WITH THE RECURRENCE of drought and famine in the Sahel during the 1 980s, and in spite of official policies which have emphasized the objective of food self-sufficiency, the countries in this region of Africa are increasingly dependent on cereals imports and are recipients of large quantities of food aid both in 'good' and 'bad' harvest years. In the face of declining or stagnant per capita food output levels due to a combination of economic, ecological and political factors, and with the prospects of long term 'aid dependence'l, steadily increasing debt repayment burdens and high rates of population growth and urbanization, a re-appraisal of agricultural development strategies in the region is underway. Efforts to devise and implement policies which could reverse these trends have led to the recognition that the agrarian crisis reflects a series of unresolved conflicts between the different groups which seek to influence the state, and that peasant communities have generally been the losers in this struggle.2 This paper concentrates on the political implications of the agricultural production and food supply crises, with reference to Burkina Faso, one of the 'least developed' countries in the Sahel region of West Africa.3 The political upheaval following the coup d'etat in August 1983, which brought the Conseil National de la Revolution (CNR) to power, appeared to include elements of an alternative approach to the problem of improving the food security and livelihood of peasant farmers in Burkina Faso. This study emphasizes the difficulties and contradictions encountered in 'economic management' reforms through food price policies and agricultural marketing strategies. In exploring these issues, it is necessary not to confine the