Food Aid Shipments Research Articles

Cargo Preference and U.S. International Food Aid Programs

AbstractThe United States is the world's largest donor of humanitarian assistance. However, that aid's effectiveness is hampered by decades‐old rules that restrict where food aid commodities are purchased and how they are transported to recipient countries. This paper evaluates costs associated with one of those restrictions—food aid cargo preference—which requires that at least half of all U.S. food aid shipped in a given year be carried on U.S.‐flagged vessels. The empirical analysis presented in this study, based on individual food aid shipments between January 2012 and May 2015, indicates that cargo preference added $42 million annually to program costs.

An Investigation of the Impact of Food Aid on Food Crop Production in Zimbabwe

The impact of food aid on food crop production has been subject to debate for a long time in literature. A couple of studies suggest that food aid has a disincentive effect on food crops production. This study uses an autoregressive distributed model to investigate whether there are effects of food aid on maize crop production in Zimbabwe from 1980-2007. The study focuses on two agricultural sectors, namely; commercial and communal agricultural sectors. Food aid shipments significantly affect maize crop production in the commercial agricultural sector. We find no evidence of the impact of food aid on food production in the communal agricultural sector. The study recommends that trade of food crops should remain liberalized to ensure that producers realize a return that is in line with world market price. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n27p77

US Food Aid and Civil Conflict

We study the effect of US food aid on conflict in recipient countries. Our analysis exploits time variation in food aid shipments due to changes in US wheat production and cross-sectional variation in a country's tendency to receive any US food aid. According to our estimates, an increase in US food aid increases the incidence and duration of civil conflicts, but has no robust effect on interstate conflicts or the onset of civil conflicts. We also provide suggestive evidence that the effects are most pronounced in countries with a recent history of civil conflict. (JEL D74, F35, O17, O19, Q11, Q18)

The Timeliness and Cost-Effectiveness of the Local and Regional Procurement of Food Aid

Local and regional procurement (LRP) of food aid is often claimed to lead to quicker and more cost-effective response. We generate timeliness and cost-effectiveness estimates by comparing US-funded LRP activities in nine countries against in-kind, transoceanic food aid shipments from the US to the same countries during the same timeframe. Procuring food locally or distributing cash or vouchers results in a time savings of nearly 14 weeks, a 62 percent gain. Cost-effectiveness varies significantly by commodity type. Procuring grains locally saved over 50 percent, on average, while local procurement of processed commodities was not always cost-effective.

Food aid allocation policies: coordination and responsiveness to recipient country needs

AbstractWe employ censored least absolute deviations and multivariate Tobit estimators to investigate whether food aid flows from the main donor countries respond to recipient country needs as reflected in low food availability, low income, or both. We also explore the hypothesis that donor countries specifically coordinate their food aid shipments to recipient countries. Our findings show that food aid in aggregate and from each donor is significantly targeted at poorer countries and is highly persistent over time. Food aid responses to food availability shortfalls, natural disasters, and violent conflicts are common but more modest and uneven across donors. Finally, we find strong evidence of donor coordination in food aid allocation.

Food Aid, Food Prices, and Producer Disincentives in Ethiopia

AbstractAlthough the short‐term aims of food aid are well conceived, strong concerns have been voiced regarding the long‐term impacts of such aid on incentives for agricultural producers in recipient countries. This article examines the statistical link between food aid shipments and food prices in Ethiopia over the period 1996–2006. Monthly data from three markets and three commodities are used to estimate a system of seemingly unrelated regression models for food prices. Results indicate that previous year food aid shipments reduce prices in all producer and consumer markets. These effects, however, appear to be limited to the set of internationally traded commodities that are domestically marketed. A recursive regression procedure is used to identify the food aid threshold at which a negative aid effect emerges. Food aid shipments that constitute less than 10% of domestic production appear to be benign, but shipments above this level show signs of being disruptive to local markets. We use a simple policy simulation to argue that production‐sensitive targeting, e.g., conditioning food aid on local food production, would help to circumvent disincentive effects.

Impact of proposed federal limits on US bagged food aid shipments: reduction in MSF carrier profits—a risk assessment 1

This paper is a stochastic risk simulation of the impact of proposed federal tonnage limits on US Maritime Security Fleet (MSF) bagged food aid shipments. Only MSF (i.e. federally subsidized carriers/vessels for war, or emergencies) and non-MSF US carriers (therefore, at competitive disadvantage) can compete for such shipments—representing an indirect subsidy to both groups. To compensate, US Congress proposed a financial penalty (loss of voyage subsidy) on MSF carriers for food aid above a certain limit. Accordingly, certain carriers will be policy ‘winners’ (non-MSF—larger food aid shipments), and others ‘losers’ (MSF). By simulating loss-minimizing economic behaviour by MSF carriers—using five stochastic factors—I obtain losses substantially below those claimed by the MSF owners. Simulated annual-average MSF profits reduction is $3.5 million—within a large confidence interval; if no carriers surrender their subsidies (as claimed by MSF owners), a reduction of $6.0 million. Only 16% of annual MSF voyages are affected by a 2,500-ton limit (3%; 5,000-ton limit). Minimizing losses, 25 (of 41 affected) annual MSF voyages replace 38,000 tons of food aid with 23,000 tons of other cargo—forgoing $2.1 million in yearly direct subsidies. Two assumptions explain most of this simulated loss reduction.

Feeding the famine? American food aid and the GMO debate in Southern Africa

The inclusion of genetically modified maize in food aid shipments to Southern Africa during the 2002 food crisis rekindled debates over agricultural biotechnology. As the region edged ever closer to famine – putting the lives to some 14 million Africans at risk – corporate pundits, government officials and biotech’s critics debated the health and environmental dangers posed by the new technology. By situating the decision to send genetically modified maize to Southern Africa in the context of US–European debates over agricultural biotechnology, it becomes clear that the promotion of biotechnology has nothing to do with ending hunger in the region. Indeed, American food aid shipments to Southern Africa have little to do with the famine at all. Instead, I argue that US food aid policy following the 2002 crisis was intended to promote the adoption of biotech crops in Southern Africa, expanding the market access and control of transnational corporations and undermining local smallholder production thereby fostering greater food insecurity on the Continent.

The domestic determinants of US food aid policy

This study presents empirical analysis of US food aid flows as evidence of the strong and stable relationship between commodity producer interests and policy-makers during a 35 yr period. Whereas most foreign aid research centers on the distribution of aid among recipient countries, this study focuses on the determinants of the supply of food aid made available by the donor country. I conduct time series regression analysis of total US food aid shipments, as well as separate analyses of two key commodities, wheat and rice. Several key findings emerge: (1) There is a consistent relationship between commodity producer interests and US food aid policy. (2) There is a strong relationship between commodity stocks and food aid shipments, especially during the years when stocks were the greatest. (3) US food aid policy-making is highly incremental. These findings, taken together with the lack of a strong relationship between grain production in poor countries and US food aid shipments, belie official rhetoric emphasizing the growing humanitarian objectives of the program over time. In the case of rice, I find a strong relationship between aid flows and US involvement in the Vietnam War.

Has population growth restricted improvements in food availability per head, 1970-95?

Using data from the Food and Agricultural Organization and some other sources, it was estimated that rapid population growth in countries with an initial average calorie availability of below 2800 per head inhibited improvements in food production and availability per head during the 1980s and early 1990s. There were statistically significant negative effects of population growth on the growth in the production of noncereal food crops, milk, and meat, and in total food production. Because net food imports and aid shipments of cereals responded similarly, rather than acting as compensatory factors, the development in total calorie availability per head was least satisfactory in countries with the most rapid growth. A rapid increase in the number of adults of working age appeared to be no less disadvantageous than an increase in the number of children or elderly. Weaker effects were found when the entire 1970-95 period was considered. There were few indications that poverty, illiteracy, or land or water scarcity made it particularly difficult to cope with a growing population.

Implications of the Uruguay Round for food aid

One possible outcome of the Uruguay Round of negotiations is an improved set of guidelines regarding food aid and concessional sale transactions. It is suggested that future guidelines should ensure that food aid transactions are not used to circumvent export subsidy disciplines. Under plausible assumptions of what a justified food aid transaction might be under improved guidelines, it is determined that approximately 32% of current cereal food aid shipments could require reallocation. If improved guidelines are established, donor and recipient nations should be aware of the implications such guidelines may have for current food aid flows.