Folk Epistemology Research Articles

The Folk Epistemology of Delusions

Lisa Bortolotti argues convincingly that opponents of the doxastic view of delusion are committed to unnecessarily stringent standards for belief attribution. Folk psychology recognises many non-rational ways in which beliefs can be caused, and our attributions of delusions may be guided by a sense that delusions are beliefs that we cannot explain in any folk psychological terms.

Editorial: Folk Epistemology. The Cognitive Bases of Epistemic Evaluation

Folk epistemology refers to a range of cognitive skills that involve epistemic concepts such as knowledge and truth. As human beings we are able to assess the truth of an utterance by another agent or whether an inference someone makes is valid. We can evaluate to what extent sources we acquire information from are reliable and whether new information we acquire should lead to belief revision. We consistently produce, in particular, epistemic evaluations. We can judge, for instance, that: “p is true”, “it is probable that p”, “A is justified in thinking that p”, “B is trustworthy when she says that p”, or “C is lying”. Epistemology is the normative study of how such epistemic evaluations should be made. By contrast, the study of folk epistemology focuses on epistemic evaluations that people actually make and on the processes that produce them. It is a descriptive research project on the beliefs and intuitions people have about knowledge, truth, reasons and other epistemic notions, as well as a research project on the psychological and cognitive processes that sustain them. We use the term “folk epistemology” to specify that the scope of this notion is not just epistemology as traditionally understood by philosophers, but the epistemology that reflects how people make epistemic evaluations; the term “folk” also refers to an established tradition in psychology that investigates “naive” or “folk” theories that ground the cognition of specific domains: folk physics, for instance, as the cognition of physical objects, or folk psychology, as the cognitive ability to ascribe intentions, beliefs and desires to others. Research on folk epistemology, or folk epistemologies, spans the study of the form and content of epistemic evaluations, as well as their cognitive underpinnings. Rev.Phil.Psych. (2010) 1:477–482 DOI 10.1007/s13164-010-0046-8

Theories of mind and personal epistemology: their interrelation and connection with the concept of metacognition

This paper seeks to highlight the links and discrepancies between three contemporary theoretical fields. The first part is devoted to theories of mind and personal epistemology. Both fields deal with naive theories relating to the nature of knowledge and can be integrated within the concept of folk epistemology (Kitchener New Ideas Psychol 20:89–105, 2002). We argue that analyzing both domains from a developmental perspective may provide evidence for the origins of epistemological beliefs and the reasons for their evolution. The second part of the paper extends the discussion to the concept of metacognition and to its potential links with the two previously mentioned fields. In the past, theories of mind and metacognition have mainly developed as independent fields, but recent studies have highlighted a possible developmental lineage between them that needs further investigation. As the influence of the procedural component of metacognition (the regulation process) seems obvious in the personal epistemology perspective, we suggest that conducting more in situ studies will enable us to deepen our understanding of the links between the multiple components of the epistemological perspective and the reasons for epistemic change.

I love you but … : Cultural differences in complexity of emotional experience during interaction with a romantic partner

Studies suggest that emotional complexity—the experience of positive and negative emotion in response to the same event—is unusual in Western samples. However, recent research finds that the co-occurrence of positive and negative emotion during unstructured situations is more common among East Asians than Westerners, consistent with theories emphasising the prevalence of dialectical folk epistemology in East-Asian culture. The present study builds upon previous research by examining Asian- and European-Americans' experience of a particular positive emotion—love—and a situationally appropriate negative emotion during four structured laboratory conversations with their romantic partner. Among Asian Americans, love and the experience of negative emotion were typically less negatively correlated during these conversations than was true for European Americans.

AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY

Folk epistemology—the idea that one can't help believing that one's beliefs are true—provides an alternative to political theorists' inadequate defenses of democracy. It implicitly suggests a dialectical, truth-seeking norm for dealing with people who do not share one's own beliefs. Folk epistemology takes us beyond Mill's consequentialist claim for democracy (that the free array of opinions in a deliberative democracy leads us to the truth); instead, the epistemic freedom of the democratic process itself makes citizens confident that evidence for one's beliefs have not been distorted by a corrupt system. Since the starting point of folk epistemology is the meta-conviction that people believe that what they believe is true, it should also serve as a starting point for more rigorous scholarship that seeks to understand why people believe what they believe, instead of dismissing them as “irrational” if one disagrees with their beliefs.

Folk Epistemology as Normative Social Cognition

Research on folk epistemology usually takes place within one of two different paradigms. The first is centered on epistemic theories or, in other words, the way people think about knowledge. The second is centered on epistemic intuitions, that is, the way people intuitively distinguish knowledge from belief. In this paper, we argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the connection between the two paradigms, as well as to the mechanisms that underlie the use of both epistemic intuitions and theories. We contend that research on folk epistemology must examine the use of both intuitions and theories in the pragmatic context of the game of giving and asking for reasons and, more generally, understand how these practices take place within the broader context of normative social cognition.

Science, Legitimacy, and “Folk Epistemology” in Medicine and Law: Parallels between Legal Reforms to the Admissibility of Expert Evidence and Evidence‐Based Medicine

This paper explores some of the important parallels between recent reforms to legal rules for the admissibility of scientific and expert evidence, exemplified by the US Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 1993, and similar calls for reforms to medical practice, that emerged around the same time as part of the Evidence‐Based Medicine (EBM) movement. Similarities between the “movements” can be observed in that both emerged from a historical context where the quality of medicine and legal approaches to science were being subjected to growing criticism, and in the ways that proponents of both movements have used appeals to “folk epistemologies” of science to help legitimate their reform aspirations. The term folk epistemology is used to describe the weaving together of formal and informal images of scientific method with normative and pragmatic concerns such as eradicating “junk science”, and promoting medical best practice. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the unfocused breadth of these aspirations the implications of these “reforms” for medical and legal practice have not been straightforward, although they do represent an important new set of rhetorical resources to critique and or legitimate expertise in medical and legal domains. Discussion closes, by noting the growth of calls for these movements to reciprocate in areas where law and medicine intersect, such as medical negligence litigation.

III-Are There Any Conceptual Truths About Knowledge?

In this paper I investigate the nature of the concept knowledge. I ask how this concept must be if it is to generate conceptual truths about knowledge, arguing that it must have a set of principles attached to it (a folk theory ) that plays a reference-determining role. I then produce evidence that suggests that the folk theory attached to our concept KNOWLEDGE—our folk epistemology —is inconsistent. If folk epistemology is inconsistent, I conclude, then either there are no conceptual truths about knowledge or any conceptual truths there are will not be a priori knowable.

Folk Epistemology and the Justification of Democracy

In introduce the concept of a "folk epistemology" and argue that norms arising from our folk epistemic commitments provide a compelling social epistemic justification for democratic political norms.

But are they right? The prospects for empirical conceptology

This is exciting stuff. Philosophers have long explored the structure of human concepts from the inside, by manipulating their skills as users of those concepts. And since Quine most reasonable philosophers have accepted that the structure is a contingent matter ‐ we or not too different creatures could have thought differently ‐ which in principle can be studied from the outside, empirically. But, except for some important connections with developmental psychology, the prospects for interesting empirical work on important aspects of human conceptual structure have not seemed encouraging. Few followed the pioneering empirical semantics of Arne Naess in the 1950s, reported in Naess [1966], largely because of the lack of sufficiently interesting results. (There are exceptions in the work of Stephen Stich, who has on several occasions published work that can be seen as empirical conceptology. See for example Stich [1998].) And now there is a burst of fresh work giving fresh hope to an obviously attractive strategy. What has made it possible? I would suggest that it is the emergence of the idea of a folk doctrine ‐ folk psychology, folk physics, folk epistemology ‐ that allows us to see the employment of a particular concept as part of a network in accordance with a strategy for understanding a particular class of phenomena or negotiating a particular class of problems. We then have a manageable aim: to discover the structure of the network and the nature of the strategy.

The Sera Lecture 2004 Education Reform as Social Barberism: Economism and the End of Authenticity

within which the construct is embedded. I will ‘own up’ straight away to trading on and perpetuating parts of the ‘folk epistemology of professionalism’ (Pels, 1999: 102) and I want to have my conceptual cake and eat it. I shall try to treat professionalism as ‘what it is’, a form of situated practice, and make some claims for a normative version of a sort professionalism which is neither ‘folk’ nor ‘post’. I also want to take professionalism as emblematic of something else, of certain general changes in the nature of, or possibilities of our lives within high modernism. I also want to acknowledge that I write here from personal experience, from within rather than simply about the practices of professionalism. This is one more contribution to the cacophony of voices which speak to, for and about teachers which are competing to be heard with more or less success. I want to argue here that professionalism is coming to its end, is being dislodged from its ‘precarious, glittering existence’ – that there is a profound shift underway in several of the ‘many independent forces which condition the formation of teachers’ professional identities in practice’ (Dillabough 1999: 390). A shift so profound that within the ‘post-welfare’ regime of social service, professionalism as an ethicalcultural practice, appears to have no place, no future. Mine then is a narrative of despair, of loss and pain and betrayal, though it should not necessarily be read as a story of tarnished glory – more like a fairy story about the struggle between the lesser of two, or more, evils. I take it that professionalism, as a pre-reform or un-reformed category, rests, in part at least — because it also has important structural and organisational features — on a particular relationship between the practitioner and their work, a relationship of commitment that is located within communal and internal dialogues. That is,

Cultural differences and the law of noncontradiction: Some criteria for further research

Recent psychological research on the connection between culture and thought could have dire consequences for the idea that there are objective standards of reasoning and that meaningful cross-cultural discussion is possible. The problems are particularly acute if research shows that the Law of Noncontradiction (LNC) is not a universal of folk epistemology. It is extremely difficult to provide a non-circular justification for the LNC, and yet the LNC seems to act as a basic standard for reasoning in the West. If non-Western cultures do not believe the LNC holds, then meaningful cross-cultural discussion and debate will be very difficult, to say the least. In this paper it is argued that the distinction between belief and acceptance is important in analyzing cross-cultural studies on the way people reason. Studies conducted by Richard Nisbett and Kaiping Peng concerning differences between East Asians and Westerners are analyzed. The distinction between belief and acceptance is used to demonstrate that the empirical data currently available fail to show that the LNC is not a universal of folk epistemology. A brief proposal for further research is presented.

Skills, tasks, and definitions: discrepancies in the understanding and data on the development of folk epistemology

Claims have been made that similar patterns in the development of folk epistemology occur in children, adolescents, and college students. Some researchers claim that children hold absolutistic assumptions about knowledge that evolve into a kind of relativistic framework where personal interpretation is primary, and last into a rationalistic epistemology. Others suggest the same developmental sequence begins in early adolescence or during the college years. The question addressed in this article is how to make sense of these seemingly discrepant claims and the data supporting them. After initially reviewing the alternative models, Fischer's (Psychol. Rev. 87 (1980) 477–531) skill theory is suggested as a framework for understanding the apparent discrepancies that considers both measurement and time of development issues. Fischer and his colleagues distinguish between “functional level” and “optimal level”. Functional level is the level at which most people operate without contextual support or practice. It marks the lower end of the development range. He contrasts this to “optimal level” which marks the upper limit of the person's information processing activity. Performance on epistemological tasks may vary between these two levels. Functional and optimal level data from the reflective judgment model (Developing Reflective Judgment: Understanding and Promoting Intellectual Growth and Critical Thinking in Adolescents and Adults, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1994) are used to illustrate the different levels of folk epistemology expressed under these two conditions and different ages at which they appear. The importance of using consistent, structural descriptions of epistemological levels across different models is emphasized for comparison purposes and, again, skill theory is suggested as one alternative framework for describing differences in structure across levels and reinterpreting the data on epistemological assumptions in children, adolescents, and college students.

The role of experience in children's developing folk epistemology: review and analysis from the theory–theory perspective

The role of experience in children's developing folk epistemology, specifically in their acquisition of an understanding of belief, is explored from the theory–theory perspective (i.e., the perspective claiming that children's conceptual development can be viewed as analogous to scientific theory development) through a selective review and analysis of extant empirical literature. Three types of investigations are identified: examinations of observed relationships between social experiences and belief understanding, attempts to facilitate the reasoning of children on the verge of belief understanding through experiences intended to compel children to face reasoning inconsistencies; and training studies demonstrating that children can be trained to understand belief over time through specific feedback experiences. A comparison of these studies reveals that experience is defined differently across them, resulting in varying and sometimes ambiguous implications for a theory–theory perspective on development. Implications for future research are discussed.

Of audience, expertise and authority: The evolving creationism debate

The persistence of “scientific creationism” is a curiosity in an age where the epistemic authority of Darwinian evolution is virtually a commonplace. Rather than conceptualizing creationism as strictly a technical discourse or appealing to psychological explanations, this essay explores a rhetorical account for creation‐ism's appeal. It argues that creationism endures not only in spite of the response of the scientific community, but also, in part, because of it. An analysis of the creationism controversy between 1975 and 1990 indicates that the scientific response to creationism misconstrues both the scientific pretensions of creationism and the relative insularity of scientific decision making on questions of public policy. The response ultimately proves unresponsive to the public appeal of creationism which is grounded in an empiricist folk epistemology. This study has implications for our theoretical understandings of the relationships between technical and public discourses and the related relationship between technical expertise and rhetorical authority.

Disappearance and Knowledge

Paul Churchland argues that the continuity of human intellectual development provides evidence against folk psychology and traditional epistemology, since these latter find purchase only at the later stages of intellectual development. He supports this contention with an analogy from the history of thermodynamics. Careful attention to the thermodynamics analogy shows that the argument from continuity does not provide independent support for eliminative materialism. The argument also rests upon claims about continuity which do not support the claim that the continuity of intellectual development is evidence for the elimination of folk psychology. Traditional epistemology and folk psychology should not yet be abandoned.