Force In International Relations Research Articles

The Principle of Responsibility to Protect as a New Approach to the Use of Force in International Relations.

The Principle of Responsibility to Protect as a New Approach to the Use of Force in International Relations.

The United States Role of the Occurrence of Violence in Cyprus

Cyprus used to be under occupation of the foreign states for many centuries and sovereignty usually with few exceptions was not transferred peacefully. As it is well known, in the 19th century, use of force in international relations was seen as normal. In the 1878 however, transformation of sovereignty in Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire to the United Kingdom (UK) was by peaceful means. The UK ruled Cyprus mostly in peace until the uprising in 1931. The upheaval of the Greek Cypriots against the UK was to unite Cyprus with Greece (Enosis). The uprising was settled by violence and the constitutional rights suspended immediately. In 1955 when the riot of the Greek Cypriots occurred again this time the UK was successful to get support of Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriots and converted the anti-colonial struggle to the ethnic strife. Clearly, the occurrence of violence in Cyprus in 20th Century begun during the British period but it continued after the colonial period. Although the United States (US) refrained direct involvement to Cyprus problem it assisted to the formation of the Republic of Cyprus by 1960s. During the Cold War conditions, the US had to involve to the Cyprus problem because of two reasons: Firstly, in order to prevent a war between Türkiye and Greece, the two “motherlands” of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots; secondly to stop the violence between two local communities. In Washington DC the US leadership met with Greek and Turkish prime ministers in 1964 and they decided to solve the Cyprus problem forever. In Geneva the US representative had several meetings with the officials of Greece and Türkiye. There, the US former secretary of state offered his plan that included the use of violence for the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus. The US plan could not be implemented at the time but after 10 years, its spirit became the source of the violence in Cyprus. In this study mainly the role of the US in occurrence of violence in the island will be studied.

Untangling the significance of the Ukraine and the Netherlands vs Russia Case on the determination of the international nature of the conflict and on the onset of the use of force by the Russian Federation against Ukraine: 2022 OR 2014?

This article will draw from the ECtHR’s judgement of 30/11/2022, without offering a direct commentary on that decision. My aim is to build upon the Court’s stance and analyse it in the context of the international framework of the use of force. I believe it gives rise to a prolific discussion on jus ad bellum, which allows, by resorting to case-law and relevant documents and scholar’s legal theories, to question whether the violation of the prohibitive principle of the use of force in international relations only occurred when Putin authorized a “special military operation” in 2022, or if it goes back to 2014. I am going to endorse this latter viewpoint, but not before putting in prominence the Court’s assessment on the ECHR’s extraterritorial application and whether it allows to link the Russian Federation to the “separatists’” warlike acts, imparting an international nature to an apparently internal armed conflict.

Reading China's Global Security Initiative Through an International Legal Lens

Closely related to China's response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Global Security Initiative (‘GSI’) has attracted attention to its vision on the current international legal order. This essay examines three major themes of the GSI through an international legal lens: common security, sovereign equality and the amorphous idea of ‘legitimate security interest’. Firstly, it highlights the risk that the notion of common security and the related emphasis on ‘major countries’ relationship in the GSI could be abused to justify state oppression of domestic population or major countries’ domination over ‘minor countries’ and proposes a reading to limit these concepts to promoting peace-making efforts led by states, particularly ‘major countries’, with cascading effects on other countries in conflicts. Secondly, it argues that the GSI's re-emphasis on sovereign equality usefully counters unilateralism and should be interpreted not retrospectively to avoid accountability but prospectively to combat impunity for serious violations of international law. Thirdly, it argues that while the notion of legitimate security interest may be irrelevant to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations, it could be a useful consideration in discharging states’ obligation to settle international disputes peacefully.

The Problem of the Prohibition of Wars of Aggression in the History of International Law

The turn of the 19th and 20th centuries was marked by the emergence of individual international acts that established certain restrictions on one of the traditional rights of states – the right to war. The need for their comprehensive study is obvious, since it was these acts that created a kind of foundation for the development of interstate cooperation in the direction of developing such legal norms that would serve as a reliable barrier against the outbreak of wars of conquest in the future. In this context, of primary importance is the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations, whose articles, among other things, set out procedural requirements, the fulfilment of which was a necessary condition preceding the resort to armed force.The subject of the study is also the Paris Pact of 1928, which for the first time at the universal level states recorded a provision prohibiting the unleashing of aggressive wars. At the same time, the legal and grammatical interpretation of the provisions of this treaty source allowed the author to conclude that, in reality, the established prohibition was not absolute in nature, since not all situations related to the resort of states to armed force in their international relations can be classified as war. This state of affairs, where states had a real opportunity to circumvent the treaty-established prohibition, became an important prerequisite for continuing work to agree on an international definition of aggression.Other international acts that played a certain role in establishing a general prohibition of the use of force in international relations also became the subject of analysis in this paper.

Cyber Warfare as a Use of Force against Third-Party Countries: The Perspective of International Law

The use of force in international relations takes different forms and changes year by year due to the development of cyber technology. The problem mentioned in this study is that the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) and international law have not considered weapons development and future weapons that may be used in international relations, as Russia has used such weapons during the war against Ukraine. Unfortunately, cyber technologies were used to deter and weaken Ukraine’s chance to gain an advanced result on the ground. Although such cyber operations can cause the same physical damage as other weapons, the international community is still struggling to determine whether using a cyber weapon is considered a use of force. This study argues that cyber attacks against third-party countries that support Ukraine during the war may count as the use of force and a breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

Mogućnost primene pravila međunarodnog humanitarnog prava na sajber rat

Cyber warfare represents a new form of conflict in today's world. Unlike earlier traditional armed conflicts, cyber warfare is different in terms of means, methods, techniques, and actors. Cyber warfare takes place in virtual space through the use of information and communication technologies. The actors may be states, but also individuals who can inflict significant damage on their opponents. The consequences of cyber attacks may not be immediately apparent, but can manifest much later. Similarly, the outcome of a cyber attack can be material damage or the loss of human life. Since cyber operations can take place not only during conflicts but also in peacetime, the concept of cyber aggression is often present. States are aware of the new cyber threats and are developing their defensive and offensive capabilities, adopting strategies and doctrines addressing these issues. However, there is no international agreement that regulates the open issues related to cyber warfare, as there is no consensus among states on how to regulate it. There are attempts to apply the rules of international humanitarian law that govern armed conflicts to the realm of cyber warfare. Consensus within the international community has not been reached, leaving this area unregulated. The paper aims to examine the possibility of applying the rules of international humanitarian law, specifically the rules governing the right to use force in international relations (jus ad bellum) and the rules governing the conduct of parties in conflict (jus in bello), to cyber warfare.

Evolutivni razvoj i međunarodnopravna regulativa plaćeništva

Mercenary, as a social phenomenon, is a constant companion of the historical development of humanity. There have always been, and still are, individuals, independently or organized in groups, who will offer their services of skills and knowledge of warfare on the world market. On the other hand, in the long series of centuries of human existence, almost everyone who had a sufficient amount of money and had a clearly expressed interest in and goal for such a thing hired individuals skilled in warrior skills and other knowledge and abilities that could be used on the battlefield for the realization of various economic, political, geo-economic, and geo-political goals of their employers. The use of private violence was brought under state control after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, where regular military service is the key guarantor of the cumulative survival of the relevant elements of statehood, i.e. the exercise of sovereign powers. However, this did not abolish the practice of mercenary work, but changed it somewhat and adapted it to the new social circumstances. Through the process of social evolution, mercenary military units are transformed into efficient, highly profitable and modern corporate structures which employ diverse, highly qualified personnel, manage them, and provide a wide range of military and security services to various and numerous state and non-state entities - clients. For modern times, in this sense, the appearance and actions of mercenaries during the decolonization process-conventional mercenary formations, on the one hand, and private military companies as a sort of contemporary quasi-mercenary phenomenon which do not themselves fit into the glossary, on the other-are indicative of the socalled legal qualification of classic mercenaries as they are recognized and explained by the key international documents in the field. The very emergence of private military companies led to a fundamental disruption in the perception of the term mercenary. It is no longer contained by, nor capable of being a strictly individual phenomenon. Also, over time, private individuals, multinational corporations, and even internationa organizations are becoming more and more prevalent among the interested parties seeking to hire mercenary services, in addition to the state and its agents. International documents pertinent to the mercenary issue are Supplementary Protocol I (from 1977) and two conventions specifically created for this issue-the UN Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries (from 1989) and the Convention of the Organization of African Unity for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa (from 1977). In these documents, mercenaries are "stigmatized" as the only entity of interest in international humanitarian law devoid of any legal protection within that particular subsystem of international law. However, the definition of a mercenary is quite restrictive. The provisions concerning the conditions and circumstances under which a person can be treated, that is, declared a mercenary, are difficult to apply in practice. Due to the restrictive nature of their "defining" aspects, the existing rules on mercenaries are difficult to apply in practice and make it difficult to achieve the ultimate goal of those international documents, which is to suppress and prosecute perpetrators of incriminated mercenary behavior and mercenary practices. On the other hand, the mercenary category is not very helpful when it comes to the qualification and legal positioning of private military companies as international corporate enterprises, which include various military potentials, military or paramilitary assets, personal skills and specialties of the employed personnel, and whose main goal is to make a profit, i.e. profit. Although they are often defined as mercenaries in public discourse, private military companies deviate from representations shaped by reminiscences from the distant and recent past, primarily military mercenaries from the Middle Ages, times of religious wars, colonial conquests, and participants in post-colonial wars of the 20th century, which were particularly infamous for violating international humanitarian law and human rights during the suppression of national liberation movements on African and Asian soil. The key difference between conventional mercenaries and private military companies, apart from the fact that mercenaries are criminalized by the provisions of international humanitarian law, is the existence of a corporate element in the provision of military services. This security sector is still not precisely defined and legally shaped, but it is undoubtedly influenced by the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law and other subsets of the international law system that would be directly or indirectly involved in the activities of these organizations or their employees in such delicate and important areas of international life as security and the use of force in international relations are.

Reciprocity as Security: Reconsidering Third Country Access to European Critical Infrastructure Procurement

EU public procurement law provides different options for preventing geopolitically undesirable dependency on third country suppliers in critical infrastructure. Their effectiveness solely depends, however, on the willingness of national authorities to use those. Recently, the EU therefore adopted the International Procurement Instrument (IPI) Regulation, within the sphere of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), to condition the access to public contracts for third country entities on reciprocity. This article explores the security dimension of this issue. After generally considering the role of sovereignty as a limit to international trade, the article specifies the security risks which may arise in a public procurement context and sets out the legal options for Member States to address those. The article then discusses how security intrinsically shapes CCP instruments and how the new regulation could indicate a shift in the EU’s role, from facilitating legal options for Member States, towards the Commission itself restricting the market access for certain third countries. Although such bans ought to be based on a lack of reciprocity rather than security, in times of weaponized dependencies the security dimension is undeniable. When considering interdependence as a stabilizing force in international relations, reciprocity itself has in fact become a security objective. EU law, Public Procurement, National Security, Critical Infrastructure, Common Commercial Policy, International Procurement Instrument, Economic Interdependence, Sovereignty, World Trade Organization, Government Procurement Agreement

Exclusion of the principle of non-refoulement in article 33 paragraph 2 of the 1951 refuge convention

This study aims to examine whether non-refoulement in the refugee context has attained the status of a jus cogens norm or not and how the exceptions in Article 33(2) should be understood if non-refoulement is indeed considered as a jus cogens. This research adopts a normative juridical analysis approach to critically examine the status of the principle of non-refoulement. The study concludes that the principle of non-refoulement qualifies as a norm of jus cogens based on several key criteria. Firstly, it satisfies the requirements of a jus cogens norm by addressing matters of common concern to the international community, serving humanitarian purposes, and aligning with principles outlined in the UN Charter relating to treaties and the use of force in international relations. Secondly, the exception outlined in Article 33 Paragraph 2 of the Refugee Convention does not alter the non-derogable nature of the principle of non-refoulement. The fulfillment of Article 33 Paragraph 2 is contingent upon strict conditions and necessitates objective evidence to be provided by a country. The research is intended to contribute to the understanding of the normative status of the principle of non-refoulement within the framework of international refugee law.

The 2022 Russian intervention in Ukraine: What is its impact on the interpretation of jus contra bellum?

AbstractThis article examines the precedential value of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine in February 2022 for the purpose of interpreting the rules of jus contra bellum. Following the methodology set down by the ICJ in its Nicaragua judgment, self-defence is identified as the legal basis explicitly invoked by Russia in order to justify its operation in Ukraine. The authors then examine closely the reactions by third states with respect to the legality of Russia’s military operation and establish that the legal arguments put forth by Russia – including, more specifically, an innovative reading of the right to self-defence of entities unilaterally recognized as states – have been overwhelmingly rejected by third states. On that basis, the authors conclude that this precedent does not challenge the established understanding of the prohibition to use force in international relations and of its exceptions.

Conscription to Fight a War of Aggression under International Criminal Law

Abstract The criminalization of the unlawful use of force in international relations is not usually linked to conscription of an army to fight such a war. However, historical precedent in the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals established that conscription was part of the common plan to wage a war of aggression. After a brief history of conscription and its justifications, this article examines that precedent and then analyses how it could be put to use in a prosecution of the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Finally, it argues that there is a normative case for the inclusion of conscription within the scope of the crime of aggression because of the harm done to both the conscripts and the state and people of the place they invade.

THE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON WARS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The problem that the research deals with focuses on the fact that war is an act that contradicts the principles of the United Nations, which prohibit aggression and the use of force in international relations.
 The research aims to discuss the position of international law on resorting to war, in managing relations between states.
 The research concluded that the policies of the major powers tend to try to adapt the policies of war, in a way that does not contradict the position of international law, by developing new generations of wars, which do not entail responsibility on the state.

The Rationale and the Perils of Failing to Invoke State Responsibility for Cyber-Attacks: The Case of the EU Cyber Sanctions

AbstractMalicious cyber activities are on the rise. States and other relevant actors need to constantly adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape, including by setting up effective deterrence mechanisms. This is what the European Union (EU) has done through the adoption of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Decision 2019/797, which allows it to impose targeted sanctions to deter and respond to cyberattacks that constitute an external threat to the EU or its member states. However, in contrast to other horizontal regimes of restrictive measures in force within the EU, foreign governments are not included as potential targets of cyber sanctions. Moreover, the recital of the Decision specifies that the adoption of restrictive measures does not involve attribution of international responsibility for cyber-attacks to a third State. This article aims at identifying the rationale behind the inclusion of these distinctive features. It starts by considering the legal uncertainty that surrounds attribution of international responsibility for cyber operations. Next, it explains why the EU is not well placed to invoke third-State responsibility, and the reasons behind its reluctance to do so. It will then illustrate the risks inherent in the lack of a clear legal framework to attribute the responsibility of cyber-attacks to third countries. This may have serious consequences in terms of legal certainty when a cyber-attack amounts to a breach of the prohibition on the use of force in international relations. Then, we explore recent developments in EU legislation in the area of cyber security and the possibility to strenghten the powers of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). We draw two conclusions: first, the Union might develop the capacity to attribute cyber attacks to specific actors and there is an interest to do so. However, Member States are probably still reticent to take this step. Two, despite the advantages of establishing a reliable attribution mechanisms, it is submitted that the majority of States prefers to take advantage of a regulative gap that allows them to react to cyber incidents as they see fit.

The (il)legality of the Iraq War of 2003: An Analytical Review of the Causes and Justifications for the US-led invasion

This study aims to establish whether the 2003 Iraq war was waged within the confines of United Nations (UN) Charter rules. To achieve this, the study analyses the circumstances under which armed force in international relations (IR) may be used within the provisions of the UN Charter. In the wake of the contentious US-led war in Iraq, critics opine that the UN thresholds for waging war were not met by the US and its allies. The US argued that the war was justified given the unprecedented security challenges occasioned mainly by 9/11. Crucially, post 9/11, US re-ordering of international security fed on the narrative that preventative strikes against states that it suspected to be potential havens for terrorist activities (the so-called rogue states) was within the broader UN Charter parameters of self-defence. Using the UN Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) on Iraq and the UN Charter rules on warfare as a framework of analysis, this study navigates the causal factors and justifications for and against the Iraq war. The study concludes that although the US faced security challenges and arguably had fathomable reasons, the invasion of Iraq was conducted without UN authorisation, and hence in defiance of the UN Charter rules.

Factual grounds for the application of the special legal regime of martial state

The factual grounds for the application of a special legal regime of martial law in Ukraine and foreign countries at the current stage and in the historical and legal context have been studied. The concept of an armed attack as a factual basis for the introduction of martial law is analyzed. The normative-legal interpretation of the concept of "threat of attack" in national Ukrainian legislation is shown. It is emphasized that armed aggression in modern theory and practice means external armed aggression, the commission of which constitutes a violation of such a fundamental principle of international law as the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations, which is formulated in mandatory international legal norms and the recognition of such norms an integral part of the national legal systems of all states of the world without exception, even without the ratification of those sources that contain the main principles of international law and generally recognized norms and principles of international humanitarian law. It is shown that the solution of internal social crises of an economic, political or any other substantive nature can be a controversial from the point of view of international legal and constitutional legal legitimacy in some foreign states. The current Ukrainian legislation quite justifiably does not include similar situations in the list of possible factual grounds for imposing martial law, since a special legal regime for internal crisis situations is a state of emergency. It has been established that according to the current Ukrainian legislation, the following factual grounds for the application of martial law as a special legal regime are recognized as possible: a) armed aggression; b) threat of attack. At the same time, both such situations should pose a danger to the state independence of Ukraine and/or its territorial integrity, which is a natural, immanently inherent property of any act of aggression or its real threat. Based on a similar formal and legal definition of the factual grounds for the application of martial law according to the current Ukrainian legislation, each of the possible factual grounds for the application of a special legal regime of martial law was considered separately in order to establish their content, scope and provide a proper interpretation in the context of the general ideas of modern constitutionalism about a special order of functioning systems of bodies and officials of public authorities and permissible and necessary temporary restrictions of the constitutional rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen.

STATE OF WAR AS AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTION

The subject of the article is an analysis of the state of war from an international legal and constitutional perspective. Until the beginning of the 20th century, international law recognized the right of a state to wage war as an important manifestation of its sovereignty. Attempts to limit this right boiled down to the development of a just war concept. It was only the United Nations Charter that introduced a ban on the use of force in international relations or the threat of its use. The only permissible exception is the exercise of the right to self-defense, either individually or collectively. Thus, the provisions on declaring war (declaring a state of war) found in the constitutions of some states acquired only a competence value. They define the competence of state organs in the event of an armed conflict. In the Constitution of the Third Republic of Poland (1997), the state of war is regulated in Article 116. The substantive prerequisites for the declaration of a state of war are identical to the implementation of the right of the state to individual or collective self-defense, admitted by the Charter of the United Nations.

Examines Iran-China Trade Relations: COVID-19 Challenges, Sanctions, and Positive Potentials

Article in English. In the field of international relations, governments use different tools to advance their national goals and interests, some of which are tangible and some of which are immaterial. In a way, these tools mainly indirectly affect the important interests of rival governments and cause them to change their behavior. At a time when the use of force in international relations has diminished or at least governments are more cautious in relying on this tool, the impact on sensitive areas has taken another form, which is a manifestation of sanctions. Sanctions imposed on Iran in recent years over its nuclear program have affected Iran's relations with other countries and thus its interests. Following the sanctions, Iran lost ties with many countries, especially European countries, and thus accelerated Iran's growing relations with China, especially in the fields of economy and trade. Therefore, in this paper, we investigated the positive capacity for cooperation between Iran and China and suggest seven effective criteria based on the objectives of this study.

Validity of the prohibition on the use of force in international relations

Devletler sisteminin ortaya çıktığı 1648 Westphalia anlaşmasından bu yana savaş devletlerarasındaki uzlaşmazlık ve çatışmaların bir çözüm yöntemi olarak varlığını korumaktadır. Bununla birlikte uluslararası sorunlarda kuvvet kullanma, taraflar arasındaki problemi çözmekten ziyade ilişkileri zehirleyen bir başka sorun kaynağı olmuştur. Gelişen teknolojiye paralel olarak nükleer, biyolojik ve kimyasal kitlesel imha silahlarının öldürücü gücü sadece insan hayatıyla ilgili endişeleri değil tüm insanlığın ve medeniyetin yok olması tehlikesini ortaya çıkartmıştır. Bu nedenle tarihî süreç içinde gittikçe artan bir şekilde kuvvet kullanımının sınırlanması ve yasaklanması yönünde bir eğilim güçlenmiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonunda tüm devletlerce kuvvete başvurmayı yasaklayan bir uluslararası düzenleme kabul edilmiş ve bunun denetimi Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) örgütüne bırakılmıştı. Ancak 1945 senesinden bu yana, kuvvet kullanımı mutlak olarak yasaklanmış olmasına rağmen dünyamızda savaşsız geçen tek bir yıl bile yaşanmamıştır. Aksine, dünya genelinde savaş ve çatışmalar gittikçe artan bir yükseliş grafiği göstermektedir. Bu durum uluslararası ilişkilerde inkâr edilemez bir çelişkiyi ortaya koymaktadır. Makalede bu çelişkinin temelinde, devletlere tanınan meşru müdafaa hakkının geniş ve farklı yorumlanmasının yattığı vurgulanmaktadır.

ABD YAPTIRIMLARININ VE COVİD19 PANDEMİSİNİN İRAN EKONOMİSİNE ETKİSİ

In international arena, governments opt for different means, either material or immaterial, to realize their national goals and interests. In addition, these means impact the competitive governments’ critical interests indirectly and this causes them to change their behavior. In an era when use of force in international relations has declined or governments use the option more carefully, the ways of affecting other sensitive realms has changed an instance of which is sanction. The sanctions imposed on Iran due to its nuclear program have impacted Iran’s relationship with other countries and its national interests. Due to these sanctions, Iran has lost its relationship with many countries especially European ones. In addition, economic consequences of the pandemic are clearly negative. Business relations which could cause disease spread are also negatively impacted by this situation. Meanwhile, the pandemic is undermining the last stage of a long period of rapid global integration. Although global economy will not be damaged like it was back in 1910s, future historians will unsurprisingly refer to the pandemic as one of the consequences of globalization which ultimately led to a new era of global business. This study adopted a descriptive-analytical design and to do so, SPSS Software (version. 19) was used and questionnaire forms were distributed in a statistical population which consisted of managers and experts of industrial sectors of Iran. This study aims to review the impact of US sanctions and COVID-19 pandemic on Iranian economy. The results suggested that US sanctions and COVID-19 have a significant impact on performance of management, production and development of small and medium industries.