Five Power Defence Arrangements Research Articles

Rupture or continuity? The evolving Australian approach to the Five Power Defence Arrangements from Gorton to Whitlam

The Whitlam Government’s decision in 1973 to withdraw Australian forces from Malaysia and Singapore has been regarded by some researchers as an act of disengagement with devastating effects for Australia’s regional engagement. However, a closer examination of the design of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) framework and a comparison between Whitlam’s and John Gorton’s positions on the defence of Southeast Asia indicate a realistic, bipartisan approach in Australia. The fact that Whitlam could withdraw Australian military forces from Malaysia and Singapore with relatively little resistance and minimal regional impact was largely due to Gorton’s strategic calculation during the FPDA’s negotiation. At the fundamental strategic level, the evolving Australian approach to the FPDA from Gorton to Whitlam was more a continuity than a rupture.

America's Role in the Five Power Defence Arrangements: Anglo-American Power Transition in South-East Asia, 1967–1971

ABSTRACTPrior to 1971, Britain played a key role in the security of Malaysia and Singapore, especially during the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) and Konfrontasi (1963–1966). Britain's military withdrawal from the east of Suez beginning from 1968 not only became a catalyst for post-colonial development of Malaysia and Singapore, but also pushed them towards America's security umbrella. Negotiations to replace the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement with a new defence arrangement were fraught with pussyfooting on the part of British, Australian and New Zealand leaders. The Malaysian and Singapore defence ministers were divided and contributed to further foot dragging. By the time the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) were signed by the five nations in November 1971, collective defence among the signatories had devolved to mere consultation. By analysing the obstacles encountered during the negotiations and American influence on the shape of the FPDA, this paper demonstrates that a power transition that had been set in motion after Second World War was completed by 1971 when British strategic influence in South-East Asia gave way to American dominance.

Mates all the way! From Konfrontasi to confronting China: Australia–Malaysia geostrategic cooperation

ABSTRACTAustralian and Malaysian strategic relations have evolved since the independence of Malaya in 1957 and the formation of Malaysia in 1963. Confronted with an aggressive neighbor, Indonesia set to “crush” Malaysia during its infancy years. The United Kingdom with Australia embarked on a military expedition to aid Malaysia in fighting an “undeclared” war. Australia committed troops in Malaysia and continued to maintain a physical presence in Malaysia after the Konfrontasi ended in 1966, and later under the auspices of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). China's recent assertion in the Asian region has precipitated mutual security risks for both Malaysia and Australia, and renewed interests for rigorous strategic cooperation. This article describes the power of geographical space and location, and its influence on the strategic context and logic of Australia-Malaysia strategic relationship.

Perkembangan Five Power Defence Arranggements dalam Menanggapi Dinamika Keamanan Asia Tenggara pasca Perang Dingin

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) is a regional security institution in Southeast Asia, with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and United Kingdom as its members. As one of the oldest, and still existing, regional security institution in the Southeast Asia region, FPDA’s existence seems to be unheard of, compared to the region’s Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or even the Cold War’s Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Although FPDA was created in the height of the Cold War, as well as in response to the potential hegemonic Indonesian threat to former British colonies, the institution is still exist even after both original existential threat wanes. In the end, how the FPDA can maintain its existence in the changing security dynamics in the region, especially after the end of the Cold War, is an interesting piece of puzzle to be solved.

China's Engagement with Regional Security Multilateralism: The Case of the Shangri-La Dialogue

Making sense of the implications of China's rise has become something of a scholarly industry. Given its scale, civilizational legacy and its place at the heart of the global economy, this is entirely appropriate. In International Relations (IR) debate the main focus is on whether China's economic growth is likely to lead to conflict with the United States and its allies. Some commentators argue that war between a dominant and rising power is almost inevitable, (1) while others contend that it can be avoided. (2) More liberally minded scholars make the case that China's interests are not well served by contesting power with the world's largest military, which also happens to be its biggest customer. (3) At the heart of this particular debate about the implications of China's rise is the extent to which a more prosperous and powerful China is likely to be a status quo or revisionist state. (4) Will a richer and more confident China accept existing arrangements or will it seek to rewrite the rules of the game? This question is of interest in many spheres, from trade policy to monetary arrangements, international institutions to development programmes; whether China supports or changes the established order has implications across almost every imaginable international policy field. One of the most important developments in international security policy in the post-war period has been the emergence of multilateral security cooperation as a core part of almost every state's security arrangements. Prior to 1945, apart from some ill-fated experiments at the League of Nations, multilateral security cooperation barely existed. Groups might form strategic alliances--as they did so disastrously prior to the First World War--but there was nothing resembling the scale, volume or frequency of the gatherings that now so routinely occur. States today regularly gather in multilateral groupings to collaborate on a vast array of security matters. This includes everything from cooperation to combat non-traditional security concerns such as infectious diseases and organized crime to multinational humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/ DR) training missions, from institutionalized summitry to gatherings of defence college heads. Prompted by the expansion of security challenges caused by globalization, changes in the understanding of what constitutes a security threat and broader normative shifts in world politics--perhaps the most important being the strong norm curtailing the use of force--multilateralism in security policy has become core business for all states. In Europe the embrace of multilateral approaches to security began shortly after the end of the Second World War. In the nascent structures of what became the European Union (EU), such as the Council of Europe, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), states began to work collectively to advance commonly held security aims. In East Asia, the turn to multilateralism was rather more circumspect. During the Cold War, security arrangements were almost entirely in the hands of states themselves or organized through traditional bilateral alliances. Efforts such as the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) were very much the exception and at the margins of strategic influence. Beyond these, perhaps the only example of an institution associated with security multilateralism was the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that was founded in 1967. Intended to provide an international framework to produce more harmonious regional relations, and as a bulwark against communist insurgency, this new body had some security dimensions. (5) Yet it was still principally a means to support the broader state and nation-building projects of societies newly liberated from European and Japanese imperialism. Since the mid-1990s, however, East Asian states have made up for lost time and have created a wide range of multilateral processes and institutions with security as a key part of their purpose and rationale. …

Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asia’s Defence Diplomacy

Asia's multilateral defence diplomacy is an increasingly important aspect of regional politics and a burgeoning area of interest for scholarship. The creation of the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in 2002, the inauguration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) in May 2006 and the arrival of the ADMM-Plus process in October 2010 has seen the establishment of a major new stream of regional dialogue and diplomacy. These arrangements also have a track two multilateral partner--the Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutes (NADI), a parallel arrangement to the long-running and influential ASEAN-ISIS. (1) These processes are increasingly attracting interest from analysts, although the body of work remains comparatively small alongside the attention lavished on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In 2012 a special issue of the journal Asian Security examined Asia's defence diplomacy, including China's activities in the region and the contribution of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). (2) Scholars have asked whether there is a Southeast Asian model of defence cooperation that might be emulated or referenced by others. (3) The origins and function of the SLD have been the subject of close academic scrutiny, (4) and there is a growing body of research looking at bilateral defence diplomacy (5) and the connection between bilateral and multilateral arrangements. (6) To date, however, most of this work has been more concerned with describing the evolution of defence diplomacy in the region, its origins and purpose than it has been with considering recent developments in the context of theoretical debates. (7) This article seeks to build on the existing literature by outlining some ways in which Asia's defence diplomacy can inform and challenge contemporary debates in international relations theory. (8) In particular, it looks at the rise of multilateral defence diplomacy against the backdrop of the scholarship concerning norm change and institutional innovation. At its heart are two questions: why was multilateral defence diplomacy so late to arrive in Asia, and what explains its rapid rise? The article is divided into three parts. The first section briefly defines defence diplomacy and outlines the general trajectory of East Asia's defence and military diplomacy in recent decades. The second part explores why defence diplomacy has been a relative laggard when compared to other forms of institutionalized security dialogue, and what explains its recent rise. I argue that explanations that stress the catalytic of external shocks such as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) or changes in the distribution of power or threats (for example, the rise of China) are underdetermining. Rather, the explanation advanced here focuses on agents and changing norms around multilateral defence cooperation. Using the lens of constitutive localization, I argue that the institutional innovation that has occurred since 2006 reflects a strategic calculation on the part of ASEAN elites, who adopted and adapted ideas initially put forward by outsiders in order to maintain ASEAN's central place in the regional security architecture. Its rise has been helped by the changing role of militaries in some East Asian states and its rapid institutionalization owes much to historical contingency, in particular the interests of two influential ASEAN Chairs in Indonesia and Vietnam. The final part of the article offers a brief assessment of the future prospects and influence of regional multilateral defence diplomacy. Defining Defence Diplomacy Defence diplomacy is a relatively new arrival in the lexicon of Asia-Pacific security. One study of the vocabulary of regional security published in 2008 includes numerous terms for diplomacy and engagement but notably omits defence or military diplomacy. (9) What then does defence diplomacy mean in Asia? Like many expressions in the security studies lexicon, the origin and meaning of the term are contested. …

The Five Power Defence Arrangements and Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) marked its 40th year of existence on November 1, 2011. What explains the durability of a collection of bilateral consultative arrangements initially conceived in the context of the British military withdrawal from East of Suez? Examining the FPDA as an institutional expression of defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia sheds light on its longevity. The arrangements have successfully operated as a defense diplomacy instrument by fulfilling three core functions. The FPDA has traditionally acted as a psychological deterrent with the fear of an assertive Indonesia in mind. It has performed a confidence-building role in the Singapore–Malaysian relationship. Finally, it has provided Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom with an instrument to be engaged in Southeast Asian security.

Malaysia, Singapore, and the Road to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), July 1970–November 1971

The Five Power Defence Arrangements refl ected a process of often vigorous negotiation designed to maintain a viable Commonwealth defence structure and relationship in the aftermath of Britain's withdrawal of forces from Southeast Asia. This paper demonstrates the internal confl icts that arose in the negotiations, and sets these in the context of tensions between Malaysia and Singapore and the recent military history of the region.

The Five Power Defence Arrangements and the reappraisal of the British and Australian policy interests in Southeast Asia, 1970–75

Working from recently declassified Australian and British government files, this paper examines the archival evidence on policy thinking in London and Canberra towards the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) during the period 1970–75. The article argues that one of the main reasons for the Heath government's decision to deploy a token military force in Southeast Asia as part of a multilateral defence arrangement with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore was the desire to uphold these Commonwealth connections. By contrast, Canberra was beginning to question the value of such arrangements in a rapidly changing Southeast Asian strategic environment.

The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Continuing Relevance

From tentative beginnings in 1971, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which groups Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore have developed into a credible military cooperation arrangement with the potential to play a role in regional security, in areas such as maritime security, counter-terrorism, and disaster rescue. The FPDA has other important roles, such as a deterrent to external attack, as a CBM between Malaysia and Singapore, an enabler for Britain, Australia, and New Zealand to remain engaged in a region of importance to them, and networking, which helps to sustain long-standing military relationships dating back to the Malayan Emergency. Despite constraints, the comfortable military working relationship, the flexibility of the Arrangements, the uncertainties of the regional security environment, and the multidimensional nature of security challenges that require a coordinated response, have meant that it has become part of the post-Cold War and post-11 September regional security architecture.

The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia´ s Unknown Regional Security Organization

This article traces the evolution of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) since its establishment in 1971 to the present day. It details the evolution of the FPDA's three main pillars: the Integrated Area Defence System (IADS), the architecture for political-military dialogue, and the exercise programme. In addition, the article tries to place the FPDA in the context of the security roles played by ASEAN, the ARF, intra-regional bilateral military ties, and the defence relationship with United States. It argues that, while the FPDA's role in upholding regional security cannot be equated to the military contribution of the United States, and the grouping certainly faces significant challenges, it nevertheless contributes positively and innovatively to the ability of Malaysia and Singapore to address not only conventional threats, but increasingly asymmetric and non-conventional security challenges as well, thereby contributing to the overall maintenance of regional security.

Challenges Facing ASEAN in a More Complex Age

Relations between members of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) took a dramatic turn in late 1998. presidents of Indonesia and the Philippines criticized the Malaysian Government's treatment of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Indonesian President B.J. Habibie cancelled a visit to Malaysia, and at one point both he and Philippine President Joseph Estrada contemplated boycotting the APEC summit in Kuala Lumpur in November. Thai leaders also expressed sympathy with Anwar, and Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew said it was bad if Anwar had been bashed while in jail. Malaysia, in turn, insisted that the Philippines and Indonesia refrain from interfering in its internal affairs, and postponed a meeting on border matters with the Philippines. Several Malaysian leaders, together with the pro-government media, also commented unfavourably on presidents Habibie and Estrada. A little earlier, other bilateral conflicts had grabbed media attention. most dramatic were between Malaysia and Singapore, over issues including commercial disagreements, the location of Malaysian customs, immigration and quarantine (CIQ) operations for train services, the supply of Malaysian water to Singapore, alleged violations of Malaysian airspace by Singapore military aircraft, and a book of memoirs by Senior Minister Lee. Security co-operation under the Five-Power Defence Arrangements was disrupted for the first time, with Malaysia suspending the 1998 exercises, ostensibly for budgetary reasons. Indonesia-Singapore relations were affected by Senior Minister Lee's February 1998 criticism of B.J. Habibie's possible appointment as Vice-President. In a memorable retort, President Habibie told the Wall Street Journal in August that Singapore was just a little red dot on the map. ASEAN's image was tarnished by these events. And indeed, there had been much questioning of ASEAN's usefulness since the middle of 1997.(1) regional economic crisis was part of the reason for this - the perception of individual countries as exemplars of the Asian economic miracle was affected, and ASEAN as an organization seemed unable to respond. At the same time, ASEAN was seen as in addressing the haze that engulfed the region in the second half of 1997, the Hun Sen coup in Cambodia in July, and human rights concerns in Myanmar after that country was admitted into the organization. international media began to describe ASEAN as a failure. July 1998 Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) did little to redress this perception. Thailand's proposal for a move to flexible engagement - widely considered a departure from the principle of non-intervention - was supported only by the Philippines, and seen as indicating further divisions within ASEAN's ranks. At the December ASEAN Summit in Hanoi, most government leaders reflected on these problems. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad observed that the economic crisis had created the impression of an ASEAN in disarray, its members at odds with one another. His Singapore counterpart, Goh Chok Tong, lamented that some Dialogue Partners believed ASEAN had been exposed as ineffective - a perception that was not entirely without basis. Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai observed that: The economic and financial crisis we are going through has somewhat eroded our self-confidence. It has raised doubts and questions about whether ASEAN can regain its vibrancy and vitality. Some have gone so far as to write us off.(2) These developments have opened up some major questions. Is the perception of an ASEAN in disarray - or even in crisis - warranted? Is the economic crisis the main cause of ASEAN's problems? How is ASEAN responding? Is ASEAN still needed? ASEAN in Crisis? Two Reasons For Caution Claims that ASEAN is in disarray or in crisis have frequently been made in the past, but subsequently disproved. When ASEAN was formed in 1967 it was divided by almost all kinds of differences conceivable - historical, racial, cultural, political, and economic. …

Stability and Security in the Region after ANZUK

Implicit in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) of 16 April 1971 is an assessment, generally agreed upon by the participating states, of the contemporary situation in Southeast Asia. Explicit in ANZUK, established in November 1971, is the action which Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom agreed at the time was required in the circumstances by their national interests, and which was acceptable to Malaysia and Singapore, the other two partners. But in the changed circumstances of 1974 their assessments of the regional situation have diverged, and priorities in the pursuit of national interests have been changed by political choices and economic pressures. The FPDA implies that the interests of the members, if not identical, are congruent and similar enough to one another's, and different enough from the interests of others concerned with the region, to merit mutual consultation in addition, but not antagonistic, to the other consultative and action groups to which each belongs. ANZUK (an integrated command of the three services set up by Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom independently of the FPDA on the grounds of efficiency and economy), a modus operandi of the FPDA, was neither its purpose nor its prescription. With the end of the process of dismantling ANZUK on 1 January 1975, the FPDA remains intact as a convention of consultation on what is still agreed to be an area of common concern, though not necessarily of common diagnosis in description, or common direction of action. The strategic baby has not been thrown out with the tactical or political bath-water. Whether it will be more or less effective as a pentagonal pattern of power without ANZUK can only be assessed in the light of the new circumstances as reflected in the five facets of the national interests of the members. What were the circumstances out of which grew both the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the ANZUK Force? The precipitating issue was the announce ment by the British in 1968 of the accelerated and specific time-table of their withdrawal from their base in Singapore, and from their commitments under the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement. The robust image of Mountbatten of SEAC (Southeast Asia Command) in 1945 and of Mountbatten of India in 1947 had faded in the eyes of the world and in the esteem of the British people. Dilatory, if not dilettante, strategic thinking was caught up by the urgencies of political party change and eco nomic stringency which set the background and the pace of the Labour Government's announcement in 1968 of complete British withdrawal before the end of 1971, thus setting the terminal date by which alternative arrangements were required to be made. The tensions of Singapore's abrupt, unplanned, and complete separation from Ma laysia in 1965 continued; and the Kuala Lumpur riots of April 1969 at first sight seemed to strengthen the same groups as those which had inspired separation. Mean while Singapore was proving, but had not yet proved her capacity, militarily and eco