intelligence agencies, terrorist and other criminal organizations, including transnational ones. Long time strategy treats like COVID-19 pandemic.Design/methodology/approachDuring the past decades of the XXI century, intelligence has become a crucial tool in the system of determining and implementing the foreign policy in international relations. Modern realities confirm that this political and legal phenomenon directly affects the formation of the foreign policy course of any state, the development of its geopolitical strategy and defense doctrine. Possessing a powerful apparatus for obtaining primary information, fulfillment of government orders for monitoring, evaluation, analysis, forecasting and modeling of possible scenarios of global- or regional-scale events and processes, special services take an active part in perspective and current foreign and domestic policy implementation.FindingsThus, based on the state security paradigm, which cannot be defined in the absence of threats and ensured by their complete elimination, since negative factors for state security objects will always exist, the ensuring of its development requires first of all creation of the conditions under which threats will not be able to limit its development. That is why it is necessary not only to minimize the impact of such factors on vulnerable objects, but also to create a certain “immunity” to their impact, i.e. the ability of the state security system to function effectively in spite of the negative impact. Thus, maintaining the ability to function in terms of the existing threats is the most important area of practical activity for the state security protection, as well as ensuring the legitimate interests of the state.Originality/valueDuring the paper decades of the XXI century, intelligence has become a crucial tool in the system of determining and implementing the foreign policy in international relations. Modern realities confirm that this political and legal phenomenon directly affects the formation of the foreign policy course of any state, the development of its geopolitical strategy and defense doctrine. Possessing a powerful apparatus for obtaining primary information, fulfillment of government orders for monitoring, evaluation, analysis, forecasting and modeling of possible scenarios of global- or regional-scale events and processes, special services take an active part in perspective and current foreign and domestic policy implementation.

Asgari egemenlik azami istihbarat: Soğuk savaşta Federal Almanya Cumhuriyeti dış istihbarat servisi’nin (BND) Ortadoğu’daki faaliyetleri

Soğuk Savaş sırasında, bölünmüş Almanya; iki blok gücü arasında önemli bir ön cephe haline gelmiş, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası egemenliğini kısıtlayıcı koşullara rağmen, bu dönemde hem kendi hem de Batılı müttefikleri adına önemli istihbarat faaliyetlerini gerçekleştirmiştir. Almanya’nın istihbaratının faaliyetleri, sadece Berlin Duvarının arkası ile sınırlı kalmamış, dünyada aralarında Ortadoğu’nun da yer aldığı geniş bir coğrafyaya yayılmıştır. Soğuk Savaş döneminde Doğu-Batı çatışmasında önemli bir mücadele alanı haline gelen Ortadoğu bölgesinde artan istihbarat faaliyetlerine Alman Dış İstihbarat Servisi BND de etkin bir şekilde katılmıştır. Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş döneminde egemenliği ve dış politikası üzerinde ciddi kısıtlamalar olan Almanya’nın aksine; BND’nin Ortadoğu’da etkin ve önemli bir rol oynadığını savunmaktadır.

COVID‐19 and Global Governance

Abstract The COVID-19 epidemic has sent economic and social shockwaves reverberating across the globe, and has shaken governance institutions at every level and across a range of issues, from trade to health and climate change An important question is whether COVID will accelerate, slow, or perhaps reverse some key trends in global governance Most prominently, the global and multilateral governance regimes that developed post-World War II were already weakening and fragmenting before COVID (Acharya, 2016) In a closely related phenomenon, cosmopolitan liberalism, as a set of institutions and ideologies committed to a democratic open society, human rights, and multiculturalism, has also retreated in the face of rising populism and authoritarianism in recent years (Norris and Inglehart, 2019) COVID could also affect a third important trend, the decline of state regulation and the rise of private, voluntary, and disclosure-based governance (Levy, Brown, and de Jong, 2010) The impact of COVID on these trends suggests some fruitful new directions for scholars of global governance and organizations

Cases and Countermeasure of Indiscriminate TERRORISM

Recently, violence and violent protests such as the political revolution in the Middle East and Africa, anti-social resistance in Europe, and the occupation of Wall Street in the US have been heating up and spreading due to the global economic downturn and the heat of liberalization. Many countries, including the US, UK, and Spain, are experiencing homegrown terrorism, and Korea is also warned of the possibility of homegrown terrorism. In ad-dition, the types of terrorism are changing in various ways due to the rapid development of science and technol-ogy. Biochemical weapons, high-performance bombs, and cyber terrorism, which can kill a large number of lives, are possible, and the development of information and communication technology(ICT) enables close links among terrorist organizations, further strengthening the formation of an international terrorist network. Also, recent terrorism has been indiscriminately perpetrated against an unspecified number of citizens in various ways. In this context, the police s anti-terrorism mission to protect citizens lives and property in the closest place to the people has emerged as an important task. In order for the police to carry out this mission, they must be trained as the first responders at the scene of terrorism, and it is important that they gather information effec-tively and cooperate with various counterterrorism agencies. In addition, efforts are needed to prevent crimes in advance by patrolling areas where foreigners are concen-trated and maintaining proper security. This is because the increase in crime by foreigners could serve as a factor that further destabilizes their status in Korean society. This will be useful not only for the prevention of crime but also for that of terrorism. Furthermore, in order to strengthen the ability to respond to international sex crimes, a joint investigation is essential, including the rapid exchange of information among related agencies and the expansion of information collection. All organizations related to countering international sex crimes, including the police, immigration au-thorities, the National Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Employment and Labor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, foreign diplomatic offices in Korea, and the Small and Medium Business Administration, should es-tablish a close cooperation system to deal with them. As there are cases of fleeing to foreign countries immediately after committing international sex crimes, the government should maintain a system of rapid investigation cooperation with police stations in charge of check-points, airports, and ports to prevent culprits from escaping to foreign countries. As terrorism is a transnational crime that transcends borders, it is essential to exchange information with foreign intelligence and investigation agencies in terms of prevention and response. Finally, it is necessary to establish a social safety net. Securing a safety net to support the lives of the socially disadvantaged and easing inequality through structural reforms are key tasks that Korean society is faced with. Disasters like COVID-19, which has plagued the world, cause more pain for the weak. Disaster is never equal and is harsher for the poor. We need to secure a safety net to support the lives of those at stake and improve ine-quality. Even if the COVID-19 crisis is overcome well, it is likely to deepen the economic polarization and social inequality between the rich and the poor in the future. The distribution of welfare benefits for the vulnerable and the establishment of a new type of governance involving the government, businesses, and labor unions all to cope with the new era are required. This is also a countermeasure against indiscriminate terrorism.

“The Secret Lives of Dennis Phombeah: Decolonization, the Cold War, and African Political Intelligence, 1953–1974”

Processes of decolonization in the context of the Cold War provided enormous opportunities for nationalist figures to parlay insider nationalist knowledge into significant metropolitan influence. This article offers an ‘agent-focused’ rather than ‘agency-focused’ approach to the study of Cold War intelligence competition in Africa’s decolonization through a study of the career of Dennis Phombeah, a Nyasalander by birth and Tanganyikan nationalist figure who came to work for multiple foreign intelligence agencies. While itself a single case study, this article suggest that multiple intelligence agencies placed a high premium on acquiring a basic understanding of the internal politics of newly-independent African countries, which were otherwise rendered deliberately opaque by the states themselves as a common sovereignty-preserving device. Using intelligence records from Britain, Czechoslovakia and Portugal, a picture emerges of cross-rival institutional dependency on informants from the peripheries who were empowered by their years at metropolitan centers, offering a challenging perspective to institutional-focused studies of Cold War intelligence.

Security, scandal and the security commission report, 1981

ABSTRACT This research note introduces the December 1981 report of the Security Commission. This report was never released with the main conclusions forming the basis of a statement by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, published in May 1982. But the 1981 report is significant for a number of reasons. It was the first major review of government security since the Radcliffe Report of 1961, resulting in a number of recommendations that changed government vetting for the rest of the 1980s. The report also recommended the avowal of Britain’s foreign intelligence agency – a recommendation that proved especially controversial.

Законодавство Росії та України у сфері розвідувальної діяльності: порівняльно-правовий аспект

Метою дослідження є розкриття особливостей законодавчого регулювання правових засад організації та діяльності органів зовнішньої розвідки України на основі порівняльного аналізу із законодавчим забезпеченням функціонування розвідувальних органів Російської Федерації.
 Наукова новизна полягає у тому, що вперше на основі юридичної компаративістики проаналізовано правове регулювання організації та діяльності органів зовнішньої розвідки України та РФ. Досліджено чинники, що спонукали законодавців зазначених країн прийняти законодавчі акти у сфері розвідувальної діяльності. Показано відмінності у правових приписах стосовно діяльності розвідок двох держав за цілями, завданнями, сферами застосування методів, сил і засобів. Визначено, які положення законодавства РФ про зовнішню розвідку можна врахувати для удосконалення вітчизняного законодавства.
 Висновки. За результатами дослідження виділено основні позитивні моменти у національному законодавстві, а саме:
 наявність двох фундаментальних законодавчих актів, що регулюють діяльність розвідувальних органів. Це Закони України «Про розвідувальні органи України» та «Про Службу зовнішньої розвідки України». Російський законодавець обмежився прийняттям лише одного Закону «Про зовнішню розвідку», фактично залишивши без правового регулювання за багатьма аспектами діяльність окремого незалежного розвідувального органу, яким є СЗР РФ;
 визначення правовими приписами основних категорій розвідувальної діяльності (розвідувальна діяльність, розвідувальна інформація, розвідувальні органи, спеціальна розвідка), чого немає у російському законодавстві;
 визначення для розвідувальних органів широкого кола завдань, у тому числі з правоохоронною спрямованістю. Натомість у Законі РФ «Про зовнішню розвідку» немає завдань щодо участі розвідки у боротьбі з тероризмом, міжнародною організованою злочинністю, незаконним обігом наркотиків, незаконним обігом зброї та технології її виробництва, нелегальною міграцією тощо;
 надання права на використання методів і засобів оперативно-розшукової діяльності для отримання розвідувальної інформації. Відповідно до російського законодавства оперативно-розшукові заходи здійснюються виключно для забезпечення власної безпеки.
 До основних позитивних моментів російського законодавства можна віднести:
 надання зовнішній розвідці при власному ліцензуванні і сертифікації права на придбання, розроблення (за виключенням криптографічних засобів захисту), створення, експлуатацію інформаційних систем, систем зв’язку та систем передачі даних, а також засобів захисту інформації від витоку по технічних каналах;
 визначення правовим приписом положення про те, що співробітники розвідки не можуть мати подвійного громадянства (підданства) і підлягають обов’язковій державній дактилоскопічній реєстрації;
 наявність правового положення про те, що особа, яка надає конфіденційну допомогу органу зовнішньої розвідки РФ і не є громадянином РФ, може бути прийнята, за її бажанням та клопотанням, до громадянства РФ у порядку, який визначений федеральними законами.
 У законодавстві обох держав, окрім позитивних моментів, також є й спірні законодавчі положення, виявлення і дослідження яких, а також удосконалення у подальшій законотворчій діяльності значно покращить функціонування всієї розвідувальної спільноти в Україні.

Foreign intelligence agencies, international organizations and the media, supported by them as subjects of manipulative influence on young people

The process of social manipulation of modern youth is the object of the study. Foreign intelligence services, international organizations and the media, supported by them as agents of the process of social manipulation of young people is the subject of the research. The relevance of the research topic is due to the fact that in the conditions of the systemic crisis of the basic institutions and institutions of socialization of modern Russian society, there is an urgent need to develop effective mechanisms to counter the manipulative effects of various, not unambiguous subjects of social life. These subjects use young people as an object of manipulation, as well as testing of political, social and psychological technologies and experiments on them. In this context, the systematization of relevant scientific knowledge about the activities of foreign intelligence agencies, international organizations and the media, supported by them as important subjects of social manipulation, is an important task facing modern Russian society and science. The analysis of the activities of these agents of social manipulation confirmed the relevance, novelty and prospects of the development of this problem, as well as the urgent need to limit the influence of these actors on the political life of Russian society, as well as the younger generation of our country.

Aleksandr Minkin: A pioneer of investigative journalism in Soviet Central Asia (1979–1991)

In the 1980s, Aleksandr Minkin was a young Russian journalist at the beginning of a brilliant career as a literary and theater critic. During his tours in Central Asia, he turned to investigative journalism, reporting on the unstable circumstances in Soviet peripheries, painting a picture for the Soviet public of the brutal side of Bolshevik modernization, such as cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan, the exploitation of peasants, the spread of deformities and disease in children due to the abuse of defoliants and pesticides in rural areas, widespread corruption, as well as the general social backwardness of the most remote areas of the USSR. In 1988, the magazine Ogonek published Minkin’s famous piece ‘khlopkorab’ (cotton slave) – denouncing for the first time in the Soviet press the exploitation of child labor in the cotton fields – as well as other articles revealing the use of dangerous Butifos defoliant, and the spread of illness in the republic. These articles caused a sensation and were at the center of a political debate during perestroika that both thrilled Soviet readers and frightened the Communist party. Minkin was viciously attacked by the official press and endured the surveillance of Soviet security authorities, as well as of foreign intelligence agencies. However, the campaign to discredit him could not cover the scandals up entirely, and Minkin became a symbol of free journalism, and a liberal intellectual figure in post–Soviet Russia, raising public awareness of social and environmental issues in Central Asia that had been officially hidden for decades.

Chemical Terrorism as a Coercive Instrument of Foreign Policy of the US and the West

This article considers modern chemical terrorism to be one of the specific and new methods for resolving political contradictions. The acts of chemical terrorism or its threat can be used deliberately as a coercive instrument of foreign policy in the Middle East. Chemical terrorism can be used as an excuse for the open aggression against other nations and for sending regular military forces into the territory of other sovereign states. The article shows that the destabilization of the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic is caused by the financial support of the so-called «moderate opposition», by the imposition of economic sanctions against the state institutions and also by the false accusations of chemical attacks. The article presents certain facts and evidence from different reliable sources, that allow to suggest the possibility of cooperation of foreign intelligence agencies with the armed groups that were committing chemical terrorist acts. The special expert group from the Troops of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence of the Russian Federation has been formed for the confirmation of the alleged acts of chemical terrorism. The article presents the results of the work of this expert group that have been accepted by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)