Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Research Articles

Pakistan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

The arrival of nuclear weapons was detrimental in changing the nature of warfare; duringWWII, we used nuclear weapons on two Japanese cities. The catastrophic effect of nuclear weapons made the pioneers apprehensive about the spread of nuclear technology across the globe. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NNPR) is a set of international rules, norms, initiatives, agreements, arrangements, bilateral and multilateral treaties to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the backbone of NNPR. This paper discusses the significance of NNPR and will focus on how Pakistan fits into the bigger picture of the NNPR as a nuclear state. This research study will further analyze the prospects and challenges for Pakistan viz a viz the NNPR. It will specifically focus on Pakistan's official position on joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and the two relevant Export Control Regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime). Moreover, the challenges Pakistan faces viz-a-viz these treaties and arrangements will be highlighted. Recommendations will be provided based on the prospects of how Pakistan can overcome these challenges.

Walking Back Delusional Nuclear Policies

India’s ‘dual use’ nuclear policy has been strung out from the beginning between the peaceful atom and military atom as illustrated in Jawaharlal Nehru’s use of the phrase for the country’s nuclear energy programme—‘Janus-faced’. However, the Indian Government has been too influenced by its own rhetoric of peaceful use to equally emphasise the security aspects that the phrase implied.While Nehru championed disarmament, he did so in the 1950s in the United Nations’ First Committee as cover for the military capability being developed under Homi Bhabha’s astute leadership. But the myth about disarmament leadership meant that even after Indira Gandhi refrained from signing the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty because it sought to freeze the ‘have and have-not’ divide, Delhi has been pusillanimous about weaponisation but gung-ho about beefing up its non-proliferation credentials by joining or seeking to join the very technology denial regimes (Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenar Arrangement, Australia Group) that have victimised the country. The desire to please the US and the West has to end and national security aspects prioritised as all weapons states are doing.It is time for India to resume nuclear testing to equip the arsenal with proven, reliable and safe thermonuclear weapons/warheads, and limit damage and recover strategic space by ensuring that neither the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty nor the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty happens.

Detecting Clandestine Reprocessing Activities in the Middle East

ABSTRACTRemote monitoring of krypton-85 from undeclared reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel could be part of a fissile material cut-off treaty, could serve as an additional measure for the IAEA safeguards system to monitor compliance with the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, and could be an important verification tool of a reprocessing moratorium or Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East or East Asia. Atmospheric transport modelling is applied to determine the area over which krypton-85 emissions from undeclared reprocessing activities at various levels in the Middle East would still be detectable against the high krypton-85 background from reprocessing in historical weapon programs in the United States and USSR as well as more recent and ongoing commercial reprocessing in France and the U.K. Analysis of annual wind flow over Israel's Dimona facility, the only operating reprocessing site in the region, suggests that a known reprocessing plant could be monitored with one or a few fixed monitoring stations. Random air sampling for krypton-85 analysis, perhaps using drones, may be feasible for reliable and timely detection of clandestine reprocessing plants against the krypton-85 background but would require on the order of 50–100 air samples per day. Ending reprocessing at La Hague in France and at Sellafield in the UK and the resulting decline of the krypton-85 background over time would reduce to about 10 the number of daily samples required to monitor the Middle East.

A Novel Framework for Safeguarding Naval Nuclear Material

ABSTRACTThe present international standard allows non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to forego safeguards when nuclear material is used in a “non-proscribed military activity,” though no criteria have been established to determine when NNWS can remove naval nuclear material from safeguards. Though at present, only nuclear-armed states possess nuclear submarines, the global nuclear naval landscape may soon change with the advancement of Brazil's fledgling program and the possible precedent it would set for other NNWS. A framework is needed to shore up nuclear security and prevent nuclear material diversion from the nuclear naval sector. Proposed and existing nonproliferation frameworks, including a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and commitments through the nuclear security summits, are insufficient to close this loophole. A Naval Use Safeguards Agreement (NUSA), modeled after the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would provide a framework to remove the opacity surrounding nuclear material in the naval sector. Designed for NNWS and encouraged as confidence-building measures for nuclear weapon states, NUSA would explicitly outline those stages in the naval nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are to be applied and in what context. This viewpoint also further provides direction for targeted research and development in technical naval nuclear safeguards solutions.

Justice and Injustice in the Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

The Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty (fm(c)t) has been on the negotiation agenda since 1996, but has seen little progress. This is due to a fundamental disagreement over whether emphasis should be placed on nuclear disarmament or nuclear non-proliferation. Several delegations perceive the fm(c)t as a tool to draw in states from outside the non-proliferation regime, while others understand it to be a disarmament measure that reduces quantities of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. They however, regard the unwillingness of nuclear weapon states to engage toward this end as deeply unjust. Additional disagreements also concern justice: Should there be different standards of verification? May some states continue to produce unverified military fuel? As long as the nuclear weapon states only push their interests through pure power instead of respecting the notion of justice, no progress can be expected and the non-proliferation regime will further erode.

President Obama's Nuclear Legacy

ABSTRACT President Obama has built a lasting legacy by reducing the number of nuclear weapons and their role in U.S. policy—laying a foundation for further reductions and making progress in securing fissile materials. This article reviews that legacy and provides an outline for bolder action in a possible second term. In such a term, Obama would also have an historic opportunity to do more to fulfill his Prague vision and enhance our security by tossing out the remaining cold war-era policies. He could achieve these goals by pursuing an additional round of arms reductions with Russia, securing Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, pulling tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe, and continuing to contain the nuclear weapons ambitions of Iran and North Korea. Were President Obama to achieve substantial progress on this agenda, it would be one of the most substantial and long-standing accomplishments of his presidency.

Countdown to global zero – on hold?

Two-and-a-half years after US President Barack Obama made a speech in Prague outlining his commitment to nuclear disarmament, many have been disappointed by the subsequent slow progress on the issue. A new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty had a difficult passage through Congress during 2010 (despite the treaty's modest ambitions); the United States has not significantly changed its nuclear deterrence doctrine nor ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; and Pakistan has blocked an envisaged Fissile-Material Cut-off Treaty. Although the so-called Prague agenda was cautious from the outset, it has been slower than envisioned.

China's HEU and Plutonium Production and Stocks

This article discusses the history of China's production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons and uses new public information to estimate the amount of highly enriched uranium and plutonium China produced at its two gaseous diffusion plants and two plutonium production complexes. The new estimates in this article are that China produced 20 ± 4 tons of HEU, 2 ± 0.5 tons of plutonium, and currently has stockpiles of about 16 ± 4 tons of HEU and 1.8 ± 0.5 tons of plutonium available for weapons. The values for China's fissile material production are at the low end of most previous independent estimates, which range from 17–26 tons of highly enriched uranium and 2.1–6.6 tons of plutonium. These new estimates would be significant to assess China's willingness to join a fissile material cutoff treaty and a multilateral nuclear disarmament.

Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia: a Realistic Narrative

President Obama's expressed desire about a nuclear-weapon-free world seems unattainable in the prevailing global strategic environment. India and Pakistan have adopted an apathetic approach towards the concept of Nuclear Zero, because the intellectual and political movements in favour of a nuclearweapons-free South Asia suffer from unconvincing rationales, inherent contradictions and unrealistic expectations. New Delhi and Islamabad have failed to negotiate and execute a bilateral arms control agreement or treaty, which would prevent a nuclear arms race and decrease the mistrust between them. Thus, they are continuing to produce fissile material and are manufacturing, testing and adding dual-capable ballistic/cruise missiles to their arsenals. The India-specific amendment in the Nuclear Suppliers Group export guidelines in September 2008 has further toughened Pakistan's stance in the Conference on Disarmament on the idea of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia: a Realistic Narrative

President Obama's expressed desire about a nuclear-weapon-free world seems unattainable in the prevailing global strategic environment. India and Pakistan have adopted an apathetic approach towards the concept of Nuclear Zero, because the intellectual and political movements in favour of a nuclearweapons-free South Asia suffer from unconvincing rationales, inherent contradictions and unrealistic expectations. New Delhi and Islamabad have failed to negotiate and execute a bilateral arms control agreement or treaty, which would prevent a nuclear arms race and decrease the mistrust between them. Thus, they are continuing to produce fissile material and are manufacturing, testing and adding dual-capable ballistic/cruise missiles to their arsenals. The India-specific amendment in the Nuclear Suppliers Group export guidelines in September 2008 has further toughened Pakistan's stance in the Conference on Disarmament on the idea of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

India and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty: Policy Options

The international community inside and outside the Conference of Disarmament is underscoring the need for concluding a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). The Indian government, for a long period, has been sponsoring the idea. Notwithstanding the international stagnation, the issue has been instigating periodic debate in India on the Indian approach. The periodic revival of the issue requires that India revisit its policy on fissile material production as well as its approach towards a possible FMCT. This article examines the question: should India's approach to conclude an FMCT be within the UN institutional framework? The new international reality is pushing for a new context, new realignments and a fresh outlook for an FMCT. India should take its own time to support conclusion of an FMCT so that its national interests and security are not adversely affected.

China's Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World

A new wave of interest in the complete elimination of nuclear-weapons is washing over international security institutions. Although the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is as old as the nuclear...

The Baruch Plan and the Quest for Atomic Disarmament

Arms control has emerged as a central component in the diplomatic approach unveiled by the Obama administration. With a long-term goal of abolishing nuclear weapons, interim steps include the revision and potential expansion of existing treaties and a strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, including a potential Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Such a treaty would mandate that member states submit to rigorous inspection and cataloguing of their stocks of nuclear materials in return for assistance in the development of civilian nuclear programs. This approach, whilst ambitious, is not new. In this article I explore the development, negotiation and ultimate failure of what is often referred to as “the Baruch Plan,” the first attempt to cooperatively control atomic energy under the auspices of the newly formed United Nations. The failure of the Baruch Plan provides important lessons for scholars and practitioners, and underscores the inherent challenges of arms control cooperation.

The India-Canada Civilian Nuclear Deal

Regimes to control weapons of mass destruction have been impressively effective, making nuclear acquisition less simple and significantly more expensive. Yet despite these mechanisms, a few states still find it to their self-defensive, prestigious, or strategic advantage to develop nuclear weapons, regardless of the dramatic international response to these proliferation decisions. India, in 1974 and then again in 1998, made such a decision, testing a nuclear device and announcing its intention to become a nuclear weapons state. Since this announcement, India has been an international nuclear pariah, a status compounded by its refusal to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the comprehensive test ban treaty, or the fissile material cut-off treaty.1 It is this breach ofthe international regime that has raised questions, frustration, and even anger about the 2005 announcement that India and the United States were negotiating a civilian nuclear transfer agreement, effectively transforming 35 years of American and international nuclear policy. Detractors from the agreement declared the end ofthe international nonproliferation regime, arguing that the deal rewards India's nuclear proliferation and signals to other aspiring nuclear states that legitimacy is gained by those that wait it out. Supporters ofthe deal argue that the regime has been so strict in implementing the principles of nonproliferation and disarmament that there has been no room for states like India, undermining the regime's ineffectiveness.Canada made the decision to pursue its own nuclear transfer agreement with India in August 2008, following negotiations at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, yet few analyses have examined the effects such a deal would have on Canada's own foreign policy. Not only has this decision determined Canada's own nuclear position, but it changes Canada's nuclear relationship with the United States and the larger international nuclear regime, and affects its broader South Asian foreign policy.While the bulk of debate has focused on the deal's nonproliferation and disarmament effects, this article argues that the Canadian decision to sign a deal has major positive outcomes. First, the article offers a brief nuclear history of Canada's bilateral relationship with India. It goes on to establish the context of US nuclear policy leading up to the deal, particularly in relation to the events of 11 September 2001. It then details the central objectives ofthe so-called 123 deal (after section 123 ofthe US Atomic Energy Act), particularly India's energy requirements and the US nonproliferation stipulations; examines the major arguments for and against the 123 agreement in the area of international nonproliferation, with a focus on how these perspectives relate to Canada's nuclear objectives; and, finally, discusses three major arguments supporting the Harper government's decision to sign a civilian nuclear deal with India.CANADA'S HISTORICAL NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIAFor obvious reasons, Canada's nuclear policy developed in parallel to its bilateral relationship with India. At the time of India's independence, there was a friendly relationship between India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Canada's Louis St. Laurent and Lester B. Pearson. Nehru's commitment to peaceful civilian nuclear energy and global disarmament was assuring to Canadian leaders, who insisted that India begin its civilian nuclear program with investment in the CANDU reactor. While Canada was committed to the idea of peaceful nuclear energy, there was hesitation by some members ofthe government who recognized that India's nuclear interests might be less benign than once assumed. Canada's decision to move forward with a nuclear transfer relationship with India was based on three arguments. First, it was possible that other states would offer India nuclear technology, but at least Canada would be in a position to offer the adequate safeguards to stop proliferation. …

Krypton isotopic signature study of the primary coolant of CANDU nuclear power plant

To support interpretation of observed atmospheric krypton radioisotopes, a database of krypton radioisotope in the primary coolant of CANDU reactors has been established. This database is comprised of 40,000 records of high-quality 89Kr, 87Kr, 88Kr and 85mKr analyses. Records from the database were retrieved by a specifically designed data-mining module and subjected to further analysis. Results from the analysis were subsequently used to study isotopic ratios of observed krypton radioisotopes in the CANDU reactor primary coolant. These studies provided practical information on the characterization of CANDU reactor krypton radioisotope, which can potentially be used to discriminate between reactor effluent and fuel reprocessing for nuclear safeguard 85Kr monitoring applications (Kalinowski et al., J Environ Radioact 73:203, 2004). The study also has some potential application to Fissile material cut-off treaty.

Verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: The case of enrichment facilities and the role of ultra-trace level isotope ratio analysis

One challenge to a potential verification regime for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would be to assure that enrichment plants are not producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons purposes. Namely in some older enrichment plants, operated in nuclear weapon states, environmental sampling techniques might detect particles from historic HEU production. Determination of the age of these particles would be the most direct confirmation of treaty-compliance. While methods are available to determine the age of nuclear materials based on the concentrations of decay products, micron-sized uranium particles are particularly difficult to analyze. We will review the sensitivity requirements for age determination of HEU particles in an FMCT, and assess the potential of advanced measurement techniques available for this application.

The continuing risk of nuclear war

Climate change and nuclear war are currently the most dangerous challenges to human civilisation and survival. The effects of climate change are now sufficient to persuade many governments to take effective measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Today there are about 27,000 nuclear warheads, many at least ten times more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, and a meaningful medical response to a nuclear attack is impossible. Nevertheless, the threat of nuclear war does not raise public concern, and indeed the nuclear-weapon states are upgrading their capability. The only effective preventive measure is the abolition of nuclear weapons. Steps towards this include: a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, for the nuclear weapon states to observe their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to enter into force. The ultimate need is for a Nuclear Weapons Convention; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War have launched an International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons (ICAN) to promote a NWC.

An Initial Analysis of 85 Kr Production and Dispersion from Reprocessing in India and Pakistan

Reprocessing of nuclear reactor spent fuel to recover plutonium is accompanied by release of krypton-85 ( 85 Kr), a fission product. Monitoring for 85 Kr might form a part of the verification regime of a possible fissile material cut-off treaty and, in the interim, a South Asian moratorium on reprocessing for military and civilian plutonium. Estimates are made of plutonium and 85 Kr generated in the spent fuel of India's CIRUS and Dhruva plutonium production reactors, and Pakistan's Khushab reactor, and of the release of 85 Kr from subsequent reprocessing activities at India's Trombay reprocessing plant and Pakistan's facility at Nilore. The reprocessing of nuclear power reactor spent fuel at India's Tarapur and Kalpakkam facilities is also examined since India reportedly conducted a nuclear weapons test in May 1998 using non-weapons grade plutonium. The atmospheric dispersion of krypton from reprocessing activities in South Asia is modeled using both a simple Gaussian plume model and a more sophisticated code available for download or to run on the web, the Hybrid Single Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory model (HYSPLIT-4), developed by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Air Resources Laboratory and Australia's Bureau of Meteorology. Preliminary results suggest that it would be difficult to detect the release of krypton from nuclear weapons related reprocessing activities in India and Pakistan at distances of more than around a hundred kilometers, assuming representative atmospheric conditions. This would make it difficult for mutual independent verification of a moratorium on reprocessing of military and civilian plutonium. A possible way forward is offered by claims that the U.S. may have monitored 85 Kr emissions from Pakistan's Nilore reprocessing facility. The results presented here seem to support the possibility that the U.S. embassy could have been used as an air sampling station, in keeping with an apparently long standing U.S. program, "Operation Bluenose," to monitor krypton emissions associated with reprocessing. An India-Pakistan moratorium could be based on a similar capability, if India were to use its embassy in Islamabad as a monitoring station and allowed Pakistan to open a consulate in Mumbai, which would be able to detect reprocessing emissions from Trombay and Tarapur, and to open a consulate in Madras for detecting possible reprocessing activity at Kalpakkam.

1124. 原子力平和利用における保障措置の観点からみた核軍縮に関連する核物質の検証措置のあり方

Since the end of cold war, negotiations on nuclear disarmament have made progress and its verification systems are under consideration. One of them is verification system for disposition of excess nuclear materials including weapon grade plutonium between USA and Russia and another is verification system of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Such verification systems, which will be applied also to Nuclear-Weapon-States (NWS), can affect IAEA safeguards applied to peaceful nuclear activities in Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States (NNWS). NNWS have much experience to accept IAEA comprehensive safeguards in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Concept of verification systems related to nuclear material for nuclear disarmament is considered and analyzed from the view point of experience of NNWS so that no additional obligation will be born by the NNWS which accept comprehensive safeguards strengthened already by additional protocol.

A Pragmatic Approach for Negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

AbstractA Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices is a natural next step on the multinational nuclear arms control agenda. Despite interest among key states and excessive stockpiles of fissile material, a formalized cut-off has yet to materialize. A new pragmatic approach for negotiating an FMCT patterned after the recent Mine Ban Treaty is presented as a potential model. Sweden, together with the other countries of the New Agenda Coalition, is identified as a possible candidate to take the lead and host an alternative FMCT negotiation process.