REVIEWS 591 while most Russians have Left-wing values, the political Left is weak. One factor is the capacity of the regime to co-opt some Leftist tropes, including both Soviet nostalgia and a newer anti-oligarchic image. While the CPRF has become increasingly neo-Stalinist, newer socialist groups show greater dynamism, and March sees particular hope in the increasing integration of these groups with the global Left. For example, ‘A Just Russia’ has joined the Socialist International. This potentially significant party showed independence from the Kremlin in 2011, but after the 2012 crackdown on the opposition all but a handful of its State Duma deputies returned to a more loyal position. Rostislav Turovsky offers an explanation as to why it is in the interests of the systemic opposition to contest elections in the regions, even when they are unfair. Alexander Kynev looks at the impact of the 2012 reforms of the electoral and party systems, showing how even some of the non-systemic opposition parties were able to have some successes in the 2013 regional elections. Interesting studies of specific regions conclude the volume: protests in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, by Valentin Mikhailov; in Tyumen region, by Olesya Lobanova and Andrey Semanov; and by Mikhail Il´chenko on Ekaterinburg, where the 2011 protest movement was able to build on an existing practice of ‘meeting-festivals’, with competitions for the best poster. I recommend this book to anyone interested in civil society, political parties or opposition in contemporary Russia. UCL SSEES Peter J. S. Duncan Gabowitsch, Mischa. Protest in Putin’s Russia. Translated from the German and Russian, revised and edited by the author. Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, MA, 2017. xii + 332 pp. Map. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. £17.99 (paperback). In the winter of 2011/12 Russia was rocked by a series of massive demonstrations which continued into the summer, with some late flare-ups in 2013. Tens of thousands, occasionally close to a hundred thousand, participated in marches and rallies in the larger cities, with smaller manifestations also elsewhere. This was the largest protest movement in Russia since the heady days of perestroika, significantly surpassing the demonstrations against the monetization of social benefits in 2005 — and, in contrast to the 2005 protests, the message of the demonstrators was clearly political this time. The sudden willingness of Russians to express distrust in — even contempt for — their political leaders surprised everyone, not only in the Kremlin, but also outside observers and even the organizers themselves. There is all reason to regard the demonstrations as a watershed event — or a series of events — even though the protesters did SEER, 95, 3, JULY 2017 592 not come close to achieving their main goal, which (for most of them) was to topple the Putin regime. On the contrary, once Putin had been installed in the presidency on 7 May 2012, Medvedev’s prevarication and concessions ended abruptly, and a much harsher political climate set in. If anybody had had any doubts about the police-state quality of Putin’s rule, the liberal mask was now off. Mischa Gabowitsch’s Protest in Putin’s Russia is a meticulous, analytical accountofthesemomentousevents.Gabowitschcombinesabroadertheoretical framework with a close-up empirical perspective in a highly felicitous way. The opening vignette takes us right into the ‘March of Millions’ on the eve of Putin’s inauguration and is written with the insider knowledge and understanding which only skilled participant observation can provide. We can almost hear the chanting of the slogans in our ears and feel the pain of police truncheons falling on people’s heads as we read. Gabowitsch makes a point of taking us into the crowd, without focusing overly on the events on the stage up front where the dissident leaders are holding their speeches. As a sociologist, he wants to adopt a grassroots perspective which he, with good reason, argues has been sorely ignored in many media reports. By mingling and talking with ordinary, ‘nonprofessional’ demonstrators he is able to show that motivations were highly variegated: different groups and individuals were pushing their own agendas, which did not necessarily coincide with the messages broadcast over the loudspeakers and reported home by foreign correspondents. Importantly, Gabowitsch...
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Apr 1, 2018
Ben Herzog 
Open Access