Force In Syria Research Articles

The Use of Force to Prevent Recurrence of Conflict: Where are the Limits of Self-Defense?

The prohibition on the use of force is the central pillar of the international system of peace and security, and yet contemporary conflicts continue to stretch and pressure this foundational rule. This article examines how international law applies to the use of force in the territory of another state for the purpose of preventing a resurgence of violence after a conflict has ended. In the absence of consent or UN Security Council authorization, can self-defense be a justification for a state to use force to prevent the resurgence of conflict? In January 2018, the United States announced an intended policy of maintaining military forces in Syria after the end of the conflict with ISIS, in order to prevent the resurgence of conflict, prevent Syria from being a platform for jihadists, and prevent Iran from extending a sphere of influence in the area. The backdrop to this decision is the well-accepted determination that the United States decision to pull out of Iraq at the end of 2011 created space for ISIS to emerge as a reconstituted version of al Qaeda in Iraq. The strategic and policy decision to maintain a military presence so as to prevent a rebirth or reconstitution of one of the most brutal terrorist groups of recent decades appears straightforward. A more complicated question, however, is how to assess the lawfulness of the use of force in the territory of another country in order to prevent the re-emergence of violence. This article addresses a series of issues that stem from the broader question of whether a state can use force to prevent the recurrence of conflict, including whether the meaning of armed attack remains constant regardless of whether it is assessed in the absence of conflict or immediately following the end of a conflict, and how necessity and proportionality apply to such uses of force in accordance with the foundational tenets of the international law of self-defense. The first section addresses introductory issues, including a brief explication of the international law of self-defense, the meaning of the term “use of force” in international law, and the ways in which different types of conflicts end and how to define or identify such endings. The second section analyzes the proper trigger for the right of self-defense, an armed attack or imminent armed attack, and explores whether and how the definition of and threshold for an armed attack might differ in post-conflict scenarios. For example, the nature of the enemy may produce different perspectives on whether and when certain acts constitute an armed attack in this phase between the end of a conflict and a potential re-emergence of violence, as could the location of the acts, the types of acts, or even the manner in which the conflict ended. Finally, the third section queries how necessity and proportionality, the key criteria for the use of force in self-defense, apply or should apply to this proposed scenario. Understanding the scope and parameters of necessity and proportionality demands an inquiry into the legitimate aims of self-defense, as well as a nuanced look at how necessity and proportionality operate and what these two essential criteria are designed to achieve and safeguard.

German Practice with Regard to the Use of Force in Syria

This brief note presents German practice with respect to the use of force in the Syrian conflict. The development of the international rules on the use of force depends to a large extent on the practice and statements of governments. For this reason, governments should carefully consider their justification for the use of force of their own armed forces as well as statements they make with respect to the use of force by other states. The contribution focuses on the participation of the German armed forces in the fight against the so-called Islamic State as well as on the reaction of Germany to the two uses of force by the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom in reaction to the alleged uses of chemical weapons by the Syrian government in 2017 and 2018.

К вопросу о правомерности применения воен- ной силы иностранными государствами (на примере Сирии).

INTRODUCTION. Military interventions in Syria by the US and its allies confirm a tendency in the policy of Western countries to ignore international law and to act in accordance with the “rule of force”, without the sanction of the UN Security Council. Russia, as a state that respects its sovereignty and international law, does not accept this approach. Russia stands for diplomatic dialogue at all venues in order to stop destabilization in international relations, including the confrontation in Syria, and to find proper legal solutions. The article recommends specific options for such solutions. MATERIALS AND METHODS. The study relies on such legal sources as the UN Charter, generally recognized principles of international law, UN Security Council resolutions, the Joint Statement of the Presidents of Russia and the United States on Syria of November 11, 2017, the joint press conference of the Presidents of Russia and the United States in Helsinki on July 17, 2018 as well as scientific studies of Russian and foreign researches. The research involved general scientific and comparative legal and historical methods of study. RESEARCH RESULTS. The author concludes that the United States and its allies using military force in Syria act in violation of the UN Charter. Russia, on the contrary, uses its military contingent in Syria in full accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter on the collective self-defense, at the request of the legitimate government of Syria. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. The author makes a concrete proposal for the search of a peaceful settlement in Syria on the basis of the Joint Statement, which was approved by the Presidents of Russia and the United States in November 11, 2017 following their meeting on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Danang, Vietnam. The author advocates that Russian and American experts jointly reconsider main elements of this document and provide an up-dated version with due account of new realities, and submit it to the UN Security Council for the adoption of a consensus resolution that would lay down the international legal framework for a peaceful settlement in Syria.

La influencia de las operaciones militares en Siria en el Estado de la Seguridad Internacional en la esfera militar y social

Las operaciones militares en Siria están involucrando enormes fuerzas, por un lado las pertenecientes a las capacidades militares del ejército de Assad, y por otro a las fuerzas religiosas que aspiran a derribar su régimen. Con independencia de la guerra civil, desarrollándose desde el 2011, actúan también las fuerzas pro- Assad, y las unidades integradas en el Cuerpo de la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica. Además de las acciones militares en el territorio de Siria e Irak, dirigidas por las fuerzas de la coalición de los países occidentales lideradas por Estados Unidos,. En el Norte de Siria, , las operaciones contra el Estado islámico son llevadas a cabo por fuerzas kurdas La gran cantidad de participantes en estas acciones conduce con frecuencia a conflictos de intereses. Como ejemplo, el derribo de un avión ruso por fuerzas turcas, que generó un potencial riesgo de un conflicto militar que podría englobar a la totalidad de Medio Oriente, así como poner en peligro la estabilidad no solamente de la región mencionada, sino también convertirse en un conflicto global entre Rusia y la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN). La situación en Siria está lejos de la estabilización y en cualquier momento puede convertirse enla chispa de un conflicto de amplia dimensión internacional.

Syria: To Bomb Again or Not?

The conflict in Syria is one of the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today. Since December 2017, over 5.4 million people have fled the war in Syria seeking refuge in neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan. Another 6.3 million people have been forcefully displaced inside Syria (IDPs). News broke out suspecting that President Bashar al-Assad's regime had used chemical attacks to strike the rebel-held suburb of Douma, east of Damascus. This prompted western governments' outrage and pressure began to mount for a forceful response despite lack of a convincing that the chemical strike was carried out by the Syrian government. Nonetheless, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, asserts proof that last week the Syrian government attacked with chemical weapons. President Trump, who recently said he wants to pull the United States out of Syria, has more recently declared that the missiles 'will be coming towards Syria. On April 13th he ordered strikes on Syrian targets. As was the case with Iraq, Libya, and now Syria, major western news agencies have fill the papers with justifications for bombing Syria. The enthusiasm for advocating for war wrapped in a moral need for violence, masks obvious consequences, an overt attack on Syria can provoke a greater war in the Middle East and bring the U.S. into direct confrontation with Russia or even China. It is expected that Russia and China will veto any Security Council resolution authorizing force in Syria. Wars that lack UN authorization are illegal under international law. Where does that leave western powers? The double standard whereby international law is only useful when it legitimizes intervention but an obstacle when it restrains intervention is frustratingly evident.

Syrians, Palestinians and Iraqi Refugees in Lebanon

The conflict between protestors and government forces in Syria has developed into a complex crisis involving many parties, and led to a unique humanitarian disaster. As the years are passing, the situation of the civilians in Syria along with the Syrian refugees is getting worse. Lebanon, despite its small size, is hosting over 1.3 million refugees from Syria, equal to more than 20% of Lebanon’s original population (UNHCR data portal 9th June 2014). Not less than 20 million people in Syria are in need of humanitarian help; in addition 4.1 million coasted over the border as refugees in neighbouring countries. These are becoming a big burden on the welcoming countries. The huge influx of Syrian refugees to the country, classified Lebanon as the biggest host country for Syrian refugees in the region. The number of refugees is projected to increase further, pressure on Lebanon in general and on the already poor hosting communities in particular increased poverty and vulnerability. Poverty incidence has risen to 53 per cent in the North, 42 per cent in the South and 30 per cent in Beqaa, compared with the national poverty rate of 28 per cent. There is an increase in the number of refugees across Lebanon due to the facilities provided. With a group of volunteers, civilians and pediatricians, an N.G.O. named BIRTH AND BEYOND/ASSAMEH was created. Purpose is to create a pediatric department with all the facilities and a very well equipment that may receive sick patients from poor economic conditions whether Lebanese, Syrians, Palestinians or undetermined nationality that are usually Syrians born in Lebanon but whom Syrian regime denies the right of nationality for several reasons. Knowing that in Lebanon, the rate of birth is around 60 000 newborns per year, we have 750 000 newborns in Lebanon which are Syrians refugees and most of them are not registered to Syrian authorities and have an undetermined nationality

German Practice With Regard to the Use of Force in Syria

This brief note presents German practice with respect to the use of force in the Syrian conflict. The development of the international rules on the use of force depends to a large extent on the practice and statements of governments. For this reason, governments should carefully consider their justification for the use of force of their own armed forces as well as statements they make with respect to the use of force by other states. The contribution focuses on the participation of the German armed forces in the fight against the so-called Islamic State as well as on the reaction of Germany to the two uses of force by the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom in reaction to the alleged uses of chemical weapons by the Syrian government in 2017 and 2018.

Resistance Dynamics and Social Movement Theory: Conditions, Mechanisms, and Effects

Understanding Current ConflictsContemporary conflicts have become more transnational, protracted, irregular, and resistancecentric.1 They can be best described as protracted internal conflicts with multiple state actors and nonstate actors intervening much like the multidimensional hybrid operational environment discussed in Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 2022.2This article aims to explain how to harness the emerging strategic utility of nonstate actors by utilizing well-established bodies of knowledge on resistance dynamics. This objective is based upon the observation that an increasing number of external state actors overtly or covertly intervene in intrastate conflicts by exploiting the environment's resistance potential in order to increase their respective strategic influence.3 Similarly, both internal and external nonstate actors take advantage of interstate conflicts or political instability stemming from failing states. The current conflicts in Iraq and Syria certainly meet this characterization; as do those in Ukraine, Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali, and Libya. More state actors are supporting or sponsoring political movements in intrastate conflict, making the termination of fighting very difficult. For instance, the resilience of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is largely attributed to the protracted Syrian civil war in which regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey all sponsor local movements. In addition, external nonstate actors such as ISIL, al-Nusrah, and Hezbollah are also deeply involved in the conflict. In other words, these current conflicts represent a sample of a larger shift in warfare. As of this writing, Uppsala University's world conflict data program compiles 40 conflicts in the world for 2014. All but one of them are intrastate conflicts and 13 of them are internationalized.4 In short, state actors are actively leveraging and taking advantage of the resistance potential of groups engaged in civil conflicts.The United States must adapt to this operational environment in order to achieve national policy objectives. Key to this goal is a shared problem identification that will lead to mitigation and reduction of the fog and friction inherent in a hybrid operational environment. Problem identification begins with understanding how external groups are leveraging and harnessing the resistance potential of organic movements toward their respective strategic interests. By understanding how resistance potential is shaped toward strategic objectives, we can also better determine how to replicate the best practices of supporting and sponsoring robust organic movements.In order to fight successfully in this complex hybrid environment, a deep understanding of resistance dynamics is critical. Without understanding resistance dynamics, it becomes next to impossible to identify who is working with adversarial state actors and how their nonstate surrogates gain political support against our own strategic interests. Our recent unsuccessful attempt at building a surrogate force in Syria is a good reminder of why it matters to harness the utility of organic resistance. Instead of building a sustainable movement with an armed wing, we thought a program designed to train and equip a few dozen commandos would suffice.5 This article intends to delineate the strategic dynamics of resistance and discuss the utility of resistance as a strategic tool.I will begin with a discussion of how resistance is conceptualized in doctrinal and academic terms to distill the essential characteristics of the concept. Then I will highlight three aspects of resistance: antecedent conditions, mechanisms, and effects. I will identify what antecedent conditions facilitate resistance, followed by a variety of mechanisms employed by movements to exploit the conditions. The discussion of mechanisms accompanies a description of the effects that can be expected when movements take advantage of these conditions. …

Searching a Political Solution for Syria

Syria’s sudden plunge into civil struggle is directly linked with United States’ Middle East policy. The 2011 pull-out of American troops from the smouldering provinces of Iraq and the subsequent refusal of the US to take sides in the ‘Arab Spring’ have weakened the incumbent governments and produced too many unsuitable civil claimants to rule ‘Arab Spring’-affected countries. The so-called US neutrality left a vacuum, which was filled by a swarm of Islamist extremists. The resultant internecine wars sparked by contending parties in Iraq, Syria and Yemen had taken these countries to the very verge of chaos. The outcome among other things included a revival of al-Qaeda, which was soon eclipsed by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and an unending spiral of civil war in Syria, the major result of the anti-Western blowback. This article argues that the fight against extremist forces in Syria is doomed if there is absence of a strong, functional and acceptable government. Lasting peace under President Bashar al-Assad looks impossible but it is essential to have the core of Ba’athist regime in place in any transitional or post-transition mechanism. A new interpretation of political solution is required. Else, the state will collapse, which will only help the jihadists. Despite its limitations and challenges, federalisation of Syria and the establishment of a federal structure of the government, it seems, is the only viable solution.

Who Goes, Why, and With What Effects: The Problem of Foreign Fighters from Europe

This article explores the phenomenon of Islamist foreign fighters, more specifically the movement of European Muslims to participate in the insurgencies in Syria and Iraq connected to the Islamic State/Daesh as well as the anti-Assad forces in Syria and the implications for European state stability. Drawing on personal psychology, social psychology, and social movement theory the article offers an integrated theoretical framework to analyze the radicalization of Islamist foreign fighters. Building on Danish data of Islamist foreign fighters, the article provides a first test of the analytical usefulness of this framework. The article further considers what distinguishes the Islamists that go from those that under similar circumstances stay behind, and whether this is a differences of kind or a difference of degree. Finally, we discuss the question of how much of a threat foreign fighter returnees pose to European states.

The law on lethal force begins with the right to life

In August 2015, the UK government intentionally killed a criminal suspect and the bystanders with him using a drone-launched Hellfire missile in Syria. In doing so, the UK violated the right to life of all three men because the UK had no lawful basis for deploying military force in Syria. Even if it did, international humanitarian law, governing the conduct of armed conflict, prohibits assassination – the intentional killing of an individual for reasons other than advancing a legitimate military objective. In any actual cases of ambiguity, the legal presumption in international law is with peace and protection of the right to life.

The Day After: What to Expect in post-Islamic State Mosul

Over recent months, the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq has lost territory to the Syrian army, opposition forces in Syria, the reorganised Iraqi Security Forces and the Hashed Al-Sha’bi (Popular Mobilization Forces – PMF), as well as to Kurdish Peshmerga forces in Iraq. These losses have led to heightened speculation that an assault on the IS stronghold of Mosul may happen sooner rather than later. However, with such speculation comes the fear of ‘the day after’, and what could be expected to happen in Mosul – a traditional focal point of Arab and Iraqi nationalists – and a city that was the centre of Iraq’s military establishment throughout the twentieth century. Tallha Abdulrazaq and Gareth Stansfield investigate this ‘day after’ question, highlighting the potential problems that may emerge following IS’s departure from the city.

Legality of the use of force in Syria against Islamic State and the Khorasan Group

This article critically examines the legality of the use of force in Syria against Islamic State and the Khorasan Group by the US-led coalition and what this reveals about the current scope of the law of self-defence. The author starts by considering Security Council Resolution 2249 and consent as possible justifications for the coalition's use of force. Following this, the justification of self-defence is analysed. The requirement of an occurrence of an armed attack for the claims of collective and individual self-defence is inspected. A further hurdle for the legality of the use of force in Syria is that the international law governing when a state can use self-defence against non-state actors acting outside the state's control is generally unsettled. This article canvases the status quo before scrutinising the justifications invoked by states involved and the international reaction to the use of force in Syria against Islamic State. Subsequent state practice is also examined. Analysis indicates that while there has been general acceptance of the military action in Syria, it is not sufficient to constitute meaningful opinio juris. Thus, this instance is not demonstrative of crystallisation at customary international law and consequently the use of force in Syria is illegal.

The New Project for the Middle East: From US Democracy Promotion to ISIL Destruction

The supercilious idea of the United States that, by toppling Saddam Hussein, can rapidly democratize Iraq and unleash a democratic tsunami in the Middle East, has metamorphosed into an apocalypse that swept the core nations of the region. Chaos and destruction became the “manifest destiny” of these peoples and democracy became a dangerous fantasy. The U.S. record of building democracy after invading other countries is mixed at best and the Bush administration’s commitment to state-building efforts in Iraq is doubtful. The United States have failed at developing democracy in the Middle East – which has led to increased instability and anarchy – because U.S. foreign policy has misunderstood the formula for building democracy in the region. The United States is just the latest Western nation to fail in the Middle East. The repercussions of a miscalculated intervention in Iraq were likely to complicate the spread of democracy in the Middle East rather than to promote it. Instead of developing democratic governments in the region the US intervention paved the way for the emergence of more oppressive radical groups that hijacked the reins of power from the legitimate governments and anguished peoples’ lives through acts of terror and bullying. The new paradox that Bush’s neoconservative government created in Iraq and the Middle East has turned a lofty project of democratization into a disaster of destruction. While ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) has seized core leadership positions in Syria, Iraq and other places, it is putting in practice the larger tripartite plan of the disintegration of the Middle East. In the process of establishing the Islamic Caliphate, ISIL is sowing the seeds of its own destruction as the U.S. contemplates increased military action in the Middle East, specifically authorization of military force in Syria. However, if the US desires to preserve American preferential treatment in the region it should reconsider the policies that created so much anarchy.

Intervention in Syria: A Lawmaking Moment?

In June 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a Sunni extremist group, made significant military and territorial gains against other rebel groups in the ongoing civil war in Syria. U.S. President Barack Obama authorized U.S. airstrikes against ISIL that September. He later declared that he would seek from the U.S. Congress a new authorization to use military force (AUMF) against ISIL in place of the existing AUMF, which has been the U.S. legal authority for military action since 2001. While a new AUMF would address the President’s U.S. constitutional authority to use force in Syria, finding a basis of authority to use force under international law, either against the Syrian regime or against ISIL, has presented a challenge. This paper will discuss the Obama administration’s approach to the use of force against the Syrian regime in 2013 and against ISIL in 2014 under international law and evaluate arguments that the Obama administration has made and could make in support of a military intervention. Part I will provide background on the conflict in Syria. Part II will analyze the possible arguments for the use of force in Syria under the U.N. Charter. Part III will consider possible arguments for humanitarian intervention.

From Cause to Responsibility: R2P as a Modern Just War

This article examines the relationship between just war theory and the modern principle of responsibility to protect (R2P). In the absence of the principle’s clear use as a justification for the use of force, this article considers two situations which prompted debate about the applicability of the principle the UN Security Council authorised no-fly-zone in Libya in 2011 and the decision not to use force in Syria in 2012. The article’s core message is that the debates about R2P suggest that rather than view R2P as a ‘new’ principle of international law, it should be viewed as a modern incarnation of the historic principles of just war. The just war criteria of ‘just cause’ and ‘proportionality’ remain the guiding standards by which an exercise of R2P will be judged. R2P remains a developing principle and, the absence of state practice in this area means that states wanting to intervene to protect foreign populations from atrocities are left without clear legal justification for such action. In the absence of UN Security Council authorisation, use of force under the banner of R2P remains contentious. In the absence of a clear legal status, consideration of R2P’s just war origins in the context of recent discourse is helpful in understanding when such force may be legitimate.

Deadlock or Restraint? The Security Council Veto and the Use of Force in Syria

The situation in Syria has revived the use of the veto power by some of the permanent five members of the Security Council. Repeated vetoes of draft resolutions and even the mere threat of a veto have stalled negotiations and rendered the Security Council largely passive in the face of mass atrocity. This article examines what this situation means for the accountability of the Security Council under international law. It concludes that there is no legal requirement at the present time for P5 members to abstain from the use of veto nor is the Security Council legally responsible for the internationally wrongful acts being committed in Syria. It considers the limited prospects for reforming the veto power through formal and informal changes to practice. The article suggests recasting the veto as a neutral technique, neither good nor bad. Some situations may call for the Security Council to encourage discussion and in-depth consideration of alternatives to the use of force. The veto power may create a more circumspect Council, which may be the more accountable entity in certain circumstances.

Predicting the duration of the Syrian insurgency

While there were several relatively short uprisings in Northern Africa and the Middle East during the Arab Spring, the dispute between the rebels and government forces in Syria has evolved into a full-scale civil war. We try to predict the length of the Syrian insurgency with a three-stage technique. Using out-of-sample techniques, we first assess the predictive capacity of 69 explanatory variables for insurgency duration. After determining the model with the highest predictive power, we categorize Syria according to the variables in this final model. Based on in-sample approaches, we then predict the duration of the Syrian uprising for three different scenarios. The most realistic point prediction is 5.12 years from the insurgency’s start, which suggests an end date between the end of 2016 and early 2017.

Hezbollah: Before and after the Syrian War

Hezbollah combat forces joined the Syrian Civil War in 2012 in alliance with the Assad regime. This Hezbollah action increased geopolitical uncertainties in the Levant and created a potentially existential crisis for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah emerged in 1982 as a Shiite terrorist organization and an ideological Shiite proxy for Iran. During the next ten years, Hezbollah evolved into a complex institution; Hezbollah became a major political force in Lebanon and emerged as a powerful non-state military force in the region. Open-literature peer-reviewed documents and vetted media reports provide event and timeline evidence of consistent adaptive behavior patterns by Hezbollah. Hezbollah has three inherent weaknesses that constrain the Hezbollah political potential: Hezbollah depends on Iran for money, weapons, and training resources. Virtually all of this Iranian support flows through a Syrian logistics channel. Shiite Hezbollah is a minority political faction within Lebanon. Hezbollah and the Assad regime are part of an Iranian geostrategic scheme to establish a “Shiite arc of influence” from Iran across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The Sunni community, led by Saudi Arabia, opposes the Iranian move to be the dominant power in the Middle East. The Shiite and Sunni factions moved from a political dual to open sectarian warfare conducted by Shiite and Sunni proxy forces in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. Although Hezbollah effectively intervened to rescue the Assad regime from a successful rebel conquest, there are negative political, material, and social consequences to Hezbollah for the intervention in the Syrian War. These problems will persist into the longer term for Hezbollah.

Influence without power? Reframing British concepts of military intervention after 10 years of counterinsurgency

British attitudes towards military intervention following the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have undergone what appears to be considerable change. Parliament has voted against the use of Britain's armed forces in Syria and the public are unenthused by overseas engagement. Conscious of the costs and the challenges posed by the use of British military power the government has been busy revamping the way it approaches crises overseas. The result is a set of policies that apparently heralds a new direction in foreign policy. This new direction is encapsulated in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the more recent International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES). Both BSOS and IDES set out the basis for avoiding major deployments to overseas conflict and instead refocuses effort on defence diplomacy, working with and through overseas governments and partners, early warning, pre-conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. Developing a number of themes that reach from across the Cold War to more contemporary discussions of British strategy, the goal of this special edition is to take into account a number of perspectives that place BSOS and IDES in their historical and strategic context. These papers suggest that using defence diplomacy is and will remain an extremely imprecise lever that needs to be carefully managed if it is to remain a democratically accountable tool of foreign policy.