Fisheries Subsidies Research Articles

Book Review: Fisheries Subsidies, Sustainable Development and the WTO

Book Review: Fisheries Subsidies, Sustainable Development and the WTO

Fuelling the fisheries subsidy debate: Agreements, loopholes and implications

There is a general consensus that most subsidies to fisheries, particularly fuel subsidies, are harmful to both the economy and the environment. As the World Trade Organization struggles to come to an agreement on fisheries subsidies, understanding the position of the negotiating countries is crucial. As we move toward more sustainable regulations, we must ensure that no loopholes exist for countries to evade binding regulations. In this note, we use the example of the United States to illustrate how arguments for exemptions can lead to such loopholes. The United States provides interesting insight, as it appears that their support for a ban on fisheries subsidies may be contingent upon a legal pun, which would allow them and other countries to carry on subsidizing fuel to their fishing fleets into the future.

Trade and the Oceans: A New Paradigm for Environmental Protection and Conservation

Increasing attention is being given to the nexus between international trade rules and environment/resource issues, especially how trade agreements and rules affect the global commons. To date, trade agreements largely have been confined to fostering environmental cooperation and promoting compliance with existing domestic environmental laws and regulations. The impact of such agreements, many argue, has been minimal in terms of having a tangible effect on the environment. However, current negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) offer the possibility of incorporating concrete environmental commitments within a traditional commercial trade agreement. Fisheries subsidies, seafood fraud, and other illegal fishing activities are mainstream issues for trade negotiations, not a radical effort to insert extraneous non-trade issues into trade negotiations. A review of the trade disciplines and measures in the tool boxes of trade negotiators provides numerous examples of how to do this, using the fisheries sector as an example.

Fisheries Subsidies, Sustainable Development and the WTO

Fisheries Subsidies, Sustainable Development and the WTO

Fisheries Subsidies, Sustainable Development and the WTO

This comprehensive resource manual explains why and how the reform of fisheries subsidies has become one of the most important international efforts to achieve global, environmental, economic and developmental policy coherence. It provides a historic overview, synthesis and analysis of key issues regarding fisheries subsidies reform and the current development of fisheries subsidies negotiations at the WTO. The book presents country experienecs from Ecuador, Norway and Senegal illustrating the impact of subsidies and reform processess. Accompanying the manual is a CD-ROM containing relevant source material from other organisations for further reading. Includes forward by A. Steiner.

Study on Current Situation and Its Countermeasures of Fishery Subsidy Problems in Our Country

Study on Current Situation and Its Countermeasures of Fishery Subsidy Problems in Our Country

Marine Protected Area Costs as “Beneficial” Fisheries Subsidies: A Global Evaluation

Marine protected areas (MPAs) are now generally accepted as important tools in the protection of coastal biodiversity. It is also likely that they play a positive role in enhancing fisheries. Yet currently, less than 1% of the global oceans are protected, although international agreements have targets ranging from 10–30% coverage. Despite its minuscule size, we consider the current MPA “network” to be beneficial to fisheries, and its running or maintenance cost, therefore, to be a positive contribution to the sustainability of fisheries, or a “beneficial” subsidy (“harmful” subsidies enhance fishing capacity and effort). A method was derived from data in Balmford et al. (PNAS, 101: 9694–9697) to estimate the annual cost of maintaining MPAs as a function of their size, and of the degree of development of the country in question. We provide national costs of the 53 countries that jointly contribute 95% of global fisheries catch and, assuming that this type of subsidy, in a given country, cannot exceed 15% of the ex-vessel value of its fisheries catches, estimated a global MPA subsidy to fisheries of 870 million US$. Given that total subsidies to fisheries currently range from 30–34 billion US$ annually (without MPA costs), this amounts to only 2.5–2.8% of total subsidies to fisheries being devoted explicitly to the maintenance of the biodiversity that sustains them.

Implications of Concluding the WTO Doha Round Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations on SVEs

The WTO Doha Development Round negotiations, as its name implies, is expected to improve the existing global trade regime in the direction of enhancing the interest of developing county Members. Such a developmental objective has also been confirmed, as a legal mandate, in the Doha and the Hong Kong Ministerial Declarations. However, in the case of fisheries subsidies talks, inter alia, it is found that both the draft text by the Chair of the Trade Negotiations Committee and the proposals by some WTO Members, while aiming at prohibiting fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and over-fishing, have failed to appropriately recognize the importance of the fisheries sector to developing country Members in terms of poverty reduction, food security and livelihood. Given that Small Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) are composed of island and coastal developing country Members and thus the fisheries sector is of even more particular significance to them, this paper, through comprehensively examining the ongoing negotiations on trade rules and exploring the potential negative impacts they may cause on SVEs, presents a series of countermeasures that should be taken in striking a balance between the prevention of over-fishing and SVEs’ development priorities

Fragmentation or interaction: the WTO, fisheries subsidies, and international law

AbstractSubsidies to the fishing sector have trade and ecological consequences, especially for fisheries that are over-exploited. In response, WTO members are negotiating to clarify and improve the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Yet significant legal challenges constrain this ongoing effort because fisheries conservation and management matters are often addressed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, instruments of the Food and Agriculture Organization, and other legal regimes to which some WTO members have not consented. This article analyses modes of learning and information exchange within the WTO regime, and compares the proposed use of standards, benchmarks, and peer review in the draft fisheries subsidies rules with existing arrangements between the WTO and organizations such as the OECD and product standard-setting bodies. It argues that novel deliberative strategies of regime interaction are more important in resolving the challenges posed by international law's fragmentation than adherence to strict mandates or legal hierarchies.

Quantification of U.S. Marine Fisheries Subsidies

AbstractSubsidies to the fishing industry are common worldwide, and it is well accepted that these subsidies contribute to overcapacity in fishing fleets and overexploitation of fisheries resources. To date, however, most of the quantitative estimates of these subsidies reported in the literature have been at either the multicountry or global level. Estimates are rarely based on a detailed accounting of individual subsidy programs, limiting both their accuracy and usefulness for management decisions. The present analysis helps fill this gap with respect to U.S. fisheries subsidies. Here, we report estimates of the different types of subsidies paid to the fishing sector by different levels of government in the USA. Our analysis shows that from 1996 to 2004, the U.S. fishing industry received a total of US$6.4 billion (1 billion = 109) in government subsidies (an average of $713 million per year), federal funds accounting for 79% of this total. This estimate is conservative because it does not include funding for fisheries management, port construction and maintenance, or subsidy program administration. Federal and state fuel subsidies (44% combined) and federal and state fisheries research (40% combined) accounted for the vast majority of fisheries subsidies. The next three largest subsidies were state sales tax subsidies (5%), disaster aid (4%), and fishing access payments (3%). Distribution was heavily weighted toward Alaska and the western Pacific and toward Pacific salmon Oncorhynchus spp. and tunas (family Scombridae). Similar detailed examinations of fisheries subsidies in other countries will be necessary in the likely event that the World Trade Organization establishes rules prohibiting subsidies that contribute to overcapacity.

Will the “Friends of Climate” Emerge in the WTO? The Prospects of Applying the “Fisheries Subsidies” Model to Energy Subsidies

Will the “Friends of Climate” Emerge in the WTO? The Prospects of Applying the “Fisheries Subsidies” Model to Energy Subsidies

An historical account of Brazilian public policy on fisheries subsidies

Abstract This paper presents a historical account of Brazilian public policy on fisheries subsidies, and a discussion of problems and limitations resulting from such policy. From the 1960s to the mid-1980s, public policies led to a great increase in fisheries catch without appropriate consideration for the long-term sustainability of the resources, resulting in declining catches over the years. The goals of current Brazilian public policy on fisheries will not help in reducing overexploitation. This is because these policies are too optimistic about the abundance of fish in Brazil's EEZ, and are not accompanied by a fisheries management plan that is likely to work.

WTO Disciplines and Fisheries Subsidies - Should the SCM Agreement" Be Modified?

This article considers the negotiations on a possible modification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) in relation to fisheries subsidies. The mandate for these negotiations was given by the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001. The current WTO regulations are deficient in that many subsidies do not meet certain criteria of the SCM Agreement. This is mainly due to the current definition of a subsidy, the requirements for specificity and the inadequate categorisation of "red box" and "amber box" subsidies. In order to address fisheries subsidies adequately, this article contends that the SCM Agreement must be changed. The United States, the European Community, several developing countries and Japan are actively discussing this issue. After examining the different proposals, the best solution seems to be to find a common categorisation for fisheries subsidies and to identify those which lead to over-capacity and over-fishing. Such subsides should be prohibited and named in an illustrative list. Furthermore, subsidies which are not reported to the WTO should be actionable. Any country which has not fulfilled its notification duties would have the burden of proving that these subsidies are consistent with the SCM Agreement. Under new WTO rules, subsidies which are beneficial for the environment should be permitted, such as subsidies for the retirement of fishing licences, the retraining of fishers and the scrapping of old vessels.

Trade Special Issue: Foreword

This foreword introduces four articles featured in this volume of the Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, all of which address trade law from diverse angles: Oliver Delvos "WTO Disciplines and Fisheries Subsidies – Should the SCM Agreement Be Modified?" (2005) 37 VUWLR 341; Thomas A Faunce, Kellie Johnston, and Hilary Bambrick "Trans-Tasman Therapeutic Products Authority: Potential AUSFTA Impacts on Safety and Cost-Effectiveness Regulation for Medicines and Medical Devices in New Zealand" (2005) 37 VUWLR 365; Jane Kelsey "Free Trade Agreements – Boon or Bane: Through the Lens of PACER" (2005) 37 VUWLR 391; and Nicholas Whittington "Reconsidering Domestic Sale of Goods Remedies in Light of CISG" (2005) 37 VUWLR 421.

Impact of using fishing boat fuel with high poly aromatic content on the emission of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons from the diesel engine

Because of the fishery subsidy policy, the fishing boat fuel oil (FBFO) exemption from commodity taxes, business taxes and air pollution control fees, resulted in the price of FBFO was ∼50% lower than premium diesel fuel (PDF) in Taiwan. It is estimated that ∼650,000 kL FBFO was illegally used by traveling diesel-vehicles (TDVs) with a heavy-duty diesel engine (HDDE), which accounted for ∼16.3% of the total diesel fuel consumed by TDVs. In this study, sulfur, poly aromatic and total-aromatic contents in both FBFO and PDF were measured and compared. Exhaust emissions of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and their carcinogenic potencies (BaP eq) from a HDDE under transient cycle testing for both FBFO and PDF were compared and discussed. Finally, the impact caused by the illegal use of FBFO on the air quality was examined. Results show that the mean sulfur-, poly aromatic and aromatic-contents in FBFO were 43.0, 3.89 and 1.04 times higher than that of PDF, respectively. Emission factors of total-PAHs and total-BaP eq obtained by utilizing FBFO were 51.5 and 0.235 mg L −1-Fuel, which were 3.41 and 5.82 times in magnitude higher than obtained by PDF, respectively. The estimated annual emissions of total-PAHs and total-BaP eq to the ambient environment due to the illegally used FBFO were 23.6 and 0.126 metric tons, respectively, which resulted in a 17.9% and a 25.0% increment of annual emissions from all mobile sources, respectively. These results indicated that the FBFO used illegally by TDVs had a significant impact on PAH emissions to the ambient environment.

The Emerging Architecture of a World Trade Organization Fisheries Subsidies Agreement and the Interests of Developing Coastal States

The Emerging Architecture of a World Trade Organization Fisheries Subsidies Agreement and the Interests of Developing Coastal States

Subsidies, buybacks, and sustainable fisheries

Most fisheries subsidies, which on a worldwide scale are immense, are probably detrimental to resource conservation. However, payments used to buy out excess fishing capacity are often represented as useful subsidies, on the grounds that overcapacity encourages overfishing and causes economic waste. Some commentators, on the other hand, assert that most buyback subsidies are ineffective because additional capacity tends to seep back into the fishery over time. In this paper we take the latter argument further, and demonstrate that buyback subsidies, if they come to be anticipated by fishermen, will generally have a negative effect on economic performance and resource conservation. Consequently, buyback subsidies are perhaps over-rated as a management tool.

The impact of subsidies upon fisheries management and sustainability: the case of the North Atlantic

AbstractThis paper provides both an estimate and assessment of subsidies in fisheries in the North Atlantic. The subsidies are estimated, on the basis of data taken from an OECD study and the Sea Around US Project database, to be in the order of US$ 2.0–2.5 billion per year. The assessment of the impact of the subsidies upon resource management and sustainability requires an examination of the underlying economics of subsidies in fisheries. There is general agreement, to which we subscribe, that fisheries subsidies do great harm by exacerbating the problems arising from the ‘common pool’ aspects of capture fisheries. Many economists, however, believe it that, if the ‘common pool’ aspects of a fishery could be removed by, for example, establishing a full‐fledged property rights system, the negative impact of fisheries subsidies would prove to be trivial.This paper demonstrates that the aforementioned comfortable belief is unfounded. Fisheries subsidies can be seriously damaging, even if the ‘common pool’ aspects of the fishery are removed. There is also a widely held belief among economists and government officials that subsidies used for vessel decommissioning schemes, far from being harmful, actually have a beneficial impact upon resource management and sustainability, or are at worst, neutral. About 20% of the fisheries subsidies in the North Atlantic are directed towards these purposes. In this paper, we argue that these seemingly beneficial subsides can, in fact, be highly negative in their impact.

Korea's fisheries industry and government financial transfers

Abstract The Korean fisheries industry has long played a role as a national food industry with agriculture. Fisheries products supply about 39.2% of animal proteins that Korean people need. The industry, however, is facing great challenges including international arguments for reduction or abolition of fishery subsidies. Therefore, it is urgent for us to review the characteristics of fishery subsidies according to WTO, OECD, FAO and UNEP. This paper examines the status of Korean fishery industry, and to tackle the problems of the currently supported fishery policy funds, whose total amount in 1999 was more than 1 trillion Korean won with 77 fishery projects.

Trade, Sustainability, and the WTO: Environmental Protection in the Hong Kong SAR

1. INTRODUCTION Environmental well-being affects human health. An important yardstick in measuring the environmental well-being of coastal states is the sustainability of fisheries. (1) A recent study has suggested that the world's fish catch might be much smaller than previously reported. (2) Nevertheless, the decline of world's fishery has become a matter of international concern. (3) As a coastal jurisdiction, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) is obliged to ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation. (4) Notwithstanding that the fishery sector is not substantial from a global economy aspect, the fishery sector has a major impact on some coastal nation states and fishery products are a major component in world trade. (5) The most important factors contributing to the depletion in fishery resources are environmentally harmful fishery subsidies and inadequate fishery management. (6) Fishery subsidies have partly contributed to the over-expansion of fishing boats, and, as a result, created excessive harvesting. (7) Inadequate fishery management includes lack of implementation and poor enforcement of environmental protection legislation regulating air and water pollution in ensuring a sustainable environment. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides sovereign rights over an exclusive economic zone to each coastal state. Every state has sovereign rights for the purpose of conserving and managing the marine resources and protecting and preserving the marine environment. (8) These measures are designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield. (9) The People's Republic of China (China) is a signatory state to the Convention. (10) As the HKSAR is now a special administrative region of China, it inevitably has a duty to honor the international obligations made between China and other members of the international community, as they apply to the HKSAR. (11) Accordingly, the HKSAR has to operate within the ambit of the UNCLOS, to which China is a signatory state. (12) The Basic Law of the HKSAR (Basic Law) authorizes the HKSAR to participate in relevant international organizations and to enter into international trade agreements on its own. (13) However, it also provides that the Central People's Government (CPG) shall be responsible for the foreign affairs relating to the HKSAR. (14) However, the CPG has to consult the HKSAR Government before such international agreements are extended to the Region. (15) International agreements made prior to resumption of exercise of sovereignty by China over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, remain unchanged. (16) These include the founding membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). International environmental law is a developing area in the HKSAR, which is subject to seventeen multilateral environmental agreements (MEA) dealing with water pollution and conservation as of December 200. (17) It was not until 1977 that an Environmental Protection Unit was established in the HKSAR. (18) Its powers, however, were merely supervisory. (19) This unit was upgraded to an Environmental Protection Agency in 1981. Finally, in 1986, the Environmental Protection Department was established and was empowered with pollution prevention and control measures. (20) While the then colonial administrative did not give environmental issues a high priority, (21) a number of these MEAs were made, including the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention). Although the HKSAR is allowed to exercise a high degree of autonomy, (22) it may not enter into any international agreement on its own other than trade agreements. …